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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation provides a comparative analysis of the foreign policies of the 
Arab Gulf monarchies during the period of 1971 to 1990, as examined through 
two case studies: (1) the Arab Gulf monarchies’ relations with Iran and Iraq and 
(2) the six states’ positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The dissertation argues that, in formulating their policies towards Iran and Iraq, 
the Arab Gulf monarchies aspired to realize four main objectives: external 
security and territorial integrity; domestic and regime stability; economic 
prosperity; and the attainment of a stable subregional balance of power without 
the emergence of Iran or Iraq as Gulf hegemon. Over the largest part of the 
period under review, the Arab Gulf monarchies managed to offset threats to 
these basic interests emanating from Iran and Iraq by alternately appeasing and 
balancing the source of the threat. The analysis reveals that the Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ individual bilateral relations with Iran and Iraq underwent 
considerable change over time and, particularly following the Iranian Revolution, 
displayed significant differences in comparison to one another. These 
developments are attributable to both disparities among Arab Gulf monarchies 
and change over time with respect to a variety of factors: geostrategic position, 
military strength, the existence of military aggression, territorial claims, 
subversive activities, or ideological challenges by either Iran or Iraq, the national 
and sectarian composition and ideological orientation of the population, and 
national economic orientation. 
The thesis reveals that the Arab Gulf monarchies’ policies in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict were mainly influenced by (1) identity/ideology, (2) religion, and (3) 
strategic considerations. In consequence, during the entire period under review, 
all Arab Gulf monarchies, although setting different priorities, shared an 
objective in the realization of following interests: the realization of Palestinian 
national rights, the return of occupied Arab lands, and the restoration of Muslim 
control over the holy places in Jerusalem; the guarantee of regime stability; the 
preservation of strategic relations with the United States; the containment of 
Soviet penetration into the Arab world; the maintenance of Arab unity 
dominated by moderate Arab forces; and the attainment of a holistic peace 
settlement supported by an Arab consensus. The analysis shows that the Arab 
Gulf monarchies succeeded in realizing most of these objectives. In addition, 
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the thesis highlights a significant rapprochement in the Arab Gulf monarchies’ 
individual policies in the Arab-Israeli conflict, a development most visible in the 
1980s. 
The dissertation identifies the Arab Gulf monarchies as a unit of state and 
regime entities with broadly similar interests and challenges and, despite a 
striking power disparity among themselves, inferiority in power status compared 
with and vulnerability to their neighbours. The similarity of both their objectives 
and constraints motivated and even required them to cooperate and coordinate 
in the foreign policy arena. As the analysis demonstrates, this cooperation and 
coordination increased during the timeframe under review, even when individual 
foreign policies diverged. 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Julia 
 
 6 
 
7 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I should like to express my deepest gratitude to several individuals without 
whose great help and support the completion of this dissertation would not have 
been possible. 
My thanks go to Prof. Dr. Martin Geyer, Professor of Modern and Contemporary 
History at Ludwig-Maximilians University of Munich, for encouraging me to 
pursue a doctorate and guiding me in the early phase of my dissertational work. 
I owe particular thanks to Prof. Gerd Nonneman, former Al-Qasimi Chair in Gulf 
studies at the University of Exeter, for the great confidence he put in me, one 
and a half years of exceptional supervision, and his continuing support after his 
departure for Doha. 
My great gratitude goes to Prof. Tim Niblock, Professor Emeritus at the 
University of Exeter’s Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, for his excellent 
supervision during the last one and a half years of my dissertation, his 
outstanding guidance and support, and his great kindness. 
I shall also like to thank Prof. Gene R. Garthwaite, Professor Emeritus of History 
at Dartmouth College, for all the advice and support he granted me years after I 
had the privilege to be his student. 
My explicit thanks go to my dear friend Ashwan Reddy for his efforts in drawing 
the brilliant maps that greatly enrich this dissertation. 
I am especially grateful to my parents. Without their constant support over the 
past three decades, I would not be where I am today. 
Last but not least, my indefinite gratitude is owed to Julia, for her unconditional 
love, her unfailing support, and her patience during the seemingly never-ending 
final phase of my dissertation work. 
8 
 
9 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 Page 
 
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................... 3 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS....................................................................................... 7 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................... 9 
List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................... 11 
1. Introduction and Conceptual Framework ................................................. 13 
1.1 Background ................................................................................... 13 
1.2 Rationale, Research Puzzle, and Scope ....................................... 17 
1.3 Literature Review........................................................................... 21 
1.4 Primary Source Material and Research Methods .......................... 28 
1.5 Foreign Policy Analysis ................................................................. 32 
2. The Arab Gulf Monarchies in 1971: Interests, Options, and 
Challenges............................................................................................... 47 
2.1 The Global International System, the Middle East, and the 
Gulf in 1971 ................................................................................... 49 
2.2 The Arab Gulf Monarchies in 1971: Material Capabilities.............. 55 
2.3 The Arab Gulf Monarchies in 1971: The Domestic Realm............. 67 
2.4 The Arab Gulf Monarchies in 1971: Foreign Policy Interests......... 85 
2.5 The Arab Gulf Monarchies in 1971: Non-Material 
Capabilities and Weaknesses ....................................................... 87 
2.6 Overview of Key Domestic and Environmental Changes, 
1971-1990 ..................................................................................... 88 
3. The Relationship of the Arab Gulf Monarchies with Iran and Iraq, 
1971-1990 ............................................................................................... 95 
3.1 The Pre-1971 Era .......................................................................... 96 
3.2 From the British Withdrawal to the Algiers Accord....................... 133 
3.3 From the Algiers Accord to the Iranian Revolution ...................... 162 
3.4 From the Iranian Revolution to the End of the Iran-Iraq War ....... 186 
3.5 From the End of the Iran-Iraq War to the Invasion of Kuwait ....... 239 
3.6 Chapter Conclusion ..................................................................... 253 
4. The Position of the Arab Gulf Monarchies in the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict, 1971-1990................................................................................ 263 
4.1 The Pre-1971 Era ........................................................................ 267 
4.2 Britain’s Withdrawal, the October War, and the Use of the 
Oil Weapon.................................................................................. 290 
10 
4.3 Camp David and Egypt’s Expulsion from the Arab League ......... 319 
4.4 The Fahd Plan and Egypt’s Return to the Arab Fold ................... 344 
4.5 The First Intifada and Oman’s Change of Policy ......................... 359 
4.6 Chapter Conclusion ..................................................................... 363 
5. General Conclusion and Outlook........................................................... 367 
APPENDIX ....................................................................................................... 375 
Map 1: The Arab Gulf Monarchies in 1971 ............................................ 375 
Map 2: The Arab Gulf Monarchies in 1990 ............................................ 376 
Map 3: Giant Oil Fields in the Gulf ......................................................... 377 
Map 4: Warba and Bubiyan Island......................................................... 378 
Map 5: Abu Musa and the Tunb Islands ................................................ 378 
Permission for Use of Third Party Copyright Material ............................ 379 
BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................... 381 
  11 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ACC  Arab Cooperation Council 
ADDF  Abu Dhabi Defence Force 
ALF  Arab Liberation Front 
ANM  Arab National Movement 
AOI  Arab Organisation for Industrialisation 
ARMCO Arabian American Oil Company 
BAPCO Bahrain Petroleum Company 
CMAGSAP  Conference of Ministers of Agriculture of the Gulf States and 
Arabian Peninsula 
DFLP  Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
DLF  Dhofar Liberation Front 
FPA  Foreign Policy Analysis 
GCC  Gulf Cooperation Council 
GOIC  Gulf Organisation for Industrial Consulting 
ILO  International Labour Organisation 
IR  International Relations 
KD  Kuwaiti Dinar 
NDFLOAG National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the 
Arabian Gulf 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation 
NLF  National Liberation Front (Yemen) 
NPMP  Nixon Presidential Materials Project 
OIC  Organisation of Islamic Conference 
PDFLP Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
PDRY  People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen 
PFLO  Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman 
PFLOAG Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf 
(later renamed Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the 
Arabian Gulf) 
PFLP  Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
PFLP-GC Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command 
PLF  Palestine Liberation Front 
PLO  Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
PNF  Palestine National Fund 
PPSF  Palestinian Popular Struggle Front 
PRSY  People’s Republic of South Yemen 
  12 
QPC  Qatar Petroleum Company 
RSC  Regional Security Complex 
RSCT  Regional Security Complex Theory 
RSSC  Regional Security Subcomplex 
SAF  Sultan of Oman’s Armed Forces 
SPA  Saudi Press Agency 
TAP  Trans Arabian Pipeline System 
TNC  Transnational Corporation 
UAE  United Arab Emirates 
UAR  United Arab Republic 
UDF  Union Defence Force (UAE) 
UK  United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
UN  United Nations 
U.S.  United States of America 
  13 
1. INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
1.1 Background 
This is a study of the foreign policy patterns of a subset of states in the Middle 
East region, over a period that saw great change subregionally, regionally, and 
internationally. This juxtaposition, these states’ particular features and rapid 
evolution – contrasting them with most of those around and indeed with other 
developing states –, and the comparative material all this provides us with at the 
domestic, regional, and global levels, combine to make for a tempting focus of 
conceptual/comparative stud y. The fact that this set of states, and this ‘theatre,’ 
remain somewhat less than well-served in conceptual investigation seemed 
justification enough for starting the current thesis. I hope it will illuminate both 
the dynamics of policy and of regional patterns in the region in question as well 
as a number of questions in the field of International Relations. 
The aftermath of the Second World War witnessed the emergence of the Middle 
East as a region of particular global relevance, both politically and 
economically. The foundation of the State of Israel in 1948 triggered a 
significant escalation of the Arab-Jewish conflict that, over the course of the 
next decades, saw a series of devastating wars, displaced millions from their 
homes, created a vast area of constant insecurity, and established a permanent 
presence both in the minds of peoples and on political agendas within and 
without the Middle East. Far from being regionally confined, the manifold 
repercussions of the Arab-Israeli conflict transgress the geographical 
boundaries of the Middle East to this day. 
The ideological confrontation of the Cold War that rapidly unfolded following the 
defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan manifested itself emphatically in the 
Middle East and soon drove a wedge between pro-Western and pro-Soviet 
regimes. Early on, the Middle East became one of the most fiercely contested 
world regions in the postwar bipolarity. 
The rise of Arab nationalism created yet another ideological front line among 
polities in the region, raising questions of regime legitimacy among peoples in 
the Middle East, and turned large parts of the region into the theatre of a 
second, parallel Arab Cold War. Due to the instrumentalisation of the conflict by 
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the world’s two superpowers to their own regional and global strategic 
advantage, in form of the U.S. support for conservative monarchical regimes 
and the Soviet assistance to their Arab nationalist antagonists, regional, intra-
Arab, and global aspirations for influence, power, and dominance became 
closely intertwined. 
The discovery and subsequent exploitation of vast oil fields coupled with the 
swiftly rising global demand for the natural resource further escalated the 
Middle East’s global economic, political, and strategic significance and 
generated a fast growing dependency particularly of Western industrial nations 
on previously poor developing countries. 
Within the greater Middle East the Gulf subregion1 soon rose to particular 
importance in intra-regional and global matters. For one thing, this was due to 
the Gulf’s geostrategic position as neuralgic junction between North and East 
Africa, the Levant, South-East Europe, the Caucasus, as well as South and 
Central Asia. Second, the Gulf turned out to be the location of the world’s 
largest and easily exploitable oil deposits, adding up to 60 percent of the world’s 
known resources. Third, the Gulf subregion was the home of the core power of 
Arab political conservatism, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as well as the 
mightiest Middle Eastern monarchy, Iran, and later saw the rise of a vastly 
powerful and progressive Arab nationalist and antimonarchical rival to the other 
two, Saudi Arabia and Iran’s common neighbour state Iraq. Fourth, whilst on 
first sight of minor significance to the main contesters of the global Cold War, 
the Gulf subregion is the place of origin and the home of the holiest sites of 
Islam – including the most important Shiite shrines – as well as the 
geographical point of intersection of the Sunni-Shiite denominational divide. 
Fifth, the northern Gulf constitutes the geographical intersection of the 
lebensraum of four ethnicities: Arabs, Kurds, Persians, and Turks. With political 
borders not paralleling sectarian and ethnic fault lines, the Gulf has long been a 
conflict prone subregion influencing and repeatedly radiating instability to 
neighbouring (sub-)regions. 
                                            
1 There exists a controversy regarding the proper designation of the Gulf, with respect to both 
the body of water and the subregion. The terms Arabian Gulf and Persian Gulf are seen to imply 
a political statement with regard to Arabian or Persian/Iranian actual or historic entitlement to 
nautical and subregional dominance. In this dissertation, both the body of water and the 
subregion are neutrally referred to as the Gulf in order to prevent any unintended connotation. 
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For more than twenty years the Gulf subregion had been only a side show in 
the global Cold War as well as a power-political relict of the fading pre-war era. 
The United Kingdom’s historic political and military dominance had shaped the 
international relations of the Gulf and had by and large secured the 
safeguarding of Western regional interests. The UK’s landmark decision in early 
1968 to leave the Gulf within four years then meant a significant alteration to the 
subregional status quo and prompted essential questions regarding the design 
of the post-British era in the Gulf. A subregional power vacuum followed by a 
struggle for dominance and overall instability was to be expected. With the 
United Kingdom leaving the Gulf stage not only regional powers saw an 
opportunity to widen their influence; the Soviet Union and the United States also 
attempted to enlarge their spheres of influence to the Gulf. Although it never 
became as highly a contested (sub-)region as others, such as Southeast Asia, 
the Gulf saw rising superpower contestation in the aftermath of Britain’s 
decision to withdraw its political and military presence. 
Hence, while the Gulf had been an area of great regional and global political 
and economic importance already prior to 1971, the two decades following the 
British withdrawal witnessed a continuous rise in the Gulf subregion’s 
international significance. For one thing, the two oil price crises of 1973 and 
1979/80 fell into this period, both with tremendous repercussions on the 
(Western) world economy. The rapidly rising oil prices and the stabilisation of 
the same at a high level in combination with the simultaneous constant increase 
in the Western economies’ oil demand until the early 1980s generated a 
remarkable increase in the Gulf’s relevance in global affairs. The Carter doctrine 
of January 1980 emphasised the vital importance of the Gulf in U.S. strategic 
and predominantly economic interest. The U.S. administration’s sharp rhetoric 
went to such lengths that it overtly threatened the Soviet Union with war should 
it attempt to actively change the status quo in the Gulf to the United States’ 
disadvantage. 
The oil crisis of 1973/74 not only initialised a significant shift in the oil producers’ 
power in relation to the importing nations and influence on the latter’s 
economies, it also evoked a permanent change in the intra-Arab balance of 
power. Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser degree, the smaller Arab Gulf monarchies, 
were able to translate their soaring economic strength into influence over other 
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Arab states, not least their former adversary Egypt. This allowed Saudi Arabia 
to effect a substantial alteration in the Middle Eastern Cold War alignment by 
inducing the Egyptian change of camps, from the Soviet to the U.S. side, in 
1972. 
In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 the 
Saudi government played an essential role in creating, staffing, arming, and 
training the Afghan mujahedeen and supporting their guerrilla war against the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. In doing so, Saudi Arabia contributed 
substantially to the Soviet Union’s lengthy and costly military campaign and 
their eventual humiliating defeat in Afghanistan, a weighty ingredient in the 
ultimate collapse of the superpower and the end of the Cold War. 
A few years earlier, the Iranian Revolution had severely shaken the status quo 
in the Gulf and had brought to power a regime the consequences of whose 
policies transgress the subregional sphere to this day, the disputes about the 
Iranian nuclear programme being one of them. In 1979, the United States lost 
an important regional ally and thus forfeited influence in the Gulf. In the course 
of the subsequent Iran-Iraq War, however, the United States for the first time 
managed to project directly its military power to the Gulf by dispatching navy 
units to safeguard the oil export routes through the Gulf waterways against 
Iranian attacks. This significant extension of the token military presence the 
U.S. Navy had maintained in Bahrain since the end of World War II set the 
grounds for the United States’ following markedly expanded power status in the 
Gulf. 
The Second Gulf War of 1990/91 then was the first piece of evidence for the 
dawn of a new post-Cold War era in global international relations. For the first 
time in its history the UN Security Council authorised military sanctions and a 
U.S.-led international coalition of 34 states, including the former Eastern block 
state of Czechoslovakia, liberated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Operations 
Desert Shield and particularly Desert Storm were made possible by the new 
U.S.-Soviet rapprochement, clearly displayed the United States’ unparalleled 
military power, and heralded the subsequent U.S. supremacy as the world’s 
only remaining superpower. 
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The foundation of another world changing development was laid out in political 
decisions taken in and at least partially with respect to the Gulf during the two 
decades following Britain’s withdrawal. The aforementioned very significant, 
multifaceted support of the Afghan mujahedeen, predominantly on part of Saudi 
Arabia, in the 1980s sowed the seeds for a development that saw its 
culmination point in the attacks on September 11, 2001 and the ensuing so 
called global war on terror. The U.S. military show of force and its sweeping 
victory over Iraq in 1991, the subsequent UN sanctions against the Saddam 
regime, and the permanent U.S. military presence in the Gulf, too, were 
essential ingredients in the rise of anti-Western and particularly anti-U.S. 
sentiments. 
For decades the Gulf has been a subregion whose manifold developments 
have had tremendous impact on a supraregional and global scale. The period 
of 1971 to 1990 was not only characterised by events of immediate significance 
it also saw the beginning of developments whose interim outcomes range 
among the most relevant matters in today’s international affairs. The six Arab 
monarchies of the Gulf, above all the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, were caught in 
the middle of these developments and often crucially shaped them. 
1.2 Rationale, Research Puzzle, and Scope 
This dissertation provides a comparative analysis of the foreign policies of the 
founding states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates2 – during the period 
of 1971 to 1990, as examined through two case studies. The initial hypothesis, 
which guided the researcher’s approach, was that over the course of the two 
decades under examination the six Arab Gulf monarchies’ foreign policy 
positions displayed a gradual rapprochement to one another. This development 
was attributed to (1) the identity of the six states’ foreign policy strategies and 
(2) developments on national, subregional, regional, and international levels. 
The latter gradually brought about greater conformity in the states’ perceptions 
of their interests, and particularly in their threat perceptions. The diverging 
                                            
2 In the following referred to as Arab Gulf monarchies. The adjective Arab in the term Arab Gulf 
monarchies is not meant to clarify the word Gulf but the word monarchies. Hence, the term Arab 
Gulf monarchies is to be read as Arab monarchies of the Gulf, not monarchies of the Arab Gulf. 
The addition of the adjective Arab is essential in order to clearly define the respective group of 
states. This is true due to the fact that, until 1979, Persian Iran was also a Gulf monarchy. 
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effects of the differing historic, socio-political, and geostrategic characteristics of 
the Arab Gulf monarchies were mitigated. However, the research has shown 
that developments were more complex than this, and that in fact while there 
was convergence in one critical field, there was also divergence in another such 
field. 
The thesis contends that the fundamental guideline of the Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ foreign policies was the consistent application of an omnibalancing 
strategy.3 This omnibalancing strategy was determined to maximise both 
national security against outside threats and regime stability against 
oppositional tendencies.4 The formulation of national foreign policy can be seen 
as the strategic response to an individual set of domestic and foreign threats to 
and opportunities for the realisation of the regime’s interests. 
This dissertation stands out from previous studies in two respects: the period 
and the subject matter under review. The time frame of this analysis ranges 
from Great Britain’s political and military disengagement from the Gulf region in 
1971 to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, two events that had a 
lasting significance on the Arab Gulf monarchies’ security-political positions. 
Unlike previous country or policy field specific analyses this study identifies 
basic foreign and security policy maxims of all six Arab Gulf monarchies, 
highlights similarities and differences in the actual individual foreign policies, 
traces change over time, and discloses the underlying reasons for these 
alterations. By providing both a classification of foreign policies and an analysis 
of a specific historical constellation, the dissertation lies at the intersection of the 
academic disciplines of International Relations and Contemporary History. 
The starting point of this study is a survey of the Arab Gulf monarchies’ foreign 
policy interests and options as well as the main challenges to the survival of the 
                                            
3 The term omnibalancing was coined by the political scientist Steven R. David in his essay 
“Explaining Third World Alignment.” David argued here that Third World states do not only 
encounter external threats for their national security but also internal threats for the survival of 
their regimes. This fact, according to David’s argument, forces the states to balance internal and 
external threats. The omnibalancing theory symbolises an advancement of the balance of 
power theory, which is limited to the balancing of external threats to the national security. See 
Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1991), pp. 
233-56. 
4 The term security is understood in the light of the negative security concept. In this regard, 
security means the absence of a military threat or a state’s protection from attacks and coups, 
respectively. 
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individual states and regimes at the outset of the timeframe under review. 
Taking into account domestic and external dynamics the chapter will highlight in 
which way social, cultural, religious, economic, geostrategic, military, and 
political factors determined the foreign policies of the Arab Gulf monarchies in 
1971. To this end, the survey will first examine the nature of the Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ global, regional, and subregional environment. In this context, I will 
show how the six states were affected by the confrontation between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, the end of the British hegemony in the Gulf, and 
interregional dynamics. The Arab Gulf monarchies were caught in between two 
parallel conflicts for power expansion: the East West conflict as well as Iran and 
Iraq’s competitive struggle for subregional hegemony. The bulk of the chapter 
will then be devoted to the scrutiny of the Arab Gulf monarchies’ military and 
economic capabilities as well as key domestic characteristics and dynamics. 
The chapter concludes with a brief section introducing domestic and 
environmental changes between 1971 and 1990 that had particular influence on 
the Arab Gulf monarchies’ foreign policies. 
The ensuing two chapters will then be devoted to the analysis of two pivotal, 
intertwined foreign policy case studies. 
The Relationship of the Arab Gulf Monarchies with Iran and Iraq 
In this chapter, I will argue that in formulating their policies towards Iran and Iraq 
the Arab Gulf monarchies aspired to realise four main objectives: external 
security and territorial integrity; domestic and regime stability; economic 
prosperity; and the attainment of a stable subregional balance of power without 
the emergence of Iran or Iraq as Gulf hegemon. Over the largest part of the 
period under review the Arab Gulf monarchies managed to offset threats to 
these basic interests emanating from Iran and Iraq by alternately appeasing and 
balancing the source of the threat. The only significant failure to do so occurred 
in the summer of 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The analysis will reveal that 
the Arab Gulf monarchies’ individual bilateral relations with Iran and Iraq 
underwent considerable change over time and, particularly following the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979, displayed significant differences in comparison to one 
another. These developments are attributable to both disparities among Arab 
Gulf monarchies and change over time with respect to a variety of factors: 
geostrategic position, military strength, the existence of military aggression, 
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territorial claims, subversive activities, or ideological challenges by either Iran or 
Iraq, the national and sectarian composition and ideological orientation of the 
population, and national economic orientation. 
The Position of the Arab Gulf Monarchies in the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
This chapter identifies the Arab-Israeli conflict as such and the necessity to 
publicly position themselves in regard to this conflict as a particular challenge to 
both the Arab Gulf monarchies’ external security and the stability of their 
regimes. In case of an armed conflict the Arab Gulf monarchies would have to 
expect a variety of direct and indirect security threats. Much more problematic, 
however, was the increasing political quandary the Arab Gulf monarchies have 
been faced with. They have been caught between their common Arab-Islamic 
identity and the increasingly intensified relationship with the United States. This 
chapter will highlight that the Arab Gulf monarchies succeeded to the greatest 
extent in meeting the expectations of their own people without undermining the 
strategically and economically important relationship to the Israel-friendly United 
States. This achievement will be attributed to an astute, balanced policy 
conducted by the Arab Gulf monarchies. In addition, I will show that the 
positions of the Arab Gulf monarchies as a group changed during the period 
under review from a rather confrontational to a more cooperative approach. In 
doing so, the remaining five states’ positions displayed a convergence with the 
previously distinct Omani stance. The same counts for the perceptions of and 
the relations with the Palestinian liberation movement. 
Two pivotal questions will be asked in both case studies: 
First, to what extent did the Arab Gulf monarchies’ foreign policies show a 
rapprochement to one another and what were the reasons for this 
development? 
The Arab Gulf monarchies’ individual policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict 
showed significant rapprochement during the timeframe under review. This was 
clearest in the 1980s when Oman’s position converged with those of the 
remaining states. The case of the six states’ individual policies towards and 
their relations with Iran and Iraq was more complex: an initial trend of gradual 
rapprochement was stopped by the Iranian Revolution and, particularly 
following the Iran-Iraq War’s initial phase, the Arab Gulf monarchies’ policies 
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showed significant divergence. Both convergence among policies in one field 
and divergence in the other were induced by external developments. In the 
case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, these developments led to a greater conformity 
in interests and threat perceptions. From 1979 onwards, alterations in the 
subregional status quo had the opposite effect. Due to differences in their 
historic, geopolitical, societal, and economic characteristics, the Arab Gulf 
monarchies faced different and varying degrees of challenges to their policy 
interests emanating from Iran and Iraq. Consequently, the Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ individual policies towards and relations with the two states varied. 
Second, to what degree did the Arab Gulf monarchies cooperate and 
coordinate with each other in the field of foreign policy? 
The analysis will show that, compared to other states in their subregional and 
regional environment, the Arab Gulf monarchies constituted a unit of state and 
regime entities with broadly similar interests and challenges. Despite a striking 
power disparity among themselves, all six states were inferior in power status 
and consequently vulnerable to most of their neighbours. The similarity of both 
their objectives and constraints motivated and even required them to cooperate 
and coordinate in the foreign policy arena. As the analysis will demonstrate, this 
cooperation and coordination increased during the timeframe under review, 
even when individual foreign policies diverged. However, the six states did not 
attribute an intrinsic normative value to cooperation and coordination among 
each other. Cooperation and coordination in the field of foreign policy were 
merely the result of rational decisions taken by regimes with similar interests 
and inadequate capabilities to realise these objectives on their own. 
1.3 Literature Review 
This dissertation provides a comparative analysis of the Arab Gulf monarchies’ 
foreign and security policy between 1971 and 1990. Following Barry Buzan and 
Ole Wæver’s Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), formulated in their 
book Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security,5 these six 
countries are to be seen as units in a regional security subcomplex (RSSC) that 
also included Iran and Iraq. The RSSC Gulf itself constitutes a subunit of the 
                                            
5 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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greater Regional Security Complex (RSC) Middle East, which comprises the 
entire Arab world, Persian Iran, Israel, and Turkey. 
When formulating their foreign policy the countries under review do so as 
Middle East, Arab, and Gulf states. A proper analysis of the Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ foreign policy, therefore, has to begin with a comparative 
contextual study of Middle East and Arab states foreign policy. In this context, a 
number of excellent publications shall be mentioned. Bahgat Korany’s and Ali 
Dessouki’s edited volume The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge 
of Change6 provides both a theoretical framework, here Paul Noble’s “The Arab 
System: Pressures, Constraints, and Opportunities” deserves particular 
mention, and a series of case studies including one on Saudi Arabia by Bahgat 
Korany himself.7 Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami’s edited 
volume “The Foreign Policies of Middle East States”8 provides an analytical 
framework of the Middle East states’ foreign policymaking, an analysis of the 
Middle East regional system’s evolution within the context of the international 
system as well a number of country case studies, including a study on Saudi 
Arabia by F. Gregory Gause, III.9 In “The International Politics of the Middle 
East,” published in 2003, Raymond Hinnebusch presents a revised and more 
detailed analysis, based on his two introductory chapters published in the 
volume edited with Anoushiravan Ehteshami.10 Hinnebusch’s approach is 
based on the IR theory of realism, modified by structuralist, constructivist, and 
pluralist assumptions. While agreeing with the realist assumptions that the 
international system is anarchical in nature, that states are the main actors in 
international relations, and that the regional order is predominantly 
characterised by balance of power processes, Hinnebusch emphasises the 
impact of both the so called core-periphery relations on the development of the 
                                            
6 Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The 
Challenge of Change, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press, 
1991). 
7 Bahgat Korany, “Defending the Faith amid Change: The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia,” in 
idem and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of 
Change, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 310-53. 
8 Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Middle 
East States, (Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner, 2002). 
9 F. Gregory Gause, III., “The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia,” in Raymond Hinnebusch and 
Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (Boulder, CO, and 
London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 193-211. 
10 Raymond Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press and New York: Palgrave, 2003). 
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regional political system as well as contemporary foreign policymaking 
processes and the competition between national, sub-national, and supra-
national identities on state formation and state sovereignty. Fred Halliday’s “The 
Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology” provides a 
theoretical analysis of the international relations of and foreign policymaking in 
the Middle East.11 Following an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses 
of four other theoretical approaches (historical analysis; realism; foreign policy 
analysis (FPA); and ideologies, perceptions and norms), Halliday advocates 
historical and international sociology with its emphasis on analysing the 
establishment and maintenance of institutions, particularly the state, as 
theoretical concept to best explain the international relations of the Middle East. 
With regard to foreign policymaking, Halliday emphasises the internal 
(bureaucratic interests, public opinion, state capacity, and norms) and external 
constraints leaders of Middle East states are confronted with. Finally, Gerd 
Nonneman’s introductory chapters to his edited volume “Analyzing Middle East 
Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe” deserve particular 
mention.12 Advocating a “complex model of international politics”, Nonneman 
argues that any explanation of international relations needs to be both “multi-
level and multi-causal,” thus taking into account “domestic political factors and 
dynamics.”13 The analysis of “contextuality” is seen as absolute inevitability in 
explaining foreign policy behaviour.14 
Beside studies focusing primarily on the greater Middle East RSC, there is a 
multitude of publications dealing particularly with the political development in 
the Gulf subregion. The academic interest in the subregion, not least due to its 
global strategic relevance, however, has been subject to considerable 
fluctuations over the past decades. During and immediately after conflicts and 
crises of supra-regional or even global scale such as the Oil Price Crisis of 
1973/74, the Islamic Revolution of 1979 as well as the First and the Second 
Gulf War, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the 2003 Iraq War followed by Iraq’s 
fall into chaos, one can observe an increase in the number of publications. 
                                            
11 Fred Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 1-72. 
12 Gerd Nonneman (ed.), Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship with 
Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 2005). 
13 Ibid, p. 9. 
14 Ibid. 
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Regarding the international relations of the Gulf subregion F. Gregory Gause’s 
brilliant account “The International Relations of the Persian Gulf” is particularly 
worth mentioning.15 W. Taylor Fain’s book “American Ascendance and British 
Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region” delivers an analysis of the international 
relations in the Gulf region until 1972 with a special focus on the roles played by 
the United Kingdom and the United States.16 Shahram Chubin’s “The 
International Politics of the Persian Gulf” provides an analysis of developments 
up to the year 1976.17 Trevor Mostyn’s “Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq and 
the Arabian Peninsula, 1945-1990” comes up with an excellent overview of the 
political events in the entire Gulf region as well as a detailed chronology.18 
Literature that deals explicitly with the Arab Gulf monarchies’ foreign policy 
focuses mainly on Saudi Arabia.19 There are few monographs on the smaller 
Arab Gulf monarchies’ foreign policies.20 Regarding specific topics one can, 
                                            
15 F. Gregory Gause, III., The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
16 W. Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region 
(Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
17 Shahram Chubin, “The International Politics of the Persian Gulf,” British Journal of 
International Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1976), pp. 216-30. 
18 Trevor Mostyn, Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, 1945-1990 
(New York: Facts on File, 1991). 
19 See, inter alia, Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi 
Arabia, the Military Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1984); Adeed Dawisha, Saudi-Arabien und seine Sicherheitspolitik 
(Munich: Bernhard & Graefe, 1981); Korany, “Defending the Faith;” Safran Nadav, Saudi 
Arabia: Ceaseless Quest for Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); J. E. 
Peterson, Saudi Arabia and the Illusion of Security (London: The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 2002); William B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, 
Security, and Oil (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981); and Louis Turner and James 
Bedore, “Saudi Arabia: The Power of the Purse-Strings,” International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 3 
(1978), pp. 405-20. 
20 See Hassan Hamdan Al-Alkim, The GCC States in an Unstable World: Foreign-Policy 
Dilemmas of Small States (London: Saqi Books, 1994); Idem, The Foreign Policy of the United 
Arab Emirates (London: Saqi Books, 1989); Majid Al-Khalili, Oman’s Foreign Policy: Foundation 
and Practice (Westport, CT, and London: Praeger Security International, 2009); Abdul-Reda 
Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy: City-State in World Politics (Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and 
London: Westview Press, 1990); Anthony H. Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the UAE: 
Challenges of Security (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); Idem with Khalid A. Rodhan, Gulf 
Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Warfare, Volume One: Overview and Northern Gulf 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007); Anthony H. Cordesman with Khalid A. Rodhan, Gulf Military 
Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Warfare, Volume Two: GCC & Southern Gulf (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 2007); Anthony H. Cordesman, Kuwait: Recovery and Security After the Gulf War 
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997); and Joseph A. Kechichian, Oman and the World: The 
Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1995). 
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however, resort to a number of articles mostly published in political science 
journals.21 
There is an extensive number of studies that focus on the relationship between 
the Arab Gulf monarchies and the United States. Similarly, the majority of these 
analyses deals with Saudi Arabia.22 Additional information can be found in 
surveys on U.S. foreign policy that put the emphasis on the Gulf or the Middle 
East.23 The same applies for the relationship between the Arab Gulf monarchies 
and the Soviet Union.24 
                                            
21 See, inter alia, Abdulla Baabood, “Dynamics and Determinants of the GCC States’ Foreign 
Policy, with Special Reference to the EU,” in Gerd Nonneman (ed.), Analyzing Middle East 
Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 
pp. 145-73. 
22 Inter alia Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr., “Saudi Arabia Faces the 1980s: Saudi Security Problems 
and American Interests,” Fletcher Forum (1981), pp. 243-77; Naif bin Hethlain, Saudi Arabia 
and the US since 1962: Allies in Conflict (London: Saqi Books, 2010); Rachel Bronson, Thicker 
Than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006); Nathan J. Citino, From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa’ud, and the 
Making of U.S.-Saudi Relations (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 
2002); Vo Xuan Han, Oil, the Persian Gulf States, and the United States (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 1994); Parker T. Hart, Saudi Arabia and the United States: Birth of a Security 
Partnership (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998); John P. 
Miglietta, American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1992: Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002); Aaron David Miller, Search for Security: Saudi Arabian 
Oil and American Foreign Policy, 1939-1949 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1980); Emile A. Nakhleh, The United States and Saudi Arabia: A Policy Analysis 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975); and Robert 
Vitalis, America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2007). 
23 Inter alia Acharya Amitav, US Military Strategy in the Gulf (London and New York: Routledge, 
1989); Andrew Fenton Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, “Bound to Follow? 
Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 106, No. 3 
(1991), pp. 391-410; Richard K. Herrmann, “The Middle East and the New World Order: 
Rethinking U.S. Political Strategy after the Gulf War,” International Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 
(1991), pp. 42-75; Robert H. Johnson, “The Persian Gulf in U.S. Strategy: A Skeptical View,” 
International Security, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1989), pp. 122-60; Charles A. Kupchan, “American 
Globalism in the Middle East: The Roots of Regional Security Policy,” Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 103, No. 4 (1988/89), pp. 585-611; Joseph Malone, “America and the Arabian 
Peninsula: The First Two Hundred Years,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 30, No. 3 (1976), pp. 406-
24; David D. Newsom, “America Engulfed,” Foreign Policy, Vol.  43 (1981), pp. 17-32; Michael 
A. Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expending Role in the Persian Gulf, 
1833-1992 (New York: The Free Press, 1992); Stephen C. Pelletiere, Douglas V. Johnson, II, 
and Leif R. Rosenberger, Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle East (Carlisle Barracks, 
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990); Barry Rubin, “Drowning in the 
Gulf,” Foreign Policy, Vol. 69 (1987/88), pp. 120-34, Hussein Sirriyeh, US Policy in the Gulf, 
1968-1977: Aftermath of British Withdrawal (London: Ithaca Press, 1984); Janice Gross Stein, 
“The Wrong Strategy in the Right Place: The United States in the Gulf,” International Security, 
Vol. 13, No. 3 (1988/89), pp. 142-67; and Michael Sterner, “Navigating the Gulf,” Foreign Policy, 
Vol. 81 (1990/91), 39-52. 
24 Inter alia Shahram Chubin, “Gains for Soviet Policy in the Middle East,” International 
Security, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1982), pp. 122-52; M. S. El Azhary, “The Attitudes of the Superpowers 
towards the Gulf War,” International Affairs, Vol.  59, No. 4 (1983), pp. 609-20; Robert O. 
Freedman, “Patterns of Soviet Policy toward the Middle East,” Annals of the American Academy 
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There are several studies on the relationship between the Arab Gulf 
monarchies and Iran and Iraq before and during the period under review.25 In 
this regard, general analyses of the foreign policy of Iran and Iraq can also be 
taken under consideration.26 The relationship between Kuwait and Iraq is 
especially surveyed in studies on the Second Gulf War 1990/91.27 
Rosemarie Said Zahlan’s study “Palestine and the Gulf States: The Presence at 
the Table” presents a sound analysis of the Arab Gulf monarchies’ relationship 
to the ‘state’ of Palestine.28 Furthermore, a number of papers have been 
published in political science journals that scrutinise the stance of the Arab Gulf 
                                                                                                                                
of Political and Social Science, Vol. 482 (Changing Patterns of Power in the Middle East, 1985), 
pp. 40-64; Fred Halliday, Soviet Policy in the Arc of Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy 
Studies, 1981); Howard Milton Hensel, Soviet Policy in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1975 
(Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1977); Mark N. Katz, Russia & Arabia: Soviet 
Foreign Policy toward the Arabian Peninsula (Baltimore, MD, and London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986); Melvyn Pryer, A View from the Rimland: An Appraisal of Soviet 
Interests and Involvement in the Gulf (Durham: University of Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern 
and Islamic Studies, 1981); Carol R. Saivetz, The Soviet Union and the Gulf in the 1980s 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989); and Erica Schoenberger and Stephanie Reich, “Soviet 
Policy in the Middle East,” MERIP Reports, No. 39 (1975), 3-28. 
25 Inter alia Faisal bin Salman Al-Saud, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Power Politics in Transition 
1968-1971 (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003); Saeed M. Badeeb, Saudi-Iranian 
Relations, 1932-1982 (London: Centre for Arab and Iranian Studies and Echoes, 1993); 
Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order: Iran and 
Saudi Arabia in the Balance of Power in the Gulf (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996); Henner Fürtig, Iran's Rivalry 
with Saudi Arabia between the Gulf Wars (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2002); Khair el-Din Haseeb 
(ed.), Arab-Iranian Relations (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1998); Tim Niblock, “Iraqi 
Policies towards the Arab States of the Gulf, 1958-1981,” in idem (ed.), Iraq: The Contemporary 
State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), pp. 125-49; Gerd Nonneman, Iraq, the Gulf States, 
and the War: A Changing Relationship 1980-1986 and Beyond (Atlantic Heights, NJ, and 
London: Ithaca Press, 1986); and Idem, “The Gulf States and the Iran-Iraq War: Pattern Shifts 
and Continuities,” in Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick (eds.) Iran, Iraq and the Legacy of 
War (New York: Palgrave, 2004), pp. 167-92. 
26 Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State in a 
Zone of Great-Power Conflict (Berkeley, CA and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1974); Christin Marshall, Iran's Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeni to Khatami (London and 
New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); and Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-
1973: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of 
Virginia, 1975). 
27 Inter alia Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1993); Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb, War in the Gulf 1990-1991 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Judith Miller and Laurie Mylroie, Saddam Hussein 
and the Crisis in the Gulf (New York: Times Books, 1990); and Harry Summers, On Strategy II: 
A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (New York: Dell, 1992). 
28 Rosemarie Said Zahlan, Palestine and the Gulf States: The Presence at the Table (New 
York: Routledge, 2009). Compare also Gawdat G. Bahgat, Israel and the Persian Gulf: 
Retrospect and Prospect (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2006); and Rashid Khalidi 
and Camille Mansour (eds.), Palestine and the Gulf (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 
1982). 
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monarchies in the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
respectively.29 
Despite the fact that this dissertation does not feature a separate, detailed 
analysis of the Arab Gulf monarchies’ oil policies during the timeframe under 
review it will repeatedly be necessary to dwell on the Gulf States’ positions in 
this particular foreign/economic policy field. The underlying reason for this is 
that due to the omnibalancing character of their foreign policies oil policy can 
not be treated as a separate realm but has to be understood as closely 
intertwined with other foreign policy fields. Due to its global economic relevance 
the Arab Gulf monarchies’ oil policy of the recent decades has always drawn 
significant attention in the academic community. As initially mentioned, the 1973 
Oil Price Crisis, the Second Oil Price Crisis in the late 1970s, and both the First 
and Second Gulf Wars led to an increased academic preoccupation with the 
topic. Accordingly, there is very substantive literature available on this topic 
which can at this point only be presented exemplarily. Most studies concentrate 
on the analysis of Saudi Arabia’s oil policy. This is due to the fact that the 
kingdom possesses by far the largest crude oil resources of all Arab Gulf 
monarchies.30 
When analysing both the Arab Gulf monarchies’ policy responses to the major 
alterations in the regional and subregional status quo in 1979 and 1980 and the 
Gulf States’ cooperation and coordination in the field of foreign policy one 
                                            
29 Inter alia Jacob Abadi, “Israel’s Relations with Oman and the Persian Gulf States,” Journal of 
South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.  20, No. 1 (1996), pp. 46-73; Gawdat Bahgat, 
“The New Middle East: The Gulf Monarchies and Israel,” Journal of Social, Political and 
Economic Studies, Vol.  28, No. 2 (2003), pp. 123-52; Adeed Dawisha, “Saudi Arabia and the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Ups and Downs of Pragmatic Moderation,” International Journal, Vol. 
38, No. 4 (1983); Jacob Goldberg, “Saudi Arabia and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Process, 1977-
1981,” Middle East Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1986), pp. 25-33; Uzi Rabi, “Oman and the Arab-
Israeli Conflict: The Reflection of a Pragmatic Foreign Policy,” Israel Affairs, Vol.  11, No. 3 
(2005), pp. 535-51; and Idem, “Qatar’s Relations with Israel: Challenging Arab and Gulf Norms,” 
Middle East Journal, Vol. 63, No. 3 (2009), pp. 443-59. 
30 Sheikh Rustum Ali, Saudi Arabia and Oil Diplomacy (New York: Praeger, 1976); Y. S. F. Al 
Sabah, Oil Economy of Kuwait (London and Boston: Kegan Paul International, 1980); Abdulaziz 
H. Al-Sowayyegh, “Saudi Oil Policy during King Faisal’s Era,” in Willard A. Beling (ed.), King 
Faisal and the Modernisation of Saudi Arabia, (London: Croom Helm and Boulder, CO: 
Westwood Press, 1980), pp. 202-29; L. P. Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975); William Bayne Fischer, The Oil States (London: 
Batsford, 1980); Thomas L. McNaugher, Arms and Oil: U.S. Military Strategy and the Persian 
Gulf (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985); Peter Odell, Oil and World Power: 
Background to the Oil Crisis, 3rd ed. (Baltimore, MD: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1974); and 
Merrill Simon, Oil, Money, Weapons: Middle East at the Brink (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
International Security, 1982). 
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needs to address the creation and impact of the GCC. The majority of the few 
monographs that explicitly deal with the organisation originate from the 1980s 
and early 1990s, offering analyses on the initial years of the organisation’s 
work.31 The remaining studies are restricted thematically to examinations of 
more recent cooperation in the economic sector. Emile A. Nakhleh’s “The Gulf 
Cooperation Council: Policies, Problems and Prospects” gives a descriptive 
overview of the formation, structure, and objectives of the GCC as well as a 
summary of the cooperative efforts in the security and economic realm.32 R. K. 
Ramazani’s “The Gulf Cooperation Council: Record and Analysis” provides an 
excellent analysis of the motivation behind the foundation of the organisation 
and illustrates improvements and obstacles in the cooperation inter alia in the 
areas of defence and economic integration.33 Particularly noteworthy is the 
wealth of well sorted documents at the end of each chapter as well as the 
extensive chronology of GCC relevant events of the years 1981-1986. A very 
detailed analysis of the organisation’s formation and development especially in 
view of the Arab Gulf monarchies’ relationship to the United States offers the 
former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Joseph Wright Twinam, in his book 
“The Gulf, Cooperation and the Council.”34 
1.4 Primary Source Material and Research Methods 
Beside secondary literature, this dissertation also accesses a wide variety of 
primary sources. These are primarily (1) legal acts under international law as 
well as the Arab Gulf monarchies’ voting behaviour in international organi-
sations; (2) press products from the Gulf subregion; (3) U.S. government 
documents; and (4) interviews with Gulf and U.S. academic experts and 
government officials. 
                                            
31 An exception is Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf: 
Diplomacy, Security and Economy Co-ordination in a Changing Middle East (London and New 
York: I.B. Tauris, 2011). 
32 Emile A. Nakhleh, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Policies, Problems and Prospects (New 
York et al.: Praeger, 1986). 
33 R. K. Ramazani, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Record and Analysis (Charlottesville, VA: 
Virginia University Press, 1988). 
34 Joseph Wright Twinam, The Gulf, Cooperation and the Council: An American Perspective 
(Washington D.C.: Middle East Policy Council, 1992). The following analysis is also noteworthy: 
Hossein Askari, Vahid Nowshirvani, and Mohamed Jaber, Economic Development in the GCC: 
The Blessing and the Curse of Oil (Greenwich, CT, and London: JAI Press, 1997). 
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The accessibility of relevant sources concerning the foreign policy of the Arab 
Gulf monarchies is restricted. Many documents by the Arab Gulf monarchies’ 
governments themselves are not accessible to the academic world. There are 
two underlying reasons for this. First, the regimes are – in contrast to Western 
democracies – characterised by a very restrictive information policy. Second, 
the Arab Gulf monarchies’ foreign policy activity has always been a pragmatic-
strategic balancing act. The publication of documents that trace foreign policy 
decision making processes would have the potential to put the regimes under 
distress, both in the domestic and foreign realm. 
Nevertheless, a vast number of useful sources dealing with the Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ foreign and security policy is accessible. For one thing, there are 
contracts and declarations of intent under international law within the context of 
international relations in the Gulf and the greater Middle East region. 
Furthermore, public and press statements by the Arab Gulf monarchies’ 
governments, as well as their voting behaviour in iternational organisations, 
shed light on the motives and objectives of the countries’ foreign policy. 
Furthermore, one can consult background articles and editorials published in 
the Gulf states’ news media that address current developments and contain 
statements by and interviews with politicians and experts. Beside newspapers, 
radio programmes such as that of Radio Baghdad, Radio Tehran, and Radio 
Riyadh also serve as sources of valuable information. During the period under 
review, the news media in all Gulf countries were widely censured, in many 
cases state-controlled, and regularly echoed governmental positions. Hence, an 
analysis of the Gulf media’s coverage allows conclusions on the Gulf states’ 
policy positions. In this context, the yearly volumes of the Middle East 
Contemporary Survey (the first issue covers the second half of 1976 and the 
first half of 1977) have been particularly helpful as they provide numerous 
quotations from and summaries of Gulf news media reports relevant to 
international relations in the Gulf and the Arab Gulf monarchies’ positions in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. 
In addition, U.S. sources offer an excellent insight into the Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ foreign and security policy. There are two reasons for this. First, 
due to strategic and economic interest the U.S. legislative and executive branch 
  30 
studied the Gulf subregion intensively. This brought to the fore a very extensive 
collection of documents, which offer detailed insight into the U.S. perception of 
the developments in the Gulf. Second, a large number of U.S. documents 
covering the time up to the early 1980s are accessible to the public. This 
significantly increases their relative value compared to sources from the Gulf 
region itself. 
During a two-month research trip to the United States in the autumn of 2009, I 
studied primary and secondary sources, many of them recently declassified, at 
the National Archives, the Library of Congress, and the Richard M. Nixon, 
Gerald R. Ford, and Jimmy Carter presidential libraries. I was fortunate to have 
been able to examine a broad spectrum of documents, which proved to be of 
particular relevance to this dissertation. These sources include diplomatic 
cables; minutes of National Security Council meetings; country-, region-, and 
topic-specific CIA and State Department dossiers; White House memoranda; 
and correspondence of the U.S. executive with political leaders of Middle East 
states. These documents allowed detailed insight into the U.S. perspective on 
developments in the Gulf region. In addition, among U.S. diplomatic cables 
leaked by WikiLeaks in 2010 and 2011 were some documents that contained 
information relevant to this dissertation. 
In April 2011, in the course of a second research trip to the United States, I had 
the opportunity to interview academic experts on the Gulf region as well as 
several former U.S. government officials who were concerned with the Gulf 
subregion during their careers. Particularly interviews with the latter officials, 
among them were former U.S. ambassadors and other former U.S. state 
department officials as well as CIA and military intelligence officers, granted me 
access to first hand information of advisors and decision makers of former U.S. 
administrations. The fact that this dissertation’s period under review ended two 
decades ago had both a positive and a negative effect on the findings that could 
be drawn from these interviews. On the one hand, interviewees repeatedly had 
difficulties recalling details with regard to events, developments, and time 
sequences. On the other hand, interviewees were free to share information no 
longer considered sensitive. Besides the conduction of interviews, I had the 
chance to be among the first academics to review the Saddam Hussein Regime 
Collection at the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic 
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Studies in Washington, D.C. This collection comprises a vast number of official 
documents and audio recordings of the Iraqi Saddam regime, captured by the 
U.S. armed forces in the course of the 2003 Iraq War. While the majority of 
captured files were at the time still being processed or classified I was able to 
find some useful documents that shed light on Iraq’s relations with the Arab Gulf 
monarchies. 
In the spring of 2012, I conducted two field trips to the Gulf subregion: a three-
week trip to the UAE and Qatar in January/February 2012 and a five-week trip 
to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in April/May 2012. Within the course of such trips, I 
was able to conduct interviews with key opinion makers and observers of the 
Arab Gulf monarchies’ foreign policy. Among interviewees were HRH Prince 
Turki Al Faisal Al Saud, former director of the Saudi General Intelligence 
Directorate, Abdullah Bishara, the first Secretary-General of the GCC, and 
several high-ranking academics from Kuwait University, the Saudi Institute of 
Diplomatic Studies, and UAE University.35 
Interviews with U.S. as well as Gulf experts and (former) decision-makers were 
all semi-structured, primarily open-ended, and largely conducted face to face. 
The focus of each interview and the prepared questions were individually 
matched to the interviewee’s specific field of expertise. While the majority of 
questions were posed to several interviewees, each interview was 
characterised by a unique set of raised research questions. This as well as both 
the semi-structured and open-ended nature of the interviews was supposed to 
allow for the greatest possible access to the individual interviewees’ knowledge 
in predetermined subject areas. Face to face interviews were preferred in order 
to reduce the distance between the interviewer and interviewee and allow for a 
maximisation of interaction. Moreover, especially advantageous in interviews 
with government officials, face to face interviews gave the interviewer the 
possibility to perceive nonverbal communication. In total, I conducted twenty 
interviews, of which seventeen were face to face in nature and three were 
conducted over the phone.36 
                                            
35 In addition, I conducted interviews with two experts on Bahrain’s foreign policy during the 
2012 Exeter Gulf Conference at the University of Exeter in July 2012. 
36 For a complete list of interviewees, see Bibliography. 
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1.5 Foreign Policy Analysis 
This analysis attempts to identify and compare the foreign and security policy of 
the six Arab Gulf monarchies from 1971 to 1991. In order to do so it is, in a first 
step, essential to develop a theoretical framework that explains the nature of 
international relations and the genesis of state foreign policy decisions. In this 
respect, the different schools of international relations theory suggest a two-, 
respectively three-level analysis. The first level of analysis deals with the nature 
of the international system itself and the rules and limitations it lays out for the 
development of international relations and state foreign policy. With regard to 
the implications the nature of the international level has on states’ foreign policy 
one could hypothesise: ‘What you [the state] do depends on what the system 
both allows and forces you to do.’ 
The second level of analysis then studies the relevant states and addresses, 
depending on the assumptions drawn from the analysis of the first level, up to 
two basic questions: First, in which relation do the individual state’s material 
capabilities (characteristics that directly influence international relations, such as 
military capabilities) stand to the capabilities of the remaining states? Second, 
how is the state’s environment characterised with regard to the quantity and 
respective capabilities of other states in geographic proximity? As a result, the 
former question is associated with the assertion ‘What you do depends on how 
powerful you are.’ The latter question is grounded on the hypothesis according 
to which ‘where you stand depends on where you sit,’ meaning that foreign 
policy decisions are formulated with regard to a state’s immediate environment. 
In extension of the above mentioned system level limitations, the second level 
of analysis defines additional, closer boundaries to a state’s foreign policy 
decision making by highlighting its relative capabilities compared to states in its 
(immediate) environment. While some IR theory schools, such as orthodox 
realism, only examine these two levels of analysis, particularly a younger trend 
in IR theory considers a third analytical level. 
The subject matter of this third level of analysis is the internal constitution of the 
state in question. In this regard the analytical focus lies on a wide variety of 
aspects and their influence on the formulation of foreign policy. Relevant issues 
include the constitution of the state’s political system, the state’s economic 
situation as well as the distribution of welfare, the degree of political and 
  33 
intrasocietal stability, the extent of ethnic, religious, cultural heterogeneity as 
well as the existence of potential conflicts related to the former, etc. The 
analysis of a state’s internal constitution again more clearly defines the 
boundaries for a state’s foreign policy decisions and narrows down its foreign 
policy options. The hypothesis in this respect reads: ‘What you do depends on 
who you are internally.’ 
Over time IR theory scholarship has seen different eras with differing trends. 
While the Cold War era was characterised by a dominance of the realist school 
the past two decades have seen the rise of less material and less state centred 
theoretical approaches. One example of the latter is the constructivist school. 
The changes in IR theory scholarship, however, are not only attributable to the 
emergent appreciation of new perspectives or a general advancement of 
academia. The continuous adjustments to existing theories as well as the 
development of new theoretical approaches also reflect alterations in the 
international system itself. Theories that had their strengths in explaining 
international relations and foreign policy of the 19th Century or during the 
heights of the Cold War may very well have lost their explanatory qualities when 
applied to the contemporary international system. This, however, does not belie 
the theories’ former explanatory power. One example for changes in the 
international system with remarkable effects on the viability of IR theories is the 
enlargement of relevant actors in the international arena. While the international 
relations of late 19th Century Europe were clearly characterised by nation states 
as the only relevant actors, the situation does look considerably different in the 
early 21st Century. Today, a very wide spectrum of international non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs), ranging from Amnesty International to al-Qaeda, 
have gained remarkable influence on international relations and the formulation 
of state foreign policy. Transnational corporations (TNCs), too, have emerged 
as significant players in the international arena. 
Additionally, even during the same epoch of international relations the 
explanatory power of a specific IR theory may vary between world regions. 
While theories focusing on questions of identity are little suitable in explaining 
the regional foreign policy of contemporary Western European states, they are 
far more applicable to the Middle East. 
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In consequence, any single IR theory is limited in its explanatory power by time 
and, to a lesser degree, also by location. Hence, the theoretical approach 
suggested in this dissertation does not raise the claim to be the one com-
prehensively explanatory IR theory. On the contrary, it is a theoretical approach 
particularly fitted to the timeframe and the world region under review. This, 
however, is not to say that it does not have explanatory power beyond this 
particular time and place. 
This analysis joins a series of other scholars of both general international 
relations and international relations of the Gulf as well as foreign policy analysis 
of the Gulf states in suggesting an amalgam of several IR theories. In doing so, 
this dissertation follows a relatively recent trend in IR theory scholarship to 
borrow assumptions from several competing schools of thought and create a 
new transcending theoretical construct.37 This approach is based on the 
conviction that while competing schools of IR theory – such as realism, 
structuralism, constructivism, and pluralism – are all indicative in explaining the 
nature of international relations and foreign policy, they lack the full explanatory 
power when applied in isolation. Only by considering multiple theoretical 
perspectives one can explain the complexity of foreign policy processes. 
The theoretical fundament underlying the analysis at hand shows notable 
parallelism to the “modified form of realist theory” approach proposed by 
Raymond Hinnebusch.38 I, however, consider the term coined by Hinnebusch 
as suboptimal due to its potential misleading character. While Hinnebusch’s 
theoretical approach is based on a realist fundament, the so called 
“modifications” diametrically oppose orthodox realism. Hence, the theory 
proposed by Hinnebusch is not realist in nature; it merely accepts some of 
realism’s basic assumptions.  
This dissertation’s theoretical framework also shows significant parallels to the 
theoretical framework Gerd Nonneman suggested in his edited work “Analyzing 
Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe.”39 While I agree 
                                            
37 See, e.g., Raymond Hinnebusch, Introduction: The Analytical Framework in Raymond 
Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Middle East States 
(Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 1-27 and Nonneman, Analyzing Middle 
East Foreign Policy. 
38 Hinnebusch, Introduction: The Analytical Framework, p. 1. 
39 Nonneman, Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policy. 
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with Nonneman’s assumptions and conclusions, the approach presented here 
is different. For one thing, this dissertation’s approach displays a more detailed 
analysis of the nature of interests and power and describes the boundaries 
states and state elites face when formulating foreign policy. Moreover, while 
Nonneman argues for a bottom-up analysis of foreign policy (starting from the 
domestic realm), this dissertation suggests a top-down approach (addressing 
international system level effects first before regarding the domestic level). 
With regard to the first level of analysis – the system level – this analysis 
generally agrees with several of (neo-)realism’s main assumptions. At this point 
,two of these claims shall be addressed. First, the international system is of an 
anarchic nature and has the character of a self-help system and second, states 
are the main actors in the international arena, the main ‘units’ in the 
international system. Firstly, whereas the existence of international law and 
international enforcement mechanisms of this legal order, such as sanction 
regimes authorised by the UN Security Council, suggest the existence of a 
superior global regulation and enforcement regime, decisions to abide to the 
rules of international law and to sanction violations of the same are primarily 
finalised on the basis of unilateral power political considerations. Hence, the 
contemporary international regulation and enforcement regime is merely a 
particular shape of international anarchy and not the replacement of the same. 
During the Cold War era, which the timeframe of this analysis falls in, the 
anarchic nature of the international system was particularly perceptible. In the 
absence of a functioning superordinate international regulation and 
enforcement system the international system is characterised as a self-help 
system. This means that units within the international system are self-
responsible with respect to the attainment of their interests. Secondly, while it is 
undeniable that non-state actors such as NGOs or TNCs have over the past 
decades gained considerable influence on international relations, states can still 
be considered the main actors in this arena. This again is particularly the case 
until the end of the Cold War. 
In defining the nature of the international system this dissertation also follows 
the basic argument of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s Regional Security 
Complex Theory (RSCT), formulated in their book “Regions and Powers: The 
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Structure of International Security.”40 While classical realist theory merely 
analyses the system level on a global scale, RSCT suggests a partition of the 
system level into the global and regional level. In this context, RSCT 
emphasises the growing relevance and increasing autonomy of “the regional 
level of security.”41 Whereas RSCT was designed to explain international 
relations particularly in the post-Cold War era, its assumptions are also 
applicable to the timeframe under review in this dissertation. According to 
RSCT, the world can be categorised according to several so called regional 
security complexes (RSCs), “substructures of the international system 
[characterised] by the relative intensity of security interdependence among a 
group of [geographically close] units, and security indifference between that set 
and surrounding units.”42 
The analysis of the system level also needs to address the one factor that 
determines the structure of the international system, meaning the relationship 
between units within the same. This factor is power. In this dissertation the 
concept of power is understood as a unit’s ability to realise its objectives within 
the international system, including the ability to influence and alter the 
behaviour of other units by resorting to co-optive (soft power) and/or coercive 
means (hard power). Hereby, power is to be seen as a relative variable that 
draws its significance from a comparison of the abilities of all units in the 
international arena. In other words, the degree of a state’s power is contingent 
on the levels of power of the other states. Hence, power is an analytical concept 
that allows for a differentiation and hierarchisation of states.43 Based on 
empirical analysis and following the theoretical assumptions of RSCT this 
dissertation differentiates between four categories of states, tiered with respect 
to their relative level as well as geographical spread and reach of power. 
According to this classification, there are, listed from most to least powerful, 
namely superpowers, great powers, regional powers, and regular states. 
                                            
40 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers. 
41 Ibid, p. 3. 
42 Ibid, p. 48. 
43 Compare Alexander Siedschlag, Neorealismus, Neoliberalismus und postinternationale 
Politik: Beispiel internationale Sicherheit – Theoretische Bestandsaufnahme und Evaluation 
(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag), p. 94. 
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The existence of diverging power potentials creates an imbalance in the 
international power structure. Moreover, the exact division of the entirety of 
states into the four categories determines the global power structure with the 
number of superpowers and great powers defining the structure’s polarity. On a 
regional level, in turn, the division of regional states into the four categories 
defines the regional power structure. In the latter case, regional powers also 
influence the polarity of the respective regional power structure. On both the 
global and the regional level there are several potential patterns of power 
distribution: unipolarity, with only one superpower, great power or regional 
power dominating either the global or regional international system; bipolarity, 
with two similarly or equally powerful states dominating the system; or 
multipolarity. The distribution of power, however, is subject to constant change. 
Therefore, also the global and regional power structures are subject to recurrent 
adjustments. 
With regard to the practical consequences of power imbalances in the 
international system, this dissertation partially agrees with a third realist 
assumption. According to the neorealist school, states disadvantaged by 
(regional) power imbalances attempt to induce a (regional) balance of power 
and, when unable to increase sufficiently their individual power position, either 
form alliances with other underprivileged states or engage in bandwagoning. 
While there is empirical evidence to substantiate this hypothesis, the existence 
of an imbalance of power alone insufficiently explains the formation of alliances. 
In reducing the rationale behind such cooperative steps on mere systemic 
pressures the assumption misses out important incentives and disincentives for 
the creation of alliances. This aspect will be addressed in more detail below. 
With respect to general state behaviour in the international system, regardless 
of the individual state’s power position, the realist school argues that states are 
principally rational, as in non-self-destructive and non-suicidal, entities. 
According to this hypothesis, state elites, the states’ foreign policy decision 
makers, have a vested interest in the state’s foreign security. Hence, they 
formulate the state’s foreign policy in such a way as to ensure the state’s 
survival and general security from outside threats. This is attributable to the 
decision makers’ human survival instinct in combination with the general link 
between the fate of the state elites and the state itself. This theoretical 
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assumption, however, while generally true, falls short in comprehensively 
explaining the foreign policy decisions taken by state elites, and therefore 
needs to be enhanced. I will go into more detail further below. 
The above analysis of the system level and its units identified the structural 
framework of international relations and the formulation of state foreign policy. It 
argued that first, the international system is anarchic in nature and has the 
character of a self-help system; second, states are the main actors in this 
international system; third, the international system can be subdivided into a 
global and a regional level; fourth, power, defined as the ability to realise one’s 
objectives by referring to co-optive (soft power) as well as coercive means (hard 
power), is the one factor determining the relations between states in the 
international system; fifth, the international system displays an uneven distribu-
tion of power among states; sixth, states in underprivileged power positions 
tend to balance out power imbalances; and last, states and state elites are 
principally rational actors that formulate foreign policy with the intention to 
guarantee state security. 
Following the abstract examination of the fundamental nature of the inter-
national system, the second level of analysis studies the specific power position 
of the relevant states within the international system during the time under 
review. In order to do so, it is essential to first analyse the power structure of the 
international system in the given time period. Hence, one has to identify the 
number of superpowers and great powers in as well as the polarity of the global 
international system. In a second step, one has to identify the RSC of which the 
states under review are themselves members. Once the RSC has been defined, 
an analysis of the regional power structure follows. This also includes the 
identification of the specific superpowers, great powers, and regional powers 
that are either member of the respective RSC or, in the case of the former two, 
influence power patterns in the same from the outside. This three step analysis 
allows for a proper assessment of the relevant states’ power positions on a 
global and a regional level. 
The identification of both the distribution of power in and the power structure of 
the international system, however, requires a method of measuring levels of 
power. The definition of power introduced previously – the ability to realise 
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one’s objectives by referring to both co-optive and coercive means – does not 
provide such a quantification method by itself. Since the abstract term of ‘ability’ 
cannot be quantified it seems appropriate to scrutinise the means that provide 
this ability. In neorealism these means are termed ‘capabilities.’ An identification 
of these ‘capabilities,’ in turn, requires the identification of the relevant states’ 
objectives. 
In this context, the neorealist school argues that all states are ‘like units’ and as 
such do not display relevant differences in their objectives. According to this 
theorem, all states share the basic interest of security regardless of their 
individual characteristics. The security term used here is to be understood in the 
sense of the negative security concept, the absence of either physical attacks 
on the state’s integrity or threats of the same. The capabilities to achieve this 
goal of security are then identified as predominantly military in nature. In other 
words, a maximisation of military capabilities translates into a maximisation of 
state security. Hence, power primarily stems from military capabilities. 
Economic and financial capabilities are of secondary importance and only 
relevant insofar as they can be converted into military capabilities, for example 
in terms of weapon procurements from abroad. The high relevance attributed to 
military capabilities is derived from their deterrent effect on potential aggressors. 
Following this hypothesis, the identification of a state’s global or regional power 
status merely requires a comparative analysis of its direct or indirect military 
capabilities44 with those of the remaining states on a global respectively 
regional level. 
The reduction of state interests to state security and the consequent 
equalisation of state power statuses to the respective level of military 
capabilities also provide an explanation for the above mentioned tendency of 
less powerful states to forge alliances in order to balance out power 
imbalances. States that are unable to draw level with other states with respect 
to their military capabilities seek to compensate their deficit by combining their 
capabilities with those of other equally underprivileged states. In doing so, 
states attempt to optimise their foreign security by maximising the costs of an 
                                            
44 Indirect military capabilities are understood as e.g. economic strength that translates into 
military capabilities. 
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attack on them. An alternative action is the so called bandwagoning, a state’s 
strategic alignment with a more powerful state or group of states. 
This dissertation agrees with the neorealist assumption that state security is a 
main objective shared by all states in the international system and that military 
capabilities are both an essential means to guarantee this objective as well as 
an important, whereas not the sole, criterion in the evaluation of states’ power 
statuses. I disagree, however, with a reduction of economic and financial 
capabilities to merely indirect military capabilities and argue that they are a 
material source of power on their own. Historic evidence shows that economic 
and financial capabilities have repeatedly been used successfully as leverage 
with the intention to adjust foreign policy decisions of other states. Due to the 
significance of material capabilities as sources of power, the second level of 
analysis is essential in narrowing down the foreign policy options of particular 
states. The relevant states’ power position within the frame of the global and 
relevant regional international system restricts the states’ foreign policy choices. 
In clear contradiction to orthodox realist theory, however, this dissertation 
argues that a comprehensive analysis of international relations and foreign 
policy requires the scrutiny of a third analytical level. The underlying assumption 
is that foreign policy is not entirely predetermined by the nature of the 
international system. On the contrary, foreign policy is both the result of system 
pressures and domestic processes. 
Empirical analysis shows that each state in the international system is 
characterised by a distinct domestic nature resulting from the concurrence of 
various factors such as the composition of the population, the economic 
situation, the political system, the people’s relations to state, nation, and other 
identity-constituting concepts, existing ideologies and value systems, and the 
(perceived) history of society, state, and nation. 
States are accumulations of individuals with various inward and outward 
oriented interests organised by a political system that translates these interests 
into domestic and foreign policy. The people’s interests arise from a concur-
rence of several human aspirations and cognitive concepts: First, the desire for 
security (to be read in the sense of the extended, positive concept of security) 
and prosperity; second, ideology and normative worldviews (based on 
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philosophical, religious, and cultural convictions); third, identities (to be 
understood as an exclusive sense of belonging); fourth, human emotions; and 
last, historical memory. The distinct composition of individuals and their re-
spective interests in a state society as well as the nature of the political process 
influence a given state’s foreign policy actions by relativising the behaviour 
determining restrictions of the international system. 
There are numerous examples of the effect the prevalence of a specific 
ideology among state populations and/or state elites can have on state foreign 
policy. A marked example is the Nazi ideology of the German Third Reich. The 
internalised belief in cultural and genetic superiority as well as in the destiny to 
reign over the world gave rise to an irrational and, at least in the case of the 
senior leadership towards the end of World War II, suicidal foreign policy. 
Backed by a significant proportion of the population the Nazi regime took a 
disproportionally high risk to its security in the attempt to gain world dominance. 
Particularly the continued fighting of an already lost war was attributable to the 
senior leadership’s assignment of more value to the triumph of their ideology 
over their and their state’s physical existence. 
As will be discussed in further detail below, especially the Middle East is an 
area where identities are of particular importance as an influential element on 
both the genesis of people’s interests and state foreign policies. While 
transnational identities evoke solidarity among populations and states, the 
exclusiveness of identities also creates cleavages both among and within 
states. Both phenomena influence foreign policy behaviour, although in different 
directions. 
Human emotions and historical memory, too, are influential factors shaping 
interests and foreign policy. For example, the Israeli society and the Israeli 
state’s foreign policy are heavily influenced by the historical memory of the 
Holocaust as well as previous century long discriminations against and 
persecutions of Jews. This particular Jewish or Israeli trauma manifested in the 
Israeli population and its state elite a sensitiveness regarding criticism and a 
principiis obsta mentality with respect to foreign policy. In other words, the 
historical memory of suppression and genocide influenced Israel’s policy 
towards a more robust and offensive foreign policy. Another example of the 
  42 
influence of collective historical memory on the formulation of foreign policy is 
the Federal Republic of Germany’s principal of ‘never again, never alone.’ 
Conscious of the enormous harm, atrocities, and destructions caused by the 
Nazi regime, German post-war foreign policy is to this day particularly anxious 
to never again become the aggressor or stand on opposite sides of their 
Western partners. 
The societal desire for prosperity and high living standards, too, influences 
foreign economic policy and is regularly at odds with normative principles 
shared by large parts of the population. This can exemplarily be seen in EU 
trade policy. While EU states make the establishment of trade relationships 
regularly dependent on the human rights situations in developing countries of 
minor economic importance, they pursue a far more pragmatic policy towards 
significant import partners. 
In democratically organised states the state elites ordinarily translate the 
interests of the majority into policies. This is not necessarily the case in non-
democratic states. There, the state elites are not directly responsible to the 
people as they are not democratically elected by the latter on a regular basis. 
This, however, is not to say that state elites in non-democratic states are free to 
ignore completely the interests of their subjects. This is deductable from the fact 
that state elites have a vested interest in regime stability. History shows that all 
regimes that ignore the interests of their populations will sooner or later fall 
victim to insurrections. Therefore, in order to sustain regime stability state elites 
have to guarantee the interests of their populations at least to such a degree as 
is necessary to prevent a public uprising. In so far, the interests of the people 
indirectly become the interests of the state elites. Nonetheless, in the case of 
non-democratic states, state interests are not unitary. There is a distinct 
difference between the various and at times competing interests of the 
population and the interests of the state elites. While state elites often share 
interests with their populations, they additionally have the interest to stay in 
power. 
This dissertation argues that state elites of non-democratic states have two 
main interests: first, the interest to protect the state’s physical integrity against 
outside threats and second, the interest to safeguard regime stability against 
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domestic perils. Particularly in world regions that display emphatically lived, 
parallel and often conflicting identities, state elites are faced with closely 
intertwined threats and opportunities with respect to both their interests. Middle 
East history shows clearly that the existence of strongly felt transnational and 
conflicting identities provides states with opportunities to intervene in the 
domestic affairs of other states. A state’s ability to instrumentalise identities and 
identity conflicts beyond the domestic realm for the benefit of its own interests 
can be seen as a non-material source of power. Thus, the level of a state’s 
power is defined by both material and non-material capabilities. 
In neorealist theory, with states as ‘black boxes’ with a one-dimensional interest 
in mainly negative security and power determined by purely material 
capabilities, the nature of the international system dictates balance of power 
politics. The theoretical approach suggested here, on the other hand, views 
states as fairly transparent ‘boxes’ with semipermeable boundaries and 
multidimensional interests. Power is based on material and non-material capa-
bilities. In non-democratic states, national interest is not identical with state elite 
interest; although they overlap, the latter is characterised by the additional 
interest in the maintenance of domestic power, namely regime stability. For 
such state elites the complex nature of domestic and international politics 
requires a flexible policy that takes into account and balances out threats and 
opportunities on both the domestic and international level. In his article 
“Explaining Third World Alignment” Stephen R. David gave this policy the name 
omnibalancing.45 
It has been argued that a state’s foreign policy is defined with regard to 
pressures stemming from both the nature of the international system and 
domestic characteristics and dynamics. There are, however, two more factors 
that influence the shape of a state’s foreign policy. 
The first of these factors is the nature of the decision making process itself, 
meaning the technical process of transforming interests, may they stem from 
the people and/or the state elites, into policies. In this context, this dissertation 
draws on Graham T. Allison’s ‘organizational process model’ that rejects the 
                                            
45 David, “Explaining Third World Alignment.” 
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presumption that governments are unitary rational actors.46 On the contrary, 
Alison ascribes governments a complex, compartmentalised character and 
proves inter alia that policy decisions often times rest on compromises made in 
the light of competitions among specialised departments for intergovernmental 
power.47 The eventual foreign policy actions then do not necessarily coincide 
with the interests of either the people or the state elite. 
The second factor is the personalities and perceptions of decision makers. The 
underlying assumption here is that, beside the material aspirations and cogni-
tive concepts mentioned above, a decision maker’s personal characteristics 
based on intelligence, education, interests, experiences, opinions, affections 
and aversions, temper, etc. influence the decision making process. 
To summarise, the theoretical approach suggested in this dissertation is tailored 
specifically for the analysis of the foreign policy of a particular group of states 
(non-democratic Middle Eastern states) at a particular period of time (during the 
last two decades of the Cold War). It assumes that a state’s foreign policy 
behaviour is the result of the limitations set by the nature of the international 
system, the state’s relative power status, and the state’s domestic charac-
teristics. I argued that states are principally rational actors with an interest in 
self-preservation and that due to the anarchic and self-help nature of the 
international system as well as the uneven distribution of power on an inter-
national and a regional level, states in underprivileged power positions tend to 
strive for balance of power. I further contended that power, defined as the ability 
to realise one’s objectives through co-optive and coercive means, rests on 
material (as in military, economic, and financial) and non-material capabilities; 
the latter are characterised as the ability to influence domestic dynamics in 
other states. Additionally, I argued that every state is unique in its domestic 
nature based on a distinct composition of societal, economic, political, historic, 
ideational, and identity-related characteristics and that these aspects determine 
the nature of the people’s interests as well as the latter’s translation into foreign 
policy. I asserted that in non-democratic states the elites have an interest in a 
twofold self-preservation in the form of both state and regime security, and that 
                                            
46 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1971). 
47 Compare J. Gary Clifford, “Bureaucratic Politics,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 77, 
No. 1 (1990), pp. 161-8, p. 161. 
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in order to realise these interests they tend to refer to a policy of omnibalancing. 
Lastly, I stressed that the translation of interests into foreign policy is influenced 
both by the nature of the decision making process and the personalities of the 
decision makers. 
Over the course of the rest of this dissertation I shall apply the above introduced 
theoretical approach in practice in an attempt to reveal the Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ interests, foreign policy options, and eventual foreign policy 
decisions in the timeframe of 1971 to 1990 with particular reference to their 
relations to Iran and Iraq and their policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
following chapter focuses on the year 1971 and provides a comparative 
analysis of the distinct domestic characteristics of the six Arab Gulf monarchies, 
their positions in the international and relevant regional system, their foreign 
policy interests and options of action, and identifies the main challenges to both 
state and regime security in the individual states. 
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2. THE ARAB GULF MONARCHIES IN 1971: INTERESTS, OPTIONS, 
AND CHALLENGES 
In the previous chapter I postulated that a state’s foreign policy behaviour is the 
result of the limitations set by the nature of the international system, the state’s 
relative power status, and its domestic characteristics. In this context, the term 
“power” was defined as a state’s ability to realise its objectives through co-
optive and coercive means; an ability resting on material and non-material 
capabilities. Moreover, I argued that a state’s foreign policy objectives are 
influenced by the respective state’s individual societal, economic, political, 
historic, ideational, and identity-related characteristics, the nature of the 
decision making process, and the personalities of the decision makers in the 
respective state. 
This chapter identifies the Arab Gulf monarchies’ foreign policy interests and 
options as well as the main challenges to the survival of the individual states 
and regimes at the beginning of the timeframe under review. In doing so, I will 
first conduct a preliminary examination of the nature of the international and 
relevant regional and subregional systems the Arab Gulf monarchies were a 
part of in 1971. 
The remainder of the chapter will then be devoted to an evaluation of the Arab 
Gulf monarchies’ relative power positions within their subregional, regional, and 
global international environment. To do so, it will be necessary to identify both 
the six states’ foreign policy interests and their capabilities to realise these 
interests. 
As argued in the previous chapter, the strive for state security against foreign 
aggression is a major, although not the sole, foreign policy interest of any state. 
The degree of a state’s material capabilities is the essential means to realise 
this security interest. A comparative analysis of the Arab Gulf monarchies’ 
relative military, economic, and financial capabilities will therefore serve as a 
means to make a preliminary assessment of the six states’ power status on 
subregional, regional, and global levels. In this context, the evaluation of military 
capabilities will take into account both quantitative and qualitative criteria. 
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Following the theoretical approach suggested in this dissertation, a state’s 
foreign policy interests are multifaceted and not limited to a striving for negative 
security. Hence, a complete evaluation of the Arab Gulf monarchies’ power 
status requires a more detailed analysis of the relevant states’ foreign policy 
interests and their capabilities to realise the latter. The identification of the Arab 
Gulf monarchies’ foreign policy interests will require a comprehensive analysis 
of their domestic characteristics. I will discuss how aspects such as 
demographics, social structure, entrenchment and diversity of religious and 
sectarian belief systems as well as other ideology-constituting concepts, 
including ethnic diversity, tradition, the (perceptions) of the history of society, 
state, and nation, the nature of the political decision making process, the public 
approval and inner stability of the political elite, and the personality of decision-
makers influenced both popular and regime interests. In this context, I will 
emphasise that the Arab Gulf monarchies’ regimes, being non-democratic in 
nature, had a vital interest in both state security against outside threats and 
regime stability against domestic opposition. 
The examination of the Arab Gulf monarchies’ extended foreign policy interests 
will be paralleled by an evaluation of the states’ capabilities to realise these 
objectives. In this context, the previously measured economic and financial 
capabilities, based primarily on the export of oil and oil products, will be 
identified as an essential element in guaranteeing regime security. 
In the next step, I will argue that in the Gulf subregion identity-constituting 
concepts such as sectarian and ethnic affiliation create both transboundary 
bonds among peoples and cleavages within nation states. This creates 
opportunities for state interference in the domestic affairs of other states and 
generates an important source of non-material power and non-material 
weakness. The analysis will then scrutinise the degree to which the Arab Gulf 
monarchies were both in the possession of such a non-material source of power 
and threatened by the possession of such power in the hands of other states in 
the region and subregion. This evaluation of non-material capabilities then 
completes the assessment of the Arab Gulf monarchies’ power status in their 
subregional, regional, and global environments. 
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The chapter concludes with a section that gives a brief overview of the domestic 
and environmental changes between 1971 and 1990 that were most influential 
on the Arab Gulf monarchies’ foreign policies. 
2.1 The Global International System, the Middle East, and the Gulf in 
1971 
The Global International System 
In 1971, the international state system featured two superpowers at the centre: 
the United States and the Soviet Union. Both states had material capabilities 
unmatched by any other state. They possessed “first-class military-political 
capabilities […] and the economies to support such capabilities.”48 Moreover, 
the two superpowers exercised their military and political reach on a global level 
and were actively engaged in securitisation and desecuritisation processes in 
the entire international system. In addition, their claim to superpower status was 
accepted by the entire state community. Lastly, the two states were perceived 
as the “fountainheads of ‘universal’ values of the type necessary to underpin 
international society.”49 
Due to the existence of these two superpowers, the international system was 
characterised by bipolarity, reinforced by the bitter rivalry between the two 
states. In the post-World War II period, conflict between the United States and 
the Soviet Union intensified rapidly and soon developed into what is commonly 
referred to as the Cold War. As a consequence, the world was divided into three 
blocks: a Western block spearheaded by the United States, an Eastern block 
dominated by the Soviet Union, and a block of independent states neither allied 
with nor controlled by any superpower. The phase of détente, an easing of 
U.S.-Soviet tensions that had begun in the late 1960s, did not change these 
general parameters. The superpower rivalry was played out in virtually all parts 
of the world, including the Middle East. 
In addition, there were a number of great powers in the 1971 global 
international system. According to Buzan and Wæver, the key characteristic of 
a great power is the fact 
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“that they are responded to by others on the basis of system level 
calculations about the present and near-future distribution of power. 
Usually, this implies that a great power is treated in the calculations of 
other major powers as if it has the clear economic, military, and political 
potential to bid for superpower status in the short or medium term. [This] 
means that actual possession of material and legal attributes is less 
crucial for great powers than for superpowers.”50 
Compared to superpowers, great powers have generally a lower degree of 
capabilities and a more limited radius of operation and are not involved in 
securitisation processes in all world regions. In the Cold War era, several states 
held the position of a great power: these were arguably the United Kingdom, 
France, China, West Germany, and Japan; the latter two characterised by 
particularly strong economic capabilities. Of greatest relevance to the 
international relations of the greater Middle East was the United Kingdom. By 
the end of World War II, the British Empire disposed of colonies and 
dependencies in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, Latin America, and the 
Indian and Pacific Oceans. In the post-war era, the British Empire and with it the 
United Kingdom’s power status began to shrink. Over a few decades the former 
superpower first dropped to the status of a great power and saw even this 
position slowly slip away. Due to economic and other political factors the British 
government advanced the decolonisation process and had granted most former 
colonies and dependencies their independence by the late 1960s; the 
independence of India in 1947 and the surrender of the Mandate of Palestine 
and subsequent transfer of responsibilities over the escalating crisis to the 
United Nations in 1948 are but two examples. Then, in early 1968, the British 
government came forward with another milestone decision when it announced 
its political and military withdrawal from East of Suez by the end of 1971. This 
announcement as well as the eventual British departure had a most significant 
impact on the international relations of the Middle East in general and the Gulf 
in particular. 
Hence, at the beginning of the timeframe under review in this dissertation, the 
global international system was undergoing change of great significance for the 
Arab Gulf monarchies. The steady decline of the United Kingdom’s great power 
status affected them directly when the British withdrawal from the Gulf altered 
permanently the regional and subregional balance of power dynamics. 
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The Middle East Regional Security Complex 
As expounded in the previous chapter, the global international system can be 
subdivided into regional security complexes (RSCs), “substructures of the 
international system [characterised] by the relative intensity of security 
interdependence among a group of [geographically close states], and security 
indifference between that set and surrounding [states].”51 One of these regional 
substructures that emerged in the post-World War II era is the Middle East 
regional security complex. Both the exact date of the RSC’s formation and the 
substructure’s membership are difficult to pinpoint. In any case, the RSC Middle 
East emerged in the course of the decolonisation process. In 1945, the only 
fully independent states in the greater Middle East area were Afghanistan, 
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The remaining states were still 
colonies, dependencies, or occupations of European powers – the United 
Kingdom, France, and Spain.52 By 1971, the decolonisation process had been 
completed in this part of the world. Hence, it is without doubt that at that time 
the RSC Middle East was in full existence. The membership of the regional 
substructure, however, is disputed. Buzan and Wæver argue that in the period 
from 1948 to 1990 the RSC Middle East consisted of the members of the Arab 
League (with the exception of Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, and Sudan), Iran, 
and Israel. With respect to Afghanistan and Turkey, the two authors argue that 
the respective states were so called “insulators” between the RSC Middle East 
on the one hand and the RSC South Asia (Afghanistan) and the RSC Europe 
(Turkey) on the other hand.53 
Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) draws on an understanding of 
security, power, and state capabilities that exceeds the narrow terms of 
orthodox realist theory. States’ domestic natures, characterised by societal, 
ideational, identity-related, and other aspects contribute fundamentally to 
securitisation processes among states and therefore determine the nature of an 
RSC. Following the theoretical framework proposed in this dissertation, the 
analysis of the nature of the regional security complex the Arab Gulf 
monarchies were part of in 1971 will at first be limited to an examination of 
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security interdependence in the larger Middle East area from an orthodox realist 
perspective. This will allow for a first rough delimitation of the RSC Middle East. 
A brief comparative overview of the respective states’ material capabilities then 
gives a first assessment of RSC polarity. 
When security is understood solely as a state’s protection against foreign direct 
or indirect (by means of proxies) military aggression, the degree of security 
interdependence between states can be analysed best by measuring such 
interstate aggression. An examination of interstate and proxy wars as well as 
direct military intervention in civil wars in the Middle East area gives clear 
evidence of both the existence and membership of the RSC Middle East. 
First, by 1971 the Arab-Israeli conflict had already brought about three major 
wars involving Israel and several Arab states (as well as the great powers 
France and United Kingdom). The wars of 1948, 1956, and 1967 saw different 
degrees of military participation by Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Sudan, Syria, and Tunisia. Moreover, 
from the mid-1960s onwards, Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia provided 
significant financial support to Palestinian paramilitaries for their asymmetric 
warfare against Israel. Following the 1967 Six-Day War, the two Arab Gulf 
monarchies alongside Libya made massive financial contributions to the so 
called Arab front states; money that was inter alia used to procure weapons that 
were used against Israel in the 1973 October War. Second, up until 1967, Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia fought a proxy war in Yemen, in which both parties had a 
direct military involvement. Third, the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman saw the 
meddling of Iran, Iraq, South Yemen, and Palestinian factions. Fourth, there is 
much additional evidence that ties Iran into security interdependence 
predominantly with the remaining Gulf states. Fifth, the temporary fusion of 
Egypt and Syria to the United Arab Republic (1958-1961) and their 
confederation with North Yemen to the United Arab State is another evidence of 
security interdependence between Middle East states. 
Even without any scrutiny of the motives behind direct and indirect military 
contestations between the individual states, one can confirm the existence of a 
RSC Middle East. There is much evidence suggesting that by 1971, this RSC 
consisted of the Maghreb states (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia); Egypt; 
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the Levant states of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian 
territories; the two Yemens; and the Gulf states Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia 
as well as newly independent Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab 
Emirates. 
A comparison of the RSC member states’ material capabilities (military and 
economic capabilities) reveals that in 1971 the structure of the RSC Middle East 
was of a multipolar nature. Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Syria possessed 
powerful armed forces that clearly stood out from all other regional states. Saudi 
Arabia had at its disposal massive economic capabilities with which the 
Kingdom could both partially compensate its relative military weakness and 
manage to influence the foreign policy of other states to its advantage. Hence, 
an overview of material capabilities suggests the existence of six regional 
powers in the RSC Middle East; states with distinctively greater capabilities than 
the remaining states within the RSC. 
With the completion of French and British withdrawal from the Middle East in 
1962 and 1971 respectively, great power penetration of the RSC Middle East 
had ended. However, in 1971, the RSC Middle East was characterised by 
significant superpower penetration. As Little points out, the U.S.-Soviet 
contestation in the Middle East became increasingly stronger between the mid-
1950s and the late 1970s. In this context, he identifies the U.S.-Soviet 
“geopolitical struggle to recruit allies and secure access to strategic resources 
(especially oil)” and their “diplomatic maneuvers to prevent the Arab–Israeli 
conflict from escalating into a superpower confrontation” as two main 
characteristics of superpower intervention in the RSC Middle East.54 
The Gulf Regional Security Subcomplex 
In 1971, the RSC Middle East could be subdivided in three regional security 
subcomplexes (RSSC): the Maghreb, the Levant, and the Gulf. Together with 
Iran and Iraq, the Arab Gulf monarchies were part of the latter. In this context, 
the argument in this dissertation agrees with Gause in not counting the two 
Yemens as members of the subcomplex. While there was undoubtedly close 
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security interdependence between these two states and their immediate 
neighbours Saudi Arabia and Oman, there was a much lesser degree of such 
security interdependence in the relations between the two Yemens and the rest 
of the RSSC Gulf member states.55 
At the beginning of the timeframe under review, the RSSC Gulf was in transition 
regarding its power constellation. Following the withdrawal of Britain’s great 
power presence from the Gulf and U.S. reluctance to fill the void, the subregion 
developed a tripolarity with Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia as (sub-)regional 
powers. In 1971, there was only minimal physical superpower presence in the 
RSSC Gulf, reduced to a symbolic U.S. Navy presence in Bahrain. At that time, 
the Gulf did not constitute a main theatre of superpower confrontation. 
Even after their independence in 1971, the newly sovereign Arab Gulf 
monarchies kept close relations with the United Kingdom, an important U.S. 
ally; this was also true for Kuwait, which had gained independence a decade 
earlier. Saudi Arabia looked back at two and a half decades of close relations 
with the United States. Iran, too, enjoyed close relations with Washington; 
relations that significantly intensified after the 1968 British announcement to 
withdraw from the Gulf. Hence, the Soviet Union’s influence in the Gulf was 
limited. For strategic reasons, Kuwait had established bilateral relations with the 
USSR in March 196356; until the late 1980s the Emirate remained the only Arab 
Gulf monarchy to maintain diplomatic ties with Moscow. Following the Baath 
party’s second accession to power in 1968, Iraqi-Soviet relations gradually 
improved. By 1971, Iraq had concluded several arms treaties with the Soviet 
Union. However, the two states were in disagreement mainly regarding the 
Baath regime’s treatment of Iraqi communists and Baghdad’s uncompromising 
                                            
55 Compare Gause, International Relations, p. 4.  
56 In November 1961, the Soviet Union had vetoed Kuwait’s admission to the United Nations, 
arguing that due to the Anglo-Kuwaiti agreement signed in connection with Kuwait’s 
independence earlier that year, the Emirate was still de facto a British colony. In February 1963, 
in the light of deteriorating Iraqi-Soviet relations following the Baath Party’s takeover, Kuwait 
sought to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR. Subsequently, in May 1963, the Soviet 
Union supported Kuwait’s renewed application to the United Nations. Compare Mark N. Katz, 
Russia & Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Arabian Peninsula (Baltimore, MD and 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 162. 
  55 
stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict.57 Their relations were not yet as close as they 
were to become from 1972 onwards. 
2.2 The Arab Gulf Monarchies in 1971: Material Capabilities 
This section reveals the Arab Gulf monarchies’ material capabilities in 1971. As 
argued above, material capabilities are a composition of military, economic, and 
financial capabilities. 
Military Capabilities 
Military capabilities are the traditional source of power in international relations. 
They allow states to both protect themselves against foreign aggression and put 
leverage on other states to adjust their behaviour. 
Saudi Arabia 
In 1971, Saudi Arabia had the by far most extensive military capabilities of all 
Arab Gulf monarchies. Following King Faisal’s accession to the thrown, the 
Saudi armed forces had undergone a process of reform, enlargement, and 
modernisation. The initial motivation for this development was Egypt’s 
intervention in the civil war in the North Yemen on the side of the anti-Saudi 
republic faction as well as direct Egyptian attacks on Saudi territory. Once the 
Egyptian danger had subsided in late 1967, the continued instability of North 
Yemen, the enmity with Soviet-backed South Yemen, the outbreak of the 
Dhofar Rebellion in Oman, and the British announcement to leave the Gulf gave 
Saudi military development plans a new impetus.58 
In 1971, the total Saudi manpower amounted to roughly 71,000 men of which 
35,000 served in the Kingdom’s army, 1,000 in the Navy, and 5,000 in the air 
force; the remaining 30,000 men made up the National Guard, formerly know as 
the White Army. The Saudi army was divided into four infantry brigades, 
equipped with ten SAM batteries with HAWK missiles, twenty-five M-47 medium 
tanks, sixty M-41 light tanks, and 200 armoured cars of the type AML-60 and 
AML-90. The Saudi Navy was equipped with three torpedo boats, one patrol 
vessel, two fast patrol boats, and eight hovercrafts. The Kingdom’s air force had 
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in its arsenal a total of seventy-five combat aircraft – including fifteen fighter-
bombers of the type F-86 Sabre, twenty ground-attack jets of the type BAC-167 
Strikemaster, and twenty F-52 Lightning interceptors – as well as ten C-130 
transport planes. Moreover, the Saudi Royal Air Force had at its disposal two 
SAM regiments equipped with thirty-six Thunderbird surface-to-air missiles. To 
expand its air defence capabilities, the Saudi government ordered twenty 
fighters jets of the type F-5A Tiger and thirty F-5E during 1971. The Saudi 
National Guard disposed only of lightly armed units.59 
Kuwait 
In the time leading to its independence in 1961, Kuwait established armed 
forces consisting of army, navy, and air force units. In the light of the Iraqi 
invasion threat right after its independence60, the Emirate expanded its military. 
Another major military expansion and modernisation was triggered by the British 
announcement on May 13, 1968 to end the 1961 military assistance agreement 
three years later. Within a decade, Kuwait’s defence expenditure showed a 
significant increase from KD 16.4 million61 in 1961 to KD 26 million62 in 1971. 
Meanwhile, the Kuwaiti manpower had increased from 2,500 men in 1961 to 
14,000 men in 1971.63 Unlike in other Arab Gulf monarchies, the Kuwaiti military 
was largely manned by natives. The so called “Non-Kuwaiti Professional,” e.g. 
technicians, served “in a quasi-military civilian capacity” and did not have any 
command authority.64 Non-national military personnel were recruited from 
among Palestinian, Egyptian, and Jordanian nationals in Kuwait’s society.65 
In the autumn of 1972, Kuwait had the second best equipped armed forces 
among Arab Gulf monarchies. The Kuwait army had three brigades with 
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armoured, infantry, and artillery units, equipped with eighty medium tanks (each 
forty Indian-made Vijayanta and British Centurion) as well as a number of 
armoured and scout cars. The Emirate’s naval forces had eight patrol boats and 
two landing crafts. Kuwait’s air force had a total of twenty-six combat aircraft – 
fourteen F-53 Lightning and twelve Hawker Hunter – as well as six light 
transport planes and four helicopters.66 
UAE 
After gaining independence in December 1971, the UAE had four parallel 
military forces. The Trucial Oman Scouts, a 1,600 men strong Sharjah-based 
security force first established by the United Kingdom in 1951, were 
transformed into the Union Defence Force (UDF), the federal armed forces. The 
troop continued to be commanded and trained by seconded British Royal 
Marines officers. Only about 40% of the soldiers were native Emiraties; 30% 
were Omanis and the remaining men originated from Iran, Pakistan, and India. 
The unit was equipped with armoured cars and infantry weapons.67 Following 
independence, the UDF’s role was not to provide external defence but rather “to 
maintain order and prevent local disputes from escalating into intertribal or 
intershaykhdom conflicts.”68 
Despite verbal support for common forces, the rulers of the individual UAE 
Emirates did not provide sufficient funding for the UDF and continued to 
maintain their own armed forces. Most prominent among them and both 
considerably larger and better equipped than the UDF was the Abu Dhabi 
Defence Force (ADDF). Established following the British announcement to 
withdraw from the Gulf, the ADDF had roughly 7,000 men in 1972.69 The ADDF, 
too, had a large number of foreign military personnel: the officer ranks were 
filled largely by Britons and Jordanians as well as several Indian, Pakistani, and 
Palestinian mercenaries. As the only UAE force, the ADDF had air force and 
naval units. Beside each two transport planes and helicopters, the ADDF had at 
its disposal twelve Hawker Hunter combat aircraft, piloted by contracted former 
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British and seconded Pakistani air force officers. Moreover, the ADDF had a 
small naval wing with four patrol boats, also largely British officered.70 
Additionally, the Emirates of Dubai, Ras al-Khaimah, and Sharjah also had their 
own armed forces that, however, were significantly smaller than the ADDF. In 
1972, the armed forces of Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah had a force level of 1,000 
and 250 men respectively.71 
Concerned about the spread of radicalism, both the UDF and the individual 
emirates’ forces discontinued to enlist Dhofari Omanis and Yemenites.72 
Bahrain 
In the months following Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf, Bahrain had the 
smallest armed forces of all Arab Gulf monarchies. By the autumn of 1972, the 
Emirate had a mere 1,100 men under arms. The majority of soldiers served in 
the army, a troop equipped with armoured and scout cars. The Bahraini navy 
had some patrol boats. Unlike the other Arab Gulf monarchies, Bahrain had no 
air force units at all.73 
Qatar 
Upon independence, Qatar had small armed forces with highly limited 
capabilities to defend the Emirate against external aggression. Hence, the 
Qatari military’s primary role was limited to the preservation of domestic order 
and the protection against small-scale border intrusions. In the autumn of 1972, 
the Qatari armed forces had a combined manpower of 1,800, of which 1,600 
served in the army. As in the case of the UAE and Oman, the Qatari army 
featured a large number of foreign mercenaries. The officer ranks were mainly 
filled by Britons and to a lesser degree by Jordanian and Pakistani nationals. 
Among the lower ranks were many Saudis, Yemenites, and Baluchis. Following 
Britain’s announcement to leave the Gulf, the Qatari army had procured several 
armoured cars and troop carriers, fifteen surface-to-air missiles of the type 
Short Tigercat. A year after independence, the Qatari air force was equipped 
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with four Hawker Hunter combat aircraft; the navy was still in development with 
a number of fast patrol boats on order.74 
Oman 
When the United Kingdom left the Gulf, the Omani armed forces had been 
fighting for several years in the intra-Omani Dhofar War. Following his takeover 
of power in July 1970, Sultan Qaboos initiated a significant reorganisation, 
enlargement, and modernisation of the military. Within the first two years of 
Qaboos’ rule, clear signs of change became visible. For one thing, arms imports 
and total military expenditure were increased significantly. Under Sultan Said, 
Oman’s overall military expenditure had amounted to less than $50 million.75 In 
contrast, figures given for 1971 indicate expenditures of $38.5 million76 to $44 
million.77 
Between 1970 and 1972, Omani manpower was increased from roughly 4,000 
to 6,000, the majority of which served in the army. In the autumn of 1972, the 
Omani army was organised in four infantry battalions and three artillery 
batteries and equipped with armoured cars. The air force had fifteen combat 
aircraft – including nine BAC-167 Strikemaster –, fourteen air support and three 
transport planes as well as twelve helicopters. Additionally, Oman had 
rudimentary naval forces with one patrol vessel and several armed dhows.78 
During Sultan Qaboos’ first years in power, the armed forces continued to 
feature a very high number of expatriates. All command functions were 
occupied by British officers. Moreover, many Britons served in lower ranks and 
as technicians. In addition, there were many Pakistani and non-Omani Arabs 
serving in the military.79 Expounding the motivation behind Sultan Said’s heavy 
reliance on expatriate soldiers, Nyrop et al. state 
“[T]he strong expatriate and minority representation in the armed forces, 
especially in the command structure but also among the troops, has 
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served the sultans of Oman well by decreasing the chances that the 
armed forces might be subverted and turned against the regime. […] A 
body of Omani noncommissioned officers and soldiers capable of 
handling modern equipment was therefore precluded in his time and 
extremely difficult to develop later.”80 
Sultan Said’s paranoia went as far as to discourage literacy among Omani 
soldiers to prevent their promotion to officer ranks. Due to the very low literacy 
rate in the Omani population in 1970, an Omanisation of the military under 
Sultan Qaboos was to take at least one generation. It is interesting to note that 
even after Sultan Qaboos’ accession to power the Omani military was officially 
referred to the Sultan of Oman’s armed forces (SAF)81; this clearly indicates 
that Qaboos considered the armed forces to serve primarily him personally and 
not the country.82 
The Arab Gulf Monarchies’ Relative Military Capabilities 
To assess the scope of the Arab Gulf monarchies’ military capabilities, it is 
necessary to analyse the military capabilities of potential aggressors as well as 
geostrategic factors. 
A comparison of manpower and weapon systems already shows the Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ clear military inferiority to the Gulf powers Iran and Iraq. In 1971, 
the Iranian armed forces had 181,000 men under arms. The Iranian army with 
its 150,000 men was equipped with 860 medium and 100 light tanks, 240 
armored cars, 870 armoured personal carriers, HAWK anti-aircraft missile 
batteries, howitzers, anti-aircraft guns, and eight helicopters. Iran’s navy was 
equipped inter alia with one destroyer, one frigate, four corvettes, four patrol 
boats, ten hovercraft, and four landing craft. The Iranian air force flew a total of 
140 combat aircraft, mostly modern F-4 and F-5 fighters, as well as forty-two 
transport planes and seventy-one helicopters.83 
Iraq had a total of 95,250 soldiers. Of those, 85,000 served in the army, which 
was subdivided into two armoured and four infantry divisions and equipped with 
860 medium and forty-five light tanks, 115 armoured cars, armoured personal 
carriers, and 200 Soviet-made artillery guns. Iraq’s navy had three submarine 
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chasers, twelve torpedo boats, and ten patrol boats. The Iraqi air force flew a 
total of 220 combat aircraft – including eighty-five MiG-21 inceptors, fifteen MiG-
17 fighters, forty-eight Su-7 fighter-bombers, nine Tu-16 medium bombers, and 
twelve Il-28 light bombers –, fifty-six helicopters, and twenty-four transport 
planes.84 
From these figures alone, it becomes obvious that in case of an attack by either 
Iran or Iraq, the Arab Gulf monarchies would not have been able to defend 
themselves in any adequate way. Saudi Arabia, which had the largest and best-
equipped armed forces among Arab Gulf monarchies, suffered additional 
problems other than being outnumbered and outgunned. For one thing, Saudi 
procurement policy had been taking to little consideration of the Kingdom’s 
defence needs; Cordesman assesses the air defence package the Saudi 
government procured from the United Kingdom and the United States in the 
mid-1960s as “an almost total failure,” as it did not establish “more than the 
most minimal air defense capability.”85 In the following years, the procurement 
process was not improved markedly. Moreover, the Saudi armed forces lacked 
coordination within and particularly between individual services. In addition, the 
Ministry of Defense continued to have significant difficulties in budget, 
programming, personnel, logistics, supply, and inter-service management. 
Additionally, despite reforms initialised in 1969, the military promotion system 
still featured discrimination due to regional, family, and tribal origin, thereby 
facilitating the ascent to high ranks of militarily incompetent and corrupt 
officers.86 
Due to Saudi Arabia’s geostrategic position, its large territory, and enormous oil 
wealth, the Kingdom’s relative military weakness was a particular strategic 
disadvantage. The Kingdom had long land borders with Iraq as well as the two 
Yemens, all three potential aggressors. Moreover, at its eastern and 
northeastern borders, Saudi territory was close to militarily much more powerful 
Egypt and Israel respectively.87 
                                            
84 The Military Balance: 1971-72, pp. 28f. 
85 Cordesman, The Gulf, p. 126. 
86 Compare ibid, pp. 137-41. 
87 For Egypt’s and Israel’s military capabilities in 1971, see The Military Balance: 1971-72, pp. 
29, 32. 
  62 
Both on the subregional and a regional level the military capabilities of the Arab 
Gulf monarchies were very limited and did not provide sufficient defence 
capacities against potential attacks by Iran and Iraq or other regional powers 
within the RSC Middle East, such as Egypt or Israel. 
Economic and Financial Capabilities 
Beside military capabilities, economic and financial capabilities are also material 
sources of power. A state can use its economic and financial capabilities to 
create positive and negative incentives with which it can influence the behaviour 
of other states. In 1971, the Arab Gulf monarchies’ economic and financial 
capabilities originated primarily from the export of oil products. Hence, an 
analysis of their oil sectors is essential for the evaluation of the Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ material capabilities. 
Saudi Arabia 
Saudi commercial oil production started in 1938. After an interruption during 
World War II, the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO)88 resumed 
production in 1946. Production quickly increased from nearly 60 million barrels 
in 1946 to roughly 357 million barrel in 1955 and 950 million barrels in 1966.89 
In 1971, Saudi Arabia was the second largest oil producer in the Middle East 
and the fourth largest in the world, behind the United States, the Soviet Union, 
and Iran. In that year, the Kingdom produced a total of 1,740.8 million barrels90, 
9.6% of the global oil production.91 
All relevant Saudi oil reserves are located in the country’s Eastern Province.92 
The most prominent oil deposit is Ghawar that remains until this day the world’s 
largest conventional oil field. Beside other onshore fields, Saudi Arabia had also 
discovered several offshore oil deposits prior to 1971. Due to the close 
proximity of the oil fields to the Gulf, the vast majority of Saudi oil exports were 
loaded on tankers at the Gulf port at Ras Tanura. In 1970, roughly 20% of 
Saudi oil production was exported through the TAP-Line (the Trans Arabian 
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Pipeline System), which connected the Saudi oil fields with the Lebanese 
Mediterranean port city of Sidon.93 
Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves were enormous. On the basis of data 
collected through oil explorations, the Kingdom’s proven reserves were 
repeatedly corrected upwards. By the end of 1970, Saudi Arabia had roughly 
148.75 billion barrels in proven oil reserves, constituting an approximate 21% of 
the then proven global oil reserves.94 At a yearly production rate of 1.74 billion 
barrels these resources would have lasted for more than another 85 years. 
The massive increase in Saudi oil production was accompanied by an even 
more significant progression in oil revenues. State income from the oil sector 
rose from just above $10 million in 1946 to almost $2 billion 25 years later. 1971 
oil revenues had more than doubled compared to 1969 levels. The significance 
of these oil-related returns becomes obvious when looking at the Kingdom’s 
1971-72 budget figures. During this fiscal year, the Kingdom total revenues 
ranged at $2.89 billion. Hence, at the beginning of the period under review 
Saudi state revenues stemmed to roughly 75% from the oil sector.95 
In addition to crude oil production, Saudi Arabia had also a significant refining 
capacity of roughly 151 million barrel in 1972. Saudi oil refineries were located 
at Ras Tanura and Jidda on the Red Sea coast.96 
Kuwait 
In Kuwait, oil was first discovered at Burgan, in the country’s south in 1938. Due 
to World War II, commercial production did not start until 1946. However, when 
production finally started, it only took until 1953 for Kuwait to become the 
largest oil producer in the Middle East with a yearly production rate of 317.4 
million barrels. The Emirate held the position as Middle East top producer until 
1966 when it was passed by Saudi Arabia.97 In 1971, meanwhile being the third 
largest producer in the region, Kuwait produced approximately 1,182 million 
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barrels of crude oil.98 In that year, Kuwait’s oil revenues amounted to nearly 
$1.4 billion. At the end of 1970, Kuwait had 67.38 billion barrels of proven oil 
reserves. At the 1971 production rate, then known oil reserves would have 
lasted for 57 years. Beside its large oil production rate, Kuwait had also the 
second largest oil refinery capacity in the Middle East. In 1972, Kuwait’s three 
oil refineries had a combined annual capacity of 201.58 million barrels.99 In 
1971, Kuwait had a budget surplus of nearly $152 million.100 
UAE 
In 1971, the UAE were the third largest oil producer among Arab Gulf 
monarchies. Among UAE emirates only Abu Dhabi and Dubai were oil 
producers. Abu Dhabi was the first to produce oil, it did so in much larger 
quantity, and it had significantly larger proven reserves than Dubai. Abu Dhabi’s 
production had begun in 1962 at the Umm Sharif offshore oilfield, almost 100 
kilometres off the Emirate’s Gulf shore. A year later onshore production started 
at Murban. In 1964, offshore production was initialised at Zakum. Abu Dhabi’s 
oil production saw a sharp rise from roughly 66 million barrel in 1964 to 329 
million barrels in 1971. In that year, Abu Dhabi’s oil revenues amounted to $431 
million. By the end of 1972, Abu Dhabi had proven oil reserves of 20.8 billion 
barrels. At the 1971 production rate then known oil reserves would have lasted 
for more than 63 years.101 In 1971, roughly 97% of Abu Dhabi’s revenues 
originated in the export of oil. In that year, the Emirate had a budget surplus of 
$115 million.102 
In 1969, production started at Dubai’s Fateh offshore field, also roughly 100 
kilometres off Dubai’s cost. Two years later, the Emirate produced 47.6 million 
barrels of oil. In late 1972, Bahrain had 366.5 million barrels in proven oil 
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reserves.103 At 1971’s production rate, these reserves would be depleted within 
less than 8 years. 
Despite the economically weak smaller Emirates, the UAE had an estimated 
surplus of $109 million in 1971.104 
Bahrain 
Bahrain’s Awali onshore oil field was discovered in 1932, earlier than any oil 
discoveries in the remaining Arab Gulf monarchies. Two years later production 
had set in and already exceeded 8 million barrels in 1938. After a lower 
production rate during World War II, Bahraini oil production levelled off for 
several years at above 10 million barrels from 1948 onwards. The Bahraini 
regime increased its profit share in December 1952 when it reached an 
agreement with the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) on equal profit 
distribution. Consequently, oil revenues increased to well above half of total 
government revenues.105 Oil production increased again in the late 1950s and 
mid-1960s – when production at the Abu Safah offshore oil field had set in106 – 
and peaked around Bahrain’s independence at nearly 28 million barrels per 
year.107 Despite this increase in production, Bahrain was in 1971 the by far 
smallest oil producer of all Arab Gulf monarchies, producing only 1.7% of Saudi 
Arabia’s rate.108 By the end of 1972, Bahrain had proven oil reserves amounting 
to 366.5 million barrels; hence, at the current production rate, Bahrain would run 
out of oil in about 13 years.109 However, Bahrain played an important role in oil 
refining, having at that time the second largest oil refinery in the Middle East. In 
1970, the Emirate refined roughly 88 million barrels of crude oil, a share of 9.3% 
of all refined oil in the Middle East.110 In 1971, the volume of oil refined in 
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Bahrain had increased to 90 million barrels. Incomes deriving from the export of 
refined products amounted to $192 million.111 
Qatar 
Oil was first discovered in Qatar in 1939. After a temporary interruption due to 
World War II, drilling activities were resumed in 1947 and two years later the 
first oil shipment was made. In 1966, the Qatar Petroleum Company (QPC) 
produced 67.5 million barrels per year. In the same year, the Shell Company of 
Qatar, too, began commercial production; in contrast to QPC, Shell produced oil 
at offshore fields. In 1963 and 1969, concessions were given to two additional 
companies.112 In the year of Qatar’s independence, the Emirate produced 
roughly 150.3 million barrels, a 13% increase from the previous years’ figures. 
This made Qatar the fourth largest producer among Arab Gulf monarchies.113 
By the end of 1970, the Emirate had proven oil reserves of nearly 4.32 billion 
barrels.114 At the 1971 production rate, then known reserves would be depleted 
within 28.7 years. Oil export revenues had increased continuously in the years 
prior to Qatar’s independence from $60 million in 1963 to $198 million in 1971; 
after slower increases in the previous years, revenues jumped 62% from 1970 
to 1971.115 In 1971, oil revenues amounted to roughly 90% of the Emirate’s total 
public state revenue.116 Nonetheless, Qatar had a negative balance of 
payments in 1971 with a deficit of $21 million.117 
Oman 
The Sultanate granted a first oil concession in 1937. However, it was not until 
1964 that first commercial oil deposits were discovered. Production set in three 
years later. By the end of 1967, 14.7 million barrel of Omani oil had been 
produced. In the subsequent years, Omani oil production saw a very significant 
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increase, reaching a first peak in 1970. For that year, figures given in literature 
vary between 121.2-126.1 million barrels.118 Due to technical difficulties, the 
1971 production level saw a decrease to the previous year’s rate and ranged at 
only 105.6 million barrels.119 In 1971, Omani oil export revenues amounted to 
$115 million, making up roughly 96% of the Omani governments total 
revenues.120 By the end of 1972, Oman had proven oil reserves amounting to 
4.98 billion barrels.121 At the 1971 production rate, then known oil reserves 
would have lasted for just above 47 years. In contrast to the remaining Arab 
Gulf monarchies, Oman did not export its oil through Gulf waters. Oil from the 
Fahud, Yibal, and Natil fields was transported via pipeline to port facilities near 
Muscat, at the Gulf of Oman.122 
Conclusion 
The preceding analysis has shown that in 1971 the Arab Gulf monarchies’ 
military capabilities were highly limited and insufficient to guarantee outside 
protection. On the other hand, the export of oil products was a source of power 
for the Arab Gulf monarchies. Particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the largest 
oil producers among them, had great potential to use their oil production and 
export rates as a political instrument. For one thing, they could offset military 
weaknesses by securing outside protection or at the least weapons 
procurements through quid pro quo relationships with militarily powerful oil 
importing states. Moreover, oil could be used as both a positive and negative 
incentive to influence policy decisions of oil importing states in general. In 
addition, with rising oil prices, state revenues would increase, giving the Arab 
Gulf monarchies the ability to use financial aid as a means to influence policy 
behaviour inter alia of states in the RSC Middle East. 
2.3 The Arab Gulf Monarchies in 1971: The Domestic Realm 
As argued above, it is essential to examine a state’s domestic characteristics in 
order to identify its extended foreign policy interests as well as its abilities to 
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realise these objectives. The subsequent analysis will reveal great similarities 
but also significant differences in the domestic natures of the Arab Gulf 
monarchies. 
Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia’s political system in 1971 was widely considered by Western 
observers to be an absolute monarchy. However, the Kingdom’s political rule 
was more complex than that. In this context, Abir states: 
“The more appropriate description of the Saudi regime after the death of 
Ibn Saud is probably an oligarchy whose pillars are the Saudi royal 
house, the ulama123 and the umara124. The conduct of its government 
follows, especially since the last years of King Abd al-Aziz, the golden 
rule of consultation (shura) and consensus (ijma’), within the ruling 
class.”125 
To understand modern Saudi political dynamics, it is essential to look back at 
the development and demise of the first two Saudi realms. The first Saudi state 
(1744-1818) was established upon an alliance between Muhammad ibn Abdul 
Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud. The former was a strictly conservative 
Sunni religious scholar, the latter an ambitious and talented but yet unimportant 
tribal Sheikh from the Najdi town of Dariya, close to Riyadh. The two men 
entered into a symbiotic alliance: the Al Saud Sheikh dedicated himself to fight 
a jihad to enforce Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s religious teachings on the Arabian 
Peninsula; conversely, Muhammad ibn Saud became the secular leader of the 
expanding state. By 1811, the Saudi state had conquered the entire Najd, the 
Eastern Arabian Peninsula, parts of today’s Iraq and Syria, and the Hijaz. 
However, the occupation of Mecca and Medina turned out to be a fatal strategic 
mistake. The Ottoman Empire based its legitimacy partially on the protection of 
the Two Holy Mosques and was determined to reconquer them. By 1818, 
Ottoman troops had not only retaken the Hijaz but occupied the entire Saudi 
state, and deported or executed its leadership.126 
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A second Saudi state began to develop in 1824 and experienced a period of 
great stability under Imam Faisal bin Turki from 1843-1865. However, after 
Faisal’s death, conflict over succession prompted a civil war, in the course of 
which the Saudi state continuously shrank until its remnants were conquered by 
the Al Rashid tribe of Hail.127 
The fate of the first two Saudi states had significant influence on the Wahhabi 
ulama’s political thought. The first state’s fatal overextension led the ulama to 
adopt a more pragmatic stance, based on a “desire to strengthen the Saudi 
state and the ruling family.”128 When in 1902, Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman Al 
Saud (frequently referred to as Ibn Saud) laid the foundation of modern Saudi 
Arabia, the ulama sought to prevent a repetition of the civil war that had 
destroyed the previous realm and caused a split in its midst. Convinced that 
only “close to total obedience towards the ruler and the leading ulama in 
Riyadh” could prevent new domestic disturbance, “the scholar’s political thinking 
was [henceforth] dominated by the notions of community (jama‘a) and 
obedience (ta‘a).”129 The senior ulama’s new quietism and strong interest in 
domestic stability became obvious when they backed Ibn Saud’s quelling of the 
Ikhwan uprising in 1930, although the Ikhwan were actively spreading the 
Wahhabi ideals.130 
Following the end of the Ikhwan movement, the ulama’s influence was greatly 
reduced; subsequently, Ibn Saud made fundamental policy decisions such as 
the invitation of foreign oil companies on Saudi territory and regarding the 
modernisation of the country often without prior approval of or even consultation 
with the ulama. Nonetheless, even when they disagreed with Ibn Saud’s 
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decision, the ulama supported him and provided his rule with religious 
legitimacy.131 
In 1971, Saudi Arabia was ruled by King Faisal bin Abdulaziz, a son of Ibn 
Saud. With overwhelming support of the royal family and the entire ulama, 
Faisal had replaced his half-brother, Saud, as King in November 1964.132 Much 
like his father, Faisal soon established himself as the “undisputed master of the 
House of Saud.”133 He reunited the powers of king and prime minister, decreed 
the Council of Minister’s sole responsibility to the king, and installed important 
allies in key governmental positions. He also waited four months before 
nominating his heir apparent and eventually appointed with his half-brother 
Khaled 
“an amiable, low-key prince with useful connections with the Najdi tribes, 
bypassing Khaled’s senior, but tougher and irascible, full brother, 
Muhammed ibn Abd al-Aziz.”134 
In subsequent years, Faisal enlarged his power base inter alia by giving the 
former oppositional Free Princes supervised government posts and appointing 
technocrats with commoner background to high administrative positions.135 
Moreover, after the Six-Day War, the Egyptian-backed propaganda campaign 
by exiled former King Saud and his sons ended.136 
Virtually undisputed leadership within the Al Saud family was not King Faisal’s 
only power base; conversely, the support of the royal family was not sufficient to 
guarantee regime stability. 
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The ulama, led by the Al al-Sheikh family137, continued to provide the Saudi 
leadership and its policies with religious legitimacy, most prominently through 
fatawa (sing. fatwa), religious decrees. It was in the vested interest of both the 
royal family and the ulama to preserve their historical alliance. However, the 
ulama’s policy influence declined further under Faisal’s rule; although the King 
himself was both a pious man and, through his mother, directly related to the Al 
al-Sheikh. Key judicial positions, traditionally held by the ulama, were abolished 
or remained vacant, non-Sharia administrative tribunals were established, the 
authority of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of 
Vice and its mutaween (the religious police) was curbed, and Faisal accelerated 
the Kingdom’s modernisation despite the ulama’s frequent opposition.138 
The political influence of the umara that had been decreasing since 1930 
declined even faster under King Faisal. This was mainly due to the 
strengthening of the central government, rapid Bedouin urbanisation, and the 
extension of governmental welfare services.139 Nonetheless, tribesmen and 
leaders remained a source of support for the regime, as evidenced by the loyal 
tribal-based National Guard.140 
Already in 1962, as Prime Minister, Faisal had started a reform programme that 
was to change significantly Saudi society and economy. As a shortage of 
qualified manpower prevented economic development and modernisation, 
Faisal reformed the educational system. He increased massively the respective 
budget, promoted school education for women, and encouraged large numbers 
of Saudis to get higher education abroad. In subsequent years, university-
graduates were encouraged to join the administration.141 
In the summer of 1970, the First Five-Year Development Plan was inaugurated, 
which aimed at developing infrastructure, reducing dependence on crude oil 
exports, maintaining high economic growth rates, improving education and 
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health services, and increasing the well-being of societal groups.142 Indeed, by 
the end of 1971, many infrastructural projects had been implemented: e.g. a 
first oil refinery, allowing for export of petrochemicals, a steel mill and a fertiliser 
plant, international and regional airports, highways, a desalination plant, power 
stations, hospitals, and other social institutions. Governmental subsidies 
encouraged the establishment of small businesses and construction 
companies. Medical care became free in 1967.143 Due to a significant increase 
in oil revenues between 1970 and 1971, the Saudi regime was able to 
overcome the previous years’ financial straits and finance the large-scale 
development programme.144 
Despite social and economic development and increased popular participation 
in the oil wealth, there was discontent in the Saudi society. Serious economic 
and religious discrimination caused resentment in the Shiite minority of the 
Eastern Province. The Hijazi population, too, was discriminated against in 
favour of Najdis in official appointment both in the administration and the 
military.145 Moreover, Cordesman reports that “several major tribal groups, 
which traditionally had been hostile to the Saud family, seem to have been 
partly excluded from the nation’s wealth.”146 Additionally, a growing number of 
higher (foreign) educated Saudis became discontent with the application of 
strict Wahhabi rules, governmental corruption, and the highly disproportionate 
distribution of wealth in favour of the ruling elite.147 The rising proportion of 
expatriate workers displeased the ulama.148 Lastly, between May and 
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September 1969 and again in 1970, the Saudi authorities conducted large-scale 
arrests of tribesmen, militaries (mainly in the air force), and Yemeni exiles that 
were accused of having planned coups against the regime.149 
Kuwait 
In 1971, Kuwait was a hereditary emirate ruled by the Al Sabah family. 
Following independence a decade earlier, the power status of the Emir and the 
ruling family as a whole had been strengthened. In the light of aggressive Iraqi 
claims on Kuwait150, the Kuwaiti population had “rall[ied] around known 
leadership patterns.”151 Moreover, with the development of modern political 
institutions, members of the Al Sabah family formalised their influence by taking 
over key government positions.152 However, in order to guarantee regime 
stability, the leadership had to accommodate several societal groups. The 
Kuwaiti regime had to formulate its policy with respect to the interests of the 
extended royal family, the most influential tribal leaders and merchant families – 
the latter became increasingly involved in the government –, the ulama, and the 
senior military functionaries. Furthermore, the constitution of 1962 provided for 
the establishment of a popularly elected National Assembly153, thus both 
granting limited democratic participation rights and establishing a platform for 
the communication of popular political will. However, the National Assembly 
turned out to be a double-edged sword for the regime. Due to the constitutional 
right of free speech, oppositional movements, such as the leftist Arab National 
Movement (ANM), were given the chance to call openly for extensive reform. 
Moreover, increased popular politicisation was paralleled by rising demands the 
regime was unable to meet. This led to a first significant constitutional crisis in 
1965 and repeated cabinet reshuffling.154 The National Assembly and the 
general popular politicisation also pressured the regime in the field of foreign 
policy, particularly with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict.155  
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A census conducted in April 1970 put the Kuwaiti population at nearly 739,000, 
of which roughly 53% were foreigners. The by far largest group among non-
Kuwaiti citizens (amounting to 20% of the total population) was Jordanians 
(mostly Palestinians with Jordanian passports) most of whom had left their 
home in the context of the escalating Arab-Israeli conflict. The remaining 
expatriates were other Arabs, e.g. Iraqis and Egyptians, as well as Iranians, 
Indians, and Pakistanis.156 Nearly 75% of Kuwait’s labour force consisted of 
expatriates.157 
The significant size of the Palestinian minority and particularly the strong 
Palestinian presence in the Kuwaiti educational, media, and political sector 
affected the native Kuwaiti population’s perspective on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.158 Similarly, Egyptian teachers had a significant influence on the 
prevalence of Arab nationalist ideology in Kuwait’s society, a development that 
caused considerable concern among the Kuwaiti leadership.159 
In the early 1970s, the vast majority of Kuwaiti nationals were Sunni Muslims. 
Non-Kuwaiti Muslims, too, were largely followers of the Sunni sect. However, 
Kuwait has since the late 18th Century had a substantial Shiite minority that over 
time had increased markedly in size. The Kuwaiti Shiite community had 
increasingly developed a separate identity, not least due to “[d]iscrimination by 
and conflict with the politically, economically, and socially dominant Sunni 
community.”160 Exact figures on the size of Kuwait’s Shiite minority in 1971 are 
not available. Nyrop et al. put the proportion of Sunni native Kuwaitis in the mid-
1970s at “[w]ell over 90 percent.”161 
In order to guarantee regime stability, the Kuwaiti government redistributed 
large amounts of its oil revenues within the Kuwaiti society. In the 1960s, the 
Kuwaiti regime rapidly developed a public welfare system and also increased 
gradually the benefits to foreign citizens.162 
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UAE 
As a political entity, the UAE differed significantly from the remaining Arab Gulf 
monarchies. On December 2, 1971, the Emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, 
Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, and Fujairah united to a federal state.163 The UAE’s 
provisional constitution provided for a separation of legislative and executive 
powers into federal and Emirate spheres of authority. The document 
enumerated the federal responsibilities, including foreign affairs, domestic 
security and national defence, nationality, education, and public health. The 
Federal Supreme Council, comprised of the rulers of the individual emirates, 
was installed as the highest federal authority, vested with both legislative and 
executive powers, such as the ratification of laws and decrees and the 
formulation of the union’s general policy. The executive day-to-day work was 
undertaken by the Council of Ministers. The Union National Assembly, whose 
members represented the individual emirates, had a primarily consultative 
function. Moreover, the constitution provided for the establishment of a Union 
Supreme Court.164 
Within the UAE, Abu Dhabi and Dubai had a dominant position, a consequence 
of their wealth and population size. They were granted veto power in decisions 
on substantial matters in the Supreme Council and had a larger representation 
in the National Assembly. Moreover, the Supreme Council elected Abu Dhabi’s 
Sheikh Zayid Al Nahyan as the first President of the Union and Dubai’s Sheikh 
Rashid Al Maktoum as his deputy. Furthermore, the most important cabinet 
positions were held by representatives of the two emirates.165 According to 
Anthony, the unequal distribution of power among UAE emirates caused 
resentment among some rulers and was one factor behind Ras al-Khaimah’s 
rejection to join the Union in December 1971.166 
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Upon the UAE’s foundation, relations among individual emirates were 
characterised by many conflicts, tracing back to historic family and tribal feuds 
as well as ongoing territorial disputes. With respect to the latter aspect, Anthony 
identifies a “leapfrog pattern” in intra-UAE relations according to which the 
individual emirates “had poor relations with their immediate neighbours and 
good relations with the Ruler just beyond.”167 
Regarding their territorial, political, economic, and societal characteristics the 
individual UAE emirates showed similarities but also significant differences. 
They were all characterised by tribal indigenous societies ruled over by 
dynastic, authoritarian, paternalistic, personalised, benevolent regimes. Before 
taking decisions, the rulers consulted personal advisors and representatives of 
the most prominent interest groups. Moreover, the Emirs held daily majalis.168 
However, the UAE emirates displayed marked differences: 
1. Territorial size: With above 67,000 square kilometres Abu Dhabi was by 
far the largest Emirate; the territory of Dubai, the runner-up, had less 
than 6% of Abu Dhabi’s size.169 
2. Population size: In 1970, Dubai had 70,000 inhabitants, followed by Abu 
Dhabi (60,000), Sharjah (40,000), and Ras al-Khaimah (27,000); Umm 
al-Qaiwain had only 4,000 inhabitants.170 
3. Economic prosperity: Abu Dhabi (oil industry) and Dubai (trade, banking, 
and recently oil exports), had rapidly expanding economies. In contrast, 
the smaller Emirates suffered economic difficulties and depended on 
financial aid from Abu Dhabi and Dubai.171 
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4. Expatriates: Abu Dhabi and Dubai’s economic success was coupled with 
high numbers of expatriates. The vast majority of merchants and 
labourers in Dubai were expatriates. In 1968, estimates put the 
proportion of Iranians, Pakistanis, and Indians alone at up to 72% of 
Dubai’s population. Moreover, Britons were influential predominantly in 
the oil (Abu Dhabi), security, and banking sector (Abu Dhabi and Dubai). 
In Sharjah, too, the largest part of the labour force and a sizeable 
proportion of merchants and businessmen were foreigners. In contrast, 
Ras al-Khaimah and particularly Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, and Fujairah 
had small foreigner communities.172 
5. Political bureaucracy: Following Sheikh Zayid’s accession to power in 
1966, Abu Dhabi had developed rapidly a modern government structure. 
In August 1971, Sheikh Zayid established a sixteen-member Council of 
Ministers and announced the introduction of a Consultative Assembly.173 
In contrast, Sheikh Rashid of Dubai intentionally “held the number of 
administrative bodies and regulatory agencies to a minimum” in order to 
“maintain[…] the free enterprise nature of [Dubai’s] economic system.”174 
Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, and Fujairah had little modern 
bureaucracy and were characterised by a virtual “one-man rule.”175 
6. Regime stability: Most UAE emirates featured great domestic stability. 
Although he had ousted his brother Shakhbut in 1966, Sheikh Zayid’s 
rule was not seriously threatened by intrafamily rivalry. Despite the 
relatively small size of the Al Nahyan family, the leadership managed to 
guarantee regime stability by preserving stable relations with the most 
prominent local tribal leaders, merchants, and commoner families, inter 
alia through intermarriage. Moreover, the Omani Dhofar rebellion 
motivated Sheikh Zayid to reinvest large portions of oil revenues into 
welfare and infrastructure development. Finally, the large ADDF also 
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contributed to regime security.176 Due to intrafamily stability among the Al 
Maktoum, a very fast economic growth, a high standard of living, the 
exceptional popularity of Sheikh Rashid, and the continued British 
presence, Dubai’s regime enjoyed great stability. The small Emirates of 
Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, and Fujairah boasted a long history of internal 
stability, primarily based on a homogenous population and the 
acceptance of the rulers. Less stable were the regimes in Sharjah and 
Ras al-Khaimah.177 Sheikh Khalid Al Qassimi’s partial abandonment of 
sovereignty over the island of Abu Musa to Iran in November 1971178 
prompted popular disaffection and, in January 1972, the Emir’s 
assassination by his ousted predecessor, Saqr bin Sultan. Most instable 
was Ras al-Khaimah’s regime, due to traditional intrafamily rivalry and a 
small but visible group of leftist and Arab nationalist dissidents.179 
Bahrain 
When Bahrain gained independence180 on August 14, 1971, the Emirate had 
already been ruled by the Al Khalifa family for 144 years.181 However, since the 
1950s, the legitimacy of both the hereditary nature of the government and 
Bahrain’s power structure had been challenged. The first significant popular 
opposition and calls for far-reaching political reforms arose in 1954, when both 
Sunni and Shiite local leaders organised demonstrations and even a general 
strike. Beside general popular discontent about the state of the health and 
education system, the sectarian discrimination by the Sunni dominated courts 
and police forces caused grief among Bahraini Shiites. The ruler’s appointment 
of advisors for the reduction of governmental anti-Shiite discrimination, a 
general Advisory Council, and the introduction of municipal councils as well as 
an Educational and Health Council, both partially elected, fell considerably short 
of the popular expectations. During the Suez crisis of 1956, the Bahraini regime 
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was faced with significant popular nationalist protests, calls for political 
democratisation, and even threats to Sheikh Isa bin Khalifa’s life. Domestic 
order was reinstated only after the proclamation of a state of emergency and 
British military intervention. Due to imprisonments and exiles of opposition 
leaders as well as governmental reforms in the labour sector, the regime 
managed to restore temporarily domestic stability.182 
Nonetheless, popular disaffection with the political status quo persisted. In the 
spring of 1965, fear of job cuts in the oil companies prompted another extended 
strike, accompanied by calls for the overthrow of the regime. Again, British 
forces had to restore domestic order. The strikes of 1956, 1965, and another 
one in 1968 were all heavily influenced by nationalist and pan-Arab ideology 
among the Bahraini labour force. Economic grievances increased both Sunni 
and Shiite popular sympathies for the ANM, the socialist Baath party, and the 
Marxist PFLOAG.183 
Encapsulating the mood in the Bahraini population in the decade before 
independence, Anthony states: 
“[A] growing number of Bahraynis began to speak out against the closed 
nature of the political system. In particular, they complained about the 
ban on political parties, the stringent regulation of freedom of speech, 
assembly and press, the harassment of would-be labor organizers by the 
government, the continuation of the state of emergency […] and an 
overall political climate that forced reform groups to maintain their 
headquarters outside the [Bahraini] islands.”184 
By 1971, the situation had not changed significantly. Popular discontent was 
still alive and could not be eliminated by either the regime’s promises for 
gradual reforms or the fact that half of the twelve members the Ruler appointed 
to the newly established Council of Ministers were commoners.185 The regime’s 
reluctance to establish a parliament was mainly based in the fear that 
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“such a body might unleash forces that, as in nearby Kuwayt, would 
spend much of their energies not on legislative matters but on criticizing 
the government and, indirectly, the ruling family.”186 
According to a census conducted in 1971, Bahrain had a population of about 
216,000; roughly 21% were foreigners, mainly of Saudi, Omani, Iranian, Indian, 
and Pakistani origin.187 Bahrain had the largest Shiite community among Arab 
Gulf monarchies; it can be assumed that in 1971 Shiites were in a slight 
majority. The Al Khalifa, Bahrain’s commercial elite, and tribes allied with the 
ruling family adhered to different schools of the Sunni sect. In contrast, the 
majority of the working class and small farmers were Shiites. As there were also 
Sunnis in the lower societal class, the claim of a clear-cut division into a rich, 
politically dominant Sunni minority and a poor, discriminated Shiite majority 
would be incorrect. There was both a history of anti-Shiite governmental 
discrimination and sectarian conflict within the working class and intermittent 
cooperation among Sunnis and Shiites in Bahrain’s nationalist movement.188 
Qatar 
When Qatar reached independence in September 1971, the Emirate was ruled 
by Sheikh Ahmad, the head of the Al Thani family. In April 1970, earlier than 
any other lower Gulf state, Qatar had adopted a temporary constitution that 
formalised the Emir’s political dominance. The document enumerated the ruler’s 
wide-ranging powers and granted him the privilege to expand his authorities by 
personal decree. The constitution also provided for the establishment of a 
partially elected Advisory Council. However, Sheikh Ahmad did not implement 
this provision.189 
Qatar’s ruling family was particularly powerful, not least due to its extensive 
size.190 Moreover, both the national security force, a British-officered, 2,200-
men mercenary troop that served “as a kind of praetorian guard”191, and the 
internal police protected the ruling family. In addition, the Al Thani subsidised 
Bedouin tribes to secure their loyalty and support in time of need. Thousands of 
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unarmed retainers also contributed to regime stability.192 Lastly, the Qatari 
regime sought to stabilise its rule by popular distribution of oil revenues; the 
regime inter alia established modern and cost-free education and health care 
systems. However, in 1971, both Sheikh Ahmad and the ruling family reportedly 
kept up to half of the country’s oil revenues for themselves.193 
Despite some popular calls for reform and restriction of the ruler’s power, the 
main threat to Sheikh Ahmad’s rule came from within the ruling family. In the 
end, intra-family feuds led to the Emir’s ousting in February 1972.194 
According to a census conducted in 1970, Qatar had a total population of about 
111,000, of which 66,000 were foreigners. Among expatriates, only roughly 
35% were Arabs, including a sizeable Palestinian community, while the rest 
originated mainly from Iran, Pakistan, and India. The reason for the consistant 
rise in immigration was Qatar’s large demand for skilled and unskilled labour.195 
While the most important local merchants were Qatari citizens, the vast majority 
of medium and small scale merchants were expatriates, many of them Iranians. 
Although less numerous, Arab expatriates had considerable influence on the 
society, as the majority of secondary school teachers were Egyptians and many 
Palestinians worked in the local media sector.196 This naturally affected the 
population’s view on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the prevalence of Arab 
nationalist ideology in Qatar’s society. The numerically small group of British 
and other Western expatriates filled key positions in the fields of defence, 
security, oil and other industries, and banking.197 
Native Qataris traditionally adhered to the Sunni branch of Islam. Qatar was the 
only Arab Gulf monarchy other than Saudi Arabia, in which a considerable part 
of both the ruling family and the native population followed the conservative 
Wahhabi teachings. The Qatari ulama had important influence on the 
educational and judicial systems and was successful in retarding governmental 
policies towards societal liberalisation. Large-scale immigration following the 
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discovery of oil caused an increase in Qatar’s previously small Shiite 
community.198 
Oman 
In 1971, Oman was both in an early phase of a profound political reform 
process and the only Arab Gulf monarchy caught in a civil war. 
When on July, 23 1970, Sultan Said bin Taymur, who had ruled since 1932, 
was ousted by his 28-year old son Qaboos, Oman was by far the most 
underdeveloped and restrictively governed state among Arab Gulf monarchies. 
Sultan Said had followed a very rigid austerity policy; he had denied to share 
with his bitterly poor people both his quite considerable personal wealth, mainly 
based on successful speculative transactions in Africa, and oil exploration 
revenues. For fear of popular opposition, the Sultan prevented any 
modernisation of his country: he minimised his people’s exposure to foreign 
values and ideas by rigid travel restrictions, the prohibition of virtually any 
foreign goods, and the withholding of a modern education system. Moreover, 
the Omani people were denied any substantial health care infrastructure, 
electricity, or running water. Even after commercial oil production started in 
1967 and state revenues increased significantly, Sultan Said was reluctant to 
invest in the development of infrastructure. These factors, as well as the 
Sultan’s strong reliance on British protection, had sparked two armed rebellions 
since the mid-1950s.199 
In 1954, following the death of Imam Muhammad bin Abdullah Al Khalili, a 
separatist rebellion rose up in Western Oman. In 1920, the Treaty of Sib had 
temporarily settled traditional conflict between the Sultans of the Al Bu Said 
dynasty in Muscat and the popularly elected Imams based in the Western 
Omani town of Nizwa.200 Parties involved reached a compromise that granted 
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the Imam both spiritual and temporary personal authority over the religiously 
conservative Western Omani tribes, while the Sultan maintained sovereignty 
over the entire country. In the early 1950s, Sultan Said bin Taymur’s refusal to 
share oil concession revenues with the de facto autonomous tribal leaders in 
the Imamate’s territory intensified the latter’s traditional separatist ambitions. In 
1954, the new Imam, Ghalib bin Ali Al Hinai, became the leader of a Saudi-
Egyptian backed rebellion against the Sultan and, through his brother, applied 
for membership in the Arab League. With massive British support, the Sultan’s 
armed forces managed to defeat the rebellion in 1959; Imam Ghalib went into 
Saudi exile. However, rebel terrorist activities continued in the early 1960s as 
did Saudi and other Arab political support for the Imam.201 
Meanwhile, a popular rebellion started in Dhofar, where the population suffered 
most under Sultan Said’s restrictive policies. Popular opposition was sparked in 
the late 1950s when despite a grave economic crisis the Sultan continued to 
deny the Dhofaris any financial aid and even imposed a trade blockade when 
they failed to pay taxes on time. Around the same time, many Dhofaris came in 
contact with radical Arab Nationalist ideology, through their lose alignment with 
neighbouring South Yemeni tribes and during work stays abroad.202 The early 
1960s saw then the gradual development of “a network of paramilitary and 
revolutionary cells”203 and the beginning of terrorist activities against oil 
installations and the Sultan’s Armed Forces. Around that time the rebels 
founded the Arab nationalist Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF). On the occasion of 
the first DLF congress in June 1965, the rebels proclaimed a full-scale 
revolution.204 
Over the next year, with South Yemeni and Egyptian support, the rebels 
managed to gain control over substantial parts of Dhofar and even made an 
attempt to assassinate the Sultan in April 1966. In 1968, the rebel movement 
underwent a significant ideological change and the civil war was increasingly 
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internationalised. Following the British withdrawal from Aden, radical Marxist-
Leninist elements were strengthened in South Yemen and within the DLF. 
Consequently, in September 1968, the DLF changed its name into the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG); the social 
revolution of the entire Arabian Peninsula had replaced independence of Dhofar 
as the organisation’s ultimate goal. With the conclusion of Egypt’s support after 
the 1967 Six-Day War, the newly established People’s Democratic Republic of 
Yemen (PDRY), the People’s Republic of China – later replaced by the Soviet 
Union –, Baathist Iraq, and leftist Palestinian movements became the 
PFLOAG’s main supporters. From then on, the PDRY that increasingly took 
over control of the PFLOAG served as safe haven and staging ground for the 
rebels. By early 1970, the PFLOAG had made significant advances and, in 
June, the newly-founded National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman 
and the Arabian Gulf (NDFLOAG), launched attacks in northern Oman.205 
Despite rebel advancements, Sultan Said rejected any compromise. He made 
no efforts to win back the more moderate rebels, refused all reforms, began to 
imprison and exile critics among his traditional allies, and, afraid of a military 
coup, refused British calls for the expansion of the SAF. Under these 
circumstances, the Sultan was ousted by his son Qaboos.206 
The new Sultan quickly initialised a far-reaching reform programme: 
“Qabus immediately began to share Oman’s oil wealth, first with the tribal 
leaders and the ruling elites in the coastal cities and then with the people 
of Oman. He initiated a broad program of funding medical, educational, 
water, and transport projects. This ‘pacification’ program was combined 
with an offer of sweeping pardons to the Dhofar rebels and other 
opponents of the former sultan.”207 
Qaboos’ sign of goodwill soon showed significant effects on the moderate 
rebels that were suffering under the brutal treatment of the South Yemeni 
PFLOAG leaders. From mid-September onwards, a large number of Dhofari 
tribesmen and leaders sided with Qaboos and fought against the PFLOAG in 
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tribal units (firqats).208 Moreover, Qaboos invested heavily in the expansion of 
the armed forces by allocating roughly half of the 1971 budget for military 
expenditures.209 In the autumn of 1971, meanwhile receiving financial and 
military aid from Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Jordan, the SAF had put the rebels on 
the defensive.210 
Sultan Qaboos also began to develop a modern government bureaucracy and 
included tribal leaders and the merchant elite in the political system. In an 
intermediate period from September 1970 to December 1971, Oman had de 
facto two parallel regimes: Qaboos maintained full authority over foreign affairs, 
defence, finances, and the Dhofar governorate while Prime Minister Sayyid 
Tariq, who had been installed by Qaboos’ foreign advisors, “began forming a 
government with ministries of health, education, interior, justice, information, 
social services and labor, and economy.”211 After Tariq’s resignation, Qaboos 
established a new government in January 1972.212 
In 1971, Oman had a population of roughly 750,000. The majority were Muslims 
of the Ibadhi denomination. Roughly 25% of the population was Sunni, including 
all Omani Dhofaris. Moreover, Oman had a small Shiite minority and some 
Hindus among its merchant class.213 
2.4 The Arab Gulf Monarchies in 1971: Foreign Policy Interests 
In the light of what has been shown above, the Arab Gulf monarchies 
formulated their foreign policies in such a way as to realise two main objectives: 
external security and regime stability. The six states’ military capabilities were 
insufficient to guarantee security against potential aggressors in their 
subregional and regional environment. Hence, they sought to balance their 
military weakness by means of (1) stable relations and dynamic alliances with 
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each other as well as with subregional, regional, and supraregional powers214; 
(2) playing off potential aggressors against each other; and (3) using their 
growing economic and financial capabilities as alternative source of material 
power. All Arab Gulf monarchies had a vested interest in preserving a stable 
balance of power in the Gulf and in the greater Middle East and to prevent the 
emergence of a subregional or regional hegemon. 
While the historic memory of fatal overextension prompted a pragmatic Saudi 
foreign policy, the Kingdom still perceived itself as being entitled to dominance 
on the Arabian Peninsula.215 This was at times cause for concern among the 
smaller Arab Gulf monarchies; while Saudi Arabia was a source of economic 
and political support for some (e.g. Bahrain)216, the Kingdom refused to 
recognise the UAE over the Buraimi conflict.217 
To guarantee regime stability, the Arab Gulf monarchies needed to implement 
the basic interests of both the elites and the population. As the case of Oman 
clearly demonstrated, the provision of human development – e.g. housing, 
education, health care, a welfare system, electricity, physical infrastructure – 
was necessary to prevent popular uprisings against the regime. To finance such 
development, particularly with significant population growth rates, the regimes 
were heavily reliant on steady economic growth that in turn largely depended on 
oil-product export revenues.218 Hence, continuous growth of such revenues 
became an essential policy objective. 
In formulating their foreign policy, the regimes also needed to respect the non-
material interests of their people and traditional power bases. In this regard, 
expectations arising from the supranational concepts of Muslim and Arab 
identity entrenched in both the societies and influential interest groups (such as 
the ulama) were of particular significance; although to varying degrees between 
individual states. As chapter 4 will show, this was particularly palpable in 
context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially after 1967. However, the regimes’ 
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formulation of foreign policy partially along Pan-Islamic and Pan-Arab lines was 
not only a pragmatic response to popular and interest group pressure. The 
concepts of Arab and Islamic solidarity also rated high in the minds of many 
among the Arab Gulf monarchies’ senior decision-makers; a paramount 
example was the high importance Saudi King Faisal ascribed to the recovery of 
Muslim control over the Holy Sites in Jerusalem. The granting of large-scale 
financial aid to Arab and Islamic countries, too, was based on strategic and 
normative considerations.219 
A factor that weighed particularly heavy in Saudi foreign policy interests and 
influenced greatly the Kingdom’s policy was anti-Communist ideology. To a 
lesser degree, this was also true for the smaller Arab Gulf monarchies; even for 
Kuwait that for strategic reasons maintained relations with the USSR. 
On a regular basis, the Arab Gulf monarchies faced the dilemma that their 
foreign policy interests called for contradictory actions. A prominent example 
was the Saudi-U.S. relationship that often simultaneously protected and 
endangered Saudi internal stability and external security. The Arab Gulf 
monarchies reacted to this challenge by applying an omnibalancing strategy: 
they dynamically adjusted their policies in such a way as to guarantee all their 
foreign and domestic policy interests. 
2.5 The Arab Gulf Monarchies in 1971: Non-Material Capabilities and 
Weaknesses 
As Assiri notes, “the phenomenon of national identity and patriotism is a recent 
one in Arabia.”220 Ethnic, religious, sectarian, and tribal identities have a much 
longer history on the Arabian Peninsula and in 1971 were entrenched deeper in 
people’s minds. These non-national identities had the potential to create 
dangers to the stability of the Arab Gulf monarchies’ regimes. Citizens 
disenchanted with their living conditions, particularly when victimised by state 
discrimination, identified less with the state and increasingly with their tribal, 
regional, sectarian, or larger Arab background. This gave outside actors the 
possibility to intervene in domestic dynamics by instrumentalising transnational 
and conflicting identities. Both Nasser and the Iraqi Baath party attempted to 
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incite revolts against the monarchical regimes by spreading radical versions of 
Arab nationalist ideology. The discrimination of Shiite minorities in Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, and Kuwait caused the gradual development of parallel societies that 
identified themselves with their sectarian affiliation rather than their citizenship. 
This later caused parts of discriminated Shiites in the Arab Gulf monarchies to 
identify with the Iranian revolution and revolt against their regimes. Iraq also 
made (unsuccessful) attempts to incite revolt against the Saudi regime by 
bribing and arming Saudi tribes.221 
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia was able to draw significant power from the 
transnationality of Islamic identity. As the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques 
in Mecca and Medina the Kingdom had a prominent position within the Islamic 
World. This granted the Saudi regime significant soft power. 
2.6 Overview of Key Domestic and Environmental Changes, 1971-1990 
The previous sections identified the preservation of external security and regime 
stability as the Arab Gulf monarchies’ main policy interests in 1971. Moreover, I 
gave evidence that at that time the six states had very limited military power, a 
disadvantage that was partially compensated by economic and financial 
capabilities, the forging of alliances among each other and with third states, and 
the playing off of potential aggressors against one another. On the other hand, I 
showed the existence of substate and transboundary identities rivalling national 
identities as both a potential threat for domestic stability and a channel of 
external influence on the Arab Gulf monarchies’ domestic affairs. I further 
argued that in order to guarantee regime stability, the Arab Gulf monarchies 
needed to implement the basic interests (including foreign policy objectives) of 
both their elites and populations. Faced with the challenge that their various 
domestic and foreign policy interests called regularly for contradictory actions, 
the Arab Gulf monarchies applied an omnibalancing strategy with the intention 
to realise all their objectives. These basic determinants as well as the other 
fundamental foreign policy interests introduced above stayed the same during 
the entire period under review. 
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Within the scope of this dissertation it is impossible to trace in detail the 
domestic political, societal, economic, financial, and military developments in 
the Arab Gulf monarchies from 1971 to 1990. However, in order to fathom 
continuity and change in the six states’ foreign policies, it is crucial to highlight 
several key events and developments in national and international affairs that 
had major influence on public and regime interests, the options for the 
realisation of these interests, and eventually the Arab Gulf monarchies’ foreign 
policy formulation. 
During the first years of the timeframe under review, three developments had 
positive effects on the Arab Gulf monarchies’ domestic stability and external 
security. At the onset of the investigation period, Oman’s domestic stability was 
greatly challenged by the Dhofar War. However, over the course of the following 
years, with British, Iranian, Jordanian, and Saudi support, Sultan Qaboos’ 
forces managed to defeat the Dhofar rebels. In December 1975, the Sultan 
officially declared the end of the rebellion; four months later, the last fighting 
seized. Henceforth, the Omani regime was less preoccupied with domestic 
developments and engaged in a more active foreign policy. The end of the 
Dhofar War also allowed for a reshaping of bilateral relations with Iraq and the 
PDRY. 
Two and a half years earlier, the 1973 October War had served as a catalyst for 
a development in consequence of which the Arab Gulf monarchies’ economic 
and political power increased considerably. This had both positive effects on 
medium- and long-term regime stability in the six states and, particularly in the 
cases of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, allowed for greater foreign policy influence 
on the regional level. The latter aspect became especially palpable with respect 
to the exertion of influence on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the incipient peace 
process. 
When the United States granted Israel massive support during the October 
War, the Arab Gulf monarchies together with other Arab oil exporting states 
applied the oil weapon: they reduced their production quotas and issued an 
embargo against the United States (and several other states). The oil 
production reduction combined with significant market psychological effects 
provoked a quadrupling of oil prices within a matter of three months. However, 
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the 1973/74 oil crisis was only one element in a development that turned the 
Arab Gulf monarchies, less so Bahrain and Oman, into very wealthy rentier 
states with considerably increased economic power in international relations.222 
The revolution in the oil market had already begun a few years earlier. In 1971, 
the Arab Gulf monarchies’ profit share in oil exports had been increased from 
50% to 55%. In addition, the oil exporting Gulf states (including Iran and Iraq) 
had obtained the oil companies’ agreement to raise oil prices on an annual 
basis (prices increased from below $2 per barrel in early 1970 to $2.90 in April 
1973). A few days before the application of the oil weapon, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, together with Iran and Iraq, unilaterally increased 
the price of their oil by 70%; the first time that producer governments dictated oil 
prices.223 Another symptom of change in the oil market was the Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ gradual takeover of control over the companies producing their oil. 
In 1974, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar secured a 60% share of 
their oil concessionaires. A year later, Kuwait became the first Arab Gulf 
monarchy to nationalise completely its oil industry (nationalisation of Aminoil, 
which produced oil in the Kuwaiti-Saudi neutral zone, followed in 1977).224 The 
takeover of greater control over their oil industries allowed the Arab Gulf 
monarchies to use oil production and export quotas more effectively as a 
political instrument. 
The massively increased oil revenues made it possible for the Arab Gulf 
monarchies to develop into rentier states that provide far-reaching services to 
their populations free of charge; this contributed to domestic and regime 
stability. 
The Arab Gulf monarchies also increased their military potential by investing 
large amounts in arms procurements (this was particularly true for Saudi 
Arabia); however, as Iran and Iraq also profited from high oil revenues and 
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developed their already superior militaries as well, the Arab Gulf monarchies’ 
relative military power did not increase significantly.225 
The Algiers Accord, reached between Iran and Iraq at the March 1975 OPEC 
meeting, was the most significant shift in the international relations of the Gulf 
since the British withdrawal from the subregion in 1971. The Iranian-Iraqi 
agreement alleviated many of the tensions between Iran and Iraq as well as 
Iraq and the Arab Gulf monarchies. For a few years, despite their partially 
contradictory objectives, all littoral states of the Gulf refrained to the largest 
extent from aggressive rhetoric and behaviour in relations to one another and 
engaged in limited multilateral cooperation. 
Between the autumn of 1978 and the autumn of 1980 a series of developments 
in the Gulf and beyond had lasting effects on the subregional and regional 
political status quo and consequently on the Arab Gulf monarchies’ domestic 
and external security situation. The 1978 Camp David Accords and the 
subsequent Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty prompted Egypt’s political exile from 
the Arab fold. This development redefined the inter-Arab balance of power to 
the disadvantage of the Arab Gulf monarchies. The latter found themselves in a 
dilemma between their interests regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, the 
necessity to preserve their strategic relations with the United States, and their 
desire to both maintain a stable and moderate balance of power in the Arab 
world and prevent becoming the target of radical Arab factions. The 
developments following Egypt’s separate peace with Israel motivated Saudi 
Arabia and the smaller Arab Gulf monarchies to develop the first holistic Arab 
peace plan in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
In 1979, the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy and its succession by a Shiite 
Islamic revolutionary regime under Ayatollah Khomeini radically altered 
international relations in the Gulf. Subsequently, the Arab Gulf monarchies were 
faced with an incalculable, aggressive, and subversive adversary that, to 
different degrees, challenged them ideologically, religiously, and militarily. After 
initial attempts to maintain solid relations with Tehran, the Arab Gulf 
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monarchies, to different degrees, opted for a rapprochement with Iraq, the 
lesser of two evils. 
In October 1980, after months of escalating bilateral tensions, Iraq invaded 
revolutionary Iran. Consequently, the Arab Gulf monarchies were put in the 
difficult situation to take a stand in the military conflict, and the northern Gulf 
and later the subregion’s economically crucial waterways were turned into war 
theatres. The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War also served as a catalyst for the 
creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). During the eight-year-long war, 
the Arab Gulf monarchies, more than before, had to formulate their policies 
towards each of the conflict parties with particular regard to the effect it would 
have on the relations with the other. It soon became the Arab Gulf monarchies’ 
vital interest to bring about an end to the military conflict between their two 
militarily very powerful neighbour states. 
In December 1979, another development in their broader geographic vicinity 
greatly concerned the Arab Gulf monarchies. The Soviet Union’s military 
intervention in the Afghan civil war gave a new impetus to the global Cold War 
and caused concern about both Soviet advances into the Gulf and an 
escalation of the superpower contestation in the Arab Gulf monarchies’ 
immediate environment. 
Towards the end of the period under review, two further exogenous 
developments had great effect on the Arab Gulf monarchies’ foreign relations 
with Iran and Iraq and their position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The first Intifada, 
a large-scale uprising of the Palestinian people against the Israeli occupation, 
which began in December 1987, and the violent Israeli reaction infuriated the 
populations and regimes of the Arab Gulf monarchies and motivated the 
regimes to both refocus their attention on the Arab-Israeli conflict and take a 
more pronounced pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli stance than in the preceding 
years. In this context, particularly Oman’s policy underwent significant change. 
Finally, the end of the Iran-Iraq War in August 1988 induced a new profound 
change in the international relations of the Gulf. Following the ceasefire, Iranian 
foreign policy towards the Arab Gulf monarchies underwent a shift towards a 
more pragmatic stance; a development that accelerated after the death of 
Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1989. In contrast, Iraq took an increasingly 
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aggressive attitude towards the Arab Gulf monarchies, particularly Kuwait and 
the UAE. By the early summer of 1990, Iraq had once again become a 
significant threat to the security of at least some Arab Gulf monarchies. 
The following two chapters deal in detail with two pivotal foreign policy case 
studies: the Arab Gulf monarchies’ relations with Iran and Iraq (chapter 3) and 
the six states’ position in the Arab-Israeli conflict (chapter 4). 
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3. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE ARAB GULF MONARCHIES WITH IRAN 
AND IRAQ, 1971-1990 
During the timeframe under review all six Arab Gulf monarchies formulated their 
policies towards Iran and Iraq in such a way as to realise four main objectives: 
external security and territorial integrity; domestic and regime stability; eco-
nomic prosperity; and the attainment of a stable subregional balance of power 
without the emergence of Iran or Iraq as Gulf hegemon. In the case of Saudi 
Arabia, two additional objectives have to be added to the list: the protection of 
its sphere of influence on the Arabian Peninsula and the preservation of its role 
as the leader of the Muslim world. 
Despite the fact that their basic policy objectives were and remained identical, 
the Arab Gulf monarchies’ individual bilateral relations with Iran and Iraq 
showed both significant change over time and marked differences in 
comparison to one another. This was due to the fact that several factors differed 
from one state to another or underwent change over time. At any given time the 
individual constellation of these factors defined the basis for bilateral relations. 
These factors were: geostrategic position, military strength, the existence of 
military aggression, territorial claims, subversive activities, or ideological 
challenging by either Iran or Iraq, the national and sectarian composition and 
ideological orientation of the population, and economic orientation. 
As during the entire period under review, Iran and Iraq were in conflict with each 
other – ranging from uneasy détente to open warfare –, the Arab Gulf 
monarchies had to formulate their policies to each of the two states with regard 
to the effect it would have on the relations with the other. In this context, the 
degree of vulnerability to retaliations was an important decision criterion.  
In this chapter I will highlight that over the largest part of the period under 
review the Arab Gulf monarchies managed to offset threats to their basic 
interests emanating from Iran and Iraq by alternately appeasing and balancing 
the source of the threat. The only significant failure to do so occurred in the 
summer of 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. However, in this particular case, the 
question arises as to whether it had been within the limits of Kuwait’s 
capabilities to prevent the invasion. 
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In addition, this chapter will reveal that the Arab Gulf monarchies cooperated to 
a significant degree in dealing with Iranian and Iraqi threats to their interests; 
this cooperation grew over time as threats intensified. 
From Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf to the Iranian Revolution the individual 
Arab Gulf monarchies’ relations with Iran and Iraq showed increasing 
convergence. This changed after the upheavals in Iran and particularly following 
the initial phase of the Iran-Iraq War when the six members of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council were increasingly divided into a neutral and a pro-Iraqi 
camp. At times, this discrepancy was cause for dispute; however, it also 
allowed the Arab Gulf monarchies as a group a greater radius of operation. In 
the post-war phase, Saudi-Iranian relations greatly diverged from the other Arab 
Gulf monarchies’ ties with Tehran; at the same time, the GCC states’ relations 
with Iraq varied between cautious rapprochement, appeasement, and conflict 
escalation. 
The timeframe under review can be divided into four distinct periods: from 
Britain’s withdrawal in 1971 to the Algiers Accord in 1975; from the Algiers 
Accord to the 1979 Iranian Revolution; from the Iranian Revolution to the end of 
the Iran-Iraq War in August 1988; and finally from late summer 1988 to the eve 
of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. 
3.1 The Pre-1971 Era 
Before the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, only Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait maintained regular diplomatic relations with states other than the United 
Kingdom. Bahrain, Qatar, and the seven Trucial states that later formed the 
UAE were still British protectorates and as such prohibited from entering into 
diplomatic relations with third states. In the case of Oman, de jure not a 
protectorate, it was by choice of Sultan Said bin Taimur rather than due to treaty 
obligation that the country maintained little political relations with states other 
than the United Kingdom. Nonetheless, particularly in the case of the British 
Gulf protectorates economic, societal, and sub-diplomatic political interaction 
existed with neighbour states such as Iran and Iraq. This was particularly true 
for the time after Britain’s decision to leave the Gulf. 
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Saudi Arabia’s Relations with Iran in the Pre-1971 Era 
Diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran go back to before the 
foundation of the Saudi Kingdom. In 1929, the Kingdom of Najd and Hijaz 
signed a Treaty of Friendship with Iran. Reportedly, King Abdulaziz Al Saud, the 
later founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, had aimed for more than a non-
aggression pact. Abdulaziz is said to have proposed Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran 
the conclusion of a mutual defence treaty, an offer that the Shah declined. In 
May 1932, Prince (later King) Faisal bin Abdulaziz paid an extended visit to 
Iran, marking the first high-ranking diplomatic visit in bilateral relations between 
Riyadh and Tehran. Up until the Allied occupation of Iran in 1941, the two states 
maintained regular, non-conflictual diplomatic relations.226 
The execution of an Iranian pilgrim found guilty of desecrating the Kaaba during 
the hajj in December 1943, then prompted a diplomatic crisis between Iran and 
Saudi Arabia. The bilateral conflict escalated until, in March 1944, Tehran 
abrogated diplomatic relations with Riyadh. In the end, it was King Abdulaziz 
who took the initiative for the restoration of bilateral relations; a clear sign of the 
importance the Saudi monarch ascribed to stable ties with Iran. In October 
1946, King Abdulaziz sent a personal letter to the Shah, calling for the renewal 
of bilateral relations “based on old and faithful ties.”227 Diplomatic relations were 
eventually restored in early 1947.228 
In the following years, Saudi-Iranian relations saw considerable improvement 
due to the two states’ common interests in close ties with the United States as 
well as in the sphere of oil policy. Saudi non-interference in Iranian domestic 
affairs guaranteed the continuation of good bilateral relations during Iran’s short 
republican interlude from 1951 to 1953. Following Shah Reza Pahlavi’s 
accession to power in 1953, Saudi-Iranian relations grew consistently closer 
due to largely identical policy interests and threat perceptions. King Saud’s 
nearly week-long state visit to Iran in August 1955 served as proof of the close 
bilateral relations. Nonetheless, there were also differences in policy stances 
between the two states: the Saudi regime rejected the Baghdad Pact Iran was a 
part of, repudiated Iran’s claim to Bahrain, and was upset about Iran’s conduct 
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during the Suez crisis when Tehran failed to protest against the invasion of 
Egypt. Particularly the last aspect caused friction in Saudi-Iranian relations. 
However, differences could partially be smoothed out during the Shah’s six-day 
visit to Saudi Arabia in mid-March 1957. This time, it was the Shah who 
suggested a common defence pact, while the Saudi King was reluctant to take 
up the initiative. Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the Shah’s visit bilateral 
relations showed further improvement.229 
An important reason for the continuing improvement in Saudi-Iranian relations 
was that in the second half of the 1950s, two political developments, one 
regional and one subregional in nature, posed significant dangers to the vital 
interests of both states. First, following the 1956 Suez War, Egyptian President 
Nasser gained rapidly in both regional power and Arab public support. Nasser’s 
progressive, anti-monarchical Arab nationalist foreign policy soon became a 
threat to the Saudi regime and turned a former ally into a powerful adversary. 
Moreover, Nasser’s increasingly close relations with the Soviet Union stood in 
clear contrast to the staunchly anti-Communist regimes in Riyadh and Tehran. 
Second, the overthrow of King Faisal II, coupled with the elimination of the Iraqi 
monarchical system deeply shocked both the Iranian Shah regime and the 
Saudi monarchy. Both leaderships were anxious of a revolutionary spill-over to 
their territory. In consequence, with the steep ascent of Nasser, the extension of 
Soviet regional influence, and the fall of a first monarchy in the Gulf subregion, 
Saudi Arabia and Iran shared common threats. Under this impression, Riyadh 
and Tehran furthered gradually their bilateral rapprochement.230 
The Egyptian-sponsored September 1962 coup d’état in North Yemen that 
overthrew the Mutawakkilite Kingdom served as further proof of Nasser’s 
objective to rid the Middle East of monarchical regimes. This development, in 
the course of which an anti-Saudi republican regime was installed in Sana’a, 
deeply worried Riyadh and Tehran. Both states denied the new regime their 
diplomatic recognition and provided political and military support to the ousted 
Imam Muhammad Al Badr in his fight to regain power. While Saudi support for 
the royalists set in soon after the coup, Tehran was at first reluctant to 
intervene. Iran eventually initiated its support for the Imam’s forces in 1964, 
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once the new Yemen Arab Republic had been in the grip of a fierce civil war. 
Subsequently, Riyadh and Tehran coordinated their support for the Yemeni 
royalists. Beside shipments of arms and supplies the Shah supported the 
Yemeni royalists with military training; for this purpose Yemeni troops were sent 
to Iran through Saudi Arabia.231 
King Faisal’s accession to the throne in 1964 led to a further improvement in 
Saudi-Iranian relations. For example, Riyadh and Tehran both supported 
Pakistan during and in the aftermath of the 1965 Indian-Pakistani War. 
Moreover, Iran supported Saudi Arabia’s pan-Islamist and Islamic solidarity 
policy.232 Nonetheless, Riyadh approached Iran’s foreign policy behaviour and 
objectives with scepticism which had a decelerating effect on the bilateral 
rapprochement. For one thing, Saudi Arabia frowned at Iran’s pragmatic stand 
towards Israel both for ideological and strategic reasons. Iran’s de facto 
recognition of Israel in 1950 and ensuing relationship with the latter put the 
Saudi regime in a dilemma. In order to avoid complications in their relations with 
other Arab states the Saudi leadership had to refrain from too close a 
relationship with Iran. The Shah, who appreciated the Saudi quandary, agreed 
“to conduct […] bilateral relations cautiously and quietly.”233 This was much in 
Riyadh’s interest, not least since the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, evidenced 
for example by King Faisal’s state visit to Iran in December 1965, was met with 
significant Egyptian and Syrian opposition.234 In addition, the Saudi regime was 
concerned about Iran’s ambition to rise to a position of dominance in the 
Gulf.235 In this respect, a particular bone of contention was Iran’s above-
mentioned historic claim to Bahrain. The Iranian government had repeatedly 
raised protest against what it considered British violations of its sovereign rights 
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in Bahrain. In November 1957, the Iranian majlis enacted a law in which it 
proclaimed Bahrain Iran’s 14th province. To emphasise its claim, Iran 
symbolically reserved two seats in its legislative chamber for Bahraini 
delegates.236 
In 1967 and 1968 four events, two in the regional and two in the subregional 
sphere, redefined Saudi-Iranian relations. The first two events lead to a 
temporary alienation in bilateral relations while the third and fourth incident 
triggered a lasting rapprochement. First, following the historic Arab defeat in the 
course of the 1967 Six-Day War Nasser’s and with him Arab nationalism’s 
reputation in the Arab world suffered a massive blow. Moreover, in its recovery 
from the war’s significant damages Egypt became financially and economically 
dependent on Saudi Arabia and therefore gave up its earlier anti-Saudi policy. 
Cairo abandoned particularly its massive support for pro-Soviet, anti-
monarchical factions on the Arabian Peninsular which had significantly worried 
Riyadh and Tehran alike. Hence, a common threat that had bound together 
Saudi Arabia and Iran for roughly a decade was fading away.237 
Second, when, in January 1968, the United Kingdom declared that it would 
abandon permanently its political and military presence in the Gulf by 1971, 
Tehran and Riyadh had conflicting visions of the subregion’s future order. The 
Saudi government was increasingly concerned about Iran’s hegemonic 
ambitions. Iran reiterated its claim to Bahrain; now, with Bahrain’s days as 
British protectorate coming to an end, the realisation of Iran’s territorial 
ambitions had become much more realistic. Saudi Arabia strictly opposed Iran’s 
claim, mainly because it wanted to prevent an extension of Iranian political and 
military power to its immediate neighbourhood. To emphasise its consideration 
of Bahrain as independent from Iran King Faisal received Sheikh Isa bin 
Salman Al Khalifa as Bahrain’s “head of state” one week before the Shah was 
scheduled to visit Riyadh in early February 1968. During Sheikh Isa’s visit it was 
even reported that he had discussed with the Saudi leadership the construction 
of a causeway connecting their two countries. Protesting against Saudi Arabia’s 
political statement, the Shah cancelled his visit. Following this episode Saudi-
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Iranian relations were tense for a few months and it took Moroccan King 
Hassan’s conciliation between King Faisal and the Shah to improve bilateral 
relations again.238 
Beside Bahrain Iran also laid claim on three islands in the Gulf, the Lower and 
Lesser Tunb islands so far administered by the Trucial state of Ras al-Khaimah 
as well as the island of Abu Musa controlled by Sharjah. It was in the context of 
these territorial claims that Iran rejected the creation of a Union of Arab 
Emirates comprised of Bahrain, Qatar, and the seven Trucial states as the 
United Kingdom had suggested. When the Shah for his part suggested the 
establishment of a joint security complex comprised of Iran and the Arab Gulf 
states, his proposal was rejected by both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Together 
with Bahrain the two Arab Gulf monarchies had agreed both to form joint 
security mechanisms excluding Iran and to refrain from entering into bilateral 
security agreements with Tehran.239 
Third, yet another coup d’état in Iraq brought the Baath Party back to power in 
Baghdad240, posing a very significant threat to both the Saudi and Iranian 
regimes. Fürtig encapsulates the threat for Riyadh and Tehran emanating from 
the new Iraqi government, 
“Although the Baath had governed Syria since 1963, Iraq was a direct 
neighbour with proven economic power, an educated population and 
huge resources of oil and other raw materials. The slogans of the new 
strong men in Baghdad, ‘Unity’, ‘Freedom’ and ‘Socialism’, were a direct 
challenge to the policies of the conservative Gulf monarchies. ‘Unity’ had 
clear pan-Arab implications replacing the danger of an enforced 
Nasserite drive for unity with a Baathist one. ‘Freedom’ meant the 
rejection of any foreign domination of the Middle East and was aimed at 
the close relationship between the Gulf monarchs and the West. 
‘Socialism’, although not interpreted in a Marxist sense by the leaders of 
the Baath party, was the most hated word of all. It meant republicanism, 
the undermining of an Islamic basis for claims to legitimacy and, at the 
least, the liquidation of privileges for present and precious rulers.”241 
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Constituting a significant challenge for both their future security, the Iraqi regime 
change had a centripetal effect on Saudi-Iranian relations. 
Fourth, on November 30, 1967, the socialist Yemeni National Liberation Front 
(NLF) proclaimed the People’s Republic of South Yemen (PRSY). The firm 
long-term objective of the newly founded state’s regime was to liberate not just 
Yemen but all of the Arabian Peninsula from autocratic monarchical regimes 
and foreign domination. South Yemen soon began to strive for the realisation of 
its objective by supporting and supplying the rebels in neighbouring Oman’s 
Dhofar province in their fight against the Sultan. Hence, with Baathist Iraq and 
the PRSY there were two revolutionary, socialist, and anti-monarchical states in 
Saudi Arabia and Iran’s immediate neighbourhood.242 
The developments in Yemen and Iraq convinced the leaderships in Riyadh and 
Tehran of the necessity to cooperate closely in facing the common threats; the 
dispute over Bahrain had lost significance. First evidence of Saudi-Iranian 
rapprochement was the signing of a new border agreement including the 
settlement of a territorial dispute over two islands in the Gulf (Farsi and al-
Arabiyah) in October 1968.243 The following month the Shah paid an extended 
visit to Saudi Arabia; the Iranian leader and King Faisal emphasised their 
countries’ joint Muslim identity and agreed “to work together to exclude 
revolutionary forces.”244 Indeed, over the next year the foreign ministers of both 
states met on a regular basis to discuss political developments in the Gulf.245 
Important issues influencing the Saudi-Iranian relations in 1970 and 1971 were 
the future control over Bahrain and the three islands in the Gulf. As mentioned 
above, Saudi Arabia had a strong interest in Bahraini independence from 
Iranian control. Hence, Riyadh was very pleased when the Shah gave up his 
claim on the island state. In reaction to the settlement, King Faisal sent a 
message to the Shah in which he 
“expresse[d] appreciation for [the] successful steps which [were] taken 
personally by [the] Shah ‘with support of members of his government and 
representatives of [the] noble people of Iran’ which led to a ‘peaceful 
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settlement of [the] Bahrain question and her orderly preparation for [the] 
performance of her duties’ as well as Iran’s effective contribution to [the] 
maintenance [of] peace and stability in [the] region.”246 
Commenting on King Faisal’s message to the Shah, U.S. Ambassador 
Hermann F. Eilts correctly predicted that 
“the highly laudatory statements praising [the] Iranian leadership should 
further serve to improve Saudi-Iranian relations and allow closer 
cooperation by [the] two countries on Gulf matters.”247 
Already a month before the eventual settlement of the Bahrain issue, Saudi 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Saqqaf, during a visit to Tehran, had praised 
both the Shah and the Iranian policy which he called “good for [the] entire 
Middle East.” Saqqaf even called Saudi Arabia and Iran’s interests in the Gulf 
identical as both states had the desire to “keep [the] area peaceful, stable, and 
progressive, making it impregnable to infiltration by those who try to harm [the] 
interest of [the] region.”248 
However, the Saudi regime remained concerned about Iranian claims to the 
three islands thus far belonging to Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah respectively. As 
in the case of Bahrain, Riyadh also tried unsuccessfully to mediate in the issue 
of Abu Musa and the Tunbs; for this purpose King Faisal met Iranian Foreign 
Minister Ardashir Zahedi in Switzerland on October 1970.249 While Iran’s 
eventual forcible seizure of the Tunb islands on November 30, 1971 was not in 
Saudi Arabia’s interest, it was considered by the Kingdom as an acceptable 
price for the continuation of the Saudi-Iranian cooperation in the Gulf. In 
contrast, Saudi Arabia was concerned that in light of the island dispute Ras al-
Khaimah had since 1970 been seeking a rapprochement with Baathist Iraq. In 
the end, Iranian occupation of two uninhabited Arab islands, even if that meant 
increased Iranian control in the Gulf, was much more acceptable to Riyadh than 
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an expansion of radical, revolutionary Iraqi influence on the Arabian Penin-
sula.250 
Saudi Arabia’s Relations with Iraq in the Pre-1971 Era 
Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq have been conflictual ever since 
independence of the Iraqi Kingdom in October 1932. Already a decade earlier, 
Abdulaziz Al Saud, the later founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, had 
rejected the British installation of a Hashemite monarchical dynasty in 
Mandatory Iraq. At the time, the Hashemites, ruling over the Kingdom of Hijaz, 
were one of the two main opponents of the Al Saud. When, at the March 1921 
Cairo Conference, the British mandatory power decided to establish Hashemite 
rule over the Kingdoms of Transjordan and Iraq, Abdulaziz became partially 
encircled by his enemies.251 On November 4 of the same year, the Al Saud 
finally defeated their other arch enemy on the Arabian Peninsula, the Al Rashid. 
Over the next months, Saudi Ikhwan forces asserted control over the entire 
Rashidi territory with the consequence of frequent clashes between the Ikhwan 
and tribes residing partially in territories claimed by Transjordan and Iraq. The 
United Kingdom had a strong interest in ending these violent confrontations as 
their planned railway, which was to connect the Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea, 
would cross through the embattled territories. Consequently, on British initiative, 
representatives of the Al Saud, Iraq, and the Kuwaiti Al Sabah conferred at 
Muhammara to demarcate their borders. Upon successful negotiations the 
Treaty of Muhammara was signed on May 5, 1922. After Abdulaziz’ objection to 
ratify the signed agreement, the Treaty of Muhammara was amended by the so 
called Uqair Protocol on December 2, 1922. This document re-regulated the 
border between Najd and Kuwait to the advantage of the Al Saud and 
established a temporary neutral zone to be administered equally by both 
states.252 
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Despite the ratification of the Treaty of Muhammara, the following years saw 
“the outbreak of serious border warfare.”253 Due to the family ties between the 
leaderships of the Hijaz and Iraq (and Transjordan), relations between the Al 
Saud and King Hussein bin Ali influenced the Saudi-Iraqi relations, too. 
Moreover, when the Najdi-Hijazi conflict escalated, particularly from August 
1924 onwards, Saudi-Iraqi relations deteriorated as well. In 1925, following the 
overthrow of the Hashemite rule over Mecca, Abdulaziz agreed to settle 
conflicting issues with both Iraq and Transjordan through British mediation.254 
In the following years, the Ikhwan called for jihad against the Iraqi “infidels” but, 
as he did not want to provoke major conflict with the United Kingdom, Abdulaziz 
rejected their aspirations. In October 1927, a group of Ikhwan attacked an Iraqi 
frontier post provoking a staunch military response. Despite his personal 
rejection of the attack King Abdulaziz felt obliged to justify the Ikhwan’s action 
before the United Kingdom and protested against the British-Iraqi military 
response. At this time, the King was not yet ready to fight the Ikhwan. 
Negotiations to end the conflict failed in April 1928 and numerous clashes 
between Ikhwan and Iraqi forces “brought the situation in Najd close to 
anarchy.”255 
In early 1929, the simmering conflict between the Ikhwan and King Abdulaziz 
escalated into a full-fledged rebellion. Once forces loyal to the King had 
defeated the Ikhwan attacks on Iraq ended. Ironically, after having been 
defeated in the inner-Najdi struggle, some of the fiercest fighters among the 
staunchly anti-Iraqi Ikhwan sought asylum in Iraq. Iraq’s rejection to extradite 
them then instigated serious conflict with the Al Saud. However, under British 
mediation the conflict could be solved and on February 22, 1930 King Faisal of 
Iraq and King Abdulaziz of Najd and the Hijaz met onboard the British HMS 
Lupin and signed a friendship and good neighbourship agreement.256 
Nonetheless, the relations between the Al Saud and Iraq remained competitive 
and mostly hostile. The main reason for Iraqi hostility towards King Abdulaziz 
was that he had dispossessed the Hashemite family of their control over the 
Hijaz. To counter the perils emanating from the two Hashemite states, 
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Abdulaziz, meanwhile King of the newly founded Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
entered into an agreement with the United Kingdom: Saudi Arabia would 
respect the integrity of the British Gulf protectorates in return for British 
assurances that Iraq and Transjordan would refrain from attacking Saudi 
territory.257 This arrangement satisfied Saudi security interests until the early 
post-World War II period. However, the subsequent British initiative to reduce its 
presence in the Middle East in general and its involvement in the politics of Iraq 
and Transjordan in particular caused new concerns in Riyadh. Particularly 
worrisome to Saudi Arabia were initially British-backed visions of new state 
federations – Greater Syria and the Fertile Crescent –, brought forward by the 
rulers of Transjordan and Iraq respectively. As he had lost his confidence in 
British protection against the Hashemite danger, King Abdulaziz turned to the 
United States for security guarantees; a defence assistance agreement was 
signed in 1951. Moreover, the Saudi King made attempts to balance Hashemite 
influence by establishing ties with Egypt, Syria, and other Arab states.258 
Saudi concerns about the danger to its security emanating from Iraq were 
increased with the establishment of the Baghdad Pact in November 1955.259 
Safran encapsulates Saudi apprehension as follows: 
“King Saud and his advisers saw in Iraq’s participation [in the Baghdad 
Pact] a resurgence in a most virulent form of the old Hashemite threat. 
They had visions of Iraq with Western help wooing Syria, Jordan, and 
Lebanon into the alliance, realizing its scheme of the Fertile Crescent, 
and then turning on them. At the very least, they saw Iraq using its 
access to the best equipment in the Western arsenals to build up its 
military power and then using it independently in direct or indirect ways to 
recover the Hijaz and avenge the defeat inflicted on its ruling family by 
Ibn Saud.”260 
In a balancing move, Saudi Arabia sought a strategic alliance with Egypt. A 
month before the creation of the Baghdad Pact, King Saud and President 
Nasser signed a mutual defence treaty. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia and Egypt 
made efforts to isolate Iraq in the Arab world and destabilise the Iraqi 
leadership. Moreover, Egypt helped to improve Saudi Arabia’s defence 
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capacities.261 Saudi-Iraqi relations improved after a visit of King Saud to 
Baghdad in March 1957, during which the Iraqi King warned the Saudi monarch 
of the danger Nasser posed not only to Iraq but also to Saudi Arabia.262 
When the Iraqi regime was toppled in the course of the 14 July Revolution of 
1958, the Saudi leadership looked at the development with mixed feelings. On 
the positive side, the revolution dethroned the rival Hashemite dynasty. It was to 
be expected that the Saudi annexation of the Hijaz would no longer burden 
Saudi-Iraqi relations. Moreover, Riyadh was pleased when the new Iraqi regime 
distanced itself from the Baghdad Pact and eventually withdrew from it in March 
1959. In addition, the end of the overly close British-Iraqi relations was also in 
the interest of the Saudi regime that for years had been in conflict with the 
United Kingdom over the Buraimi Oasis and had even abrogated diplomatic 
relations in the course of the Suez War.263 However, the Iraqi Revolution also 
entailed manifold threats to Saudi interests. For one thing, Riyadh was very 
concerned about the appeal Iraqi republicanism and Arab nationalism could 
have to the Saudi population. Although Saudi-Egyptian relations had not yet 
deteriorated to enmity, the Saudi regime was well aware of the dangers of 
facing two Arab nationalist regimes in its immediate environment. Moreover, the 
Qasim regime turned away from previous Western integration, became hostile 
towards the United States and other Western powers, and “sought Communist 
support internally and Soviet military and economic assistance externally to 
assert ‘Iraq’s independence.”264 Only three days after the revolution, the new 
Iraqi regime entered into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.265 Being 
staunchly anti-Soviet and having a strategic need for close relations with the 
United States, Saudi Arabia was in complete disagreement with Iraq. Overall, 
from the Saudi perspective the Iraqi revolution of 1958 caused more concerns 
than it eliminated. 
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Over the next decade Saudi-Iraqi relations fluctuated between uneasy and 
hostile. This was due to the two states’ incongruent political ideologies and 
policy objectives. Yet another aspect Saudi Arabia and Iraq were in 
disagreement about was Iraq’s stance towards Kuwait. The Saudi regime 
supported Kuwait’s independence and membership in the Arab League. When 
Qasim raised claim on Kuwait and seemed prepared to annex the Emirate by 
force, Saudi Arabia sent troops to protect its neighbour state.266 Due to Saudi 
Arabia’s diplomatic recognition of Kuwait, Baghdad abrogated bilateral relations 
with Riyadh.267 
As mentioned above, the Baath party’s takeover in Baghdad in July 1968 in 
combination with the upcoming British withdrawal from the Gulf posed serious 
danger to the Saudi regime. Iraqi policies stood in marked contrast to Riyadh’s 
interests, as Baghdad sought to transform the Gulf according to its socialist, 
anti-Western, republican, pan-Arabist, and nationalist expansionist political 
ideology. Moreover, the close Soviet-Iraqi relations seem to have concerned the 
Saudi regime. In November 1970, acting Saudi Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs Masud told U.S. Ambassador Thatcher that his government felt encircled 
by Soviet proxies: Yemen at its southern border and Iraq to its north.268 
Kuwait’s Relations with Iraq in the Pre-1971 Era 
Ever since its 1899 treaty with the United Kingdom, Kuwait’s relations with Iraq 
have been difficult. Following the First World War Iraq supported nationalist 
elements within the Kuwaiti society in an attempt to weaken British influence in 
the sheikhdom.269 Between its independence in 1932 and the end of the 
decade, the Iraqi Kingdom had made repeated attempts to annex Kuwait.270 In 
the 1930s and 1940s, Kuwait denied repeated Iraqi requests to post an 
ambassador in Kuwait.271 
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In 1951, the Iraqi government signified its readiness to demarcate its border 
with Kuwait; however, only on the condition that Baghdad would be given full 
sovereignty over Warba Island. Three years later, Iraq extended its territorial 
claim and demanded additionally sovereignty over roughly four kilometres of the 
Kuwaiti coastline west of Warba and Bubiyan Island (Khor al-Sabiya). Kuwait 
rejected both Iraqi demands as well as the British mediation proposal which 
suggested an Iraqi lease of Warba Island.272 
Following the Iraqi Revolution of 1958, a solution of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi dispute 
seemed to be within reach. However, Baghdad did not fold permanently its 
ambitions with regard to its comparatively small neighbour. At first, the newly 
founded Iraqi Republic implicitly recognised Kuwait as a separate entity as 
evidenced inter alia in diplomatic correspondence between the governments of 
Iraq and Kuwait, a trade agreement signed in April 1961, Iraqi support for 
Kuwait’s membership in international specialised agencies and the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), and Iraq’s acceptance of Kuwait’s founding 
membership of OPEC in September 1960.273 However, when Kuwait gained 
independence from the United Kingdom on June 19, 1961, the Iraqi stance 
changed significantly. In a first reaction Iraqi Prime Minister Abdulkarim Qasim 
congratulated Sheikh Abdullah Al Salim Al Sabah “on having got rid of the false 
[British-Kuwaiti] agreement of 1899, but saying nothing about his 
independence.”274 Barely one week later, on June 25, Qasim publicly laid claim 
to Kuwait, stating that effective the following day Kuwait would be part of the 
Iraqi district of Basra. In addition, Qasim uttered a serious warning in the 
direction of the Kuwaiti Emir, stating, “if he […] were to misbehave he would 
receive […] a severe punishment and be considered a rebel.”275 Reportedly, the 
Iraqi regime immediately started with preparations for a forced annexation of 
Kuwait.276 
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In prompt reaction to Qasim’s announcement, the Kuwaiti Emir declared his and 
his people’s willingness to defend their independence. However, at that time 
Kuwait’s armed forces were limited to a mere 2,000 to 3,000 troops and clearly 
inferior to Iraq’s 60,000 men strong and modern equipped Iraqi military. Hence, 
the Kuwaiti ruler invoked the friendship agreement he had signed with the 
United Kingdom barely two weeks earlier. In this treaty the United Kingdom 
committed to come to Kuwait’s defence upon the latter’s request. Honouring its 
treaty obligation the British military initiated Operation Vantage. On June 30, the 
Royal Navy moved a fleet of frigates, commando, and aircraft carriers towards 
Kuwait. On the following day, 600 British ground troops landed in the Emirate 
and took position on the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. Eventually, the British troop level 
was increased to 5,000. In addition, 5,000 to 6,000 Kuwaiti volunteers as well 
as 2,000 Saudi soldiers helped to protect Kuwait from an Iraqi invasion. In 
addition, the Iraqi verbal and military threats against Kuwait were brought 
before the UN Security Council.277 Harshly protesting the Council’s dealing with 
the issue and reiterating Baghdad’s claim on Kuwait, the Iraqi UN 
representative declared that 
“Kuwait is not and has never been an independent State. It has always 
been considered, historically and legally, a part of the Basra province of 
Iraq. There can be no question of an international dispute arising 
between Iraq and Kuwait since the latter is an integral part of the Iraqi 
Republic.”278 
In the end, a Soviet veto prevented any Security Council resolution on the 
Kuwait crisis. Consequently, Kuwait sought broad Arab support and deterrence 
against Baghdad’s aggression. Hence, in a letter to Egyptian President Nasser 
dated July 12, Kuwait applied for membership in the Arab League. In order to 
get Nasser’s support for Kuwait’s admission to the regional organisation, the 
Emirate had to request the withdrawal of the British troops from its territory. On 
July 20, against Iraqi protest, Kuwait was admitted as the twelfth member of the 
Arab League.279 
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To guarantee a continued deterrence against an Iraqi invasion the British troops 
were replaced by a joint Arab League peacekeeping force.280 The Arab League 
troops, numbering roughly 3,300, arrived in Kuwait between September 10 and 
October 3. The largest contingents of 1,200 men each were provided by the 
United Arab Republic (UAR) and Saudi Arabia. By October 10, with the 
exception of a few military advisors, all British troops had left Kuwait. While the 
UAR troops left Kuwait in December 1961, the remaining troops remained until 
early 1963.281 
Even in absence of an Iraqi invasion, Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations remained heavily 
strained for another two years. Iraq denied Kuwait’s statehood recognition and 
did not enter into bilateral diplomatic relations with the Emirate. In addition, 
through its Soviet ally Iraq indirectly blocked Kuwait’s admission to the United 
Nations. It took another Iraqi Revolution and the overthrow of Prime Minister 
Qasim on February 8, 1963 for Iraq’s attitude towards Kuwait to undergo 
significant change. Hoping for improved relations with the new Iraqi regime, 
Kuwaiti Emir Abdullah Al Salim promptly sent a congratulatory telegram to Iraq’s 
new President, Colonel Abdulsalam Arif. In an attempt to improve relations with 
the new Iraqi regime, 
“Kuwait’s government announced in parliament on April 9, 1963, that it 
would review its friendship agreement of 1961 with Britain and ‘adopt a 
Kuwaiti position’ in keeping with the political realities in the region 
[thereby referring to the success of Arab nationalism not least in Iraq].”282 
However, it took several months before the new regime altered the previous 
Iraqi attitude towards Kuwait. When Kuwait applied for UN membership again, 
Iraq renewed its objection, reiterating its “legitimate rights” over Kuwait. 
However, this time Iraq could not prevent Kuwait’s admission.283 
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A few months later, the situation had changed. On October 4, 1963, Iraq 
concluded a bilateral treaty with Kuwait in which Baghdad recognised Kuwait’s 
independence and full sovereignty.284 In The Agreed Minutes Regarding the 
Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters, as the 
treaty was headed, Iraq also recognised the 1932 Iraqi-Kuwaiti border 
demarcation agreement. In addition, the two states pledged to “reinforce[…] the 
fraternal relations subsisting between the two sister countries, inspired by their 
national duty, common interest and aspiration to a complete Arab Unity” and 
“work towards establishing cultural, commercial and economic co-operation 
between the two countries and the exchange of technical information.”285 The 
first steps of rapprochement were soon taken: On October 19, Kuwait granted 
Iraq an $80 million interest-free loan with a long credit period of 25 years; and, 
also, a bilateral border demarcation commission resumed work. However, it 
became clear that a compromise on border delimitation would be difficult to 
reach when Iraq emphasised that its preceding recognition of Kuwait did not 
mean recognition of the territorial status quo.286 Over the course of the next four 
years, border demarcation talks were complicated as the Iraqi delegation 
repeatedly challenged the validity of previous border agreements concluded 
before Iraq’s independence and called for the cessation of Kuwaiti territory to 
Iraq. Kuwait on its part rejected any cessation of land. In 1967, as differences 
between the delegations were irreconcilable, the border commission meetings 
were adjourned indefinitely.287 
After the Baath party takeover in 1968, there was some rapprochement in 
Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations. The Kuwaiti leadership was first to recognise diplo-
matically the new Iraqi government. In addition, as Niblock summarises, 
“by the end of 1969 the two states had concluded an agreement co-
ordinating information media (as part of a programme to preserve the 
Arab character of the Gulf); held a series of talks on military co-operation; 
agreed on terms for the compensation of nationalised Kuwaiti property in 
Iraq; and reached an agreement on co-operation in the oil sector.”288 
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Further to this, new bilateral talks regarding border demarcation started in 
February 1970 and the two states renewed and extended a free trade 
agreement both parties had signed in 1964. Moreover, both states closely 
coordinated their policy reactions to Iran’s claims on Abu Musa and the two 
Tunb islands.289 On the other hand, when in April 1969 the Iranian-Iraqi dispute 
had reached a critical point and war appeared to be imminent Baghdad 
pressured the Kuwaiti leadership into conceding Iraq the right to station part of 
its troops on Kuwaiti territory to better protect Iraq’s harbour of Umm Qasr. 
According to the then Kuwaiti Minister of Defence and Interior, Sheikh Saad Al 
Abdullah Al Sabah, Iraqi troops moved into Kuwaiti territory before the official 
Iraqi request was made to the Kuwaiti leadership. Moreover, there had been no 
explicit Kuwaiti concession, rather a tacit approval that Iraq interpreted as a 
green light. In the end, Iranian-Iraqi tensions did not escalate into a hot war. 
Nonetheless, much to the discontent of the Kuwaiti regime, Iraqi troops 
remained on Kuwaiti soil on the grounds that their positioning there was vital for 
the protection of Umm Qasr.290 
In any case, Iraq had not given up its claims on Kuwait. Irrespective of the 
regime in Baghdad – monarchy, pro-Nasser or Baathist republic – Iraq’s main 
justification for its claim on Kuwait was historic and legal in nature. Iraq argued 
that, under Ottoman rule, Kuwait had been governed by a district governor 
(qaimaqam), who in turn was a subordinate of the governor of Basra. As the 
Basra Governorate now was a part of the independent state of Iraq, Kuwait had 
to be considered as falling under Iraqi sovereignty, too. The Iraqi regime further 
contended that the 1899 British-Kuwaiti protectorate treaty was null and void as 
then Kuwaiti qaimaqam, Sheikh Mubarak Al Sabah, had not had the compe-
tence to sign international treaties.291 
However, the key motivation behind the repeated Iraqi claims on Kuwait was 
economic and territorial in character. For one thing, Kuwait possessed exten-
sive oil resources and made high profits from their export. In 1960, Kuwait 
produced roughly 591 million barrels of crude oil and received 50% of the 
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operational profits from its export.292 In addition, Kuwaiti territory, particularly the 
islands of Warba and Bubiyan293, would give Iraq the opportunity to offset a 
very significant geostrategic disadvantage, if under Baghdad’s control. Due to 
its short seaboard, Iraq had very limited access to Gulf waters and only few 
potential locations for the construction of deep water ports – installations with 
high relevance for trade, particularly the export of raw oil and petrochemical 
products. Umm Qasr, directly on the border to Kuwait, was the only location 
suitable for an Iraqi deep sea port. In contrast, the Iraqi Faw Peninsula is a 
swampy and alluvial area and therefore a suboptimal location for a port 
installation and the inland city of Basra along the Shatt al-Arab river was of 
limited suitability as sovereignty over and right of use of the river was contested 
between Iran and Iraq.294 In April 1969, Iran unilaterally abrogated the 1937 
Iran-Iraq treaty on the Shatt al-Arab waterway and henceforward claimed the 
river’s thalweg (median line) as its border with Iraq.295 Therefore, different Iraqi 
regimes had a great interest in the annexation of Kuwait or at least the islands 
of Warba and Bubiyan. As a consequence, Kuwait considered its powerful 
neighbour a considerable threat to its very existence. Kuwait’s concerns about 
Iraq became very clear when in January 1970 the Kuwaiti government made an 
urgent request for a U.S. arms sale.296 Within less than a week after the official 
request, Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah Al Ahmad Al Jaber Al Sabah reiterated 
his government’s urgent need for the relevant arms. According to U.S. 
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Ambassador John P. Walsh the foreign minister referred explicitly to his 
government’s strong concerns about the threat emanating from Iraq.297 
Kuwait’s Relations with Iran in the Pre-1971 Era 
In contrast to the Emirate’s relations with Iraq, Kuwait’s ties with Iran were 
friendly and cooperative. There had been a Persian expatriate community in 
Kuwait ever since 1776, when Iran captured nearby Basra. Following the 
beginning of the oil boom in Kuwait, the Persian community increased very 
significantly to roughly 30,000 in the early 1950s.298 Despite their large number 
the Iranian expatriates had been largely “politically quiescent, worked well and 
co-existed peacefully with their Arab counterparts.”299 However, in the 1960s, 
several factors motivated the Kuwaiti regime to limit Iranian immigration. For 
one thing, it was a reaction to pressure from the Kuwaiti people and the 
increasing numbers of Palestinian and Egyptian expatriates that rejected both 
Iranian trade relations with Israel and Tehran’s territorial claims in the Gulf. 
Another factor influencing the Kuwaiti government’s decision was the Iranian-
Egyptian rivalry. In this context, Chubin and Zabih state,  
“It being an axiom of Kuwait foreign policy not to take sides in intra-Arab 
or regional disputes and to avoid offense to the larger Arab states, it was 
perhaps natural that the Kuwait government take [sic] action to limit and 
restrict immigration–and if possible, to appear to limit Iranian immigration 
more than that of the fraternal Arab states. There is, in fact, no evidence 
to show that Iranian immigration has been limited more than that of any 
other nation, but the impression that this was so was certainly something 
the Kuwait government may have sought in the light of domestic and 
intra-Arab considerations.”300 
In the end, Kuwait’s immigration policy did not cause any strains in Kuwaiti-
Iranian relations.301 
Soon after Kuwait’s independence, the Iranian regime sent a delegation to 
Kuwait to inform Emir Abdullah that the Shah was interested in establishing 
diplomatic relations and promoting cultural and economic ties. Indeed, Iran 
                                            
297 Telegram, Kuwait 76, US Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State, Untitled, 1/27/70, 
NND 969023, Box 1762, DEF 12-5 KUW 1-1-70, NARA. 
298 Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State in a 
Zone of Great-Power Conflict (Berkeley, CA, Los Angeles and London: University of California 
Press, 1974), p. 208. 
299 Ibid, p. 209. 
300 Ibid, pp. 209f. 
301 Ibid, p. 210. 
  116
welcomed Kuwait’s independence and the chance to enter into closer relations 
with the Emirate than had been possible during the state’s protectorate status. 
Ever since the 1958 Iraqi revolution, the Iranian regime had an interest in 
offsetting the influence and ambitions of revolutionary regimes in the Gulf by 
forging close relations with Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states such as 
Kuwait. During the Iraq-Kuwait crisis in the summer of 1961, when Iraq ceased 
shipments of foodstuffs to Kuwait, Iran supplied the Emirate, despite Iraqi 
attacks on Iranian cargo ships. Over the course of the 1960s, Kuwaiti-Iranian 
trade relations saw a rapid development. For example, Iranian exports to Kuwait 
more than tripled between 1962/63 (merchandise value of $7 million) and 
1965/66 ($24.4 million).302 
In the course of a visit by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aram to Kuwait in April 
1964, both countries decided to initialise negotiations on their offshore 
boundaries. In October of the following year, Kuwait and Tehran established a 
technical committee to deal with the issue. Over the next years, several 
meetings were conducted and partial agreement (inter alia on a maritime water 
boundary) was reached. However, mainly due to the ongoing Iranian-Iraqi 
border dispute, final agreement particularly on the demarcation of the 
continental shelf boundary was still pending in 1971.303 
In light of the soon ending British-Kuwaiti defence agreement and hoping for 
close future relations, the Iranian Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi visited 
Kuwait from June 5-6, 1970. During his visit, a decision was made to conclude a 
bilateral continental shelf agreement.304 However, Kuwait also disagreed with 
Iran on the foundation of a Union of Gulf Emirates, Iranian territorial claims on 
Bahrain and the islands of Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunb, and the 
general question over the Arab or Persian nature of the Gulf. Kuwait clearly 
favoured the creation of a federation of Gulf Emirates and rejected Iran’s claim 
to Bahrain and the island state’s incorporation into Iran. With respect to the 
latter issue, Kuwait made attempts to mediate between the leaderships in 
Tehran and Manama and welcomed Iran’s eventual agreement to a UN fact-
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finding mission.305 Regarding the three islands thus far administered by Sharjah 
and Ras al-Khaimah, Kuwait was the only Arab Gulf monarchy that took the 
same stand as Iraq in clearly rejecting Iranian claims of sovereignty. As a sign 
of protest against the Iranian position, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, Sabah Al 
Ahmad Al Jaber Al Sabah, rescheduled a visit to Tehran in the summer of 
1971.306 Kuwait’s comparatively staunch stance on this issue was taken after 
consideration of both the popular mood in Kuwait and Iraq’s expectations. A 
statement by Foreign Minister Sabah Al Sabah to U.S. Ambassador Walsh 
suggests that the Kuwaiti government did not see the issue itself as problematic 
as its policy reaction purported. According to Walsh, the foreign minister 
expressed his government’s concern about Iran’s policies regarding the three 
islands; however, he went on to say that 
“he simply could not understand why the Iranians seemed so convinced 
of [the] military significance of those islands, but [that] he was prepared 
[to] accept as [a] reality that they did feel very sensitive about the 
issue.”307 
Bahrain’s Relations with Iran and Iraq in the Pre-1971 Era 
For one and a half centuries prior to its independence, Bahrain’s relations with 
Iran were characterised by the latter’s claim to the island state. Bahrain had 
been under Persian rule from 1602, when Shah Abbas I ousted the Hormuzi-
Portuguese rulers, to 1783 when the Al Khalifa took over the island state. In 
1819, a joint Persian-Omani attempt to reconquer Bahrain was stopped when 
the United Kingdom agreed with the Al Khalifa to grant Bahrain protection and 
accept it as a party to the General Treaty of Peace signed in the following 
year.308 Once Bahrain had entered into treaty relations with the United 
Kingdom, Iran did not undertake any more attempts to reconquer Bahrain by 
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force. However, the regime in Tehran repeatedly claimed sovereignty over 
Bahrain and protested against actions that violated their alleged legitimate 
rights. One such example was Iran’s formal protest against the United 
Kingdom’s treatment of Bahrain as an independent state in 1927. The Treaty of 
Jidda, signed on May 20 of that year, in which the United Kingdom recognised 
King Abdulaziz Al Saud’s sovereignty over the Kingdom of Hijaz and Najd, had 
referred to the British-Bahraini treaty relationship. As the Iranian government 
considered the diplomatic relations between Bahrain and the United Kingdom a 
violation of their national sovereignty rights, it categorically rejected the treaty’s 
reference in notes of protests sent to both the British government and the 
League of Nation’s secretary-general. When in January 1928 the British Foreign 
Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain, repudiated the Iranian claim to Bahrain due 
to the absence of “any valid grounds,” Tehran reiterated its claim in another 
note to London.309 A similar note by the Iranian government was sent to the 
Secretary-General of the League of Nation in August of the same year.310 Only 
two years later, Iran raised renewed protests. In 1930, the Bahraini leadership 
granted a first oil concession, prompting another Iranian note of protest to the 
British government. As “the Bahrayn Islands form an integral part of Persia […], 
and […] Persia possesses incontestable rights of sovereignty over those 
islands,” as was contended by Tehran, the right to grant oil concessions was 
reserved to the Iranian government and did not fall in the jurisdiction of the Al 
Khalifa.311 A similar protest note sent to the U.S. Government in May 1934 read 
“According to information recently received by the Imperial Government 
[of Iran], a concession to exploit Bahrein oil has just been obtained by the 
Standard Oil Company of California, which has begun operations and 
has already extracted large quantities of oil. I have the honour […] to 
inform you that the concession in question or any other concession 
acquired by the Standard Oil Company or any other company 
whatsoever–having been obtained, not from the Persian Government, 
whose rights of sovereignty over the Bahrein Islands are incontestable, 
but from legally incompetent authorities [i.e. the ruler of Bahrain] who 
have no right to grant such concessions–is regarded as null and void. My 
Government strongly protests against this concession and considers 
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itself at liberty to claim and demand the restitution of any profit that may 
accrue from such concessions.”312 
In the same year, Iran protested against the construction of a British military 
base in Bahrain. Following the Second World War Iran put the Bahrain issue 
back on the agenda. In April 1947, the Iranian majlis unanimously passed a bill 
that requested the government to take appropriate steps to implement Iranian 
sovereignty over Bahrain. In the first years of the 1950s, nationalist feelings 
regarding the Iranian claim to Bahrain were widespread among the Iranian 
people who pressed the government to act accordingly. In November 1957, 
partially in reaction to the public pressure, the Iranian parliament enacted the 
above-mentioned law that proclaimed Bahrain as 14th province of Iran. The two 
reserved seats in the majlis then served as a constant reminder of Iran’s claim 
to sovereignty over Bahrain.313 In 1958, the Shah reiterated Iran’s claim to the 
island state when he declared during a press conference somewhat 
provocatively, 
“We consider Bahrain an integral part of Iran and will gladly accept the 
allegiance of Sheikh Sulman bin Ahmad all [sic] Khalifa, the present 
ruler, in the capacity of the first Irani Governor-General of Bahrain.”314 
During large parts of the 1960s the Iranian regime refrained from putting 
forward its claim to Bahrain. During that time Tehran was striving for closer 
cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in countering Nasser’s growing 
regional influence and therefore did not want to bring up this bone of 
contention.315 However, once the United Kingdom had announced its 
withdrawal from the Gulf in January 1968 the solution of the Bahrain issue 
became politically pressing. Britain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait all approached 
Iran in mediation attempts. These arbitration efforts were successful in 
arranging direct meetings between delegations of Bahrain and Iran later that 
year. However, the secret talks held in Switzerland failed to produce an 
agreement. Bahrain rejected Iranian suggestions to refer the conflict to the UN 
Security Council, under Articles 34 and 35 UN Charter, the UN Special 
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Committee on Decolonisation, or the International Court of Justice. Bahrain 
emphasised that it was neither a colony nor a territory disputed by the two UN 
members Iran and United Kingdom. Bahrain’s counterproposal of mediation by 
either regional organisations or heads of states with good relations with both 
conflict parties was in turn rejected by Iran. Despite the failure of these direct 
talks Manama and Tehran stayed in indirect contact with one another through 
the United Kingdom as intermediary.316 
The solution to the dispute was initiated by the Shah, who on January 4, 1969, 
at a press conference during a state visit to India, declared that he would not 
use force to assert the Iranian claim to Bahrain against the will of the Bahraini 
people. The Iranian Emperor then stated his readiness to recognise an 
independent Bahrain under certain premises. He emphasised that his 
government would reject and deny recognition to a Bahraini state if it was 
granted independence by the United Kingdom. The Shah made clear that he 
would not recognise a union of Arab Gulf emirates if Bahrain were to become a 
part of it. However, if the Bahraini population verifiably rejected to be governed 
under Iranian rule, Tehran would accept Bahrain’s independence.317 
Upon the Shah’s initiative the governments of Bahrain and Iran entered into 
new, British mediated talks. In mid-1969 the Iranian Government suggested to 
use the UN Secretary-General’s good offices to settle the Bahrain question. As 
in the past such settlements had repeatedly been reached after the UN 
Secretary-General arranged for a referendum in the disputed area, the 
suggestion was rejected by the Bahraini ruler. In a newspaper interview, Sheikh 
Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa stated: "There can be no question of a plebiscite, 
as that would only lead to excitement and animosity between Persians and 
Arabs in the whole area".318 
Further Bahraini-Iranian negotiations managed to produce a solution satisfac-
tory to both conflict parties. Instead of a plebiscite, a UN fact-finding mission 
should determine the wishes of the Bahraini people. On March 9, 1970 Iran 
formally requested UN Secretary-General Sithu U Thant to exercise his good 
offices in order to determine “the true wishes of the people of Bahrain with 
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respect to the future status of the islands of Bahrain by appointing a personal 
representative to carry out this mission.”319 On March 20, the United Kingdom 
accepted Iran’s proposal. The terms of reference under which Secretary-
General U Thant was mandated to solve the dispute read 
“Having regard to the problem created by the differing views of the 
parties concerned about the status of Bahrain and the need to find a 
solution to this problem in order to create an atmosphere of tranquility, 
stability and friendliness throughout the area, the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations is requested by the parties concerned to send a 
Personal Representative to ascertain the wishes of the people of 
Bahrain.”320 
Secretary-General U Thant appointed Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi, UN Under-
Secretary-General and Director General of the UN Office at Geneva, as his 
personal representative and head of the fact-finding mission. Between March 
30 and April 18, 1970 the UN mission consulted with representatives and 
members of “all associations and organized groups in Bahrain,” namely 
“religious leaders, municipal councils and other administrative committees, 
welfare societies, clubs and other community centres as well as professional 
groups, sports and recreational associations,” in order to ensure the best 
possible “cross-section in age, activity, status and geographical distribution.”321 
The Bahraini people were informed that they had the chance to see the mission 
and “to express their views on the question at issue freely, in private and in 
confidence.”322 In addition, the UN mission visited sparsely populated parts of 
Bahrain to gather the opinions of the population there. Summarising his 
findings, Winspeare Guicciardi reported to the Secretary-General that “the 
Bahrainis I met were virtually unanimous in wanting a fully independent 
sovereign State. The great majority added that this should be an Arab State.” 
The large majority of interviewed subjects expressed their hope that “the cloud 
of the Iranian claim would be removed once and for all.” However, the report 
said, 
“[t]his was never accompanied by the slightest bitterness or hostility 
towards Iran. On the contrary the wording of the terms of reference was 
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used spontaneously to express the wish of all for tranquillity [sic], stability 
and friendliness in the area. Once the question of the claim had been 
settled closer relations with other States in the Gulf, including of course 
Iran, were expected to follow.”323 
In this context, it is of particular relevance that the findings did not show any 
sectarian differences; the report emphasised that “[e]ven the religious leaders of 
the Sunni and Shia sects made a point of being received together.”324 In 
conclusion, Winspeare Guicciardi stated 
“My consultations have convinced me that the overwhelming majority of 
the people of Bahrain wish to gain recognition of their identity in a fully 
independent and sovereign State free to decide for itself its relations with 
other States.”325 
On May 11, 1970, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 278 in which it 
“endorse[d]” Winspeare Guicciardi’s report and “welcome[d] the conclusions 
and findings of the report,” particularly the above mentioned conclusion.326 
Right after the resolution’s adoption, the Iranian representative to the UN, 
Mehdi Vakil, who had been authorised to attend the Security Council session, 
addressed the Council and accepted the resolution. Vakil added 
“It was my government's wish that the solution of the question should be 
one acceptable to the inhabitants of Bahrain and not contrary to their 
wishes. Much as we wished to see Bahrain reunited with us, we 
contemplated only a voluntary reunion, not one involving a resort to 
force, which was likely to foster resentment and encounter resistance.”327 
The Iranian delegate also expressed his government’s hope for future Bahraini-
Iranian cooperation.328 Shortly afterwards, a resolution identical to Security 
Council Resolution 278 was introduced by the Iranian government to the 
legislative branch and adopted unanimously by the senate and with only a few 
dissenting votes by the majlis.329 
Indeed, immediately after the solution of the Bahrain conflict, Tehran made 
determined efforts to improve its relations with the leadership in Manama. Still in 
May 1970, Iran sent a goodwill mission to Bahrain. A month later, on June 13, 
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for the first time an official Bahraini delegation visited Iran. At the end of June, 
Iran abolished the visa requirement for Bahraini citizens. In addition, on June 
17, 1971, roughly two months before Bahrain’s independence, Iran and Bahrain 
signed a continental shelf agreement. The extent of the Shah’s regime’s interest 
in close relations with Bahrain was demonstrated when Iran became the first 
state to diplomatically recognise the island state within half an hour of Bahrain’s 
declaration of independence on August 15, 1971.330 
In contrast to the close historic contacts and the long-standing conflict Bahrain 
had with Iran, Manama’s relations with Iraq before 1971 were minimal and 
mostly limited to commercial ties, especially the entrepôt trade between Bahrain 
and the Iraqi port at Basra. Ever since the 1958 Iraqi Revolution, the Bahraini 
government had been anxious about Baghdad’s socialist, Arab nationalist (later 
Baathist) republicanism that stood in marked contrast to Bahrain’s political 
reality. After the Baath party’s second takeover in 1968, the Bahraini 
government was increasingly concerned that Iraq might attempt to undermine 
Bahrain’s regime stability. The apprehension was intensified by the fact that 
there was a considerable degree of sympathy for Iraq’s Baathist ideology 
among Bahrain’s population; particularly among those who had studied at Iraqi 
universities. There was also a degree of identification between Iraqi and 
Bahraini Shiites of whom many felt discriminated against by their respective 
home state.331 Nonetheless, there was an intergovernmental meeting in 
February 1969, and two months later Baghdad and Manama concluded an 
economic cooperation agreement.332 
Trucial State Relations with Iran and Iraq in the Pre-1971 Era 
For most of the pre-1971 era, the relations between the Trucial States and Iran 
were predominantly commercial. Political conflict and Iranian territorial claims 
only became an issue in the aftermath of Britain’s 1968 announcement to leave 
the Gulf three years later. 
Dubai had traditionally close and amicable relations with Tehran. Economic 
contacts between the Emirate and Iran had been extensive since the 1920s. 
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During that time, numerous Iranian merchants moved to Dubai and as the 
emirate’s entrepôt trade became its main economic activity Iran turned into a 
vital trade partner.333 An example for the cordial Dubai-Iranian relations was that 
several months before the foundation of the UAE, Dubai, to the disfavour of Abu 
Dhabi, gave special privileges to Iranian immigrants. Dubai also argued for the 
UAE immigration law to treat Iranian citizens equally to those of Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, and Oman and exempt them from visa requirements.334 Around the 
UAE’s inception Dubai had beside Bahrain the largest Iranian expatriate 
community of all Arab Gulf states.335 Sharjah and Abu Dhabi, although to a 
smaller extent, also had commercial ties with Iran as well as a sizeable 
community of Iranian expatriates.336 
Relations between Iran and the Trucial States became conflictual as a direct 
consequence of the January 1968 British announcement to withdraw from the 
Gulf in 1971. Iran saw Britain’s upcoming departure from the subregion as both 
an opportunity and a challenge. On the one hand, Iran would have the chance 
to implement its claim for dominance in the Gulf; on the other hand, with the 
British withdrawal, the political stability of the previous British protectorates as 
well as Oman and the security of the Gulf waters would be in jeopardy. Tehran 
was concerned about a continued spread of socialist, anti-monarchical 
radicalism on the Arabian Peninsula and a potential spill-over of such a 
development to Iran, thereby endangering Iranian regime stability. Therefore, 
the Iranian regime had a strong interest in the political stability of and friendly 
relations with the soon to be independent Arab Gulf states. Iran’s second major 
concern was that following the British departure trade routes in the Gulf and 
particularly through the Strait of Hormuz might be disrupted as a consequence 
of subregional political instability. As all Iranian oil exports had to pass through 
the Strait of Hormuz, uninterrupted navigation through the strait was of vital 
importance to Tehran’s economy.337 Iran’s policy towards the Trucial States was 
then being conducted in reference to these challenges and associated interests. 
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This was obvious in Iran’s stance towards both the proposed Union of Arab 
Emirates and the islands of Abu Musa as well as Greater and Lesser Tunbs. 
On February 25, 1968, less than two months after they had been informed 
about the British intention to leave the Gulf, the rulers of Bahrain, Qatar, and the 
seven Trucial States met in Dubai. During the summit, they agreed to work 
towards the establishment of a Union of Arab Emirates. The Dubai Agreement 
additionally stipulated the establishment of three federal authorities: a supreme 
council, a council of experts, and a supreme court. At the third supreme council 
meeting, that took place in Abu Dhabi from July 6-7, 1968, progress was made 
towards institutionalisation of the Union: the rulers inter alia charged a legal 
advisor with the drafting of a federal constitution, and established a temporary 
federal council.338 These decisions, particularly the establishment of a 
provisional cabinet body, provoked a renunciatory Iranian reaction. The day 
after the summit ended, Tehran denounced the temporary federal council in 
strong words.339 Iran’s rejection of the looming Union had three main reasons. 
First, still claiming sovereignty over Bahrain Iran rejected the inclusion of the 
island state in a newly to be founded federation of Arab Emirates. This was 
reiterated in the Shah’s speech in Delhi on January 4, 1969. Second, the 
Iranian regime had a strong interest in obtaining Abu Musa and the two Tunb 
islands, which would have been part of the Union.340 Third and most 
importantly, Tehran was concerned about the long-term political stability of the 
envisaged federation. As Agwani points out, the Shah worried “that a union of 
economically disparate and politically unseasoned emirates might fall an easy 
prey in [the] future to army officers or radical groups or both.”341 As the Times 
aptly put it, Iran had no interest in a “second South Yemen on her door.”342 
Nonetheless, the Iranian regime had a major interest in the establishment of a 
federation; they had even pressed the United Kingdom to promote such political 
integration. At that time however, Iran envisaged a federation comprising only of 
the politically and economically most viable states (with the exception of 
Bahrain), namely Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Qatar, while the remaining Trucial 
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States should be placed under Omani protection.343 In the end, not least after 
Bahrain had opted out from the federation scheme, Iran was principally 
prepared to approve the planned United Arab Emirates. However, Tehran made 
its recognition conditional on its control over Abu Musa and the two Tunb 
islands. 
Historically, Iran had officially laid claim on the three islands before; last in the 
1930s.344 In the 1950s and 1960s, the Iranian government had been interested 
in obtaining the three islands. At that time, the interest had been based on 
economic considerations; expected oil deposits in the vicinity of the islands 
promised attractive profits.345 Following Britain’s withdrawal announcement in 
January 1968, Iran brought up the island issue again. As mentioned above, Iran 
was worried about Gulf maritime security and particularly the safety of trade 
routes through the Strait of Hormuz in the time after Britain’s withdrawal. Control 
over Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunb, claimed by the Trucial States of 
Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah respectively, would go a long way towards 
securing the waterways through the Strait. Economic considerations also played 
a significant role. As Cordesman states, “Iranian occupation of the Tunbs and 
Abu Musa meant that Iran could extend its waters to the edge of the southern 
Gulf and gain[…] offshore areas with significant offshore oil potential.”346 Hence, 
Tehran was determined to seize control over the three islands and, in October 
1970, formally renewed its previous claim.347 Over the following months, Tehran 
reiterated its claim on several occasions and coupled it with threats. The Iranian 
regime let the United Kingdom know that in case its claims on the islands were 
rejected it would in turn refuse recognition to a future Union of Arab Emirates. 
Moreover, on November 9, 1970, the semi-official Iranian newspaper Kayhan 
International reported of Iran’s willingness to forcefully seize control over the 
islands if necessary. The threat was repeated by Iran’s Foreign Minister Zahedi 
and the Shah in June and September 1971.348 On September 18, the Shah 
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reiterated his willingness to assert his claim when he stated “we need them [the 
islands]; we shall have them; no power on earth will stop us.”349 
Nonetheless, the Shah’s regime was anxious not to poison relations with 
Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, and the remaining Arab Gulf states. Therefore, during 
a state visit to Egypt, Iranian Foreign Minister Zahedi portrayed the island 
dispute as a conflict solely between Iran and the United Kingdom. Zahedi 
argued that the islands had taken from Iran by the United Kingdom and that it 
was London that now attempted to involve the non-participant Sharjah and 
Rasa al-Khaimah in the conflict.350 
At first, the two Emirates were unwilling to compromise. They rejected a British 
mediation proposal according to which they would cede their claim to the 
islands in return for financial compensation and a share of the profits made from 
potential onshore and offshore oil production. However, on November 2, 1971 
Iran and Sharjah had reached an agreement regarding the future control of Abu 
Musa. Accordingly, Iran would get full jurisdiction over a clearly defined part of 
the island including the right to station troops on this territory, while Sharjah 
would maintain sovereignty over the remaining island. The partial secession of 
sovereignty would be compensated by Iran with an annual payment of £1.5 
million until Sharjah’s annual oil income would reach £3 million. Moreover, 
Sharjah and Iran would divide equally the profits from onshore and offshore 
(within 12 miles) oil production.351 With respect to the two Tunb islands, no 
agreement was reached. In this context, Abbas Masudi, long-term senator and 
founder of the semi-official daily newspaper Ettila’at later stated that 
“regarding the two Tunbs neither Iran nor Britain considered the consent 
of the Sheikh of Ras al-Khaima necessary. For this reason the 
negotiations between Iran and Britain concluded that Iran could regain its 
two islands after British withdrawal. But Iran wished to regain its islands 
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at the time of the British presence, it did so a day before the British 
departure.”352 
This statement seems to be supported by the fact that despite no agreement 
being reached between Iran and Ras al-Khaimah, Sir William Luce, Britain’s 
special envoy to the Gulf between 1968 and 1971, declared on November 17, 
1971 that British-Iranian differences on the three islands had been sorted out.353 
On November 30, 1971 – one day before the United Kingdom left the Trucial 
States – the Iranian armed forces seized both Abu Musa and the Tunb islands. 
As Masudi states, Iran’s seizure of the islands was timed deliberately to occur 
during the last hours of Britain’s status as protectorate power. This was 
supposed to give the impression that Iran’s action was directed against the 
United Kingdom’s colonial presence and not against Arab sovereignty rights. 
On Abu Musa, the Iranian troops were welcomed by representatives of the 
government of Sharjah. In contrast, Iranian military landing on the Tunbs 
provoked a short skirmish with Ras al-Khaimah’s police forces that cost a total 
of seven lives.354 
Two days later, the UAE were founded. There is contradicting information about 
the date of Iran’s recognition of the new state: Ramazani emphasises that Iran 
had recognised the UAE within one hour of its declaration of independence355; 
Al-Alkim on the other hand, dates the Iranian diplomatic recognition on 
December 4, 1971, two days after the UAE’s independence.356 In any case, the 
Iranian recognition was fast, particularly when compared to Saudi Arabia that 
did not recognise its neighbour state until 1974. The swift Iranian recognition 
had a symbolic character. The Shah’s regime underlined its interest in close 
relations with the UAE and reiterated implicitly that the occupation of the three 
islands had been a strategic necessity and should not be seen as an unfriendly 
or even aggressive act against the UAE. 
For the longest time before the foundation of the UAE, the Trucial States had 
very limited contact with Iraq. The existing ties were of a commercial nature. 
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However, following the 1968 Iraqi revolution, an expansion of relations could be 
detected; Baghdad opened trade centres in the lower Gulf, in July 1969 
representatives of both governments met, and Iraq supported the formation of 
the UAE. Nonetheless, Iraq’s socialist, Arab nationalist – and now Baathist – 
ideology and policy intentions in the Gulf had been raising suspicions and 
concern among merchants and most regimes in the Trucial States.357 An 
exception was the government of Ras al-Khaimah that in 1970-71 sought Iraqi 
support against Iran’s aggressively pursued claim to the Tunb islands. In late 
June 1970, Sheikh Saqr bin Muhammad Al Qassimi paid a four-day visit to Iraq 
during which he thanked the Baathist regime for its constant support of the Arab 
Gulf states. Clearly hinting at Iran’s territorial claims in the Gulf, Sheikh Saqr 
stated at a press conference, “the Arabism of the Arabian Gulf can not be 
disputed and its people are capable of repulsing any aggression in cooperation 
with their brothers.”358 As will be shown below, the rapprochement between Ras 
al-Khaimah and Iraq continued for several years following the foundation of the 
UAE, much to the disfavour of both the other UAE Emirates and the remaining 
Arab Gulf monarchies. 
Oman’s Relations with Iran and Iraq in the Pre-1971 Era 
Under Sultan Said bin Taimur’s reign, Oman’s policy was very inward-oriented. 
The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman maintained few diplomatic relations other 
than with the United Kingdom. Prior to the bloodless coup of 1970 in the course 
of which Sultan Qaboos displaced his father as ruler, the Sultanate did not have 
any official diplomatic ties with either Iran or Iraq. Both Iran and Iraq, however, 
had some involvement in the internal affairs of Oman. In the case of Iraq, 
contact was at first minimal. The Iraqi monarchy was hesitant to position itself 
openly with respect to the Jebel Akhdar War, the inner-Omani conflict between 
Sultan Said and the Imamate of Oman under Ghalib bin Ali Al Hinai. However, 
in the end, intra-Arab and popular pressure forced the Iraqi regime to take 
position against Sultan Said and particularly the British involvement in the 
Sultan’s struggle against the Imamate forces. In this context, a cable sent by the 
British embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 
August 23, 1957 reads 
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“the Iraq Government at first hoped that the whole affair would be over 
before they were compelled by events to take a stand; at that stage their 
only concern was to ensure that nothing was said publicly to suggest that 
we were using our staging post facilities at Habbaniya [British Royal Air 
Force base roughly 90 kilometers west of Baghdad] to assist our military 
effort so that they could no [sic] be accused by the other Arab countries 
of assisting imperialism against their ‘brother Arabs’ … in the end they 
found themselves obliged to commit themselves, and at this point, 
despite their correct understanding of the statue of the Sultan, they do 
not appear to have doubted that the right course was to stand with the 
other Arabs in disregard of what they knew to be the right cause.”359 
On April 13, 1957, the Iraqi government responding to Egyptian and Saudi 
pressure had co-authored a letter by ten Arab UN member states, including 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to the UN Security Council’s president calling for the 
Council to concern itself with “the armed aggression by the United Kingdom […] 
against the independence, sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the 
Imamate of Oman.”360 Commenting on Iraq’s participation in the joint Arab 
advance, the British ambassador in Iraq stated, 
“I am doing my best to persuade the Iraqis to take a lead in preventing 
the ventilation of this issue in the General Assembly, but I fear that they 
will in the last resort follow the wishes of the Saudis. [T]he Egyptians so 
maneuvered matters that they were able to say to the Saudis: ‘you see, 
you want this badly but the Iraqis are reluctant to support you’ and the 
Iraqis had then to cave in.”361 
After the 1958 Revolution, though, Republican Iraq supported the Imamate 
forces inter alia by providing them with training.362 When the Dhofar Rebellion 
started in 1962, Iraq early on trained the rebels and provided them with other 
forms of military assistance.363 When the rebels institutionalised their subversive 
actions, founded the DLF, and started a guerrilla war against the Sultan’s 
forces, Iraq became one of its main supporters.364 In 1968, the DLF was 
succeeded by the PFLOAG: an organisation with objectives exceeding those of 
the DLF, which fought merely for the independence of the Dhofar province from 
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the Sultan’s reign. The PFLOAG, on the other hand, had a Marxist ideological 
orientation and it aimed at the replacement of monarchical by collectivist 
regimes on the entire Arabian Peninsula. Beside the Soviet Union, the PDRY, 
and the People’s Republic of China, Iraq was among the main supporters of the 
PFLOAG, providing financial and arms support.365 In 1969, Omani expatriates, 
most of them students, founded the NDFLOAG in Iraq. Consequently, the Iraqi 
government supported the rebel organisation, which began conducting guerrilla 
operations in Oman in 1970.366  
In contrast to Iraq, Iran did not support anti-Sultan forces in Oman. On the 
contrary, the Shah’s regime was anxious about the effect a successful Dhofar 
rebellion and above all the potential fall of the Sultan regime would have on 
subregional security. Therefore, the Iranian government went as far as to urge 
the United Kingdom to intervene more resolutely in favour of Sultan Said. 
Moreover, in April and May 1965, Iran intercepted weapons shipments destined 
for Dhofar Province. For one thing, as the Omani Musandam Peninsula 
constituted the southern tip of the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran was concerned 
about potential disruptive effects on naval trade routes a destabilisation of 
Oman could entail. The Shah’s regime was additionally concerned about the 
future stability of the Trucial States if the Sultan regime were to fall victim to the 
rebellion. Lastly, the Marxist orientation of the Dhofar rebels as well as the 
exertion of influence by Iraq, the PDRY, the Soviet Union, and China on the 
rebels alarmed the anti-Communist Iranian regime. As not only the PDRY and 
Iraq but also Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had at least at some point supported 
Omani opposition groups, Iran was the only independent state in Oman’s 
immediate neighbourhood that was neither interested in weakening nor the fall 
of the Sultan. This, by default, made Iran to a potential future ally for Oman and 
provided the fundament for stout Iranian military support for the Sultan a few 
years later.367 In prompt reaction to Qaboos’ accession to power in July 1970 
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the Shah congratulated the new Sultan via telegram. Diplomatic relations 
between Tehran and Muscat were established in August 1971.368 
Qatar’s Relations with Iran and Iraq in the Pre-1971 Era 
Prior to its independence, Qatar’s relations with Iran were friendly and 
unproblematic. Sheikh Ahmad bin Ali Al Thani, the ruler of Qatar, as well as 
many members of the Qatari elite appreciated Iran as a vacation and hunting 
destination. Moreover, Qatar had a significant Iranian expatriate community, 
which was integrated comparatively well into the society. Iranian influx into 
Qatar had not been a recent phenomenon. While there had been a significant 
increase in Iranian immigration following the discovery of oil in Qatar, the 
Sheikhdom’s society had been intermingled with Iranian immigrants for several 
generations; many well-established Qatari families traced back to immigrants 
from southern Iran. The considerable group of third generation Iranian 
immigrants was being granted full Qatari citizenship. While the largest part of 
the Iranian immigrants belonged traditionally to the lower working class, 
Iranians were strongly represented among the predominantly foreign medium 
and smaller scale merchants in Qatar. In contrast to Bahrain, the Iranian 
community had at no time provoked any noteworthy sectarian (Sunni-Shiite) or 
ethno-nationalist (Arab-Persian) contentions within the Qatari society.369 In 
addition, as Anthony observes, “neither the Shi‘ah nor the Sunni Iranians ha[d] 
been known to organize along lines of religious differences.”370 In general, 
Shiite Iranians tended to keep a low profile and, often publicly identified 
themselves as Sunnis and Arab muhawwalah (“returnees”; descendants of Arab 
who had emigrated to Iran). Anthony interprets this as a sign of both “deference 
to the Sunni affiliation of the Qatari ruling family” on the one hand and “political 
respect for Arab nationalist sentiments” among the native population on the 
other.371 Following the British decision to leave the Gulf the Iranian government 
made attempts to create amicable ties with Qatar. On September 20, 1969 Iran 
and Qatar signed a continental shelf agreement that demarcated the maritime 
border between the two states. A year before Qatar’s independence, Sheikh 
Ahmad bin Ali Al Thani became the first Qatari ruler to make a state visit to Iran. 
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Qatar tried to prevent an escalation of tensions between the soon to be 
established UAE and Iran regarding the island issue. The U.S. Consulate in 
Dhahran reported Sheikh Khalifa expressing his intention 
“to press Abu Dhabi to use its influence with Shaikh Khalid of Sharjah 
and Shaikh Saqr of Ras Al-Khalima to arrive at an agreement with Iran 
before [the] end of 1971 about the islands. If they do not agree, he said, 
Iran will occupy the island and there could be trouble between Arabs and 
Persians on the coast. In Khalifa’s view the Shah of Iran could not avoid 
taking action to protect Persians if violence should erupt against them. 
This would provoke no end of trouble in [the] area. He was going to try 
[to] make [future UAE Foreign Minister] Ahmad Suwaidi understand this 
point, and to stress with hi that the other Arabs must learn there are 
special considerations Gulf Arabs have to take into account in their 
foreign relations. Iran is a reality, a neighbor with whom Gulf Arabs must 
live peaceably.”372 
When Qatar eventually declared its independence on September 3, 1971 the 
Shah recognised the Emirate via telegram within an hour and emphasised 
publicly to have been the first state to do so.373 
Prior to 1968 Qatar did not have any significant contacts with Iraq. Historic 
societal relations as in the case of Iran did not exist. However, following the 
Baathist takeover in Baghdad relations were expanded. Iraq opened trade 
centres in the lower Gulf, Qatari and Iraqi governmental officials met in April 
1969, and in August 1970 a bilateral economic cooperation agreement was 
concluded. Nonetheless, like the other lower Gulf state regimes, the Qatari 
leadership, too, looked sceptically on Iraq’s socialist, revolutionary, and Arab 
nationalist political ideology.374  
3.2 From the British Withdrawal to the Algiers Accord 
Britain’s final departure from the Gulf on December 1, 1971 marked the start of 
a new era of subregional international relations. The phase of political 
transformation that had begun in January 1968 with the British announcement 
to withdraw its military and political presence from the Gulf now came to a 
close. With Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE three new states had just gained 
independence and full national sovereignty. After ten years, the British-Kuwaiti 
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defence treaty had been terminated, eliminating the last remnant of Kuwait’s 
status as British protectorate. Iran, Iraq, and also Saudi Arabia, which had 
gradually stepped out of Britain’s Great power shadow, now determined the 
polarity of the Gulf regional security subcomplex. While Saudi Arabia implicitly 
claimed its sphere of influence on the Arabian Peninsula, Iran and Iraq 
competed for hegemony over the entire Gulf. Some old territorial claims had 
been settled peacefully (Bahrain) or forcefully (the Tunb islands), others were 
still unresolved (e.g. the Kuwaiti islands or Buraimi). Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the 
smaller Gulf monarchies had a vital interest in the preservation of a 
conservative political status quo, while Baathist Iraq aimed for revolutionary 
change. The United States, which had no ambition to take over Britain’s role 
and establish a sizeable physical presence in the Gulf, had begun to support 
and arm the conservative monarchies, first and foremost the designated twin 
pillars of Gulf stability, Iran and Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, the Soviet 
Union, the United States’ contestant in the global Cold War increased its 
influence in the Gulf through a rapprochement with Iraq. Lastly, on the southern 
edge of the Arabian Peninsula, the Omani Dhofar War increasingly became a 
venue were all the conflicting interests collided. This subchapter provides a 
comparative analysis of the relations between the Arab Gulf monarchies and 
the subregional powers Iran and Iraq from the British withdrawal to the 1975 
Algiers Accord. 
Saudi Arabia’s Relations with Iran and Iraq, 1971-75 
The British announcement to leave the Gulf in early 1968 and the Iraqi 
Revolution later that year initiated a subregional development that posed both 
opportunities and significant challenges to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Faced 
with two powerful neighbours, both striving for leadership in the Gulf, the 
Kingdom perceived Iraq as the larger threat to its external and internal security. 
This was due to several factors: Iraq’s antimonarchical, pan-Arab ideology; its 
harsh criticism of the Saudi monarchy and its attempts to destabilise the latter; 
its military strength; its hegemonic ambitions in the Gulf subregion; its claims on 
Kuwait; the long Saudi-Iraqi border; its destabilising policy in Yemen and Oman; 
its opposition to the United States; its improving relationship with the Soviet 
Union; and finally, its claim of leadership in the Arab world. In contrast, Iran 
constituted a far lesser threat in the eyes of Saudi Arabia. While the Iranian 
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regime had hegemonic ambitions, they were more moderate than Iraq’s. Saudi 
Arabia and Iran shared an interest in stability and subregional status quo, 
particularly with regard to regime stability. Moreover, both states were allied 
with the United States and wanted by all means to prevent an expansion of 
Soviet influence in the Gulf. The ethnic and religious divide was surpassed by 
common interests. 
Between 1971 and 1975, Saudi-Iranian relations were solid; never hostile but 
also never cordial. Bilateral ties during this period can be characterised as a 
temporary alliance of convenience, based on strategic, pragmatic consid-
erations rather than on trust or even friendship. Riyadh and Tehran shared 
many interests: uninterrupted export routes through Gulf waters and the Strait of 
Hormuz, external security of and regime stability in all Gulf monarchies 
(including Iran), containment of socialist, Baathist ideology as well as Soviet 
influence in the Gulf, and close relations with the United States. All these 
aspects put them on the opposite side of Iraq and made them allies by default 
in the face of Iraqi danger to their common interests. However, despite their 
largely mutual interests and threat perceptions, there was also disagreement 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran about several aspects such as oil policy and 
most importantly Iran’s self-conception as rightful hegemon in the Gulf. In this 
context, an April 1972 report by the U.S. Embassy in Jidda stated, 
“As new arrangements develop in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia’s relations to 
Iran will become increasingly important. Both share a strong security 
interest in protecting the Gulf from radical (especially, Iraqi) or foreign 
influence. The Saudis continue to be aware of the need for good 
relations with Iran […] At the same time, the wide ‘perceptual gap’ 
between Arabs and Iranians will continue to provide possibilities for 
future misunderstandings.”375 
During a visit to Washington, D.C. in late September 1971, Saudi Interior 
Minister, Prince Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, expressed his hopes that Saudi-
Iranian cooperation would guarantee stability and security in the Gulf after the 
upcoming British withdrawal.376 To not endanger their strategic relations with 
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Iran, the Saudi regime hoped that the dispute over Abu Musa and the Tunb 
islands could be solved consensually. To this end, Saudi Arabia seemingly 
attempted to arrange a compromise according to which Iran would lease the 
islands from the respective Emirates.377 When this aspiration failed the Saudi 
reaction differed from that of other Arab states. Riyadh reacted with great 
restraint in marked contrast to Iraq, which immediately abrogated diplomatic 
relations with Iran and the United Kingdom, and Kuwait, which harshly criticised 
the Iranian seizure of the islands and recalled its ambassador to Tehran. The 
fact that Iran occupied Abu Musa and the Tunbs on the eve of Britain’s 
withdrawal saved Saudi Arabia the embarrassment of having failed to protect 
Arab land in its immediate sphere of influence and therefore allowed Riyadh to 
refrain from a harsh response.378 In a conversation with U.S. Ambassador 
Nicholas G. Thatcher on December 3, Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs 
Saqqaf called the clashes Ras al-Khaimah security forces on the Tunb islands 
“particularly unfortunate [as] Arab feelings had been deeply hurt and [the] 
bitterness created by [the] arbitrary Iranian steps would not be easily erased.” 
However, Saqqaf emphasised that despite this regrettable development “Saudi 
Arabia had very much in mind that over [the] long run it is vital to its own 
interests and those of regional stability that [the] Saudi-Iranian harmony be 
preserved.”379 Accordingly, Saudi Arabia did not follow Iraq’s request to 
abrogate diplomatic relations with Iran.380 
Indeed, Saudi-Iranian relations developed favourably. In a conversation with 
President Nixon on June 15, 1972, Saudi Minister of Defence and Aviation, 
Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, stated that after border disputes had been 
dissolved Saudi-Iranian relations were now “excellent.”381 While this charac-
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terisation of bilateral ties was an exaggeration, Saudi-Iranian relations were 
indeed improving. In August 1973, the U.S. Embassy in Jidda reported that  
“although relations with Iran are still not as solidly based as we would 
hope, there have been fairly frequent exchanges of view between the two 
sides, and both Saudi Arabia and Iran seem aware of the extent to which 
their regional interests are complementary.”382 
Between 1971 and 1975, Saudi Arabia and Iran exchanged several high-level 
visits. Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Saqqaf paid a four day visit to 
Tehran in December 1972 and in June 1974. The Iranian Foreign Minister 
Abbas Khalatbari visited Riyadh in early July 1973.383 
As mentioned above, Saudi Arabia and Iran were very concerned about both 
Iraq’s subversive activities in the Arab Gulf monarchies and the expansion of 
Soviet influence in the Middle East in general and in the Gulf in particular. 
Hence, Riyadh and Tehran were alarmed by the fifteen-year Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation Iraq and the Soviet Union signed in April 1972 and 
the subsequent closer military cooperation between Baghdad and Moscow; Iraq 
went as far as to grant the Soviet navy access to the Umm Qasr port 
facilities.384 Pradoxically, it was the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement as well as the 
two states’ close relations between the United States that motivated Iraq to 
intensify its relations with the Soviet Union. Upon conclusion of Saqqaf’s 
December 1972 Tehran visit, the Saudi Minister of State gave a statement in 
which he claimed that his talks with the Shah had revealed no differences 
between both regimes and then called upon all Gulf states to unite in order to 
defeat “conspiracy” in the Gulf.385 It is safe to assume that Saqqaf was referring 
to the “conspiracy” between radical socialist and Baathist elements, i.e. Iraq, the 
Marxist PDRY, the Soviet Union, the Dhofar rebels and socialist, anti-
monarchical elements in the Arab Gulf monarchies. 
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The Omani Dhofar conflict turned into a proxy war between the radical PDRY 
and Iraq on the one hand and Saudi Arabia and Iran on the other. The 
stabilisation of Sultan Qaboos’ rule was in the interest of both Riyadh and 
Tehran. A successful overthrow of the Sultan regime would have had several 
negative effects for Saudi and Iranian interests: first, such a development would 
have had the potential to destabilise the regimes in the remaining Arab Gulf 
monarchies as it would have boosted the motivation and legitimacy of radical 
socialist and Baathist elements elsewhere on the Arabian Peninsula; second, 
Iraqi (and Soviet) influence in the Gulf would have been greatly increased; and 
third, the security of the trade routes through the Strait of Hormuz might have 
been challenged. Hence, Saudi Arabia was giving the Sultan diplomatic and 
economic support and was appreciative of Iranian military support for the Omani 
regime as long as this support was limited to arms supply. 
However, the Saudi regime rejected Iran’s active military engagement in Oman, 
suspicious that Tehran “might have expansionist ambitions to establish a 
permanent presence on the Arab side of the Gulf.” Consequently, Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt, which shared the former’s concern, suggested the replacement of 
Iranian troops in Oman with a pan-Arab force. Despite the fact that neither 
Sultan Qaboos nor the Shah expressed their opposition to the Saudi-Egyptian 
proposal, the pan-Arab force was never realised.386 
Hence, the Dhofar War revealed both the scope and the limits of the Saudi-
Iranian congruity of interests. As much as Riyadh was interested in a loose, 
pragmatic alliance with Tehran in addressing common threats, the Kingdom 
rejected Iran’s claim for hegemony in the Gulf in general and an expansion of 
Iranian influence on the Arabian Peninsula in particular. Therefore, the 
assertion that “[t]he intervention in Oman marked the clearest examples of [a 
Saudi-Iranian] diplomatic ‘division of labour’ [with] Saudi diplomatic and 
economic support [having been] matched by Iran’s dispatch of troops and 
equipment,”387 is not fully accurate. From the Saudi perspective, Iranian military 
engagement on the Arabian Peninsula was principally inacceptable; only the 
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realisation that there was no viable alternative that could have saved the Sultan, 
made it tolerable for the Saudi regime. 
Oil policy was another field in which Saudi Arabia and Iran had conflicting 
interests. Between 1971 and 1975, there were two central issues Riyadh and 
Tehran disagreed upon. First, while Iran considered oil purely as a commodity 
and the steady satisfaction of Western oil demands a high priority within the 
scope of the Cold War, Saudi Arabia increasingly found itself in a dilemma 
between its economic interests and firm pro-Western stance on the one hand, 
and its Arab identity and responsibilities in the context of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Disagreement arose when Saudi Arabia began to use its main export 
good as a political tool, first in form of a positive incentive for a change in U.S. 
policy and later as leverage. Accordingly, the Shah rejected Saudi warnings to 
use oil as a weapon during the months leading to the 1973 October War. When 
the Arab oil producing states eventually embargoed the United States and other 
countries that were supporting Israel in the war against its Arab neighbors, Iran 
opted out. Through its continued oil supply to the Western world including the 
United States, Iran dampened the oil weapon’s effect. An important motive 
behind Iran’s decision to walk a different path from its fellow Middle Eastern oil 
producers was economic in nature. The Shah’s regime was in need for high oil 
incomes in order to finance its very costly societal, infrastructural, and military 
development programmes; a discontinuation of oil exports, even if only 
temporary, would have had negative effects on Iran’s economy and eventually 
also on domestic stability. In contrast, by continuing to supply oil to its 
customers to highly inflated prices, Tehran was able to boost its economy and 
further improve its standing in Washington.388 
The second Saudi-Iranian disagreement regarding oil policy ensued in the 
aftermath of the 1973/74 oil crisis. Between early October 1973 and January 
1974, the price of oil had nearly quadrupled. The increase in oil prices was very 
much in the interest of the Shah’s regime. For one thing, as mentioned above, 
Tehran needed large incomes to finance its great government expenditures. 
Iran’s comparatively large population was continuously growing, increasing 
further state expenses. At the same time, oil production rates showed only 
minor increases. Furthermore, the Shah was confident that the Iranian economy 
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would flourish due to the huge petrodollar influx.389 In contrast, Saudi Arabia 
soon developed an interest in a reduction in oil prices. As early as January 27, 
1974, while the embargo against the United States was still in place, Saudi Oil 
Minister Yamani announced his government’s intention to reduce oil prices.390 
In May, Yamani called for a decrease of the oil price by $2; a proposal that was 
firmly rejected by Iran.391 Saudi Arabia’s stance had several reasons: first, 
Saudi Arabia was concerned about the negative effects a too high price level 
would have on the Western world economy, particularly the U.S. American 
one.392 Interestingly, within only a few months, the objective to strengthen the 
U.S. economy in the context of the Cold War motivated first Iran and then Saudi 
Arabia to object to the other’s oil policy. Second, Saudi Arabia had a 
considerably smaller population and was therefore not dependent economically 
on oil prices as high as they were in the spring of 1974. Third, Saudi oil 
production witnessed a considerable increase in the 1970s; between 1972 and 
1977 the Saudi production rate increased by an annual 9.8%, compared to a 
much lower 2.4% increase in Iranian oil production.393 Fourth, the relatively 
underdeveloped Saudi economy was not able to absorb effectively the massive 
influx of petrodollars. It was impossible to accelerate significantly national 
development without causing considerable societal problems. Reserving the 
enormous surpluses was not a viable option either; as Safran points out,  
“the accumulation of vast reserves when most of the population still lived 
in difficult conditions would create an explosive political situation. 
Attempts to explain it in terms of prudent social policy or inadequate 
administrative apparatus either would not be understood or would 
underscore the defects of the political system. Most likely, in view of the 
local tribal tradition and the example of some of the Gulf shaikhs, the 
conclusion would be drawn that the rulers were hoarding the reserves for 
themselves, as their own private wealth. Radical propaganda from hostile 
neighbors was certain to drive the point home to the Saudi people if they 
did not initially entertain it themselves. Thus, […] a reduction in [oil] 
prices would resolve or at least mitigate a major problem, allowing the 
Saudis to undertake a measured acceleration of development and a 
modest accumulation of reserves.”394 
                                            
389 Fürtig, Iran’s Rivalry, p. 9. 
390 Safran, Saudi Arabia, p. 168. 
391 Badeeb, Saudi-Iranian Relations, p. 64. 
392 Compare Safran, Saudi Arabia, p. 168. 
393 Haass, “Saudi Arabia,” p. 156. 
394 Safran, Saudi Arabia, p. 169. 
  141
Fifth, the Saudi regime was concerned that continuously high oil prices would 
accelerate the developing of alternative sources of energy, ultimately resulting 
in a dramatic reduction of the global oil demand. As the Kingdom had the 
largest known oil reserves that would not be depleted for decades, such a 
development would damage greatly Saudi Arabia’s long-term economic 
interests. Sixth, Riyadh was concerned about a deterioration of its relations with 
the United States; the latter’s economy suffered under the high oil prices and 
put pressure on Riyadh to effectuate a price decrease.395 Safran sees another 
reason for Saudi Arabia’s position in the effects continuously high oil prices 
would have on the balance of power in the Gulf. Due to their larger population 
and more advanced infrastructure, both Iran and Iraq could more effectively 
transform their enormous profits from oil exports into military power than Saudi 
Arabia.396 
In early September 1974, in a conversation with U.S. Ambassador James E. 
Akins, King Faisal expressed his strong criticism of Iran’s oil policy. The King 
pointed out that his government was willing to bring down oil prices, e.g. by 
increasing production. However, due to insufficient U.S. pressure on the Iranian 
regime, he did not see any significant chance of success.397 
Despite Riyadh and Tehran’s contradictory interests with respect to oil price 
policy, bilateral discussion on the issue was maintained. In October 1974, Saudi 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Saqqaf and Deputy Oil Minister Saud Al 
Faisal Al Saud paid a visit to the Shah for discussions on oil policy.398 In the 
end, Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Iran and Iraq on the other – both in 
favour of high oil prices – reached a compromise at the December 1974 OPEC 
summit when the decision was made to reduce the oil price to $10.12 per barrel 
for the following nine months.399 
From Britain’s withdrawal to the Algiers Accord, Saudi-Iraqi relations were 
characterised by fluctuating degrees of hostility. In virtually all policy fields, the 
                                            
395 Safran, Saudi Arabia, pp. 169f. and Yergin, The Price, p. 620. 
396 Safran, Saudi Arabia, p. 130. 
397 Memorandum, President’s Morning Briefing, 9/8/74, Ford Library Project File of Documents 
Declassified Through the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) Program_Box 9, NSA. NSC Middle 
East and South Asia Affairs Staff Files, Box 42, Presidential Briefings File August 9, 1974 - 
October 22, 1974, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. 
398 Ibid. 
399 Safran, Saudi Arabia, p. 171. 
  142
regimes in Riyadh and Baghdad had either contradictory objectives or 
disagreed about the methods to reach the few shared objectives. Most major 
aspects of disagreement have already been mentioned. First, Iraq’s socialist, 
antimonarchical, pan-Arabist Baath ideology was in many respects the 
antithesis to Saudi Arabia’s political order. The continuous Iraqi attempts to 
subvert the conservative regimes in Riyadh and in the other Arab Gulf 
monarchies then turned Iraq into an existential threat for the Al Saud and the 
regimes in what Saudi Arabia considered its immediate sphere of influence. 
In September 1971, Saudi Prince Fahd expressed his government’s concern 
about the severe threat of Iraqi subversion to the newly emerging states 
(Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE); an assessment shared by the U.S. 
government.400 As mentioned above, the Iraqi support for the Dhofar rebellion 
also posed a threat to Saudi interests; for years Riyadh and Baghdad supported 
the opposite side in the Omani civil war. Saudi Arabia, too, was the target of 
Iraqi subversive activities. In August 1971, Saudi Interior Minister Fahd bin 
Abdulaziz Al Saud told the U.S. Ambassador that Iraq had bribed Saudi 
Bedouin sheikhs near the Iraqi border with arms and money to revolt against 
the regime in Riyadh. However, according to Prince Fahd, the Saudi regime had 
good relations with the Bedouin tribes, including some that had fled from Iraq to 
the Kingdom; hence, if they had decided to do so (read, if the conflict with Iraq 
were to escalate), the Saudis would be able to use the tribes against Iraq.401 
The U.S. Embassy later confirmed Prince Fahd’s assertion. In March 1972, U.S. 
Ambassador Thatcher reported that “for well over [a] year [the] Iraqis have been 
trying to forment trouble along [the] border by bribing and arming tribesmen who 
cross [the] border as part of [the] normal migratory pattern.” Ambassador 
Thatcher further reported that the Iraqi regime accommodated roughly two 
dozen former Saudi military officers who had defected over the past decade. 
However, the Saudi regime claimed to be “fully aware of these activities and 
view them as minor pinpricks, posing no threat to [them].”402 Earlier in March 
1972, the Iraqi News Agency alleged that a coup attempt had taken place in the 
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Kingdom. As there was no evidence of such an event, this was apparently a 
deliberate disinformation to provoke a revolt in Saudi Arabia.403 In general, the 
Iraqi media were hostile against the Al Saud regime, issuing highly critical 
comments on Riyadh’s close ties with both the United States and Iran, and 
occasionally even “openly calling for popular revolt against the Saudi 
regime.”404  
Second, the Saudi regime – and this was particularly true for King Faisal – was 
distinctly anti-Communist. As Badeeb puts it, the Saudi King considered 
“communism as the most dangerous and inhuman form of government;”405 
mainly due to communism’s atheist nature. An important reason for the Saudi 
regime to maintain close relations with the United States was the fact that the 
superpower was the bulwark against the spread of Soviet communism. For 
years it had been an important objective of the Saudi regime to contain and roll 
back Soviet influence in the Middle East. One example of this was the 
considerable effort the Saudi leadership made to distance Egypt from the Soviet 
Union following the death of President Nasser in September 1970.406 Against 
this background, it is self-evident that the Iraqi-Soviet rapprochement caused 
significant concern in Riyadh. The conclusion of the Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation in April 1972 made things even worse. Saudi 
Arabia felt encircled by Soviet backed enemies in the north (Iraq) and the south 
(PDRY).407 Moreover, as it was an important interest of the Saudi regime to 
keep the Cold War struggle out of the Gulf, Riyadh feared a Soviet power 
expansion in the subregion. 
Third, Saudi Arabia continued to reject Iraq’s claims on Kuwaiti territory and its 
aggressive attitude towards the Emirate. As both a clear sign of public support 
for Kuwait and warning to Iraq, Saudi Defence Minister, Prince Sultan bin 
Abdulaziz Al Saud, informed the Kuwaiti government in mid-April 1972 about 
Saudi Arabia’s readiness to “respond to any request that the Kuwayt army 
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would make to us at any time.”408 When in March 1973 Iraq erected a border 
post on Kuwaiti territory, opened fire on Kuwaiti soldiers, and repeated its claim 
on Warba and Bubiyan, Saudi Arabia gave staunch political support to the 
Emirate, inter alia by “mustering diplomatic pressure on Iraq within the Arab 
League.”409 Moreover, to underline its position the Saudi regime sent 15,000 
troops to Kuwait. Safran encapsulates the motivation behind the Saudi support 
for Kuwait as follows, 
“If successful, the Iraqi move [to take over Warba and Bubiyan islands] 
would not only enhance greatly the strategic position of the port [of Umm 
Qasr] used by Iraqi and Soviet naval units but could also trigger a 
collapse of the Kuwaiti regime perhaps even bring Iraqi troops within 
striking distance of Saudi Arabia’s oil region.”410 
Fourth, closely connected with its territorial claims on Kuwait and its attempts to 
export the Baathist ideology to the remaining Arab Gulf states was Iraq’s 
nationalist claim for political hegemony in the Gulf. This, of course, was rejected 
by Saudi Arabia. Due to the manifold threats to Saudi interests emanating from 
Iraq, Baghdad’s striving for dominance in the subregion was much more 
worrisome to Riyadh than Iran’s self-perception as “policeman of the Gulf.” 
Iraq’s military strength and the long Saudi-Iraqi border caused particular 
concern in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom was well aware that if relations with Iraq 
were to escalate into a military confrontation, it would not be able to defend 
itself against Iraq’s superior armed forces.  
Fifth, in the light of massive U.S. support for Israel during the 1973 October 
War, Saudi Arabia and Iraq basically agreed on the necessity to apply 
economic pressure to provoke a policy change in Washington. However, Riyadh 
and Baghdad were in disagreement regarding the exact measures that should 
be undertaken. The Iraqi government called for drastic anti-American measures 
that exceeded by far the sanctions the Saudi regime envisaged. Unwilling to 
compromise, Iraq did eventually not participate in the sanctions applied by the 
other Arab oil producing states.411 In 1974, Saudi Arabia and Iraq were again at 
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odds regarding oil policy. Like Iran, Iraq also wanted to keep oil prices high, 
while Saudi Arabia was calling for a significant reduction.412 
Due to the very tense bilateral relations, there were few direct encounters of 
high-level representatives of the Saudi and Iraqi governments. Beside highly 
conflictual contacts between oil ministers within OPEC and meetings at the 
1973 and 1974 Arab League summits at Algiers and Rabat respectively, there 
was only one state visit between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Despite very tense 
bilateral relations Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Saqqaf visited Iraq 
upon invitation by his Iraqi couterpart in mid-September 1972.413 
Kuwait’s Relations with Iran and Iraq, 1971-75 
The Kuwaiti-Iraqi rapprochement that had set in after the 1968 Iraqi Revolution 
continued for one year following Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf. For example, 
when in June 1972 the Iraqi government nationalised the Iraqi Petroleum 
Company, Kuwait supported Baghdad’s decision. However, bilateral relations 
became conflictual again from December 1972 onwards.414 Iraq had stationed 
troops on Kuwaiti soil in the spring of 1969 on the grounds of needing to protect 
its port of Umm Qasr in the light an escalating conflict with Iran over the Shatt 
al-Arab. Despite the fact that the tensions with Iran had begun to subside a few 
months later, Iraqi troops remained in the Emirate. In consequence, the Kuwaiti 
regime became increasingly worried that the Iraqi military presence might 
become a permanent condition; a concern supported by the fact that in late 
1972 Iraq had completed a road on Kuwaiti territory connecting the “temporary” 
Iraqi military post with its territory. A reported Iraqi military build-up at the 
Kuwaiti border in December 1972 raised additional concerns in Kuwait. Kuwaiti 
apprehensions seemed to materialise when on March 20, 1973 Iraqi forces put 
up a defence post at Al Samitah. When Kuwaiti soldiers tried to prevent this, the 
Iraqi troops opened fire on them; in the course of the violent clash two Kuwaiti 
soldiers and one Iraqi soldier lost their lives and two additional Kuwaiti soldiers 
were reported missing. In reaction, the Kuwaiti regime, supported by the 
National Assembly, proclaimed a state of emergency, sent protest notes to 
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Baghdad requesting an Iraqi troop withdrawal, closed the border to Iraq, and 
called back its ambassador to Baghdad. This, however, did not prevent Iraq 
from reasserting its earlier claim on the Emirate.415 Iraqi Foreign Minister 
Murtada Abdulbaqi stated publicly that “[t]here is a document saying that Kuwait 
is Iraqi territory. There is no document which says it is not Iraqi territory.”416 
Stressing their strategic importance for Iraq (see above), Abdulbaqi reiterated 
Baghdad’s claim on Warba and Bubiyan Island and emphasised that “we are 
not taking them from Kuwait[;] rather we are giving up Kuwait for the sake of the 
two islands.”417 In the end, a combination of several factors forced Iraq to back 
down: Soviet pressure; an implicit Iranian threat of intervention; Saudi political 
support and troop redeployment to the Saudi-Iraqi-Kuwaiti tripartite border area 
– 15,000 Saudi troops later entered Kuwait to underline Riyadh’s support for the 
Emirate; diplomatic pressure from other Arab League states including the 
remaining Arab Gulf monarchies; and Kuwaiti threats to freeze all financial 
support to the Arab confrontation states.  
However, Iraqi threat to Kuwaiti integrity was far from over. Diplomatic 
correspondence between Baghdad and Kuwait failed to reach a settlement of 
the border dispute. Iraq maintained that previous bilateral agreements 
demarcating the border between both states were not legally binding as they 
had never been properly ratified due to Iraqi law. In August 1973, during Kuwaiti 
Prime Minister Jaber Al Ahmad Al Sabah’s visit to Baghdad, the Baathist 
leadership emphasised that their acceptance of the current borders with Kuwait 
was contingent on Iraqi control over the islands of Warba and Bubiyan. Kuwait 
rejected this position and the conflict persisted.418 
In an apparent attempt to improve relations with Baghdad, Kuwait allowed Iraqi 
ships to unload at Kuwaiti ports in light of the Iraqi ports’ capacity overload.419 
Nonetheless, in December 1974 Iraqi military units crossed the border and 
erected military installations within Kuwaiti territory.420 Iraqi claims on Kuwaiti 
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territory were reiterated in early January 1975 when the Iraqi pro-government 
newspaper Al-Thawrah implicitly requested the Kuwaiti government to accept 
Baghdad’s “practical and flexible proposals” regarding the solution to the border 
dispute.421 
Iran’s occupation of Abu Musa and the Tunb islands caused serious friction in 
Kuwaiti-Iranian relations. On December 12, 1971 the Kuwaiti National Assembly 
passed a resolution both condemning Iran’s action and requesting the 
government to sever relations with Iran and the United Kingdom. The Kuwaiti 
government, too, strongly rejected Tehran’s action and symbolically recalled its 
ambassador to Iran. Moreover, the Kuwaiti foreign ministry refused to accept 
the credentials of the designated Iranian ambassador to Kuwait; the 
ambassador left Tehran and no replacement was sent until late 1972.422 The 
Kuwaiti regime’s firm reaction to Iran’s seizure of the islands was motivated 
both by popular outrage over the occupation of Arab territory423 and Iraq’s 
insistence on anti-Iranian sanctions. As the Kuwaiti regime did not want to 
alienate either its own populace or its difficult neighbour, it expressed its 
rejection of Iran’s action more emphatically than the remaining Arab Gulf 
monarchies did. Kuwait, however, had no interest in a lasting damage of ties 
with Iran. Hence, it did not follow the Iraqi call to break completely diplomatic 
relations with Tehran. 
From Britain’s withdrawal to the end of 1972, Iran was concerned about Kuwaiti 
attempts to improve relations with Iraq. Both the Shah and pro-government 
Iranian newspapers warned Kuwait of a pro-Iraq policy as this would eventually 
harm the Emirate’s interests. Moreover, Tehran strongly rejected a joint Kuwaiti-
Iraqi statement that reiterated the Arab nature of the three islands.424 
Despite its genuine distaste for both Tehran’s occupation of the three Gulf 
islands and the general Iranian demeanour as policeman of the Gulf, the 
Kuwaiti regime had an interest in stable, good-neighbourly relations with Iran. 
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However, the Kuwaiti regime had to appreciate the public mood. Arab 
nationalist and Palestinian influence in the Kuwaiti society was strong. 
Therefore, the Kuwaiti people rejected vigorously both Iran’s striving for 
dominance in the “Persian Gulf” and its Israel friendly policy. Moreover, the 
Kuwaiti government was well aware that any close ties with Iran would further 
complicate its relations with Iraq and eliminate any chance of a rapprochement 
with Baghdad. Hence, Kuwait refrained from entering into overly close relations 
with Iran. Nonetheless, Kuwait and Tehran shared a common interest in political 
stability both in the Arab Gulf monarchies and in the subregion in general. 
UAE Relations with Iran and Iraq, 1971-75 
In the first phase after the creation of the UAE, its relations with both Iran and 
Iraq were influenced heavily by the Iranian occupation of Abu Musa and the 
Tunbs on November 30, 1971. As mentioned above, Iran was quick to issue 
diplomatic recognition to the newly founded UAE. However, the two states did 
not enter into diplomatic relations until the autumn of 1972. Even then, the UAE 
officially announced the establishment of bilateral relations with one month 
delay. Ambassadors of both nations eventually presented their credentials in 
December 1972 and January 1973 respectively.425 
During the first two years of UAE independence, bilateral relations with Iran 
were overshadowed by the island issue. The UAE’s distant demeanour towards 
Iran had several reasons. First, the ruling elite of the UAE were genuinely upset 
about Iran’s seizure of islands. This of course was particularly true for the ruling 
family in Ras al-Khaimah; less so in the case of the not directly affected 
emirates. The apparent great influence of Arab nationalist advisors to Sheikh 
Zayid played a decisive role in this context.426 Second, Ras al-Khaimah, which 
had rejected to join the UAE on December 1, 1971, made its accession to the 
union in February 1972 conditional on the UAE’s pledge to sustain the claim on 
the occupied islands. This required the UAE to reiterate the unlawfulness of 
Iran’s occupation. Third, the seizure of the islands evoked very significant 
popular protest in the Emirates. Naturally, the largest protests were seen in Ras 
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al-Khaimah and in Sharjah. In Ras al-Khaimah a protest demonstration led by 
the ruler, Sheikh Saqr bin Muhammad Al Qassimi, called for the deportation of 
Iranian expatriates from the Arab states of the Gulf as well as the destruction of 
Iran and Britain’s commercial interests in the entire Arab world; the protests saw 
the destruction of Iranian banks and the burning of Iranian flags. In Sharjah, the 
deputy ruler survived an assassination attempt on December 2; the angry mob 
intended to kill him for his ceding of Abu Musa to Iran, as he had welcomed 
Iran’s troops on the island two days earlier. Hence, to avoid popular outrage 
and a questioning of its legitimacy, the UAE government had to distance itself 
from Iran for a while.427 Fourth, Iraq pressured the UAE not to enter into 
relations with Iran. Baghdad emphasised the Arab nature of the three islands 
and requested the entire Arab world to impose sanctions on Iran for their 
occupation. The UAE did neither want to antagonise Iraq, whose socialist, 
Baathist policy concerned them anyways, nor to undermine their legitimacy as a 
newly established Arab state within the Arab world.428 Hence, five days after the 
Iranian occupation of the three islands, the newly elected UAE President, 
Sheikh Zayid, stated publicly, “We condemn the aggression by a neighbouring 
and friendly state and we are awaiting the Arab states’ concrete support to 
assist us in regaining our rights.”429 In 1972, the UAE raised the issue of the 
occupied islands several times with the Arab League. Moreover, Sheikh Zayid, 
the UAE Foreign Minister, and other Emirati leaders emphasised on several 
occasions that the occupation of Abu Musa and the Tunbs “was not a purely 
local issue, but above all an Arab issue.”430 It is uncertain whether the UAE’s 
main motive was to generate Arab pressure on Iran in order to increase the 
chances for Iran to give in. It seems also plausible that the UAE was trying 
primarily to satisfy Arab nationalist forces and to distribute responsibility for the 
expected failure of the islands’ recapture. 
In the case of the UAE, it is essential to distinguish between federal policy and 
the individual emirate’s policies. While foreign policy is de jure a federal 
prerogative, each emirate de facto also conducts individual foreign policies, 
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particularly in the field of foreign economic and commercial policy. Regarding 
their stance towards Iran, Ras al-Khaimah and Dubai constituted the extremes 
of a continuum stretching from highly conflictual to cordial relations. Due to the 
disagreement about the occupation of the Tunb islands no senior official of Ras 
al-Khaimah visited Iran until 1975. In contrast, having had traditionally strong 
economic ties with Iran, Dubai had an interest in normalised relations with 
Tehran. This explains why Dubai’s ruler, Sheikh Rashid bin Said Al Maktoum, 
did not comment publicly on the island issue and even prohibited anti-Iranian 
demonstrations in his Emirate. Moreover, Sheikh Rashid visited Iran in his 
function as Emir of Dubai in January 1972, months before the UAE federal 
government entered into diplomatic relations with Iran.431 In a conversation with 
U.S. Ambassador Stolzfus in June 1972, Sheikh Rashid emphasised the need 
for good relations with Iran and criticised Sheikh Zayid for “harp[ing] on [the] 
islands dispute.”432 After the federal UAE government had entered into 
diplomatic relations with Iran, Iranian delegations always visited Dubai and 
Sheikh Rashid before heading to the federal capital of Abu Dhabi. The close 
Dubai-Iranian relations were reiterated by a friendly visit of an Iranian Navy 
destroyer to the port of Dubai in May 1974.433 
The federal UAE foreign policy took an intermediate position between Ras al-
Khaimah and Dubai. Despite the island issue the UAE government soon had a 
strong interest in close relations with Iran. As early as December 2, 1971, two 
days after Iran’s seizure of the islands, Sheikh Zayid had sent a message to the 
Shah, announcing the UAE’s “willingness to strengthen all relations” with both 
the Iranian government and the Iranian people. The Shah replied expressing his 
hope that ‘brotherly and friendly ties between Iran and all Emirates in [the] 
Persian Gulf will increasingly develop in [the] future.”434 Tehran, too, was 
anxious to overcome the island crisis and redevelop and further close ties with 
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the UAE. The two states shared deep concern about Baathist, socialist Iraq and 
the Marxist PDRY, which were both actively pursuing the objective of subverting 
pro-Western monarchical regimes in the Gulf. This by default constituted a 
direct threat to the very existence of the regimes in the UAE and Iran. Radical 
Arab pressure on the UAE government, however, prevented a meaningful 
rapprochement with Tehran at that time. In a conversation with U.S. 
Ambassador William Stolzfus in mid-June 1972, Sheikh Zayid expressed a 
favourable view of the Iranian role in the Gulf calling it “vital and inevitable.”435 A 
few days earlier, UAE Foreign Minister Ahmad Khalifa Al Suwaidi had gone into 
much more detail when encapsulating the UAE government’s standpoint 
regarding Iran. According to the U.S chargé d’affaires in Abu Dhabi, 
“Suwaidi stressed that [the] UAE is in urgent need of friendship with Iran, 
[the] most powerful Gulf state. The UAE had tried unsuccessfully [to] 
head off [the] seizure of [the] islands. Now there was [the] problem of 
restoring good relations with Iran while at [the] same time not stirring up 
wrath and emotions of Arab League members, especially radicals, who 
[are] incensed over [the] loss of Arab territory. Suwaidi said at this 
juncture quiet diplomacy was [the] most realistic way to build bridges. 
[The] UAE desires [the] establishment [of] formal diplomatic ties, but 
recognized that this would irritate certain Arab states. This was [an] open 
admission on [the] part of Suwaidi that [the] UAE does not feel strong 
enough to buck Arab political pressures. Suwaidi said [the] question of 
how best to approach Iran in order [to] overcome existing problem is now 
receiving serious study within [the] UAE [government]. He urged [the 
U.S. Government] to do what it could behind the scenes to make [the] 
Iranians appreciate [the] dilemma facing [the] UAE in its efforts [to] 
improve relations. Suwaidi made [a] strong pitch for [U.S. Government] 
backing for [the] route of quiet diplomacy.”436 
In late August 1972 Sheikh Zayid told the U.S. chargé d’affaires that his 
country’s  
“top priorities were [the] improvement of relations first with [Saudi Arabia] 
and second with Iran. [Regarding] Iran, [the] dispute could be quickly and 
easily settled, but [the] major stumbling block was [the] attitude of Iraq 
and Libya, and he (Zayid) has asked [Arab League Secretary General] 
Riad to seek [the] agreement of these countries to drop [their] objections 
to [a] UAE-Iran settlement at [the] upcoming [Arab League] meeting.”437 
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The report points out further that “Zayid spent [a] good deal of [the] 
conversation stressing his desire for friendly relations with Iran.”438 It is 
important to see the UAE’s desire for close ties with Iran also in context of the 
tense relations with Saudi Arabia; the Kingdom did not recognise the UAE 
diplomatically until 1974 due to the unresolved Buraimi conflict. Therefore, 
closer relations with Iran were also a way to balance out the troubled relations 
with the powerful neighbour in Riyadh. 
The exchange of ambassadors in December 1972 and January 1973 was then 
the first visible step towards a UAE-Iranian rapprochement. The first UAE state 
visits to Iran followed in July and August 1973 by the Ministers of Health and 
Defence respectively. In March 1974 the Iranian Agriculture Minister paid a visit 
to the UAE. The breakthrough in bilateral relations was reached in August 1974 
during a visit to Iran by Sheikh Rashid Al Maktoum, ruler of Dubai and UAE 
Vice-President.439 Subsequent to Sheikh Rashid’s visit, the UAE and Iran 
signed a border agreement that determined the median line as boundary 
between both countries’ continental shelves.440 The three islands were however 
omitted from the treaty.441 
Following Sheikh Rashid’s visit and the conclusion of the continental shelf 
agreement UAE-Iran relations underwent a rapid rapprochement. In the course 
of the UAE Information Minister’s seven-day visit to Iran in mid-November 1974, 
both states agreed to organise exhibitions in each other’s states. In an interview 
in late December 1974, Sheikh Zayid implied a substantial congruity in interests 
between the UAE and Iran when he stated that “the Arabs and Iranians are both 
working to maintain Gulf security and stability.”442 While the UAE President and 
other top UAE officials had made similar comments in confidential meetings 
before, it was the first time that a high-ranking UAE representative did so 
publicly. 
The shift in the UAE’s stand towards Iran had been made possible by a change 
in popular attitude. By 1974, the population of both Sharjah and, to a lesser 
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degree, Ras al-Khaimah had accepted the fact that Iran would not return the 
islands in the foreseeable future. Additionally, in the case of Sharjah, the 
financial compensation agreed upon with Iran in November 1971 had a positive 
economic effect in the Emirate.443 Furthermore, Iraqi, Syrian, and Libyan 
pressure on the UAE regarding relations with Iran had lessened over time. 
Sheikh Zayid had been able to win Yasser Arafat’s support in this regard. The 
leader of the Palestinian fedayeen pointed out to the leaders in Baghdad, 
Damascus, and Tripoli “that [the] Gulf Shaikhs have to live with Iran” and that an 
overly anti-Iranian policy over the island issue “only dissipated the struggle 
against the Arabs real enemy,” Israel.444 Hence, the door was open for an 
accelerated UAE-Iranian rapprochement. 
UAE-Iranian trade relations, too, improved significantly during the first years. 
Between 1971 and 1975 the volume of Iranian imports to the UAE showed a 
13.7-fold increase. The vast majority of Iranian imports went to the Emirate of 
Dubai: roughly two thirds in 1971 and as much as 92% in 1974. Despite the 
rapid increase in imports from Iran, the share of Iranian products among total 
UAE imports dropped from 13% to 6% between 1971 and 1975.445 The primary 
cause for both developments was the massive economic growth following the 
1973/74 oil crisis. 
Despite the rapprochement in UAE-Iranian relations and their wide-ranging 
congruity in interests, the UAE government did not always agree with Iranian 
policy in the Gulf. Apart from the ongoing Iranian occupation of the three 
islands, the UAE disagreed with the scale of Iran’s involvement in the Omani 
Dhofar conflict. The UAE was in agreement with Tehran about the need to 
support the Omani regime in its “struggle against communism and leftist 
subversion.”446 Both states were concerned about a spill-over of this conflict to 
the UAE or Saudi Arabia. This apprehension is understandable considering the 
fact that both the PDRY and Iraq supported elements that intended to “liberate” 
the entire Arabian Peninsula, and not just Oman, from monarchical regimes. 
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Therefore, the UAE was very appreciative of Iranian support for the Sultan’s 
forces. However, the UAE government “objected strongly” the introduction of 
any Iranian forces into the conflict. In a personal conversation with a U.S. 
diplomat, Sheikh Zayid expressed his concern that the Iranian military 
intervention might cause a public debate in the UAE.447 
During the first half of the 1970s the UAE, with the partial exception of Ras al-
Khaimah, considered Iraq’s policy to be a considerable threat to their interests. 
As mentioned above, the UAE were very concerned about Iraq’s support of 
radical antimonarchical parties in the Arab Gulf monarchies. For one thing, the 
UAE government feared destabilising effects an overthrow of the neighbourly 
Omani Sultan regime through Iraqi backed rebels would have on both the 
domestic and subregional level. Iraqi subversive activities in other peninsular 
states, particularly the UAE, were additional cause for alarm. In June 1972 in a 
conversation with U.S. Ambassador Stolzfus, Sheikh Rashid of Dubai 
“expressed serious personal concern over Iraqi activities, particularly in Abu 
Dhabi and Ras al-Khaima.” The ruler of Dubai added that according to his 
observation Iraqis in the UAE were “not well liked[,] ‘which is [a] good thing 
because if [the] Iraqis had a Nasser, we would be in for real trouble.”448  
Very troublesome to the UAE government was the apparent Iraqi involvement in 
the failed coup attempt in Sharjah in January 1972, in the course of which Emir 
Khalid bin Mohammed Al Qasimi was killed.449 Moreover, Iraq’s aggressive 
policy against Kuwait was also against UAE interests. 
In addition, the UAE-Iraq relations were burdened by Baghdad’s denial to 
recognise the UAE diplomatically unless the Emirates were to change their 
policy towards Iran. Specifically, Iraq requested the UAE to reject and annul the 
1971 Sharjah-Iranian agreement regarding control of the island of Abu Musa. 
Baghdad further demanded that the UAE makes the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with Iran contingent on the return of the three islands. Sheikh Zayid 
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indeed criticised publicly the UAE-Sharjah agreement; however, the UAE did 
not undertake any legal actions against the validity of the treaty.450 
In the light of the manifold conflicts between the UAE and Iraq, there was little 
development in bilateral relations aside from a few visits by UAE officials to Iraq 
and vice versa. On May 8, 1972, Iraqi Foreign Minister Murtada Al Hadithi 
visited Abu Dhabi. Upon conclusion of the visit, a joint communiqué was 
published that reiterated the Arab nature of the three occupied islands.451 In late 
1973, Iraq and the UAE concluded an agreement according to which Baghdad 
would provide Abu Dhabi with personnel.452 In late July of the following year, 
UAE Prime Minister Khalifa bin Zayid Al Khalifa paid a three-day visit to Iraq.453 
It does not seem to be coincidental that Prime Minister Khalifa’s visit to 
Baghdad occurred in close temporal connection with the signing of the UAE-
Iranian border agreement of mid-August. It is likely that the UAE government 
wanted to inform the Iraqi government before taking a significant step forward in 
the UAE-Iranian rapprochement. 
Qatar’s Relations with Iran and Iraq, 1971-75 
In the first years following Qatar’s independence, the Emirate’s foreign policy 
was rather passive and in most instances followed the Saudi lead. Qatar’s 
foreign policy objectives were characterised by an interest in subregional 
stability and regime stability in all Arab Gulf monarchies. Qatar did not face any 
immediate threats from either Iraq or Iran; neither was the Emirate the subject 
of Iranian or Iraqi territorial claims nor the victim of any noteworthy meddling in 
its domestic affairs by any of the two subregional powers. Nonetheless, Qatar 
was concerned about Iraq’s radical Baathist ideology and Baghdad’s support of 
oppositional forces in the other Gulf states. Therefore, Qatar kept a sceptical 
distance from Iraq. In contrast, as Iran shared Qatar’s interest in a stable 
subregional status quo and had the power to influence subregional relations in 
this direction, Doha was interested in close, friendly relations with Tehran. This 
interest was mutual as demonstrated by Iran’s above-mentioned emphasis to 
have been first to recognise Qatar diplomatically. When the Al Thani family 
                                            
450 Compare Al-Alkim, Foreign Policy, pp. 63f. 
451 “Chronology: February 16, 1972-May 15, 1972,” p. 302. 
452 Niblock, “Iraqi Policies,” p. 143. 
453 “Chronology: May 16, 1974-August 15, 1974,” p. 428. 
  156
replaced Emir Ahmad bin Ali on February 22, 1972, Iran again was among the 
first states to recognise publicly Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani’s rule. The large 
Iranian expatriate community in Qatar454 continued to cause no noteworthy 
problems within the Qatari society. On the contrary, there is evidence 
suggesting that Iran used its influence on Iranian expatriates in Qatar to 
stabilise the Al Thani regime. Hence, the latter saw in Iran a source of 
legitimacy, security, and stability for both country and regime.455 In August 
1972, U.S. diplomatic sources went as far as calling relations between Doha 
and Tehran “excellent.”456 
Bahrain’s Relations with Iran and Iraq, 1971-75 
Formal diplomatic Bahraini-Iraqi relations had been initiated soon after 
Bahrain’s independence in August 1971.457 However, in the first post-
independence years Manama’s bilateral ties with Baghdad were conflictual and 
characterised by significant Bahraini suspicion. The policy interests of the 
regimes in Manama and Baghdad were largely incompatible. This was true with 
respect to the domestic political order in Bahrain and in the remaining Arab Gulf 
monarchies as well as regarding relations with the United States and Iran. 
Ever since the Iraqi Baath Party had come to power in 1968, the Bahraini 
regime had been concerned about Iraq’s efforts to spread Baathist ideology in 
the Arab Gulf monarchies, most notably through the newly established Iraqi 
trade centres. Manama was particularly anxious about Baghdad’s support for 
radical antimonarchical and socialist elements in the Gulf states. Bahrain itself 
had become the target of such Iraqi actions as Baghdad supported radical 
Sunni elements in the Emirate whose objective it was to overthrow the Al 
Khalifa rule.458 In February 1972, a high-ranking Iraqi diplomat was taken into 
custody at Manama airport after having been caught in the attempt to smuggle 
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automatic weapons in the country.459 Bahrain considered Iraq and the PDRY to 
be the largest threats to the stability and security of the Arab Gulf monarchies 
and the entire Gulf subregion.460 
Following the Al Samitah incident in Kuwait, Bahrain’s leadership was 
increasingly concerned about Iraq destabilising Bahrain’s domestic order as 
well as the entire Gulf area. Following a conversation with Bahraini Emir Isa bin 
Salman Al Khalifa and Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, U.S. 
diplomat Robert A. Stein stated that “Bahrain’s leaders were given quite a jolt by 
recent Iraqi agression [sic] against Kuwait.”461 
Iraq and Bahrain had contradicting views on U.S. military presence in the Gulf. 
The socialist, strongly anti-American Iraqi government strictly rejected any U.S. 
military presence in the area. The Bahraini regime, on the other hand, had an 
interest in close relations with the United States and to a certain degree also 
U.S. protection against potential aggressors such as Iraq or a revived Iranian 
claim on Bahrain. Hence, Manama leased a part of the former British Royal 
Navy base at Juffair to the U.S. Navy, allowing it to establish a permanent 
presence in Bahrain and in the Gulf as a whole. This Bahraini policy provoked 
repeated, strong Iraqi criticism and further burdened relations between 
Baghdad and Manama.462 Conversely, the Bahraini regime was concerned 
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about the accelerated Iraqi-Soviet rapprochement as evidenced by the 1972 
bilateral friendship and cooperation agreement.463 
Another bone of contention in Bahraini-Iraqi relations was the improving ties 
between Manama and Iraq’s rival in Tehran. The Baath regime strongly 
criticised Bahrain “for acquiescing in what the Iraqis perceived as Iran’s attempt 
to create a sphere of influence around the Gulf littoral.”464 
In what seems as an attempt to support Bahrain’s close Kuwaiti ally and both 
improve relations with Iraq, the Bahraini regime reportedly offered to mediate in 
the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border dispute.465 
While political ties with Iraq were estranged, relations in the economic, 
educational, and cultural sphere were comparatively close. Iraq had established 
a trade center in Manama and the state-owned Iraqi Airways and Rafidain Bank 
had branches in Bahrain. As mentioned above a relatively large number of 
Bahraini students attended the University of Baghdad and other institutions of 
higher education in Iraq. This, however, concerned the Bahraini regime as their 
nationals became exposed and in some cases also attracted to Baathist 
ideology. Hence, the Al Khalifa considered the educational exchange with Iraq 
to be a potential gateway for subversive elements and ideas. Lastly, there was 
a significant Bahraini religious tourism to the holy Shiite sites in Karbala and 
Najaf.466 
The conflictual relations with Baghdad and the threat to Bahrain’s domestic 
stability emanating from Iraq motivated Manama to seek close relations with 
Saudi Arabia and the smaller Arab Gulf monarchies. Beside suggestions of 
constructing a bridge connection between Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, 
the Al Khalifa regime also called for a military alliance among Arab Gulf 
monarchies. While such an alliance or any other meaningful military cooperation 
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failed to materialise for several years, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain symbolically 
conducted a joint manoeuvre in June of 1975.467 
Once Iran had dropped its historic claim on Bahrain and accepted Bahraini 
independent statehood, relations between Manama and Tehran had improved 
significantly. The Shah’s regime’s foreign policy had become much less of a 
threat to the interests of the Bahraini leadership. More than that, both states 
had an interest in friendly relations in the post-British Gulf era. The Bahraini-
Iranian rapprochement, which had begun in 1969 continued gradually after 
Bahrain’s independence. This could be seen inter alia by the Bahraini Defence 
Minister’s the five-day visit to Iran in late April, early May 1973.468 The close 
economic connection between Bahrain and Iran, advanced by the large Iranian 
expatriate community among merchants in Bahrain, helped to improve relations 
between the two states. The opening of several Iranian bank branches in 
Bahrain was also evidence of thriving economic relations.469 
Oman’s Relations with Iran and Iraq, 1971-75 
In the first half of the 1970s, the Omani regime under the new Sultan, Qaboos 
bin Said Al Said, was preoccupied with both nation-building and fighting a war 
against the Dhofar rebels. Both the rebels and the Sultan’s forces received 
substantial support by outside powers. Iran was, beside the United Kingdom, 
the largest supporter of Qaboos, while Iraq together with the PDRY and the 
Soviet Union supported the rebels.470 Logically, Iran and Iraq’s engagement in 
the Omani civil war shaped Omani relations with the two subregional powers. 
Between 1971 and 1975, Omani-Iranian relations were cordial and considerably 
closer than Muscat’s relations with its Arab neighbour states Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE. This was evidenced inter alia by several meetings between Sultan 
Qaboos and the Shah in the months following the establishment of bilateral 
relations as well as the signing of a bilateral border agreement in 1972.471 Much 
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more importantly, Iranian support was instrumental in the Omani regime’s fight 
against the Dhofar rebels and decisive for the Sultan’s eventual victory in the 
Omani civil war; Iranian financial support and shipments of military equipment 
began in 1971. Soon after Qaboos had taken power in July 1970, his troops 
supported by British officers and arms made progress in driving back the rebel 
forces. Towards the end of 1972, the Sultan’s advances had prompted the 
Soviet Union to increase its support for the anti-Sultan front. In reaction, starting 
in January 1973 and upon request of the Omani government, Iran intervened 
militarily on the side of the Sultan.472 The first Iranian troops to arrive were 
Special Forces units that, in the spring of 1973, participated in the 
establishment of the so called Hornbeam Line, a physical barrier that was 
meant to interrupt the rebels’ supply lines. Over the following months, Iran 
supplied the Omani air force with fourteen helicopters, and in December 1973, 
the Shah sent a 1,200 man battle group to Dhofar.473 In order to interrupt the 
rebels’ supply lines, the Shah’s regime also committed F-5 fighter aircraft to 
patrol Oman’s border to the PDYR. Moreover, destroyers of the Iranian Imperial 
Navy attacked rebel strongholds from the sea.474 When, in December 1974, the 
final campaign against the rebels started, Iranian forces played an essential 
role. In this regard, Allen Jr. and Rigsbee summarise 
“In the Iranian fashion of massive force, the IITF [Imperial Iranian Task 
Force] included approximately 4,000 troops with two infantry battalions, a 
gun battery, Chinook cargo helicopters and Hueys, and naval support 
from the Iranian navy all under a brigadier-general.”475 
After an initial setback, the Iranian Task Force managed to capture the rebel’s 
capital of Rakhyut on January 5, 1975, heralding the end of the Dhofar War.476 
Iran’s substantial support for the Sultan had strategic reasons. As mentioned 
above, the Shah had a vital interest in the stabilisation of Oman under the 
moderate regime of Sultan Qaboos. A collapse of Qaboos’ rule and an ensuing 
accession to power by the radical Marxist PFLOAG (later PFLO) would have 
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had massive repercussions for Iran’s interests. In the light of continuously closer 
Iraqi-Soviet relations and Baghdad’s attempts to export its Baathist 
revolutionary ideology in the Gulf, the Shah’s regime was particularly anxious to 
prevent further Communist and revolutionary advances in its immediate 
neighbourhood. The fact that the Omani Musandam Peninsula constituted the 
southern tip of the Strait of Hormuz further motivated the Shah to bolster Sultan 
Qaboos and to guarantee good neighbourly relations with Muscat for the 
foreseeable future. With its massive military intervention in Oman, Iran also 
reiterated its claim on subregional hegemony; Tehran would not allow 
developments in the Gulf contrary to its interests. Moreover, the Dhofar War 
offered an opportunity to the Shah to both demonstrate his military capabilities 
and give his forces combat training.477 The definitive number of Iranian troops 
deployed to Oman is disputed; based on an overview of different publications, it 
seems safe to say that Iranian force levels peaked in 1975 with 3,500 to 5,000 
troops. As Al-Khalili states correctly, Marshall’s suggestion that Iran had 
between 30,000 and 35,000 troops in Oman is dubious, as this figure was 
alleged by the PFLO.478 Interestingly, Sultan Qaboos admitted publicly Iran’s 
active military involvement in the conflict not before February 1974, and then 
probably only in reaction to a PFLO conference in Beirut the month before 
during which the organisation had remonstrated against Iranian imperialist 
intervention in Dhofar.479 It can be assumed that Sultan Qaboos’ reluctance to 
acknowledge Iranian intervention was based on his concern that it would 
provoke additional radical Arab nationalist propaganda against his rule. 
Between 1971 and 1975, direct ties between Baghdad and Muscat were 
minimal. The Omani Information Minister’s visit to Baghdad in June 1971 was 
the only state visit during that time. Sultan Qaboos’ offer to enter into formal 
relations was rejected by Iraqi President Ahmad Hassan Al Bakr.480 Official 
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diplomatic relations between Baghdad and Muscat were not established until 
January 1976.481 Paradoxically, Iraq supported Oman’s admission to both the 
Arab League and the United Nations. Regarding Iraq’s stand on Oman’s 
admission to the Arab League, Al-Khalili summarises 
“Iraq’s position toward the entire issue can be described as an incoherent 
vacillation between rejecting the sultanate’s bid for membership and 
supporting it. In the end, however, Iraq chose to support the 
sultanate.”482 
After Saudi Arabia delayed Oman’s admission for two weeks, the Sultanate was 
admitted to the regional organisation on September 29, 1971.483 With regard to 
Oman’s admission to the United Nations, Baghdad’s stance was even more 
surprising. Not only did Iraq vote in favour of Oman’s admission to the United 
Nations on October 7, 1971, it even sponsored the respective UN General 
Assembly resolution.484 
In the absence of any official ties, Iraq was heavily involved in inner-Omani 
developments. As mentioned above, the Baath regime in Baghdad had 
supported the rebels since the early 1960s both ideologically and physically, 
and increased greatly its support in the first years of the 1970s. Ergo, Iraq was a 
source of great danger to the interests of the Qaboos regime.485 
3.3 From the Algiers Accord to the Iranian Revolution 
The next phase of the Arab Gulf monarchies’ relations with Iran and Iraq set in 
following the Algiers Accord. This milestone in Iranian-Iraqi relations evoked 
considerable change in the international relations of the Gulf. Following the 
Baath Party’s 1968 takeover of power the traditionally conflictual Iranian-Iraqi 
relations had further deteriorated. The decades-long conflict over the Shatt al-
Arab escalated once again when in 1969 Tehran abrogated unilaterally the 
Iranian-Iraqi treaty of 1937 and enforced equal usage rights of the river. Beside 
their dispute over the Shatt al-Arab, Iran and Iraq also disagreed about other 
territories along their border. In general, as described in detail above, both 
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states had competing interests in the Gulf. The result was hostile bilateral 
relations. In order to weaken the Iraqi regime, Tehran gave support to the Iraqi 
Kurdish opposition in its fight for autonomy from Baghdad. When the intra-Iraqi 
conflict escalated in March 1974, Iranian support for the rebels increased. In 
early 1975, Iran even intervened militarily on the side of the rebels and 
provoked border clashes with Iraq in order to dispurse Baghdad’s forces from 
the Kurdish front. On March 6, 1975, having reached the verge of war, Iran and 
Iraq came to a comprehensive agreement that resolved the most important 
differences. During the OPEC summit in Algiers, the two states settled their land 
border dispute and agreed upon shared sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab. In 
return for these considerable Iraqi concessions, Iran pledged to terminate its aid 
for the Kurdish rebellion.486 The principles of the Algiers Accord were codified in 
Baghdad on June 13, 1975 in the Treaty on International Relations and Good 
Neighbourly Relations that 
“(1) reaffirmed the Algiers Agreement; (2) demarcated the river boundary 
according to the thalweg; (3) instituted measures and mechanisms to 
stop ‘any infiltration of a subversive nature’ along the borders; and (4) re-
emphasized the indivisibility of the treaty.”487 
In the first half of the 1970s, international relations in the Gulf, particularly 
between Iraq and the remaining Gulf states, had been characterised by a high 
degree of tension and conflict. In the aftermath of the Algiers Accord, these 
tensions gradually subsided as Iraq’s foreign policy underwent a transition. In 
this context Gause points out,  
“Iraq’s willingness to settle its differences with Iran was but one aspect of 
a general turn in Baghdad’s foreign policy away from ideological 
confrontation and toward state-to-state cooperation, not just with Iran but 
also with the Gulf monarchies. While Iranian military pressure through 
the Kurds was the major reason for this switch, it also reflected the 
Ba’thist government’s appreciation that its previous policies had isolated 
it both in the Gulf and in the larger Arab region. […] Baghdad followed 
the Algiers Agreement with a charm offensive toward Saudi Arabia and 
the smaller Gulf monarchies.”488 
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Saudi Arabia’s Relations with Iran and Iraq, 1975-79 
The transition in Iraqi Gulf policy had significant influence not only on Saudi-
Iraqi but also on Saudi-Iranian relations. Riyadh welcomed Baghdad’s initiative 
towards more cooperative relations with the Kingdom and the remaining Gulf 
states; a Saudi-Iraqi rapprochement became visible within only a matter of 
weeks following the Algiers Accord. Nonetheless, major Saudi concerns 
persisted: about Iraq’s ambitions for a leadership role among Arab Gulf states, 
Baghdad’s ongoing, although reduced, support for Baathist elements in the 
Arab Gulf monarchies as well as Iraq’s anti-American stance and friendly 
relations with the Soviet Union. Regardless, with the immediate danger 
emanating from Iraq slowly receding, Riyadh’s concerns about Iran’s 
hegemonic ambitions in the Gulf increased. Against this background, the Saudi 
regime devised a strategy of partially neutralising Baghdad’s and Tehran’s 
ambitions and consolidating its influence in the smaller Arab Gulf monarchies by 
skilfully playing off both parties against each other. 
In general, Saudi-Iranian relations remained friendly and cooperative until the 
Iranian Revolution. As in the years before, Riyadh and Tehran shared many 
interests with regard to subregional, regional, and global developments: the 
maintenance of stability and security in the Gulf; the preservation of regime 
stability in the conservative Gulf states associated with the prevention of a 
spread of Baathist and communist ideology; the containment of Iraqi 
nationalism; close political, economic, and military ties with the United States; 
the prevention of Soviet intrusion into the Gulf and Soviet advances in the Arab 
and Islamic world as well as in Africa in general; the settlement of the Arab-
Israeli conflict including the restoration of Islamic control over Jerusalem; and 
the promotion of Islamic solidarity.489 
Nonetheless, Riyadh and Tehran were not in agreement in all fields. Following 
the Algiers Accord, Iran reiterated its calls for the establishment of a 
comprehensive, multilateral security scheme in the Gulf. In a state visit to 
Riyadh on April 28, the Shah presented his proposal to King Khaled. While the 
Saudi regime shared in principal the interest in multilateral security cooperation 
in the Gulf, it was concerned that the far-reaching Iranian plan, which provided 
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for “a substantial mobilization of the resources of the Gulf countries,” would 
allow Tehran to cement its subregional hegemony.490 In this context, the clear 
Iraqi objection to any multilateral security arrangement served Riyadh as it 
spared them the need to object to Iran’s proposal.491 Mainly due to Iraqi 
opposition the Shah’s vision of a collective defence pact in the Gulf was served 
a final blow during the November 1976 Muscat meeting of all Gulf littoral states. 
For Saudi Arabia the failure of the Iranian plan meant the chance to pursue their 
own Gulf security scheme more effectively and enter into closer bilateral 
cooperation with the smaller Arab Gulf monarchies. 492 
Saudi Arabia made further attempts to balance Iranian power and reduce its 
influence on the Arabian Peninsula. For one thing, Riyadh invested in the 
Egypt’s economic development as it considered the Sadat regime an important 
counterweight to Iran on the regional level. Moreover, the Saudi regime had an 
interest in the elimination of Iran’s military presence in Oman as this was 
considered by Riyadh as an Iranian intervention in its traditional sphere of 
influence. Hence, in March 1976, Riyadh established diplomatic relations with 
the PDRY and subsequently brokered an understanding between the latter and 
Oman according to which South Yemen would end its support for the rebellion 
in exchange for a withdrawal of foreign troops from Oman; indeed, in January 
1977, Iranian troops were partially withdrawn from Oman.493 
Strong U.S. support for the Shah’s Gulf security scheme and the general U.S. 
perception of Iran as its main partner and guarantor for security in the Gulf 
upset the Saudi regime. The desire to counter this and improve its own standing 
in Washington was an important source of motivation for Riyadh to align its oil 
policy in such a way as to favour the economic interests of the United States.494 
This led to new Saudi-Iranian disagreement over oil prices. At the May 1976 
OPEC summit in Bali, the Saudi delegation rejected the call for a 15% rise in oil 
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prices supported by Iran and Iraq. Due to Riyadh’s uncompromising stance and 
its influence as top oil producer, the oil price was not raised at all.495 
Saudi-Iranian disagreement on oil policy continued in December 1976. At the 
OPEC summit in Doha the majority of member states, including Kuwait and 
Qatar, agreed to raise the price of oil by 10% in January 1977, followed by 
another 5% increase six months later. Saudi Arabia and the UAE both broke 
ranks and increased the price of their oil exports by only 5%.496 Again, 
economic interests were partially the reason for Saudi Arabia’s decision to 
break ranks with Iran. However, as it was the case in Bali, Riyadh chose its 
policy with regard to its own relations with the United States and the U.S.-
Iranian relations. Saudi Arabia intended to enhance its relative status as 
important partner in the eyes of both the outgoing Ford and incoming Carter 
administration.497 Iranian reaction was aggressive, however, targeted mainly 
against Saudi Oil Minister Yamani. The Iranian press called Yamani a “stooge 
of capitalist circles” and accused him of “scheming to wreck OPEC’s 
achievements.”498 
The ensuing two-tier price system within OPEC remained in existence for six 
months. At the July 1977 OPEC meeting in Stockholm, Sweden, a compromise 
was reached. Accordingly, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi increased their oil prices by 
5% while the remaining states forewent the previously agreed additional 5% 
increase for July 1977. Hence, an equal price level was restored.499 This 
compromise had been reached in mid-April in talks in Saudi Arabia between 
King Khaled and the Shah’s personal envoy and step-brother, Prince 
Gholamreza.500 The meeting advanced Saudi-Iranian economic cooperation 
also beyond the issue of oil prices. Saudi Arabia was reported to have agreed 
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to give Iran a very significant loan of $3,000 million. The fact that Tehran 
decided to obtain the loan from Riyadh and not from a different source, 
“underlined a political motive, and established Saudi Arabia and Iran as 
economic partners on an equal standing.”501 At the Stockholm summit Iran 
emphasised the end of the Saudi-Iranian disagreement on oil policy with the 
Iranian chief negotiator giving a statement according to which “Iran’s oil policy 
was identical with the Saudis’.”502 
Following the agreement on oil prices Saudi-Iranian relations improved 
considerably. In early November, during a visit to Tehran, Saudi Interior Minister 
Naif bin Abdualziz Al Saud discussed with the Iranian government about joint 
actions in the fight against terrorism and signed an agreement on information 
exchange on criminal and subversive activities.503 In mid-January 1978, the 
Shah paid a visit to Riyadh. His main discussion points with King Khaled were 
Sadat’s Jerusalem visit two months earlier and the common approach to the 
developing situation in the Horn of Africa; Marxist Ethiopia, supported by the 
Soviet Union, Cuba, and the PDRY, was fighting Somalia in the Ogaden War. 
Under these conditions, the Shah initiated a new attempt to establish a Gulf 
security pact. This time, Saudi Arabia was more susceptible to the Shah’s 
proposal and, particularly after the Marxist coup d’état in Afghanistan in April 
1978 and the pro-Soviet regime change in the PDRY in June, the Saudi regime 
tried to convince Iraq to agree to a comprehensive Gulf security agreement. To 
coordinate their positions, Saudi Defence Minister Sultan visited both Iran and 
Iraq in April 1978. Before these attempts could bear any fruit the Iranian regime 
crumbled.504 
The continuous deterioration of Iranian domestic stability over the course of 
1978 deeply concerned the Saudi regime. Despite their disagreement with the 
Shah on certain issues, the Saudi government feared the consequences radical 
change in Iran would have on the security of the entire Gulf area. Repeatedly, 
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the leadership in Riyadh expressed public support for the Iranian regime. In 
August 1978, Saudi Crown Prince Fahd commended the Shah for the develop-
ment Iran had made under his rule and blamed international Communism and 
global leftist elements for the subversion of the Iranian and other Gulf regimes. 
Fahd added that should against all expectations the Shah fail to restore internal 
stability, “the Arab states will have to support Iran and the Shah, because the 
stability of that country is important to the [entire] region.”505 Not only did the 
Saudi regime see in the potential overthrow of the Shah a loss of a source of 
Gulf stability, but it also feared the extension of Communist influence in post-
Shah Iran; reportedly, “the Saudis were apprehensive that the chaos in Iran was 
part of a grand Soviet-orchestrated strategy in the region.”506 
As a general trend, Saudi-Iraqi relations underwent a rapprochement from the 
Algiers Accord to the Iranian Revolution. Particularly the field of economic 
cooperation between Saudi Arabia (and the remaining Arab Gulf monarchies) 
and Iraq saw improvements.507 Nonetheless, conflict arose over several issues 
and major differences in interests and political ideology prevailed over the entire 
period. 
On March 25, 1975, a mere three weeks after the conclusion of the Algiers 
Accord, King Faisal fell victim to an assassination. Two days later, newly 
appointed Crown Prince Fahd gave a speech in which he outlined the new 
policy under King Khaled. Fahd used this opportunity to express Saudi Arabia’s 
“desire to cultivate brotherly relations with Iraq.”508 First signs of a bilateral 
rapprochement became visible in April when an agreement was reached on the 
partition of the Saudi-Iraqi neutral zone, which had been established by the 
1922 Uqair Protocol. Moreover, Saudi Arabia began mediating in the Iraqi-
Syrian conflict over the Euphrates River. In addition, Saudi Arabia reportedly 
granted Iraq a $200 million loan.509 On June 9, the Saudi Crown Prince arrived 
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in Baghdad for a three-day state visit, the first high-level state visit between 
Saudi Arabia and Iraq since Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf. However, at this 
meeting, the limits of Saudi-Iraqi cooperation and the Iraqi claim to leadership 
among Arab Gulf states became obvious when Baghdad denied stoutly Saudi 
attempts to mediate the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait.510 The fact that the 
Saudi regime continued its expansion of the military base at Hafar al-Batin in 
northern Saudi Arabia, close to the tripartite border with Kuwait and Iraq, is 
indicative of Riyadh’s concerns about Iraq’s intentions.511 
In the first two years after the Algiers Accord, Iraq’s rejection of the collective 
defence pact suggested by the Shah came in useful to the Saudi regime; 
however, Iraq’s interest in a network of bilateral security agreements raised 
concerns in Riyadh as Baghdad’s suggestion was based clearly on a desire to 
increase its influence on the smaller Arab Gulf monarchies.512 The renewed 
aggressive Iraqi stance towards Kuwait from August 1976 onwards caused 
additional Saudi apprehension.513 
Another source for Saudi-Iraqi conflict was Riyadh’s aforementioned oil price 
policy at the Bali and Doha OPEC summits. At the December 1976 Doha 
summit Iraq had called for an even higher increase in oil prices (26%) than Iran 
(15%).514 The Iraqi reaction to Saudi Arabia’s unwillingness to follow the 
majority in raising oil prices by 10% provoked harsh Iraqi criticism. After his 
return to Baghdad, Iraqi Oil Minister Abdulkarim Tayeh accused Riyadh to act 
“in the service of imperialism and Zionism” and called the Saudi regime “a 
defeatist and reactionary cell working inside and outside O.P.E.C. against the 
interest of oil-producing countries and other developing states.”515 
Once Iran and Saudi Arabia had reached an understanding and their relations 
showed significant improvement, the Iraqi government in a balancing move was 
also increasingly motivated to improve its relations with the Arab Gulf monar-
chies. As part of a Gulf tour the Iraqi interior minister, accompanied by the 
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foreign minister, paid a visit to Saudi Arabia to encourage cooperation. This and 
the détente in Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations were welcomed in Riyadh.516 
As mentioned above, the situation in the Horn of Africa motivated Saudi Arabia 
to agree with Iran on the need for a multilateral security arrangement in the 
Gulf. In an attempt to get the Iraqi regime to agree, Saudi Defence Minister 
Sultan paid a visit to Baghdad in April 1978. Allegedly, the ongoing debate in 
the U.S. Congress about large-scale arms deals with Egypt, Iran, and Saudi 
Arabia prevented Iraqi consent. In the end, tripartite negotiations in May and 
June as well as a visit to Baghdad by Crown Prince Fahd in early August failed 
to bring about an agreement on collective security measures.517 
In the autumn of 1978, both Riyadh and Baghdad were concerned about the 
developments in Iran and voiced their support for the Shah’s regime.518 At the 
same time, Saudi Arabia and Iraq were in disagreement about the appropriate 
reaction to the Camp David Accords. While Iraq was calling for prompt and 
severe sanctions against the Sadat regime in the framework of the Arab 
League, Saudi Arabia was pressing for a softer approach.519 Indeed, the 
domestic crisis in Iran and Iraq’s response to Sadat’s policy towards Israel 
became closely intertwined. 
With the downfall of the Shah becoming increasingly likely, the Iraqi regime saw 
an opportunity to realise its long-held objective to take the role of protector of 
the Arab Gulf monarchies and install itself as hegemon on the Arabian 
Peninsula and in the Gulf at large. To realise this, Iraq applied a skilfully crafted 
strategy taking advantage of the coincidence of several regional developments. 
With the security situation in Iran constantly deteriorating, it was Iraq’s intention 
to prevent the Arab Gulf monarchies from turning towards the United States or 
Egypt (or both) in search for security; instead they should turn to Baghdad as 
their protector. Safran illustrates Iraq’s strategic thinking as follows 
“The fact that Iraq had been loosening its ties to the Soviet Union for 
some time made it more acceptable to the Gulf countries’ rulers. 
Furthermore the fact that the United States had been perceived to be 
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ineffective in countering Soviet advances in Afghanistan, south Arabia, 
and the Horn of Africa undermined America’s credibility as a security 
asset. Nevertheless, to capitalize on the opportunity, Iraq needed to 
devise a nonprovocative stratagem to block entirely the Gulf countries’ 
way to the United States and Egypt and leave them no choice but to rally 
to itself. Egypt’s coincidental signing of the Camp David accords under 
American aegis at that very time gave the Iraqis the perfect chance to 
attempt such a stratagem.”520 
In the end, the disagreement between Saudi Arabia and Iraq over anti-Egyptian 
sanctions was to a large degree an expression of disagreement over the power 
constellation in the Gulf. 
Kuwait’s Relations with Iran and Iraq, 1975-79 
Due to the geostrategic constellation at the head of the Gulf, with Iraq having 
only very limited deep-water access, Kuwait’s relations with Baghdad had 
traditionally been conflictual. Iraqi claims on Kuwaiti territory, particularly to the 
islands of Warba and Bubiyan, had been a highly recurrent phenomenon 
seemingly irrespective of the current relations between Baghdad and Tehran. 
However, Iraq’s demeanour towards Kuwait became more aggressive 
whenever Iraqi-Iranian conflict over the use of the Shatt al-Arab intensified. 
Hence, the Kuwaiti regime welcomed the 1975 Algiers Accord, hoping that the 
Iraqi-Iranian rapprochement would effectuate an easing of tensions with its 
powerful and aggressive neighbour. However, while Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations 
showed some improvement, Iraqi claims on the two islands did not subside. In 
addition, Baghdad did not give up its support for subversive elements in 
Kuwait.521 
Following the Algiers Accord the Iraqi government requested from Kuwait a 
long-term lease of Warba Island and the northern part of Bubiyan Island, so that 
Baghdad could position military forces there that would defend the Iraqi port at 
Umm Qasr; in return, Iraq offered to recognise Kuwait in its current borders. 
Underlining the fact that the islands were uninhabited, Baghdad argued that its 
demand was reasonable. Nonetheless, Kuwait rejected the Iraqi offer and 
began with the construction of outposts and other buildings on the two islands 
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emphasising Kuwaiti territorial sovereignty rights.522 Khadduri summarises the 
motives behind Kuwait’s decision as follows, 
“These islands […] are not a small part of Kuwayt; they form nearly a 
quarter of her territory, and they lie so close to the coast that their control 
by a foreign country would not only compromise Kuwayti sovereignty but 
also might involve Kuwayt in conflicts with neighbors to which she would 
not like to be drawn.”523 
With respect to the latter issue Khadduri adds, 
“In conversations with a number of responsible Kuwayti officials, the 
writer was reminded time and again that Kuwayt has always maintained 
a policy of peace and neutrality with her neighbors and that Iraq’s 
demand to use the islands of Warba and Bubyan for military purposes 
would necessarily affect her policy of neutrality.”524 
The second half of 1976 saw a serious deterioration in Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations. 
When the Kuwaiti regime dissolved the National Assembly and suspended 
basic constitutional clauses on August 29, the Iraqi response was very harsh. 
Baghdad denunciated the Kuwaiti regime and its measures as reactionary; 
moreover, it renewed its claims on the two islands.525 On September 9, Iraqi 
troops intruded into Kuwaiti territory and erected a tent camp roughly one 
kilometre across the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. One month later – on the same day 
as Acting Foreign Minister Salim Sabah Al Salim Al Sabah met Revolution 
Command Council Vice Chairman Saddam Hussein – Kuwait agreed to raise its 
annual liquefied petroleum gas exports to Iraq by 15,000 tons.526 This sequence 
of events does not seem to be coincidental. Already before had Kuwait tried to 
mitigate Iraq’s aggressive stand by providing financial and economic incentives. 
In December 1976, the Iraqi government reiterated its claim on sovereignty 
rights over Warba and Bubiyan, prompting a public denial by Acting Kuwaiti 
Prime Minister Jabir Al Ali Al Sabah.527 Bilateral relations further suffered when 
in January 1977 Iraq shot down a Kuwaiti jet, which had allegedly entered Iraqi 
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airspace.528 Also in early 1977, Kuwait resumed oil production at Jirfan, located 
close to the Iraqi border within territory claimed by Iraq.529 
Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations improved greatly with Kuwaiti Minister of Interior and 
Defence Saad’s seven-day visit to Iraq in late June and early July 1977. Saad 
Al Abdullah and Saddam Hussein agreed to establish two ministerial 
committees: one committee was tasked with finding a solution to the border 
conflict and developing closer bilateral relations; the other committee was 
assigned the task to oversee day-to-day contacts along the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. 
Sheikh Saad and Saddam Hussein further agreed upon the withdrawal of 
Kuwaiti and Iraqi forces from the joint border.530 Indeed, troop withdrawal began 
on July 20.531 On the positive side, Iraq now seemed ready to recognise 
Kuwait’s sovereignty in principal; however, the basic dissent over the islands 
and other territorial readjustments had not been removed.532 The Kuwaiti 
government “angrily denied” reports that suggested that Kuwait had accepted 
Baghdad’s request of a long-term lease of Warba and Bubiyan islands.533 
Despite the ongoing territorial dispute, there was an increase in official visits534 
and bilateral cooperation from 1977 onwards. Kuwait and Baghdad agreed to 
construct a railroad connecting their states. In addition, the two governments 
concluded agreements on cooperation in the fields of culture, science, 
information, and agriculture.535 On October 1, 1978, a decision was taken to 
establish an Iraqi trade center in Kuwait City and a Kuwaiti equivalent in 
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Baghdad. In December 1978 and January 1979 further talks were held on 
closer economic, industrial, and agricultural cooperation.536 
Up to the Iranian revolution relations between Kuwait and Tehran were solid, 
although for the longest time not particularly close. In 1976, after the PDRY had 
shot down an Iranian military plane in its airspace, Tehran requested Kuwaiti 
mediation assistance in its attempt to retrieve the pilot, the deceased co-pilot, 
and the F-14 fighter jet.537 In the following year, it was Iran that reportedly 
mediated between Kuwait and Baghdad in the conflict over Warba and Bubiyan. 
The visits of the Kuwaiti Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Al Rashid and 
Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah Al Ahmad Al Jabir Al Sabah to Tehran in 
February and May 1977, respectively, also signaled an improvement in bilateral 
relations.538 In 1978, the Kuwaiti regime became increasingly concerned about 
the escalating domestic turbulences in Iran as it feared destabilising effects on 
security and stability in the entire Gulf subregion. Hence, Kuwait hoped for a 
restabilisation of the Iranian regime and expressed public support for the 
Shah.539 In October of the same year, after Ruhollah Khomeini had been asked 
to leave his exile residence in the Iraqi city of Najaf, the Kuwaiti regime denied 
him the right of residence in the Emirate.540 This decision could be understood 
as support of the Shah. 
UAE Relations with Iran and Iraq, 1975-79 
The March 1975 Algiers OPEC summit was not only the venue for the 
groundbreaking Iranian-Iraqi agreement, it was also the occasion of the first 
meeting between Sheikh Zayid and the Shah since UAE independence. 
Addressing Iranian media representatives the UAE President emphasised his 
country’s interest in the improvement of economic ties with Iran and the 
promotion of good bilateral relations in general.541 Subsequently, the UAE-
Iranian rapprochement took an even faster pace. This was evidenced by 
numerous state visits by UAE and Iranian officials to each other’s countries and 
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the praise for each other’s policies. Moreover, the Shah assured his respect for 
the UAE’s territorial integrity and domestic sovereignty and even pledged to 
deter foreign and domestic threats against UAE security. In UAE rhetoric, earlier 
references to an Arab battle for the preservation of the Arab character of the 
Gulf gave way to an emphasis of the vital necessity of Arab-Iranian cooperation 
to achieve common goals.542 When Sheikh Zayid visited Iran in December 
1975, he stressed the “religious and spiritual bonds” between both countries 
and expressed gratitude for the Iranian people’s historic involvement in the 
development of the Emirates. A joint statement with the Shah upon conclusion 
of Sheikh Zayid’s visit reiterated both countries’ intention to collaborate in the 
fields of Gulf and wider Middle Eastern security, oil policy, and the liberation of 
Jerusalem from Israeli occupation.543 The following two years saw a 
continuation of regular visits – including top-level visits by Sheikh Zayid in late 
October/early November 1977, Sheikh Rashid in December 1976 and May 
1977 –, messages, and public praises of bilateral cooperation. In November 
1976, in a phase of severe domestic political crisis in the UAE, Sheikh Zayid 
turned to the Shah for support in convincing the ruler of Dubai to not leave the 
federation over disagreements. Educational cooperation was improved in May 
1977, when Tehran agreed to the admission of UAE students at Iranian 
universities.544 On the occasion of Sheikh Zayid’s visit to Tehran in early 
November 1977, Iran and the UAE reportedly agreed to exchange intelligence 
on subversive, leftist, and communist groups and activities in the Gulf area. 
Moreover, the UAE President and the Shah reiterated their common objective 
according to which regional security should be guaranteed solely through the 
cooperation among regional states, “without any foreign interference.”545 
The ongoing occupation of the three islands lost in significance and had virtually 
no hindering effect on UAE-Iranian relations. A communiqué issued upon the 
conclusion of Sheikh Zayid’s December 1975 visit to Iran left the island issue 
unmentioned. When the UAE President returned to Tehran in October 1977, he 
went as far as saying that UAE-Iranian relations were free of misunder-
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standings. Encapsulating the motivation behind this change in UAE attitude Al-
Alkim notes, 
“Clearly Iran was important to the conservative governments of the Gulf 
states, of which the UAE was one, in order to maintain the status quo. 
This in turn explains why the UAE had chosen to suspend the issue of 
the islands in favour of good relations with Iran.”546 
Even the previously very tense relations between Ras al-Khaimah and Iran 
improved during this period. Crown Prince Khalid bin Saqr Al Qasimi’s visit to 
Iran in early October 1975 was a milestone in relations as it constituted the first 
such visit by a senior official of Ras al-Khaimah since Iran’s seizure of the Tunb 
islands. The Crown Prince returned to Iran several times over the following 
years and there were speculations that he tried to broker an agreement with 
Iran similar to the Sharjah-Iranian agreement on Abu Musa, which provided for 
financial compensation and participation in oil production revenues.547 In 1977, 
the government of Ras al-Khaimah declared publicly that it was interested in 
cooperation with Iran.548 
Dubai continued to maintain the strongest and most cordial relations with Iran 
among all UAE emirates. In 1975, in its support for the Iranian regime, the 
Dubai government went as far to close down a local newspaper that had 
published an article critical of the SAVAK, Iran’s central intelligence service. 
Moreover, Sheikh Rashid disagreed with the federal government’s stand when 
he supported Tehran’s proposal of a Gulf security pact and took Iran’s side in 
the border conflict between Ras al-Khaimah and Oman that erupted in the 
autumn of 1977.549 
In the economic field, UAE-Iranian relations saw major improvements from 1975 
through 1978. A milestone in this respect was the comprehensive December 
1976 bilateral economic cooperation agreement. Within the scope of the treaty 
the two parties agreed to establish a Joint Investment Bank with a start-up 
capital of $100 million550 as well as a joint ministerial committee tasked with the 
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improvement of economic and technical cooperation, which was to convene on 
a regular basis; to hold commercial exhibitions; conduct joint industrial and 
other development projects; improve trade conditions; encourage the 
establishment of shopping centres; fight sea pollution; and improve and extend 
cooperation in the fields of agriculture, mass communication, education, and 
cultural exchange.551 Concrete steps towards these goals were taken in April of 
the following year with the adoption of bilateral memoranda that provided the 
basis for three major private sector joint ventures: the construction of two hotels 
in Esfahan and Bandar Abbas by Iran Air and UAE interests; the establishment 
of a department store chain with branches in Iran, Bahrain, and Dubai by the 
Iranian Industrial and Mining Development Bank and UAE interests; and a cattle 
and livestock breeding project in the Iranian Province of Khuzestan 
implemented by a consortium of the Agricultural Development Bank and private 
investors from Dubai.552 Al-Alkim points out that “it is clear from a reading of the 
economic co-operation memoranda that the [1976 economic] agreement was, 
in fact, between Iran and Dubai rather than Iran and the UAE. […] The use of 
the name ‘UAE’ in some of the clauses was only to confer legitimacy on the 
agreement,” since the conclusion of a treaty with a foreign state had to be 
conducted or approved by the UAE federal authority.553 
The volume of Iranian exports to the UAE saw a considerable decline from a 
trade value of roughly 385 million UAE dirhams ($97 million) in 1975 to 
approximately 110 million UAE dirhams in 1978 ($28.4 million). During the 
same time period, though, the share of Iranian products among UAE imports 
increased from 6% to 26%.554 Therefore, the decrease in Iranian import figures 
was caused by a considerable reduction of UAE imports in general and was not 
indicative of any dissent between the UAE and Iran. Again, the vast majority of 
Iranian imports entered the UAE in Dubai, amounting to approximately 87% in 
1978. In that same year the UAE exported goods to Iran worth just above 
595,000 UAE dirhams. 
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Despite intensified bilateral coordination and cooperation and general 
improvement of relations, there was also disagreement between the UAE and 
Iran regarding several issues. One aspect was the Iranian call for the 
establishment of a subregional security pact. While the UAE shared Iran’s 
conviction that the responsibility for Gulf security should be primarily with the 
littoral states, the UAE government did not support Iran’s proposition. Strict 
Saudi opposition to the collective security pact had considerable influence on 
the UAE stand.555 As noted above, Sheikh Rashid of Dubai was the only ruler 
among the Emirates to approve of Iran’s proposal. In April 1976, Sheikh Zayid 
also rejected publicly Iran’s proposal for the standardisation of Gulf militaries; 
however, his argument that “such a policy would weaken the military capability 
of the armed forces,” was little convincing.556 It can be assumed that Saudi 
pressure influenced this decision as well. 
Another aspect that caused some conflict in UAE-Iranian, or more precisely 
Sharjah-Iranian relations was dispute regarding the distribution of revenues 
obtained from oil production in the vicinity of Abu Musa and the Tunbs.557 This, 
however, did not affect relations in any significant way. 
In the field of oil policy, the UAE followed Saudi lead in calling for moderate oil 
prices. In January 1977, the UAE alongside Saudi Arabia refused to raise oil 
prices for more than 5% while the remaining OPEC members implemented a 
10% raise. Six months later, a compromise could be reached according that 
ended the first two-tied price system in OPEC history.558 
The creation of the Arabian Gulf News Agency in January caused some tension 
in UAE-Iranian relations. While Tehran did not reject the institution itself, it 
objected its name; the term “Arabian Gulf” to be precise. Iran had traditionally 
insisted in the designation of both the subregion and the body of water as the 
“Persian Gulf;” an expression of Tehran’s repeated claim of subregional 
hegemony. Hence, it considered the name of the newly established institution to 
be an affront. In consequence, Iran recalled its ambassadors from all founding 
states of the new institution – the Arab Gulf monarchies, including the UAE, and 
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Iraq – and only sent them back after the term “Arabian” had been dropped from 
the news Agency’s name. However, the Iranian act had to be understood as a 
symbolic sign of protest rather than an expression of a serious diplomatic 
crisis.559 
As described in detail above, these relatively minor dissensions did not prevent 
the UAE from considering Iran as an important partner and a source of stability 
and security in the Gulf. Therefore, the growing domestic instability in Iran in 
course of the autumn of 1978 concerned the UAE. The maintenance of the 
Shah’s regime was clearly in UAE interest. However, the UAE government was 
cautious to not take sides openly in the intra-Iranian dispute. Having close 
economic relations with Iran as well as a large Iranian expatriate community, 
and being a militarily weak state in a traditionally conflict-prone area, the UAE 
regime had to ensure continuously stable relations with Tehran. Having this in 
mind, the UAE for the largest part neither openly supported the Shah nor his 
opposition.560 The only notable exception was when UAE Foreign Minister 
Ahmad Khalifa Al Suwaidi met with the Shah and in mid-September 1978. On 
this occasion, Al Suwaidi expressed UAE support for the Shah’s introduction of 
martial law earlier that month.561 
The UAE government welcomed the Iranian-Iraqi Algiers Accord as the 
agreement held out the prospects of both an increase in Gulf stability and a 
decrease in Iraq’s subversion activities in the Arab Gulf monarchies in general 
and in the UAE in particular. Despite the fact that Baghdad did not give up its 
ideological support for radical elements in the UAE and the latter remained 
sceptical about the Baath regime’s policies, bilateral relations saw gradual 
improved from 1975 onwards. For one thing, Baghdad did not consider the 
steadily improving relations between the UAE and Iran as threatening to its 
interests as it did before its rapprochement with Tehran. Accordingly, the Iraqi 
regime reduced its political pressure on the UAE government.562 Moreover, Iraq 
had an interest in economic cooperation with all Arab Gulf monarchies, 
including the UAE. In the second half of the 1970s, the UAE and Iraq became 
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co-founders of or were partners in several institutions in the Gulf563: the Arab 
Maritime Petroleum Transport Company564, the Gulf International Bank565, the 
Gulf Organisation for Industrial Consulting (GOIC)566, the Conference of 
Ministers of Agriculture of the Gulf States and Arabian Peninsula 
(CMAGSAP)567, the Technical Consulting Bureau for Gulf Ports568, and the 
United Arab Shipping Company.569  
UAE-Iraqi trade relations also improved in the second half of the 1970s. In 1976 
Iraqi commercial centres were established in Abu Dhabi and Dubai to promote 
Iraqi exports. Indeed, Iraqi imports to the UAE increased from a trade value of 
$600,000 in 1975 to $1.5 million in 1978. Moreover, while the UAE did not 
export any goods to Iraq in 1975 they exported goods worth $3.9 million in 
1978.570  
Between 1975 and early 1979 there were also a few high-level visits by UAE 
officials to Baghdad and vice versa: in May 1975, the UAE Chief of Staff was 
invited to attend a military parade in Baghdad; in December of the same year, 
the UAE Defence Minister held talks with Iraqi government officials in the 
course of which Iraq reportedly offered the UAE military and technical 
assistance; and in mid-November 1976, UAE Foreign Minister Al Suwaidi 
visited Baghdad and met separately with Iraqi President Ahmad Hassan Al Bakr 
and RCC Vice Chairman Saddam Hussein.571 It is conceivable that the UAE 
Foreign Minister used this opportunity to give advance notice to the Iraqi regime 
of the upcoming economic agreement with Iran. In 1977, in the course of a Gulf 
tour, Saddam Hussein visited the UAE, accompanied by the Iraqi Ministers of 
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Trade as well as the Governor of the Iraqi Central Bank.572 Finally, in mid-
November 1978, UAE Oil Minister Mana Sayid Al Utayba paid a visit to Iraq as 
part of a larger tour of oil exporting countries.573 
Bahrain’s Relations with Iran and Iraq, 1975-79 
Following the Algiers Accord, Bahraini-Iraqi relations gradually improved. The 
main reason for this development was the slowly reduced Iraqi support for 
subversive elements in Bahrain. According to Cordesman, this support came to 
a full stop in 1978.574  
Iraq’s increased interest in economic cooperation with the Arab Gulf monarchies 
soon bore fruits and led to improvement in general bilateral relations between 
Baghdad and Manama. On November 4, 1975, Bahrain concluded its first 
bilateral economic agreement with Iraq since independence. According to the 
treaty Baghdad would provide Manama aid in the fields of agriculture and 
industry.575 In January of the following year, Iraq and the Arab Gulf monarchies 
(with the exception of Oman) established the United Arab Shipping 
Company.576 Also in 1976, Iraq opened a commercial center in Bahrain, and in 
1977, while on a tour through the Gulf, RCC Vice Chairman Saddam Hussein 
visited Manama and brought with him the Ministers of Agriculture and Trade as 
well as the Governor of the Iraqi Central Bank. The composition of the 
delegation clearly indicated Iraqi interest in close economic cooperation with 
Bahrain.577 Moreover, Iraqi exports to Bahrain jumped from a trade value of a 
mere $0.3 million in 1975 to $5.8 million in 1978 making Bahrain the second 
largest importer of Iraqi goods among the Arab Gulf monarchies.578 
During the same timeframe, relations between Bahrain and Iran were cordial. 
The only exception was Tehran’s symbolic recall of its ambassador to Manama 
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in context of the foundation of the Arabian Gulf News Agency.579 Otherwise, 
bilateral relations were characterised by close economic ties and frequent high-
level meetings. The Iranian Prime Minister, Amir Abbas Hoveyda visited 
Manama in late November, early December 1975. During Hoveyda’s three-day 
visit it was agreed to establish a high level committee tasked with the effective 
implementation of economic cooperation agreements.580 In May of the following 
year, Bahraini Defence Minister Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa paid a five-day visit to 
Iran.581 Further high level visits were paid by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Ali 
Khalatbari to Manama in December 1976 and the Bahraini ruler, Emir Isa Al 
Khalifa to Tehran in June 1978.582 While Gulf security was the main issue at the 
meeting of Emir Isa Al Khalifa with the Shah – in this regard both leaders 
agreed that subregional security was “the responsibility of the littoral states 
alone,”583 the two rulers also finalised an agreement on further scientific and 
cultural cooperation.584 
Oman’s Relations with Iran and Iraq, 1975-79 
Over the whole period from the Algiers Accord to the Iranian Revolution, 
bilateral relations between Muscat and Tehran remained very cordial. Iran’s 
continuing military support contributed greatly to Sultan Qaboos’ victory in the 
Dhofar War. On December 11, 1975 the Sultan announced officially the end of 
the War; the last PFLO attacks ended eventually in April 1976.585 Following the 
end of the Omani civil war, Omani-Iranian strategic partnership continued. For 
one thing, Iran was still concerned about Oman’s domestic stability as the 
Sultanate remained exposed to a continuous threat emanating from its radical 
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neighbour, the PDRY. Moreover, the joint protection of the Strait of Hormuz 
became a new pillar of the strategic alliance between Muscat and Tehran.586 
In the post-Dhofar War era, Qaboos was interested in an ongoing Iranian 
military presence in the Sultanate. Indeed, a contingent of 3,200 Iranian troops 
remained in Oman for an additional 13 months after the declared end of the 
Dhofar War.587 Nonetheless, in January 1977, Sultan Qaboos requested Iran to 
reduce its military presence in Oman. This decision had been preceded by 
Saudi Arabia’s success to get the PDRY to commit to stop supporting the PFLO 
in return for the withdrawal of Iranian and all other foreign troops from Oman. 
However, for Oman the prerequisite for a complete withdrawal of Iranian forces 
from its territory was the conclusion of a Gulf security agreement with the 
involvement of Iran and Iraq. As this did not materialise, Sultan Qaboos was 
only ready to reduce the number of Iranian forces in Oman rather than request 
their complete withdrawal.588 Accordingly, in January 1977, all but roughly 1,000 
troops left the Sultanate; those remaining were air defence units stationed at 
the Midway airbase (later renamed Thumrait air base), located roughly 100 
kilometres north of Salalah, in Dhofar Province. In addition, Iran constructed a 
radar facility at Thumrait, where it also stationed temporarily eight F-5 fighter 
jets; the latter remained until they were replaced by 12 Omani Air Force jets of 
the type Jaguar later in 1977. Iranian military presence became even more 
essential to Sultan Qaboos when the United Kingdom abandoned its military 
bases in Salalah and on Masirah Island in March 1977.589 In consequence, 
three months later, the Sultan offered Iran control over the base on Masirah 
Island.590 
Omani-Iranian relations further improved in the course of the Shah’s first state 
visit to the Sultanate in early December 1977.591 The Iranian Emperor and 
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Sultan Qaboos discussed further Iranian technical and economic support for 
Oman as well as the strengthening of both their states’ military cooperation with 
regard to the protection of the shipping lanes through the Strait of Hormuz. 
Indeed, in early 1978, Oman and Iran initiated joint naval surveillance activities 
in the strait.592 
When in September 1978 Iranian domestic stability began to deteriorate, Oman 
expressed unequivocal support for the Shah’s regime in Tehran.593 
Between 1975 and 1979, Omani-Iraqi relations were influenced positively by 
both the change in Iraq’s Gulf policy following the Algiers Agreement and the 
end of the Dhofar War. However, the cordial Omani-Iranian relations, 
particularly Iranian military presence in Oman, Oman’s close relations with the 
United States, and Oman’s stand on the Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement and 
eventual peace treaty cast significant shadows on the relations between Muscat 
and Baghdad. 
As mentioned above, Oman and Iraq established diplomatic relations in 
January 1976. Around this time Iraqi military support for the PFLO appears to 
have stopped.594 However, in the light of Baghdad’s year-long massive support 
for the Dhofar rebels, relations between the two states remained aloof at first. 
Nonetheless, Oman and Iraq cooperated with the remaining Arab Gulf 
monarchies in establishing of Arab Gulf institutions such as the Arabian Gulf 
News Agency and the Gulf Organisation for Industrial Consulting.595 
In early May 1977, a state visit to Oman by the Iraqi Ministers of Interior Izzat 
Ibrahim Al Duri and Foreign Affairs Hamadi helped improve bilateral relations. 
Beside a call for greater Arab solidarity in general, the Iraqi delegation also 
expressed Baghdad’s desire to expand trade relations and economic 
cooperation with Oman. However, the two Iraqi officials also reiterated 
Baghdad’s clear rejection of a Gulf security pact for which Oman had been the 
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main proponent.596 Ramazani summarises the Iraqi (and Iranian) reaction to 
Oman’s proposal as follows 
“Al-Thawra, the mouthpiece of the Baath party of Iraq, dubbed the Omani 
security proposal as a ‘new imperialist alliance,’ and the Iraqi government 
did everything to discredit it among the Arab states. […] The charge that 
the Omani plan was an imperialist plot stemmed from the fact that it 
envisaged financial and technical aid from major oil-consuming industrial 
nations. Rejected by both Iran and Iraq, the plan was subsequently 
confined to the establishment of a Joint Arab Gulf Force to which 
participating Arab states would contribute money for arms purchases, but 
not to the exclusion of assistance from Western industrialized nations.”597  
In an attempt to further improve bilateral relations, Omani Interior Minister 
Muhammad ibn Ahmad paid a three-day visit to Iraq towards the end of January 
1978.598 However, since November of the previous year, Omani-Iraqi relations 
had been burdened by the two states’ disagreement over Sadat’s Israel policy. 
While Iraq harshly criticised Sadat’s Jerusalem visit and the 1978 Egyptian-
Israeli Camp David Accords and early on called for tough anti-Egyptian 
sanctions, Oman took the exact opposite stand. Contrary to the majority of all 
Arab states, Oman endorsed Sadat’s Jerusalem visit and the Camp David 
Accords. When at the Arab League Baghdad Summit in early September 1978 
the decision was taken to expel Egypt from the regional organisation should it 
sign a separate peace with Israel, Oman registered its reservation.599 
During the entire period, trade relations between Oman and Iraq were virtually 
non-existent.600 
Qatar’s Relations with Iran and Iraq, 1975-79 
Relations between Qatar and Iran remained cordial during the entire period. 
The Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abbas Ali Khalatbari, visited Qatar on 
November 23, 1976.601 In October 1977, Qatari Minister of Labour Ali Ahmad Al 
Ansari paid a seven-day visit to Iran; the great length of the visit was likely 
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attributed to the large number of Iranian expatriates in Qatar.602 In December 
1977, Doha and Tehran signed a bilateral health agreement.603 As in the case 
of the other Arab Gulf states, Tehran recalled temporarily its ambassador from 
Doha in early January 1976 following the establishment of the Arabian Gulf 
News Agency. This, however, did not cause any lasting friction in Qatari-Iranian 
relations. 
As a state with a great interest in domestic and subregional stability, Qatar 
welcomed both the 1975 Iranian-Iraqi Algiers Accord and the subsequently 
more moderate Iraqi Gulf policy. Relations with Iraq were stable, however, not 
particularly close; Doha remained concerned about Iraq’s Baathist political 
ideology. In May 1975, the Qatari Chief of Staff, together with his colleagues 
from Bahrain and Qatar, attended an Iraqi military parade. Two months later, 
Emir Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani visited Baghdad. Reportedly, the Qatari ruler 
was offered “technical assistance in the fields of housing and water supply.”604 
During the period under review in this subchapter, the Qatari government 
welcomed two high-level delegations from Baghdad: Iraqi Vice President 
Saddam Hussein paid a visit to Doha in April 1976 and Interior Minister Izzat 
Ibrahim Al Duri visited Qatar in late April of the following year.605 
3.4 From the Iranian Revolution to the End of the Iran-Iraq War 
The Iranian revolution rang in a new era in the international relations of the Gulf, 
having a great effect on the Arab Gulf monarchies’ bilateral relations with both 
Iran and Iraq. Following years of increasing popular opposition and months-long 
escalating unrest, the regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi finally fell in January of 
1979. The ultraorthodox Shiite movement around the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini 
had managed to take over the lead of the heterogeneous Iranian revolution and 
turned the nationalist Persian monarchy into a Shiite Islamic Republic. Both 
Iran’s foreign policy interests and its actual foreign policy took a prompt and 
extensive turn. 
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First, the close strategic U.S.-Iranian relations, which had been in place since 
the reinstatement of the Shah in 1953 and had intensified following the United 
Kingdom’s decision to leave the Gulf, quickly collapsed. The newborn Islamic 
Republic of Iran was firmly anti-American in both its rhetoric and policy, 
portraying the United States as infidel imperialist power that had supported the 
illegitimate Shah in violating the good of Iran, its people, and Islam. The 
hostage crisis at the U.S. embassy in Tehran, began on November 4, 1979 and 
dragged on for over 14 months, ultimately poisoned the U.S.-Iranian 
relations.606 Hence, within a matter of weeks the U.S. Twin Pillar strategy lay in 
ashes. More than that, the new Iranian regime looked in anger at the Arab Gulf 
monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia, for their close ties with the “American 
devil.” 
Second, the new regime in Tehran saw the ultimate objective of its revolution in 
the transformation of the entire Islamic world. Naturally, this meant a departure 
from the Shah’s regime’s interest in the preservation of a conservative status 
quo in the Gulf. Within the subregional sphere, the Sunni Arab Gulf monarchies 
were no longer only confronted with an Iraqi Republic that, despite its preceding 
gradual policy change, still sought to impose both its Baathist revolution and its 
hegemonic ambitions on its fellow Arab Gulf states, but also with an Iranian 
Republic that saw its destiny in the exportation of its strongly anti-monarchical 
Shiite-dominated Islamic revolution to its Gulf neighbours and beyond. 
Saudi Arabia’s Relations with Iran and Iraq, 1979-1988 
For Saudi Arabia the Iranian Revolution turned out disastrous as the cautious 
but stable alliance of interests with the Shah, important mainly to balance Iraq’s 
ambitions, was replaced by open hostility with the Islamic Republic. 
Consequently, Saudi relations with both Iran and Iraq underwent significant 
change. Once the Iran-Iraq War broke out, Saudi Arabia formulated its relations 
with Iraq mainly in response to the threats emanating from Iran. 
In the initial post-revolutionary period, the Saudi regime was concerned about 
both the establishment of Soviet influence in Iran and the potential of a 
revolutionary spill-over onto Saudi territory; the fact that the vast majority of the 
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Kingdom’s Shiite minority resided in the oil-rich Eastern Province amplified this 
apprehension.607 In an attempt to maintain good relations with Iran and to 
stymie aggressive anti-Saudi rhetoric from among clerics around Khomeini, the 
Saudi government extended a hand to the new Iranian regime. On April 2, the 
day after the proclamation of the Islamic Republic, King Khaled sent Khomeini a 
congratulatory note, expressing his delight about the new Iranian political 
order’s “firm Islamic foundations.”608 Later that month, Prince Abdullah bin 
Abdulaziz stated publicly that henceforward Islam would be the fundament of 
bilateral relations and common Saudi-Iranian interests.609 Moreover, the Saudi 
regime sought to relax tensions with Iran through direct talks.610 However, as 
the moderate forces within the new Iranian government were gradually 
marginalised, Iran’s anti-Saudi actions intensified.611 Subsequently, beside 
general emphatic calls for the adaption of their revolution by Muslims 
everywhere in the world, Tehran discredited the Saudi regime and called 
repeatedly for its overthrow.612 In addition to speeches by Khomeini and other 
clerics, Iran conducted this propaganda campaign through the mass distribution 
of inter alia newspapers, books, leaflets, audio and video tapes.613 Tehran 
explicitly attacked the Al Saud regime for its monarchical character, which was 
allegedly incompatible with Islam, their discrimination of Shiite citizens, their 
dependence on the United States, and their misusage of their country’s 
wealth.614 
The first significant direct effects on Saudi Arabia became apparent in the 
autumn of 1979. For one thing, Khomeini instructed Iranian pilgrims to use the 
hajj as a forum for the propagation of the Iranian revolution and calls for the 
overthrow of the Al Saud.615 Moreover, in late November, roughly 90,000 Shiites 
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gathered illegally in the Saudi city of Qatif to celebrate the Ashura festival. The 
occasion turned into an overt display of anti-Americanism, support for the 
Islamic Revolution, and demands for an end of discrimination against Saudi 
Shiites; some protesters even called for the establishment of an Islamic republic 
in the Eastern Province. Attempts by the Saudi authorities to disperse the 
demonstration provoked a three-day riot, involving nearly 200,000 protesters in 
several Shiite-dominated cities and settlements in al-Hasa, and acts of 
sabotage at oil installations. The National Guard eventually quelled the riots.616 
However, due to the government’s robust measures, a lack of meaningful 
reforms, and the continuation of Iranian propaganda, new protests arose in 
February 1980 in the course of which Shiite workers at oil installations went on 
strike.617 
The Saudi regime was also concerned about the disruptive effects the 
revolution had on both the domestic stability of the other Arab Gulf monarchies, 
particularly Bahrain618 and Kuwait, and the security of trade routes in the Gulf 
and especially through the Strait of Hormuz.619 
Saudi-Iranian relations hit a low after Tehran categorically rejected Riyadh’s 
competence to safeguard the holy places at Mecca and Medina and proposed 
to transfer this responsibility to a Joint Islamic Committee – a direct challenge of 
the Al Saud’s self-perception as the custodian of the two holy mosques. In 
reaction, Riyadh started a propaganda campaign against Tehran, denouncing it 
as un-Islamic.620 
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In the light of the Iranian Revolution, Saudi-Iraqi relations improved. In February 
1979, following the Shah’s departure, Riyadh and Baghdad signed a bilateral 
security cooperation agreement and held repeated meetings during the 
subsequent months.621 Moreover, the conflict over the Egyptian-Israeli peace 
agreement was settled when Riyadh, in part due to Iraqi pressure, agreed to cut 
bilateral relations with Cairo.622 However, two reasons still held back the Saudi 
regime from entering into overly close relations with Iraq: with a view to the 
escalating Iraqi-Iranian conflict, Riyadh did not want to antagonise Iran 
additionally; in addition, the Saudi regime wanted to prevent Iraq from realising 
its long-held objective of becoming the protector of the Arab Gulf states.623 
Accordingly, when Saudi Arabia arranged meetings with the remaining Arab 
Gulf monarchies in late June and mid-October to discuss multilateral security 
cooperation, Iraq was not invited.624 
Nonetheless, starting in the second half of 1979 there was a clear 
rapprochement in Saudi-Iraqi relations.625 In mid-February 1980, the Iraqi 
regime claimed that Saudi Arabia had approved its pan-Arab National Charter – 
a collective Arab security plan626; however, probably to avoid antagonising Iran 
and Iraq’s Arab rival Syria, Riyadh never explicitly positioned itself to the 
initiative.627 To assure the Al Saud regime of Iraqi goodwill, Saddam Hussein 
stated in March, that in case the Soviet Union was ever to invade Saudi 
territory, “the Iraqi army would fight them even before the Saudi Army did.”628 A 
clear sign of both Saudi leaning towards Iraq and massive deterioration in 
relations with Iran was Saddam Hussein’s visit to the Kingdom in early August 
1980, seven weeks before the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War.629 Much has 
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been speculated about whether the Iraqi President informed the Saudi regime 
about his invasion plans. Nonneman, for examples, states that 
“it seems highly likely that Saudi Arabia, at least, was informed in 
advance of Iraq’s plan to invade Iran, and that Riyadh had given the 
green light, probably on the occasion of the August 5 visit.”630 
Prince Turki Al Faisal, at that time director of the Saudi General Intelligence 
Directorate, strongly disagrees with this account. In a conversation with the 
author, Prince Turki rejected the claim that Crown Prince Fahd had given the 
“green light” to Saddam Hussein. In contrast, Prince Turki emphasised that the 
Iraqi invasion had taken Fahd by complete surprise and that the latter had 
subsequently tried to convince the Iraqi leadership to end its military aggression 
against Iran. Furthermore, when confronted with the wide-spread hypothesis 
that the Iraqi attack on Iran and the ensuing war had at the time been in the 
Saudi regime’s interest, Prince Turki countered 
“Not at all. […] Fahd saw it as a catastrophe that will upset the peace of 
the area and basically push the Iranian people to support their 
government […] Iran was in the middle of a civil war when Saddam 
Hussein invaded. So, they just left their differences apart and opposed 
the foreign invader.”631 
In the first phase of the war, Saudi Arabia tried to keep an appearance of 
neutrality in order to not become a victim of Iranian reprisals. Through Radio 
Riyadh, the Al Saud regime quickly rejected an earlier Iraqi announcement that 
King Khaled had expressed his support for Iraq.632 In addition, Saudi officials 
repeatedly called for negotiation between the two belligerents.633 However, a 
few days later and probably bowing to Iraqi pressure, Foreign Minister Saud Al 
Faisal declared “our Kingdom has national commitments and obligations 
towards Iraq which we are not able, neither do we want to, ignore.”634 Addition-
ally, there are strong indications that Saudi Arabia gave Iraq logistic support by 
granting its jets the right to use Saudi airfields as safe haven and bases of 
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operation.635 To preserve its image of neutrality and to prevent both an 
escalation of the war and an unnecessary strengthening of Iraq, Riyadh at that 
time gave no significant additional support to Baghdad’s war efforts, “persuaded 
Iraq to drop the plan of the islands invasion and sent the Iraqi planes back once 
the U.S. AWACS had arrived.”636 
When it became clear that Saddam Hussein’s blitzkrieg had failed and a 
stalemate set in, the Saudi regime was interested in a rapid termination of the 
war. As Nonneman puts it, 
“[t]he need to avoid a long-drawn-out conflict, with its implications of 
economic drain, military spill-over and superpower involvement, became 
more important than anything that could be gained from further bleeding 
the two combatants.”637 
Since an early ceasefire failed to materialise, the prevention of an Iranian 
victory became Riyadh’s main objective. Due to the fact that Iranian naval 
superiority had interrupted Iraq’s oil export routes through the Gulf, Baghdad’s 
economy threatened to collapse. Hence, Saudi Arabia began providing Iraq 
massive financial638 and logistic support. By April 1981, the Kingdom had given 
Iraq direct financial aid amounting to $6 billion; another $4 billion were 
transferred until the end of the year. In addition, Saudi Arabia transhipped 
civilian and military goods destined for Iraq at its Red Sea ports.639 Furthermore, 
the Kingdom “agreed in principle to construct an oil pipeline to the Red Sea,” 
thus creating an alternative Iraqi oil export route.640 
Saudi support for Iraq against Iran was based on Riyadh’s perception of the 
former as the lesser of two evils. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia was still concerned 
about Iraq’s Baathist ideology and nationalist ambitions. Hence, a clear-cut 
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victory that would turn Iraq into the hegemon of the Gulf was not in their 
interest.641 Strong Saudi initiative towards the establishment of the GCC in May 
1981 was partially due to the ongoing apprehension of Iraq’s hegemonic 
ambitions. While the Iranian Revolution had given the Arab Gulf monarchies 
additional reason to enter into closer collective security cooperation, the war 
had given them the perfect excuse to do so to the exclusion of Iraq. Thus, Saudi 
Arabia could increase its influence on the smaller Arab Gulf monarchies. 
Following the outbreak of the war, Saudi-Iranian relations continued to 
deteriorate. Early on, Iran suspected Saudi support for Iraq. In reaction, anti-
Saudi propaganda was intensified.642 Moreover, Iranian war planes reportedly 
intruded into Saudi airspace.643 In the autumn of 1981, several developments 
led to a further increase in tensions. During the hajj, there were even more 
Iranian pro-Khomeini demonstrations than the year before and on several 
occasions the Saudi authorities clashed with Iranian pilgrims. Saudi complaints 
to Khomeini only provoked an intensification of anti-Saudi propaganda, in turn 
triggering massive Saudi counter-propaganda.644 Iranian missile attacks on 
Kuwait in October concerned Riyadh and prompted a strong Saudi reaction, as 
did the discovery of an Iranian-backed coup attempt in Bahrain in December.645 
Also in 1981, Saudi Arabia used its power in OPEC to hurt Iran’s already 
struggling economy, by keeping Iran’s production quota low.646 In December, on 
the occasion of the signing of a final Saudi-Iraqi border agreement, Saudi 
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Interior Minister Naif bin Abdulaziz made the hitherto strongest statement of 
Riyadh’s pro-Iraqi stance in the war.647 
The turn of the war in Iran’s favour in late March 1982 alarmed Riyadh. To 
prevent further Iranian advances or even a complete Iraqi collapse, Saudi 
Arabia applied a seven-pronged strategy: Riyadh a) provided Iraq with 
additional $4 billion in grants during 1982, $6 billion in the first half of 1983 and, 
starting in February 1983, sold 200,000 barrels of its oil per day on Iraq’s 
account; b) continued oil overproduction to keep prices low and blocked an 
increase in Iran’s quotas in OPEC; c) attempted to mobilise joint Arab pressure 
on Iran; d) pressured Syria to give up its pro-Iranian support; e) tried to 
convince the Assad regime to reopen the Iraqi-Syrian oil pipeline; f) made direct 
mediation attempts between the belligerents with Syrian assistance; g) and 
apparently presented a joint GCC proposal to pay Tehran $25 billion in war 
reparations in return for an Iranian ceasefire.648 Eventually, all of Riyadh’s 
intensified attempts to end the war failed. With a new stalemate in the spring of 
1983, Saudi Arabia reduced its diplomatic activity.649 
Starting in the autumn of 1983, Saudi Arabia made increased attempts to avoid 
confrontation with Iran: financial and other “aid to Iraq was provided as quietly 
as possible, criticism of Iran was toned down and, above all, Riyadh avoided all 
action liable to be interpreted in Tehran as acts of hostility.”650 The Kingdom 
played down Iranian disruptions during the hajj and refrained from blaming 
Tehran for a series of explosions in Kuwait.651 The beginning of the Tanker War 
in the following spring briefly intensified Saudi-Iranian tensions before Riyadh 
sought de-escalation. On June 5, two Saudi F-15 fighters shot down one of two 
Iranian jets that were preparing to fire on tankers leaving Saudi ports. On the 
same day, a larger Saudi-Iranian air combat was barely prevented. These 
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events provoked newly intensified Iranian propaganda.652 However, only three 
months later, King Khaled reached out to Iranian majlis Speaker Rafsanjani and 
invited him to participate in the hajj. Although Khomeini prevented Rafsanjani 
from going, the latter entered into secret negotiations with Riyadh. In May 1985, 
in the light of the burdening war costs, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal 
visited Tehran and offered to assist in bringing about a ceasefire. However, 
Tehran’s demands for both Saddam’s immediate resignation and Iranian 
“observer rights” over the two holy cities were unrealistic respectively 
inacceptable. A visit by Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati to Riyadh in December 
also failed to produce any compromise.653 Nonetheless, Saudi-Iranian tensions 
lessened during this time. Following Saud Al Faisal’s Tehran visit654 both sides 
spoke favourably of the meeting, calling it the basis for cooperation and good 
relations;655 the Saudi media even spoke of a “historical achievement.”656 Prior 
to the hajj, relations saw additional improvement with Riyadh accepting 150,000 
Iranian pilgrims and Iran giving 
“an unprecedented instruction to the pilgrims to maintain ‘Islamic 
discipline and dignity’ while in Mecca and to ‘refrain from conduct which 
would cause unnecessary clashes with Saudi officials’.”657 
In this period, secret U.S. arms sales to Tehran happened, which were revealed 
in late 1986 as part of the Iran-Contra affair. The degree of the Saudi regime’s 
involvement remains opaque. However, as Nonneman states, “Saudi ‘facil-
itation’ may have been no more than Saudi arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi’s 
involvement in the U.S. arms-to-Iran deal, but it would appear the royal family 
had given its permission.”658 In addition, the subsequent Saudi oil product sales 
to Iran “could, presumably, have been prevented” by the Saudi regime.659 
                                            
652 Fürtig, Iran’s Rivalry, p. 67. 
653 Ibid, pp. 67f. 
654 It was the first state visit to Tehran by a senior Saudi official since the revolution. Bruce 
Maddy-Weitzman, “Inter-Arab Relations,” in Itamar Rabinovich and Haim Shaked (eds.), Middle 
East Contemporary Survey, Volume IX: 1984-85 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 
109-45, p. 122 and Jacob Goldberg, “The Saudi Arabian Kingdom,” in Itamar Rabinovich and 
Haim Shaked (eds.), Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume IX: 1984-85 (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1987), pp. 588-613, p. 605. 
655 Goldberg, “The Saudi Arabian Kingdom” (1984-85), p. 605f. 
656 Ibid, p. 606. 
657 Ibid. 
658 Nonneman, “Gulf States,” p. 179. 
659 Ibid. 
  196
The cautious steps towards a Saudi-Iranian rapprochement were contrary to 
Iraq’s interests. As Baghdad was highly dependent on Saudi support, there was 
no visible deterioration in Saudi-Iraqi relations; however, there have been 
speculations that a series of sabotage acts in Saudi Arabia and in other Arab 
Gulf monarchies, which occurred in temporal connection with Saud Al Faisal’s 
Tehran visit were “initiated by Iraq in an attempt to ‘frighten the Gulf Sates’ from 
a shift in policy.”660 
Following the Iranian capture of the Iraqi Faw peninsula, Riyadh retook a more 
emphatic pro-Iraqi stance, while still looking for a way to stop the war. Together 
with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia both tried unsuccessfully to get Damascus to evoke 
change in Iranian policy and pushed through a strong condemnation of Iran by 
the GCC. In the second half of 1986, Riyadh reportedly granted Baghdad 
another $4 billion loan and allowed Iraqi jets to use Saudi air fields to refuel 
following raids on Iranian oil facilities.661 Moreover, there is reason to assume 
that Riyadh offered to finance further Iraqi-Egyptian arms deals.662 However, 
due to the ongoing oil crisis, partially provoked by Riyadh’s year-long 
overproduction, Saudi Arabia had increasing difficulties to continue its strong 
financial support for Iraq.663 In addition, reports of increased Saudi support for 
Iraq provoked an escalation of Iranian threats against the Kingdom as well as 
attacks on Saudi tankers.664 It can be assumed that the reported Saudi 
involvement in arms and refined oil shipments was meant to reduce tensions 
with Iran and reach a compromise with Tehran on oil price increases. Once this 
low-level Saudi-Iranian cooperation became public665, Saudi-Iraqi relations 
suffered and Saddam Hussein subsequently pressured Riyadh to increase the 
oil flow through IPSA.666 
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From March 1987 onwards, Saudi support for Iraq was increased. Moreover, 
Saudi-Iranian relations deteriorated due to new Iranian attacks on Saudi 
tankers, a series of bomb explosions in Kuwait, the Iranian stationing of missiles 
on the Faw peninsula, and Kuwait’s request for the reflagging of its ships, which 
Riyadh supported.667 In the weeks leading to the hajj season, Saudi-Iranian 
tensions further increased: while Khomeini called on the Iranian pilgrims to 
stage the largest possible anti-Saudi demonstrations, the Saudi regime banned 
all political gatherings, expressed the hitherto most explicit warnings, and 
verbally attacked Khomeini’s agitations. After the riots of July 31, which cost 
hundreds of lives, Saudi-Iranian relations hit an all-time low. Riyadh presented 
confessions of arrested Iranians according to which more than three fourths of 
the 150,000 Iranian pilgrims were “Revolutionary Guards [,] suicidal volunteers 
[and] members of ‘the generation of the revolution,’ whose multistage mission 
had been to first take over the Grand Mosque and eventually lead a popular 
uprising against the Al Saud regime.668 On the same day, a Saudi diplomat was 
killed when demonstrators sacked the Saudi Embassy in Tehran; allegedly on 
the Iranian regime’s behest.669 Subsequently, both the governments and media 
of Iran and Saudi Arabia issued highly aggressive propaganda against each 
other.670 
Increasingly affected by the war671 and very apprehensive of being drawn into 
open warfare with Iran, Riyadh made new attempts to create a strong Arab front 
that would pressure Iran to agree to a ceasefire in line with Security Council 
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Resolution 598 of July 20, 1987.672 This strategy was partially successful: at the 
November 1987 Arab League summit in Amman even Syria called on Iran to 
accept a ceasefire. Moreover, Riyadh managed to isolate Iran at the Geneva 
OPEC summit in December. However, due to its own economic difficulties, 
Riyadh was not willing to decrease oil prices any further.673 Meanwhile, Saudi 
financial support for Iraq continued.674 
In the last months of the war, Riyadh continued its strong support for Iraq, e.g. 
in context of Iraqi attacks on Tehran and Qom and the recapture of the Faw 
peninsula.675 Judging from public statements of government officials Saudi-Iraqi 
relations seemed cordial.676 In the meantime, both the Saudi regime and the 
Saudi media called for UN sanctions against Iran for its refusal to accept a 
ceasefire and denounced Tehran for training members of terrorist groups. 
Furthermore, Saudi-Iranian relations were once again burdened over the 
upcoming hajj. In April, Iran, which had repeated its call for an end of Saudi 
sovereignty over Mecca and Medina, held out even more enthusiastic and 
vigorous demonstrations for the 1988 pilgrimage. Saudi concerns were 
increased when the regime learnt that Iran was training 100,000 Revolutionary 
Guards to cause chaos during the hajj. Hence, Riyadh decided to reduce 
drastically the quota of Iranian pilgrims to 45,000, prompting an aggressive 
Iranian refusal. In consequence, on April 26, Riyadh unilaterally abrogated 
diplomatic relations with Iran.677 
On July 18, the Iranian acceptance of UN Resolution 598 invoked a change in 
the Saudi stance towards the war. Despite contrasting public statements, Saudi 
pressure was instrumental in convincing Iraq to accept a ceasefire on August 6. 
In this context, Nonneman states, 
“[h]aving decided at least as far back as 1981 that the costs of a 
continuing situation of war outweighed the benefits, the Saudi leadership 
                                            
672 Goldberg, “The Saudi Arabian Kingdom” (1987), pp. 590, 595f. 
673 Ibid, pp. 604f. 
674 Nonneman, “Gulf States,” p. 183. 
675 Ibid, pp. 184f. There were, however, reports that Riyadh denied Baghdad the right to refuel 
its jets at Saudi air fields. Goldberg, “The Saudi Arabian Kingdom” (1987), p. 605. 
676 Fürtig, Iran’s Rivalry, p. 69. 
677 Jacob Goldberg, “The Saudi Arabian Kingdom,” in Ami Ayalon and Haim Shaked (eds.), 
Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XII: 1988 (Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1990), pp. 675-705, pp. 690f. 
  199
could no longer see any convincing reason to continue to bankroll Iraqi 
military adventures once Iran had sued for peace.”678 
Kuwait’s Relations with Iran and Iraq, 1979-1988 
As described above, Kuwait’s relations with Imperial Iran had never been 
particularly close. The Kuwaiti regime, not least because of the prevalence of 
strong Arab nationalist feelings in the society, rejected Iran’s self-perception as 
the guardian of the Gulf. Meanwhile, Iran had been a source of security for 
Kuwait as it neutralised to a certain degree the dangers stemming from Iraq’s 
territorial claims and contributed to Gulf security in general. Hence, the Shah’s 
fall was not in Kuwait’s interest. Khomeini’s rise to power was additional cause 
for concern. For one thing, Kuwait had not only backed the Shah’s regime but 
also denied Khomeini entry into the country after he had been asked to leave 
Iraq.679 Moreover, the Khomeini regime’s declared objective to export its 
antimonarchical Shiite revolution was particularly troublesome to the Kuwaiti 
government as an autocratic regime ruling over a large Shiite minority; 
additionally, local Shiite clerics had been in close contact with Khomeini during 
his years in Iraq.680 
In contrast to the regime, large parts of the Kuwaiti population welcomed the 
changes in Iran. The overthrow of the Shah was seen as a popular victory over 
a tyrannical, secular regime that was closely aligned with Israel’s main 
supporter, the United States. Hence, in the initial phase, the Iranian Revolution 
had an appeal to many Arab nationalists and devout Sunnis among Kuwaitis.681 
Additionally, the Revolution 
“fostered a new assertiveness, pride and consciousness among most 
Shiites, who as a minority have historically felt themselves to be 
downtrodden, underprivileged, and subordinated to the Sunni majorities 
in the Gulf states.”682 
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During the first post-revolutionary months, the Kuwaiti regime made great 
efforts to maintain solid relations with Tehran. In mid-July 1979, Saleh Al 
Ahmad Al Saleh was the first foreign minister of a Gulf state to pay a state visit 
to Tehran.683A joint communiqué issued following the meeting stressed both 
states’ conviction that “mutual respect for sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity [and] non-interference in other people’s internal affairs” 
should be the basis for the conduct of international relations.684 Earlier in July, 
Tehran had extended an invitation to the Kuwaiti ruler.685 Kuwait’s relations with 
Iran remained unproblematic until mid-August, when Kuwait blamed Iran for 
causing disturbance in its internal affairs. Sayed Abbas Muhri, Khomeini’s 
cousin and personal envoy in Kuwait had been preaching Iranian revolutionary 
ideology to Kuwaiti Shiites. Subsequently, the Kuwaiti authorities hindered him 
from preaching and on September 26 rescinded his Kuwaiti citizenship and 
deported him and his family to Iran. This caused severe tensions in Kuwaiti-
Iranian relations.686 However, Kuwait was still anxious to prevent relations with 
Iran from deteriorating. To get in Tehran’s good favour, Kuwait rejected anti-
Iranian actions in the context of the U.S. hostage crisis. On December 31, as a 
non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, Kuwait defied U.S. 
pressure and abstained in the voting on Resolution 461, which threatened Iran 
with economic sanctions if it did not release the U.S. hostages within one 
week.687 Moreover, Kuwait expressed its condemnation for both the freezing of 
Iranian governmental assets in the United States688 and the failed U.S. rescue 
attempt in April 1980.689 Furthermore, in February 1980, Kuwait and Iran 
reached an agreement on both Kuwaiti shipments of refined oil products and 
the establishment of bilateral oil and technical cooperation. In the same month, 
Kuwait supplied Iran with humanitarian aid for flood victims in the country’s 
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south.690 In April, Iranian Foreign Minister Qutubzadeh visited Kuwait. However, 
bilateral relations did not improve in any significant way.691 
Following the Iranian Revolution, Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations saw an acceleration of 
the previous rapprochement. The reason for this development was Kuwait’s 
increasing apprehension about the danger to its security emanating from Iran. 
In September 1979, Iraqi Defence Minister Khayrallah visited Kuwait and 
conveyed Saddam Hussein’s reassurance that Iraq would defend the Arab Gulf 
monarchies against external aggression. However, reminding of Iraq’s Baathist 
ideology, Saddam later added that his government would support the people of 
any Arab state that chose to change their regime.692 Nonetheless, Kuwait was 
the first Arab Gulf monarchy to express its support for Saddam’s Arab National 
Charter in February 1980.693 In early May, while Iraqi-Iranian tensions 
escalated, Kuwait’s Prime Minister visited Baghdad and expressed his country’s 
strong support for Iraq.694 In another sign of rapprochement, Kuwait and Iraq 
agreed in July to resume talks about border demarcations.695 
The beginning of the Iran-Iraq War put Kuwait in a very difficult position. On the 
one hand, two large powers posing threats to Kuwait would now focus primarily 
on each other. The war might weaken them both, thereby reducing their danger 
to Kuwait. However, there were grave immediate perils for Kuwait’s interests: 
first, its geostrategic position put Kuwait in close proximity to the war zone; 
second, the Kuwaiti regime would need to position itself in the war, thereby 
automatically alienating one of the belligerents and a part of its society696; third, 
the Kuwaiti economy would suffer under both instability in the Gulf and a 
reduction of trade with the belligerents; fourth, there was a risk of a territorial 
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expansion and internationalisation of the war dragging the Arab Gulf 
monarchies or even the superpowers into the conflict.697 
In the light of improved relations with Baghdad, promising prospects for a 
successful Iraqi blitzkrieg, and apprehensions of Iraqi retaliations in case of 
lacking support, Kuwait sided with Iraq. Early on, Kuwait began transhipping 
Iraqi imports at its port facilities and allowed for their overland transport to 
Iraq.698 Once it became clear that there would be now no quick Iraqi victory, 
Kuwait continued its initial logistic support but expressed publicly its neutrality in 
the war.699 However, as early as mid-November, the Emirate became directly 
affected by the military contestation when Iranian missiles hit the Kuwaiti border 
post at Abdali. Kuwait protested directly to Iran and sent notes to the UN, the 
Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), and the Non-
Alignment Movement. However, “Iran denied any hostile intent and declared 
itself committed to ‘the safety of, and respect for, Kuwait’s territory.’”700 
When the stalemate set in, Kuwait shared Riyadh’s main objectives of a rapid 
termination of the war or at least the prevention of an Iranian victory. Hence, 
Kuwait also provided Iraq with significant financial support: a $2 billion loan was 
given in the autumn of 1980, another $2 billion the following April. Moreover, 
Kuwait’s logistic support in transhipping Iraqi civilian and military imports was 
extended greatly.701 However, Kuwaiti-Iraqi tensions arose again over Warba 
and Bubiyan. Due to the blockade of the Shatt al-Arab, Iraq intended to expand 
its only usable port at Umm Qasr. For better access to the facility, Baghdad 
repeated earlier demands for a Kuwaiti lease of the two islands; in this context, 
the Iraqi Interior Minister visited Kuwait in early February 1981. However, 
Baghdad’s reliance on Kuwait for financial support allowed the Emirate to 
withstand Iraqi pressure on the issue. In a clear sign of defiance to Iraqi 
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demands, Kuwait decided to build a bridge connecting Bubiyan island with the 
mainland.702 
Over the following months, Iranian jets repeatedly violated Kuwaiti airspace and 
in mid-June fired at the Abdali border post. On October 1, Tehran carried a first 
major assault on the Emirate when it raided Kuwaiti oil installations in retaliation 
for Kuwaiti support for Iraq; Iran, however, denied any responsibility for the 
incident. While the Kuwaiti media issued harsh condemnations, the regime 
exercised great restraint: it recalled its ambassador to Tehran, issued a formal 
protest to Iran, and requested UN support but otherwise tried to prevent 
relations with Iran from deteriorating completely. Subsequently, Kuwaiti-Iranian 
relations fluctuated. Following the revelation of the plot in Bahrain, Kuwait 
blamed Iran for supporting terrorist infiltrations into the Arab Gulf monarchies 
and Iran continuously warned Kuwait to stop supporting Iraq. However, Iran 
launched no further attacks on Kuwaiti territory and in February Iranian 
President Khameini even congratulated the Kuwaiti ruler on the occasion of 
Kuwait’s Independence Day. Kuwait for its part, being heavily affected by the 
war, was particularly interested in a rapid termination of the military contestation 
and sought to mediate between the belligerents both unilaterally and in 
cooperation with the other GCC states. Meanwhile, Kuwait granted Iraq another 
$2 billion loan in December 1981.703 
Iranian crossing of the Iraqi border in July 1982 concerned Kuwait, as this 
development brought the frontline closer to Kuwaiti territory. Subsequently, the 
Emirate made increased attempts to not antagonise Tehran by taking a more 
pronounced “neutral” stance, inter alia in the GCC framework, and amplifying its 
mediation efforts.704 Nonetheless, Kuwaiti-Iranian relations deteriorated due to 
strong Iranian support for subversive activities in Kuwait, which Tehran denied. 
In relations with Baghdad, Kuwait continued to reject Iraqi demands for a lease 
of the islands and reduced its overall financial support. Nonetheless, bilateral 
relations rather improved with high-ranking state visits and regular 
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intergovernmental consultations. In February 1983 Kuwait started to sell 50,000 
barrels of its oil on Baghdad’s account; in mid-1983, the daily volume was 
increased to 130,000 barrels.705 
In the aftermath of a bomb series in Kuwait on December 12, 1983706, Kuwaiti-
Iranian relations deteriorated significantly. Despite the obvious connection 
between the perpetrators and the Iranian government707, Kuwait refrained from 
protesting to Tehran. Moreover, during the subsequent trials, the Kuwaiti 
authorities neither made charges of political conspiracy nor did they suggest 
any connections between the accused and Iran.708 However, the Kuwaiti 
attempt to prevent an escalation of tensions with Iran failed. Kuwaiti mass 
arrests and deportations of Iranian citizens and Iraqi Shiites provoked Iranian 
outrage; the government issued complaints and anti-Kuwaiti propaganda was 
intensified.709 Despite their resentment over Iranian subversive activities, Kuwait 
again attempted to calm the waves in its relations with Tehran.710 This, 
however, changed with the beginning of the Tanker War. After Iranian raids on 
two Kuwaiti tankers in mid-May, Kuwait condemned the attacks but still 
refrained from condemning Iran itself. Nonetheless, together with Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait managed to get the remaining GCC members to explicitly criticise Iran 
and request the UN Security Council to consider the matter; this led to UN 
Resolution 552 of June 1, 1984, which condemned the Iranian attacks on 
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Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers.711 After a third Kuwait tanker was hit on June 10 and 
another Kuwaiti ship was seized by Iran, Kuwait clearly sharpened its tone. 
Kuwaiti-Iranian relations deteriorated further in late August, when Kuwait 
refused Tehran’s request to let a hijacked Iranian airliner land and instead 
called the Iraqi air force to escort the plane to Iraq.712 Diplomatic conflict arose 
with regard to another hijacking in December, when Iran refused to extradite 
Hezbollah fighters that had hijacked a Kuwaiti airliner and flown it to Tehran.713 
Meanwhile, Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations were friendly, although Baghdad repeatedly 
raised the island issue.714 
By 1985, Kuwait’s internal security situation had deteriorated dangerously with 
increased sectarian tensions, bomb threats and explosions, and an 
assassination attempt on Kuwaiti Emir Jaber Al Ahmad on May 25.715 As it was 
the case after the December 1983 bombings, Kuwait expelled a large number 
of Iranians – more than 1000 until the end of the year – provoking a 
continuation of Iranian anti-Kuwaiti propaganda.716 Bilateral relations were also 
burdened by Iran’s repeated detention of Kuwaiti ships that prompted Kuwaiti 
protest to the UN Security Council in June 1985.717 In the autumn of 1985, there 
was a short intermezzo of reduced tensions; in this time fell a meeting between 
the foreign ministers of both states at the UN headquarters. However, due to 
the continuation of Kuwait’s support for Iraq, tensions soon increased again.718 
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In the meantime, Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations continued to follow roughly the same 
pattern as before. The two states conducted regular visits, the most prominent 
being Kuwaiti Prime Minister Saad Al Abdullah’s visit to Baghdad in mid-
November 1984. However, there was disagreement about a number of aspects: 
first and foremost, Iraq continued to pressure Kuwait regarding a lease of 
Warba and Bubiyan, now reducing the demanded term of lease to 20 years 
(from an earlier 99 years). However, Kuwait remained steadfast and 
underscored its position by both erecting defence installations on Bubiyan and 
repeated visits by the Kuwaiti Defence Minister to the troops stationed on the 
island. Second, Kuwait had reduced its economic assistance to Iraq due to 
financial constraints connected to the low oil price. Third, Kuwait was anxious 
that Iraq’s attacks on Iranian naval targets and cities would provoke retaliation 
against the Arab Gulf monarchies. Fourth, Kuwait was concerned about 
collateral damage caused by Iraq’s use of chemical weapons.719 
The Iranian capture of the Faw Peninsula in February 1986 brought about a 
very significant change in Kuwaiti foreign policy in general and in their relations 
with the two belligerents in particular. The Iranian advance moved the frontline 
very close to Kuwaiti territory, thus increasing the likelihood of Kuwait being 
directly affected. Kuwait’s response was equal to Riyadh’s, namely a prompt 
strong and explicit condemnation of Iran. The Emirate subsequently became 
the spearhead of pro-Iraqi policy within the GCC. Together with Riyadh the 
Kuwaiti regime tried to pressure Syria to change Iran’s policy, forced through a 
strong condemnation of Iran in the GCC, and despite its own financial 
constraints provided Iraq with another comprehensive loan and renewed the 
earlier agreement to sell 350,000 barrels of oil per day on Baghdad’s 
account.720 Consequently, Kuwaiti-Iranian relations deteriorated significantly. 
Iran threatened to attack Kuwaiti oil installations if they did not end their support 
for Iraq. When Iranian helicopters intruded into Kuwaiti airspace and chicaned a 
Kuwaiti Navy vessel, the Emirate issued both a condemnation and a warning to 
the Iranian chargé d’affaires; in October, when an Iranian jet violated Kuwaiti 
airspace, it was fired upon by the Kuwaiti air defence. In February and 
September, Iranian forces attacked a fishing boat and a tanker respectively; in 
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the latter case the Iranian chargé d’affaires was summoned again. In April, 
Kuwait complained to the UN Secretary General about the continued 
confiscation of a Kuwaiti freighter, Iran had seized five months earlier.721 
In the light of the increased threats to its security, Kuwait gave up its prior 
reluctance and joined the GCC mutual defence pact in late 1986.722 At the 
December GCC summit, Kuwait requested the dispatch of the Peninsular Shield 
force to Bubiyan Island, joint protection of its commercial fleet in the Gulf, and 
the expansion of the Saudi AWACS surveillance zone to Kuwait. When its 
request was rejected, due to some GCC members’ anxiety to not antagonise 
Iran, the Emirate turned to the Soviet Union, the United States, and the 
remaining permanent members of the Security Council for protection of their 
commercial interests through the chartering and reflagging of tankers. In the 
end, Kuwait chartered three Soviet and three British tankers; moreover, from 
May 1987, eleven Kuwaiti tankers were flying the U.S. American, three the 
British, and six the Liberian flag. In addition to the reflagging of Kuwaiti ships, 
the U.S. Navy increased its presence in the Gulf and began escorting the 
tankers. Kuwait’s decision to internationalise the war and involve the 
superpowers was a clear departure from its prior objectives of keeping foreign 
powers, especially the superpowers, out of the Gulf.723 
Already prior to the reflagging operation, Kuwaiti-Iranian relations had further 
worsened. Kuwait blamed Iran for bomb explosions on its territory during the 
months of April through July. Moreover, on July 20, the day before the 
reflagging operation started, Kuwait’s Crown Prince reiterated his country’s 
strong support for Iraq. Both developments provoked additional Iranian threats 
and in turn an even clearer pro-Iraqi stance in Kuwait; reportedly, Kuwait 
supported Iraq with $1 billion over the course of 1987. After the hajj incident, 
also the Kuwaiti embassy in Tehran was ransacked.724 Once Kuwait’s tankers 
were better protected, Iran partially changed its tactics. From September, Iran 
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conducted repeated Silkworm missile strikes against targets closer to Kuwaiti 
territory, particularly against Kuwaiti oil installations.725 After one such attack, 
Kuwait expelled Iranian diplomats.726 
In early 1988, Kuwait defied Iraqi pressure and cautiously favoured in the GCC 
a joint Omani-UAE effort to convince Iran to accept UN Resolution 598. 
Moreover, Kuwait’s principle readiness to improve relations with Iran became 
clear when the Kuwaiti foreign minister declared in late January that the Emirate 
would reopen its embassy in Tehran; a month later he stated that Kuwait was 
interested in a constructive dialogue with Iran.727 Along the same lines the 
Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States stated in February, “We are playing 
the role of a mediator between Iraq and Iran and we have never taken sides 
with one Islamic country against another.”728 In this context, the Kuwaiti regime 
portrayed its massive financial support for Iraq as routine foreign aid and not a 
taking side in the Iran-Iraq War.729 However, due to Iranian attacks on Bubiyan 
in late March, the hijacking of a Kuwaiti commercial plane to Iran by Hezbollah 
in early April, and repeated bombings by pro-Iranian terrorists in Kuwait in 
February, April, and May, Kuwait reverted to its previous anti-Iranian position.730 
Both Kuwaiti government and press hailed Iraq’s recapture of the Faw 
peninsula in April; Iranian accusation that Kuwait had allowed Iraq to use 
Bubiyan in the reconquest were denied.731 
Despite pressure from the local press, the Kuwaiti regime did not follow 
Riyadh’s example and did not cut diplomatic ties over the hajj controversy in 
late April. Following the U.S. downing of an Iranian passenger plane in early 
July, a gradual reduction of Kuwaiti-Iranian tensions could be witnessed. 
Considering the massive effects the war had had on the foreign and domestic 
security as well as on the economy of Kuwait, the Iranian acceptance of UN 
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Resolution 598 on July 18 was welcomed enthusiastically by both the Kuwaiti 
press and the regime.732 
UAE Relations with Iran and Iraq, 1979-1988 
The Iranian Revolution had a very significant impact on UAE relations with both 
Tehran and Baghdad. Even more than before the overthrow of the Shah’s 
regime, the UAE shaped their policies towards each of the two subregional 
powers with great appreciation of the effect it would have on relations with the 
other. Moreover, particularly in the first years, differences in individual Emirates’ 
policy stances continued to be a characteristic pattern of UAE foreign policy 
towards Iran and Iraq. Again, Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah were the extremes in 
a continuum ranging from a more neutral policy seeking closest possible 
relations with Iran to a more pro-Iraqi stance; as in the 1970s, the federal UAE 
policy took an intermediate position. Despite smaller alterations over time, UAE 
policy towards the Iran-Iraq War was one of marked neutrality and, beside 
Oman, the UAE became the leading mediator for a ceasefire and a general 
reduction of tensions between Iran and the Arab Gulf states. 
UAE relations with Iran underwent several phases during the timeframe under 
review in this subchapter. In the first months following the overthrow of the 
Shah’s regime, UAE-Iranian relations were characterised by a reciprocal charm 
offensive. As early as February 13, 1979, Sheikh Rashid Al Maktoum, UAE 
Prime Minister and ruler of Dubai, conveyed his congratulations to the Iranian 
transitional government under Mehdi Bazargan; underscoring their two 
countries’ joint Islamic identity, Sheikh Rashid expressed his hopes for 
improved bilateral relations in line with shared Islamic objectives. Iran, too, 
adopted a friendly policy towards the UAE. Also in February 1979, Ayatollah 
Khomeini sent a letter to UAE President Sheikh Zayid through PLO Chairman 
Arafat in which he expressed his gratitude and respect “for the UAE President, 
government and people, on the basis of their stand towards the revolution.”733 
Moreover, Khomeini conveyed his wish for improved and intensified relations 
with the UAE untainted by the previous Iranian expansionist Gulf policy. For a 
few months, UAE-Iranian relations saw significant improvement due to mutual 
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efforts: in early March, the UAE ambassador to Tehran resumed his post;734 in 
the following month, the UAE Minister for Justice and Religious Endowments, 
upon his return from an extended visit to Iran, “call[ed] on all Muslims to support 
the Iranian revolution;”735 and in May, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary 
Courts, Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali, expressed Iran’s desire for improved 
relations with the UAE when he met with Sheikh’s Zayid, Rashid, and Saqr bin 
Muhammad Al Qasimi of Ras al-Khaimah. Khalkhali also emphasised that the 
new Iranian regime had broken with the Shah’s nationalism.736 Curiously, during 
a visit of the Ayatollah to Dubai, the local government even allowed the Iranian 
Fada’iyyane Islam party to open a branch in the Emirate.737 
However, the first conflicts in UAE-Iranian relations arose when the UAE denied 
an Iranian request to extradite individuals who had had connections with Iran’s 
central intelligence service SAVAK. Interestingly, Dubai that for economic 
reasons had the greatest interest in solid relations with Iran was pressing the 
UAE government to an uncompromising position. While the federal government 
had originally only denied the extradition of UAE citizens, Dubai rejected also 
the handing over to Iranian authorities of foreigners, as the individuals in 
question belonged to Emirate’s merchant elite. This decision disgruntled the 
Iranian regime and had negative effects on the bilateral rapprochement. 
Possibly in consequence to the UAE’s lacking readiness to compromise on the 
question of extradition, Tehran denied earlier suggestions about a return of the 
three occupied islands.738 
In addition, the UAE were concerned about the Iranian regime’s objective to 
export its Shiite revolution to the Arab Gulf monarchies.739 The fact that the UAE 
had large Shiite and Iranian communities – particularly in Dubai – created the 
possibility for a revolutionary spill-over to the Emirates. In this context, some 
apprehension was caused by both meetings of Iranian clerics close to Khomeini 
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with representatives of local Shiite-Iranian communities in the UAE740 and 
Iranian President Bani Sadr’s statement in March 1980 that “Iran would support 
any Islamic movement in any Arab country, on principle, regardless of whether 
or not there were relations with the ruling regime.”741 
Precisely because of these concerns and temporary conflicts with Iran, the UAE 
made great efforts to demonstrate to Iran its desire for close and cooperative 
relations. Towards this objective, the UAE government repeatedly criticised U.S. 
policy towards Iran: the UAE publicly rejected the freezing of Iranian assets by 
the United States as well as the failed U.S. attempt to free the hostages from 
the occupied U.S. embassy in Tehran.742 In early January 1980, both Sheikhs 
Zayid and Rashid sent congratulatory messages to the newly elected Iranian 
President Badi Sadr, reiterating the UAE’s desire in improved bilateral relations. 
Means to strengthen bilateral relations “on the basis of good neighbourliness 
and Islamic fraternity” were discussed by Sheikh Zayid and the Iranian Foreign 
Minister Sadeq Qutubzadeh during the latter’s visit to Abu Dhabi on April 30, 
1980.743 
Economic relations between the UAE and Iran were also thriving. The Iranian 
import volume to the UAE increased from roughly AED 110 million in 1978 to 
AED 162 million in 1982.744 In this context, it is interesting to note that while the 
imports to Dubai stayed virtually the same, imports to Abu Dhabi declined 
significantly and imports to Sharjah saw an 11-fold increase. Re-exports from 
the UAE to Iran increased from roughly $148.5 million in 1978 to approximately 
$234.6 million in the following year. Re-exports from the Emirate of Dubai to 
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Iran underwent a smaller but still significant 17% increase between 1977 and 
1979.745 
Following the Iranian Revolution, there were frequent consultations between the 
UAE and Iraq on the question of how to restore the disturbed Gulf stability. 
Despite frequent mutual visits, the UAE government remained suspicious and 
distrustful of the Iraqi Baath regime.746 Iraq’s emphatic insistence on the return 
of the Iranian-occupied islands put the UAE in a difficult position. What at first 
glance appears to be support for the UAE regime was in fact an Iraqi strategy to 
gain Arab backing in its escalating conflict with Iran and to prevent a UAE-
Iranian rapprochement. Indeed, the Iraqi regime made the return of the islands 
a central condition for an improvement of relations with Tehran. This 
automatically dragged the UAE into the Iranian-Iraqi conflict as it put pressure 
on the Emirati government to take a stand. Moreover, the Iraqi demand 
damaged UAE interests as it reinforced Iran’s rejection to return the islands.747 
However, the major reason for the Iranian rejection to return the islands seems 
to have been the close relations between the Arab Gulf monarchies and the 
United States in general and U.S. military presence in the area in particular.748 
When Iraq invaded Iran in October 1980 it officially declared the return of the 
islands a main war objective749; putting even more pressure on the UAE 
government to take a stand. 
Regarding both the Iraqi demand for the return of the islands and the Iran-Iraq 
War in general, the individual UAE Emirates were in disagreement. In the initial 
stage of the war, when it seemed that Iraq was likely to succeed in quickly 
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defeating the Iranian military, the UAE emirates were divided into two camps – 
a group led by Abu Dhabi and completed by Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, and 
Fujairah, which was generally supportive of Iraq’s attack, and another group 
consisting of Dubai, Sharjah, and Umm al-Qaiwain that, mainly for economic 
reasons, took a neutral position and did not favour Iraq’s war decision.750 
Regarding the island issue, the UAE initially refrained from taking a public 
position. They saw themselves in a quandary as “[t]o take up the Iraqi demand 
would have earned it [the UAE] Iranian hostility; to disclaim it would have 
antagonized Iraq.”751 In early October, Sheikh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah implicitly 
expressed his support for Iraq in its war with Iran. Although talks about eco-
nomic cooperation were claimed as the sole reason for his visit to Baghdad, 
Sheikh Saqr’s meeting with the Iraqi government this early in the war was a 
clear pro-Iraqi statement. Reportedly, the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah and Iraqi 
government also reached an agreement on the recovery of the occupied 
islands. The federal UAE government continued to keep silent on the island 
issue until mid-December. In the meantime, Arab public opinion had increasing-
ly called into question the UAE government’s Arab patriotism. Articles issued in 
the Lebanese newspaper al-Bayraq put additional pressure on the UAE 
government. The paper referred to opposition movements in the country and 
alleged threats to leave the union by Ras al-Khaimah over the federal 
government’s lack of a decisive stand on the island issue. Moreover, the Iranian 
leadership embarrassed the UAE government when it suggested that some 
UAE rulers had been bribed by the Shah to keep silent on the Iranian 
occupation of the islands. The UAE government reacted on December 11, 
when it conveyed a message to the UN Secretary-General insisting on the 
restoration of UAE sovereignty over the occupied islands and declaring their 
readiness to enter into negotiation with Iran on the matter.752 In the following 
spring, the UAE government adopted an even sharper tone; the acting foreign 
minister declared that while the UAE hoped to resolve their disagreement with 
Iran over the islands “with understanding and [by a] dialogue on logic,” they 
were now supportive of Baghdad’s insistence on the island’s return as a 
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prerequisite for a ceasefire.753 However, reportedly neither Sheikh Zayid nor 
acting Foreign Minister Rashid Abdullah Al Nuaymi addressed the island issue 
in meetings with Iranian officials visiting the Emirates.754 If true, this would 
support the assumption that the UAE did only take a stronger stance regarding 
the islands in reaction to increased Iraqi and general Arab pressure. As in 
1970s, the UAE federal government did consider stabile relations with Iran more 
important than the recovery of the occupied islands; without a doubt this was 
true for most of the individual emirates as well.755 
Early on in the war, the UAE were expressing their hopes for a rapid end of the 
fighting. In mid-October, Sheikh Zayid called on the two belligerents to end their 
military contestation in order to “save Muslim lives.”756 Nonetheless, during the 
war’s first year, the UAE gave financial and very likely also logistic support to 
Iraq. As Nonneman reports, during this time “[t]he UAE (in essence Abu Dhabi) 
is thought to have contributed between $1-3 billion” to the Iraqi war effort.757 
Moreover, there were unconfirmed Iranian allegations that the UAE gave 
“shelter to Iraqi naval vessels and aircraft.”758 In addition, Anthony reports that 
“Iraqi planes landed in Dubai en route to Oman and projected bombing of the 
southern port of Bandar Abbas.”759 According to Cordesman, 
“[t]here were numerous news reports that Abu Dhabi was prepared to 
serve as a base for Iraqi fighters and ships and that several members of 
the UAE would back an Iraqi invasion of the Tumb and Abu Musa islands 
in return for the promise that the islands would be returned to Iraqi 
sovereignty.”760 
This, however, is contradicted by a statement of an unnamed “senior UAE 
official” referred to by Al-Alkim; the official reportedly claimed that Iraq had 
requested to use UAE territory as a basis for bomb raids on Bandar Abbas but 
that the UAE denied Iraqi military jets entry into their airspace.761 
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Encapsulating the UAE leadership’s concerns and hopes regarding the Iran-
Iraq War in its first year Anthony states, 
“The emirs are concerned about several possible results of the Iran-Iraq 
hostilities. They fear that if Iraq emerges too dominant, the region's 
fragile power structure will be thrown out of balance. They also fear that 
a weakened and destabilized Iran would produce greater radicalism in 
the area, to which an outraged Shi‘i minority in the Gulf states would 
respond. Worse, if Iran resorted to prolonged guerilla warfare, the 
fighting could spread across to the islands and to the Peninsula itself. 
Moreover, a chaotic Iran could provoke the Soviets to adventurism, 
opening the region to Soviet influence and bringing on a superpower 
confrontation in the Gulf. What the emirs would like to see is an early end 
to the fighting without too much humiliation for Iran, with a negotiated 
settlement that would give Iraq its stated limited objectives, but without 
over-inflating the stature of Saddam Hussein or his military forces.”762 
From 1982, the UAE reduced their support for Iraq – although Abu Dhabi 
reportedly “contributed another $1 billion or so to Iraq’s coffers in 1982”763 –, 
sought a rapprochement with Iran, took a markedly neutral position in the war, 
and made offers to the contestants to mediate between them.764 Beside the 
reasons mentioned by Anthony, the UAE now had a pressing economic interest 
in a rapid termination of the war. The ongoing military contestation between Iran 
and Iraq had increasingly negative effects on the UAE economy: following the 
considerable profits Dubai made in the first months of the war “by transshipping 
a wide range of badly needed supplies into Iran,”765 the Emirate’s trade with 
Iran was now declining and Dubai’s overall re-export trade did not develop as 
fast as it could have due to the war’s turbulences. As oil prices fell at the same 
time, the UAE budget deficit was rapidly growing from $622 million in 1982 to 
$1,447 million in 1983.766 
The UAE adopted an Iran-friendly policy and distanced itself from Iraq as it was 
concerned to be dragged into the war or be targeted by Iranian asymmetric 
retaliations – a fear reinforced by Iranian pressure following its military 
advances in 1982. Following the discovery of the coup attempt in Bahrain in 
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December 1981, the UAE government refrained from denouncing Iran for its 
involvement. In the only public statement in this regard, Sheikh Zayid merely 
noted that Iran denied any involvement in the plot. The UAE soon went back to 
business as usual and hosted the Iranian Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs in 
March 1982 and a delegation of Iranian parliamentarians headed by Ayatollah 
Khalkhali in April.767 In an interview in early March, Sheikh Zayid reiterated the 
UAE’s neutrality in the war and downplayed the peril emanating from 
revolutionary Iran to the Emirates. He stated that “Iran has never threatened us 
[…] there is no pressure” and denied ever having given military or financial 
support to either Iran or Iraq.768 In addition, Al-Alkim cites an unnamed senior 
UAE official who confirmed earlier assumptions that from 1982 the UAE bowed 
to Iranian pressure and even made quiet payments to Tehran.769 However, 
there was a boundary to the UAE’s readiness to cooperate with Iran. The 
Emirates did not take up an Iranian proposal to establish a joint UAE-Iranian 
bank and firmly rejected a suggested “bilateral trade agreement on a barter 
basis, with Iran paying in crops, minerals, dried fruits and paper for UAE 
goods.”770 
In May 1982, during a visit to Abu Dhabi by Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati, 
Sheikh Zayid reiterated that a continuation of the war was in no one’s interest 
and offered his support in reaching a peaceful conflict settlement; indeed, the 
UAE together with Algeria made attempts to mediate between the belligerents 
in 1982.771 Due to the UAE’s charm offensive towards Iran, bilateral relations 
showed clear improvement. In June, Iranian President Khamenei sent a 
message to Sheikh Zayid, “prais[ing] the UAE’s policy as wise and realistic,”772 
and in October, the first Iranian ambassador presented his credentials to the 
UAE government in the post-revolutionary era.773 
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UAE-Iranian relations continued to improve over the next years. In fact, among 
Arab Gulf monarchies the UAE had the best relations with Iran.774 During this 
time, there were regular visits by Iranian officials to the Emirates; examples are 
visits by Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati in mid-August 1983 and in December 
1985, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Besharti in October 1985, and the 
Director of Arab and Islamic Affairs at the Iranian Foreign Ministry in July 
1985.775  
When Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz in July 1983, the UAE 
responded in a milder tone than the regimes in Riyadh and Muscat. While the 
UAE government made clear that it considered the closing of the strait 
“unacceptable,” both the UAE minister for petroleum and mineral wealth and the 
foreign minister made public comments calming the mood by stressing that no 
Gulf state, including Iran, had an interest to follow through with such a threat.776 
At the same time, to put pressure on Iran, Sheikh Zayid tried to mediate the 
conflict between Iraq and Syria, Iran’s most important Arab ally. Reportedly, the 
UAE was even willing to pay Syria for the reopening of the Iraqi-Syrian oil 
pipeline.777 
When in May 1984 Arab-Iranian tensions escalated over the Tanker War, the 
UAE government was anxious to maintain its balanced stance. On the one 
hand, the Emirates supported the condemnation of Iranian aggression within 
the framework of the GCC. On the other, the UAE emphasised the need to 
maintain cordial relations with both Iraq and Iran as this was a precondition for 
its attempts to bring about an end of the war. The UAE press also exercised 
restraint regarding its criticism of Iran. In fact, the Emirati newspaper Al Ittihad 
“identif[ied] the ‘key enemy’ as those Western powers which sought to 
manipulate the conflict in order to re-establish their hegemony over the Gulf 
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countries.”778 Reiterating its connectedness with both belligerents, the UAE 
equally stressed its common Arab identity with Iraq and the ‘ties of 
neighbourhood and Islamic brotherhood’ it shared with Iran.779 
With intensification of the war, the UAE were in a growing quandary: for trade 
reasons and out of concern about Iranian retaliations, the Emirates had an 
interest in a continuation of solid relations with Iran; meanwhile, Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait were pressing the Emirates to take a more anti-Iranian stand.780 The 
UAE addressed this predicament by applying a three-pronged strategy: first, 
they maintained to the largest degree a neutral stance in their individual policy, 
rarely criticising Iran openly. In February 1986, the UAE government 
condemned Iran’s seizure of the Faw peninsula. However, soon afterwards the 
Emirates returned to their previous neutral stance. The same was true for the 
time after the hajj incident in July 1987.781 Second, the UAE backed GCC 
communiqués and resolutions critical of Iran after making every effort to 
moderate their tone; the best example was the GCC summit resolution in 
December 1987.782 Third, the UAE intensified its efforts to mediate between 
Iran and Iraq. In 1987, the UAE made several mediation attempts through Syria, 
Iran’s main ally in the region. During the December 1987 GCC summit, the 
remaining Arab Gulf monarchies then entrusted the Emirates to lead a 
diplomatic campaign to convince Iran to accept a ceasefire. Indeed, the UAE 
were very active in 1988 and reportedly even offered Iran financial 
compensation for its acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 598.783 
These increased mediation attempts were also motivated by the fact that from 
1986 onwards, the UAE were increasingly affected by the war. In 1987, after 
two ships had hit mines off the coast of Fujairah, the UAE banned commercial 
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shipping in its territorial waters for a month.784 Moreover, following the start of 
the reflagging operation, Iran had increasingly fired upon neutral ships, thus 
raising the number of attacks near the shores of the UAE. In April 1988, Iran 
even targeted a UAE installation directly when it attacked the Mubarak offshore 
oil field in retaliation for U.S. attacks on Iranian targets.785 
Understandably, the UAE felt relieved when Iran eventually accepted the 
ceasefire in mid-August.786 
Bahrain’s Relations with Iran and Iraq, 1979-1988 
The Iranian Revolution was a watershed in Bahraini-Iranian relations. After ten 
years of increasingly close and cordial ties between Manama and Tehran, the 
situation changed fundamentally following the advent to power by the Khomeini 
regime. Over the next years, bilateral relations fluctuated depending on two 
factors: the degree of Iranian subversive activities in, verbal aggression 
towards, and threats against Bahrain; and the course of the Iran-Iraq War. 
During the same period, relations between Manama and Baghdad were also 
decisively affected by Iran’s policy and the developments of the war. Early on, 
Iraq sought closer relations with Bahrain, as was the case with all Arab Gulf 
monarchies. Manama’s response to this attempted Iraqi rapprochement varied 
over time; domestic stability and external security being their top priority, the Al 
Khalifa regime gave strong support for Iraq at times and at other times took an 
explicitly neutral stance. 
The new Iranian regime’s intention to export its revolution to the other Gulf 
states caused great concern in Manama. The Al Khalifa feared that Iranian 
instigation of unrest could lead to an overthrow of their regime just as it had 
happened to the Shah. Indeed, Bahrain was very vulnerable to Iranian 
subversion. For one thing, the island state was the only Arab Gulf monarchy 
with a Shiite majority among its population. Moreover, Shiite clerics in Bahrain 
had been in close touch with Khomeini during his exile in Iraq. Most worrisome, 
however, was the fact that 
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“[m]any of Khomeyni’s accusations against the Shah could equally well 
be applied to [Bahrain’s] rulers, including those of autocratic government, 
use of oil revenues for the benefit of a small minority, wide socio-
economic gaps, reliance on and imitation of the West, and the failure to 
maintain an Islamic life-style.”787 
Furthermore, the Bahraini regime was concerned about a possible revival of the 
historic Iranian claim on Bahrain when during a press conference on June 15, 
1979, Iranian Ayatollah Sayyid Sadeq Ruhani called Bahrain “an indivisible part 
of Iran.”788 However, the Bahraini regime’s concerns were allayed by both an 
Iranian government statement according to which Ruhani’s comment did not 
represent Tehran’s official position and more importantly Iran’s appointment of 
an Ambassador to Manama the next month.789 
Starting in the summer of 1979, the Bahraini regime became increasingly 
concerned about subversive activities in the Emirate. In mid-August, a group of 
Shiite Bahraini clerics called for significant reforms and the proclamation of 
Bahrain as an Islamic state. A few days later, Muhammad Ali Al Akari, the 
group’s head, was arrested by the Bahraini authorities upon his return from Iran 
where he had met with Ayatollah Ruhani. Al Akari’s detention prompted a 
demonstration in the course of which the Bahraini regime arrested 28 
protestors; among the detained was the Iranian national Al Hadi Al Mudaresi, 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s “personal and unofficial representative in Bahrain.”790 The 
arrests in turn provoked a harsh response from Tehran, which accused the Al 
Khalifa regime of persecuting the Bahraini Shiite community, demanded the 
immediate release of the detained protesters, and threatened with open support 
for Bahraini Shiite subversives. As Bahrain did not respond to Tehran’s 
ultimatum, the Iranian regime gave staunch verbal support for the Bahraini 
Shiites through the media. Over the next months, Iranian clerics and 
government officials uttered repeated threats in direction of the Bahraini regime. 
In late September, Ayatollah Ruhani issued a clear warning when he wrote to 
the Bahraini ruler, “If you do not want to stop oppressing the people, we will call 
on the people of Bahrain to demand annexation to the Islamic government of 
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Iran.”791 The Ayatollah repeated his warning in the presence of Khomeini and 
added that Sheikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa would meet the same fate as the 
Shah had. In addition, Ruhani demanded a Bahraini referendum, convinced that 
the majority of the Bahraini people would want to join Iran; Sheikh Isa replied by 
strongly rejecting Ruhani’s interference in domestic Bahraini affairs.792 
Within the first two and a half years following the takeover of the Khomeini 
regime, Iran’s stance towards Bahrain was somewhat schizophrenic; a result of 
the Iranian regime’s lack of a concerted foreign policy. On this Lawson 
encapsulates, 
“Representatives arriving in Manama during this period brought 
messages reaffirming Tehran’s desire to end the rivalry between Arabs 
and Persians that had characterized the policies of the Pahlavi period. 
[An example was the visit Iranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Qutubzadeh 
paid to Bahrain on May 2, 1980.793] At the same time, however, more 
militant factions within the Islamic Republic continued to broadcast calls 
by the Islamic Liberation Front-Bahrain and other clandestine organiza-
tions for a popular uprising against the Al Khalifah.”794 
Until early 1980, Bahrain tried to not antagonise Iran; a desire shared by the 
remaining Arab Gulf monarchies. This was the reason why in mid-October 
1979, when representatives of the six states met in Taif, Saudi Arabia, to review 
the unrest in Bahrain and Kuwait, they did neither invite Iraq, Iran’s nemesis, 
nor made public the discussion’s results.795 However, Bahrain kept a safe 
distance from Iraq for another reason, too. In September 1979, Iraqi Defence 
Minister Khayrallah visited Bahrain carrying a message from President Saddam 
Hussein that emphasised that Iraq would protect the Emirate against external 
aggression.796 In the following month Saddam Hussein said in an interview that 
“[h]e [had] told the Gulf rulers that they could ask for Iraqi help ‘to the 
degree they need it and to the degree they allow us to help.’ He added, 
however, that Iraq’s rulers were ‘revolutionaries and socialists’ and if the 
people in the Gulf States were seeking a change of regime, then ‘we are 
with the people.’ In the eyes of the Gulf rulers, that rider probably 
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cancelled out whatever pro-Iraqi sympathy the offer of help might have 
created in the first place.”797 
In 1980, Bahrain began to take a more pro-Iraqi stance. Manama quickly 
expressed its support for the National Charter for the Arab States Saddam 
Hussein proposed in February 1980. From May onwards, in the light of 
intensified Iranian-Iraqi tensions, the Al Khalifa regime increased its diplomatic 
activity with Iraq. During a visit to Baghdad, the Bahraini prime minister went as 
far as to express strong support for Iraq. Bahrain’s pro-Iraqi stance continued in 
the early phase of the Iran-Iraq War. The regime in Manama hoped that the 
expected blitzkrieg would lead to the overthrow of the Iranian regime and 
subsequently reduce Tehran’s destabilising influence in Bahrain. However, 
once Iran had stopped Iraq’s offensive and a stalemate set in, Bahrain was 
concerned about the repercussions of a continued overt support of Iraq; hence, 
Manama expressed officially its neutrality in the war.798 
In mid-December 1981, Bahraini authorities discovered a plot by a group of 
Shiites to overthrow the Al Khalifa regime. On December 13, Bahraini police 
arrested 60 individuals, among them 45 Bahrainis, 13 Saudis, one Kuwaiti, and 
one Omani. The detainees confessed having “planned to seize Government 
House and take officials hostage during Bahrain's National Day celebrations 
Dec. 16.”799 Moreover, the arrested individuals claimed to have received training 
for their coup attempt in Iran.800 In consequence, Bahraini-Iranian relations saw 
massive deterioration. Despite Iranian denials, the Bahraini government 
immediately handed an official protest note to Hassan Shushtarizadeh, the 
Iranian chargé d’affaires in Manama. On December 18, the Al Khalifa regime 
recalled its ambassador to Iran and declared Shushtarizadeh persona non grata 
because of his alleged involvement in the plot – the Bahraini authorities 
accused the Iranian diplomat of having provided the plotters with weapons and 
explosives he had previously smuggled into the country.801 In January 1982, the 
Bahraini regime identified a group of Shiite Bahraini citizens as the leaders of 
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the plotters; all twelve individuals resided in Iran and were members of the 
Tehran-based Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, a faction headed by 
the aforementioned Al Hadi Al Mudaresi, the then Director of the Iranian Gulf 
Affairs Broadcasting Section. The sequence of the failed plot was later 
described as follows: 
“National Day, 16 December 1981, was zero-hour for the group’s 
planned demonstration and attack on government installations and 
officials. Simultaneously, Tehran Radio was to have urged people to rally 
around the group. Five Iranian hovercraft loaded with troops and 
equipment were standing by in the Iranian port of Bushehr to fly in 
support as soon as they received word that the attempted coup was 
underway.”802 
Subsequently, Bahrain abrogated diplomatic relations with Iran and refused 
Iranian citizens entry into the country. Moreover, Bahrain requested all 
remaining GCC members to follow its example and cut ties with Tehran.803 In 
another prompt reaction to the failed plot, the regime in Manama sought a 
rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the remaining Arab Gulf monarchies as it 
saw in increased cooperation the best guarantee for security and stability. In the 
following years, Bahrain was a main driving force behind closer cooperation and 
integration in the framework of the GCC.804 An early example of such intensified 
cooperation among the GCC states was an emergency meeting by the GCC 
foreign ministers in February 1982 during which the six states agreed upon joint 
measures against Iranian-sponsored subversion.805 
In the summer of 1982, the Bahraini-Iranian relations improved again. During a 
visit to Manama by two Iranian members of parliament on August 9, officials of 
both states met for the first time since the abrogation of diplomatic relations. 
Over the course of the following nine months, several Iranian economic 
delegations visited Bahrain and in September 1982 both countries announced a 
plan for the establishment of a passenger shipping service between Manama, 
Doha, and the Saudi city of Dammam operated by the Islamic Republic 
Shipping Lines. In the spring of 1983, diplomatic relations were officially 
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reinstated, followed by the visit to Manama of a senior official of the Iranian 
foreign ministry in May. Another two months later, a new Iranian chargé 
d’affaires presented his credentials to the Al Khalifa regime.806 Despite this 
improvement in political relations, the Iranian media continued their previous 
critical reporting on Bahrain; the main points of criticism were Bahrain’s pro-Iraqi 
stance in the war and the U.S. military presence in the Emirate.807 
As regards the Iran-Iraq war, Bahrain called on both belligerents to agree to a 
ceasefire. However, Manama continued to show a pro-Iraqi stance, although 
not as emphatically as in the war’s initial phase.808 In mid-March 1983, 
Bahrain’s Prime Minister, Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, told the Egyptian 
newspaper Al Akhbar 
“I say frankly and without hesitation that Iraq did not want this war. The 
war was imposed on Iraq which found itself, as a revolution and a 
regime, in a position of self-defence […] We hope that the Iranian side 
will now accept mediation.”809 
Due to its pro-Iraqi stance Bahrain’s relations with Iraq were stable. In mid-
September 1982, bilateral trade relations were improved when a joint Bahraini-
Iraqi economic trade committee agreed to increase further the already 
significant bilateral trade volume and reduce tariff barriers.810 
During the following years, Bahrain made great efforts to prevent bilateral 
relations with Iran from deteriorating; the underlying intention behind this policy 
was to contain both Iranian subversive activities in Bahrain and the risk of being 
dragged into the war. For one thing, Bahrain kept a relatively neutral stance in 
the Iran-Iraq War and conducted low-key relations with Iraq; despite the fact 
that the Al Khalifa regime’s sympathy for Iraq far exceeded any it had for Iran. 
Moreover, when repeated reports made credible claims that Tehran 
continuously supported Bahraini underground groups, Manama gave no public 
confirmation. On the contrary, in October 1983, the Bahraini foreign minister 
stated: “In fact, two years ago there was clear interference, but we hope that 
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such things have ended.”811 Furthermore, the Bahraini regime usually ignored 
the continued hostile reporting on Bahrain broadcasted by Radio Tehran. 
Despite the fact that the Iranian media clearly attempted to instigate protests 
among the Shiite elements of the Bahraini population, the Al Khalifa regime did 
usually refrain from verbal retaliations.812 From late 1984 onwards, the Iranian 
government made attempts to improve relations with Bahrain; this 
rapprochement was part of a larger Iranian strategy to reduce pro-Iraqi support 
among the Arab Gulf monarchies. Examples of the changed Iranian policy was 
the congratulatory message Iranian Prime Minister Musavi conveyed to his 
Bahraini counterpart on the occasion of the Bahraini National Day in December 
1984 and the visits to Bahrain by a personal representative of the Iranian 
foreign minister in the spring and by Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Besharti 
in late October of the following year. The Bahraini regime was glad about Iran’s 
more cooperative approach. However, not least since the Iranian media 
continued to broadcast anti-Bahraini propaganda, Manama remained highly 
suspicious about Iran’s ulterior motives.813 
In 1986, Bahrain’s stance towards the Iran-Iraq War began to shift towards a 
more pro-Iraqi position. Bahrain backed the GCC foreign ministers’ strong 
condemnation of Iran’s seizure of the Faw peninsula in February 1986. 
Moreover, both the Bahraini government and the country’s media issued 
condemnations of Iran’s military advance. Unlike Oman, Qatar, and the UAE, 
which soon resumed their previous neutral stance, Bahrain kept a tendentially 
pro-Iraqi attitude. As Nonneman notes, this “may be explained by its own 
experience with Iranian-inspired protest, and the island’s high degree of 
dependence on Saudi aid, oil supplies, and military protection.”814 Bahrain’s 
increased tilt towards Iraq was evidenced inter alia by the visits to Bahrain by 
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Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Ramadan and the Iraqi interior minister in mid-July 
and late October respectively.815 
A few months later, Bahrain publicly expressed its approval for Kuwait’s 
reflagging operation. In an attempt to avoid antagonising the Iranian regime with 
its support for the introduction of a large foreign navy presence into Gulf waters, 
the Bahraini foreign minister “rather feebly tr[ied] to reassure Tehran that this 
would not be aimed against it.”816 However, as its commerce was heavily 
affected by the Tanker War, the Bahraini regime had a great interest in an 
increased security of the Gulf waterways; the reflagging operation, so Manama 
hoped, would go a long way to realise this objective.817 
From 1987, Bahrain took an increasingly anti-Iranian stance. Having taken a 
neutral stance towards the war for several years, Bahrain now sided more and 
more with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In June, Bahrain supported a GCC foreign 
ministers communiqué that harshly criticised Iran for its anti-Kuwaiti actions. 
Moreover, the Bahraini government publicly condemned Iran following the hajj 
incident on July 31, 1987; an important reason for Bahrain’s harsh response 
was its apprehension that the incident might cause domestic unrest. Another 
Bahraini condemnation of Iran followed after the Iranian attack on Kuwait in 
September, as the Al Khalifa regime was very concerned that the GCC states 
might be dragged into the war. In the light of the immediate danger of a 
geographic expansion of the war, which might have directly affected Bahrain, 
Manama advocated firmly UN Security Council Resolution 598, which called for 
a ceasefire. Addressing the UN General Assembly in September 1987, Bahraini 
Foreign Minister Muhammad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa went as far as to call for 
anti-Iranian sanctions if Tehran did not comply with the Resolution. The Iranian 
attack on a Kuwaiti oil terminal in October prompted yet another strong Bahraini 
condemnation.818 
It should not come as a surprise that in consequence of Bahrain’s increasingly 
Iran-critical stance, the Iranian attitude towards the Emirate became hostile 
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again. In October 1987, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards 
labelled Bahrain as “U.S.-occupied,” which made the island state “fair game for 
attacks on the Americans.”819 In mid-December, Radio Tehran uttered an 
implicit threat in direction of Manama: 
“Regimes like Bahrain’s are too small to remain optimistic about their 
future security under US support while they continue their policy of 
supporting US forces and helping the enemies of Islam.”820 
In 1988, Bahrain’s stance towards the war was characterised by an even more 
pronounced anti-Iranian and pro-Iraqi tilt. On the one hand, Bahrain supported 
the UAE initiative to lead a GCC-Iranian dialogue with the objective to convince 
Iran to agree to a ceasefire. On the other, Manama denounced the Iranian 
government for both its attack on the UAE’s Mubarak offshore oil field and its 
alleged involvement in the hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner in April. Moreover, the 
visits of Bahraini Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman to Iraq in the same month 
and Bahrain’s Defence Minister Khalifa bin Hamad to Faw and Shalanchah on 
June 20, right after they had been liberated from Iranian occupation, were clear 
symbols of Bahrain’s siding with Iraq.821 
When Iran eventually agreed to a ceasefire on June 20 the Bahraini regime was 
cautiously optimistic.822 
Qatar’s Relations with Iran and Iraq, 1979-1988 
From the Iranian Revolution to the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Qatar was careful 
to maintain stable relations with both Iran and Iraq. The Iranian Revolution 
caused great apprehension in Doha. With a view to the large Iranian and Shiite 
communities in the country, the Al Thani regime was greatly concerned about 
domestic security. The concerns were reinforced when several of Khomeini’s 
assistants visited the Emirate in order to meet with the local Iranian and Shiite 
minorities.823 Fearing Iranian instigation of unrest in Qatar, the leadership made 
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great efforts to not antagonise the new revolutionary regime in Tehran.824 The 
Al Thani regime expressed its objection against any forcible U.S. intervention in 
Iran and “rejected the establishment of foreign bases, or the stationing of 
foreign military troops, in the Gulf, and advocated keeping the region neutral.”825 
In this regard, Doha and Tehran were in agreement. As a sign of stable bilateral 
relations, Iranian Foreign Minister Sadegh Qutubzadeh paid a state visit to 
Doha in late April 1980.826 
Meanwhile, bilateral relations with Iraq improved as well. This was mainly a 
result of the accelerated Saudi-Iraqi rapprochement prompted by the Iranian 
Revolution. In this, the Qatari regime followed the established pattern of looking 
to Riyadh for policy guidance. Nonetheless, Doha remained suspicious of the 
radical and overly secular Baathist regime in Baghdad.827 
Following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, Qatar declared its neutrality, a 
stance it officially kept throughout the entire war.828 Once Iran had stopped the 
initial Iraqi offensive and a stalemate set it, Qatar shared the other Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ strong interest in a rapid termination of the war, as its continuation 
would entail significant risks for the economic prosperity, domestic stability, and 
external security of the Emirate.829 Consequently, in November 1980, Emir 
Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani called upon the community of Islamic states to work 
together towards a termination of the war.830 Underlining its claimed neutrality in 
the armed conflict, the Qatari regime publicly held the view that the war 
between Iran and Iraq was the result of the pan-Islamic community’s failure to 
focus on and unite against the true enemy, Zionist Israel. Qatar repeated this 
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view throughout the entire war.831 However, as it became clear that there was 
no hope for a swift ceasefire and a return to the status quo ante, Qatar took 
sides for Iraq. As mentioned above, Qatar was concerned about the new 
Iranian regime’s policy orientation and the trouble that could arise from Iranian 
efforts to export the revolution. Therefore, the Al Thani regime considered Iran 
to be the larger threat to its interests and did not want to see an Iranian victory. 
Consequently, despite its officially neutral stance, the Qatari regime began to 
grant Iraq very significant financial aid to further its war efforts; within the war’s 
first year, Qatar is reported to have provided Iraq with “some $1 billion.”832 
In early 1981, Qatar issued the first criticism against the revolutionary Iranian 
regime. In January of that year, the Emirate supported publicly the Iraqi-UAE 
demand for the return of Abu Musa and the Tunb islands and in June, Doha 
condemned the Iranian attacks on Kuwait. However, the Qatari regime made 
certain to not break with Iran altogether. Exemplary for this was a three-day visit 
by an Iranian parliamentary delegation to Doha in February.833 
In late 1981, Qatar adopted a sharper tone towards Tehran. The exposure of 
Iran’s sabotage network in Bahrain prompted Doha’s first public denunciation of 
the revolutionary Iranian regime. In addition, Qatar condemned the Iranian 
execution of 1,500 Iraqi prisoners of war, labelling it a “violation of Islamic 
religious and moral principles.”834 
While Saudi Arabia and Kuwait continued their financial support for Iraq from 
1982 onwards, Qatar, along with the remaining Arab Gulf monarchies, 
discontinued its previous considerable aid.835 However, despite the termination 
of financial aid, Qatari Foreign Minister Suhaim bin Hamad Al Thani stated in 
mid-September 1983, on the occasion of his visit to Baghdad, Qatar’s 
sympathies with the Iraqi regime “in its war at the eastern border of the Arab 
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Homeland.”836 Nonetheless, bilateral relations with Iran were kept alive and 
“Qatar could take some comfort in not having been completely written off by 
Tehran as an Arab ally of Iraq.”837 Underscoring this fact, several Iranian 
officials paid visits to Doha over the following years.838 In late 1985, the Iranian 
Ambassador to Doha expressed on Radio Tehran the Iranian government’s 
particular interest in an expansion of relations with Qatar.839 Overall, Qatar’s 
friendly stance towards Iran paid off as the Emirate did not become the target of 
Iranian subversive activities comparable to that in Bahrain or Kuwait.840 
Following Iran’s capture of the Faw peninsula in February 1986, the GCC 
foreign ministers issued a very emphatic condemnation. Chiefly responsible for 
the joint communiqué’s harsh tone were the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait. Both the Qatari government and the Emirate’s media issued a 
condemnation as well. However, as was the case in the Bahrain, Oman, and 
UAE, Qatari statements were more restrained than those of Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait. In the subsequent months, Qatar returned again to a more neutral 
position towards the Iran-Iraq War.841 
The longer the war dragged on, the more concerns it raised in Doha and the 
more negative repercussions it had for the Emirate. Qatar feared both the war’s 
further escalation and internationalisation. The Al Thani regime feared a spill-
over of the armed conflict on its territory and the effects of a superpower 
involvement in the war.842 Most immediate negative effects for the Emirate bore 
the escalating Tanker War. Due to its geostrategic position, Qatar was heavily 
reliant on the trade routes through the Gulf. Therefore, any disturbances in the 
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Gulf waterways directly affected the Qatari economy.843 Despite both Qatar’s 
attempts to maintain a relatively neutral stance during the war and the Emirate’s 
comparatively stable relations with Iran, its tankers had repeatedly been the 
target of Iranian attacks.844 Moreover, Qatari vessels had been repeatedly 
stopped, searched, and seized by the Iranian military.845 In the end, Doha 
approved of the U.S. reflagging mission in the context of the GCC. However, 
the Emirate did not issue any unilateral statements according the same lines.846 
Until the end of the war, Qatar backed resolutions condemning Iran in both the 
GCC and the Arab League, however, refrained to the largest extent from 
unilateral public rejection of Iranian policy.847  
Having a vital interest in the termination of the war, Qatar gave strong support 
to UN Security Council Resolution 598 and called on Iran to accept a ceasefire. 
At the Arab League Summit in Amman in November 1987, Qatar presumably 
joined the UAE and Oman in their demand to formulate the summit resolution in 
such way that channels of communication with Tehran would still remain open 
in order to convince the latter to accept a ceasefire. When Iran eventually did so 
on July 18, 1988 both the Qatari government and press lauded Tehran’s 
decision; the eventual end of the war a month later then caused great relief in 
Doha.848 
Oman’s Relations with Iran and Iraq, 1979-1988 
As it was the case for the remaining Arab Gulf monarchies, Oman’s relations 
with both Iran and Iraq from 1979 to 1988 were shaped primarily by the Iranian 
Revolution, the altered Iranian foreign policy, and the ensuing Iran-Iraq War. 
Moreover, in the early years, policy reactions to the Egyptian-Israeli peace 
treaty and the Soviet Afghanistan invasion affected Oman’s relations with Iraq. 
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Having had very cordial ties with the Shah’s regime849 and having favoured the 
gradual détente in Gulf relations following the 1975 Algiers Accord, the 
Sultanate was concerned about revolutionary change in Iran. However, Oman’s 
threat perception regarding the Khomeini regime’s policy orientation differed 
from that of the remaining Arab Gulf monarchies. Oman had no substantive 
Shiite community and those Shiites that lived in Oman originated from India, a 
fact that made them much less susceptible to Iranian influence. Hence, in clear 
contrast to Bahrain and Kuwait, the peril of Shiite upheavals was minimal in 
Oman. Indeed, following the Iranian Revolution there was no significant Iranian-
sponsored subversive activity in the Sultanate.850 
Early on, the Omani regime emphasised that the Iranian Revolution was a 
purely domestic Iranian matter; a view the Sultanate reiterated throughout the 
entire period under review in this section.851 What concerned Oman most with 
regard to the change of political status quo in Iran was the security of the Strait 
of Hormuz. It is true that Oman was economically far less reliant on the Strait as 
an export route than the other Arab Gulf monarchies – the largest part of the 
Omani coastline and the major Omani ports are located outside the Gulf, 
offering the Sultanate alternative export routes. However, Oman and Iran 
shared sovereignty over the Strait. The responsibility stemming from that gained 
particular significance as all commercial traffic lanes through the Strait go 
through Omani territorial waters.852 Hence, to guarantee uninterrupted oil export 
routes, the Sultanate applied a two-pronged strategy. First, the Omani regime 
tried to maintain cooperative relations with Tehran. To this end, the Sultan sent 
a delegation headed by his Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Yusuf bin Alawi 
bin Abdullah, to Iran in late June 1979. Khomeini’s pledge to honor all previous 
agreements in Oman and to engage in close cooperation to ensure Gulf 
security comforted the regime in Muscat. To underscore Oman’s interest in 
friendly relations with Tehran the Omani Information Minister who had 
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accompanied Minister Abdullah stated upon conclusion of their meeting with 
Khomeini, 
“Iran is our neighbor, we have close historical, religious and geographic 
links with her an we are eagerly looking forward to expanding pure 
relations with her in all fields in order to make the region a safer place to 
live in.”853 
In mid-September 1979, the Sultan sent a special envoy to Tehran to discuss 
the safety of shipping lanes through the Strait of Hormuz.854 
Second, Oman tried to put forward a multilateral security plan that would involve 
all littoral states of the Gulf as well as Western powers – the United States, the 
United Kingdom, West Germany, and Japan, the main importers of Gulf oil. The 
Omani Gulf plan was put forward in reaction to both subregional instability 
following the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet Afghanistan invasion.855 The 
Sultanate proposed “the setting up of air reconnaissance patrols, electronic 
monitoring equipment on both sides of the Hormuz waterway, and a fleet of 
barges and Gulf patrol ships.”856 According to Oman’s vision, the new to be 
established Gulf defence force should consist of approximately 75,000 men and 
be base primarily in Oman. In order to not eliminate any chance for an Iranian 
participation, the Omani proposal did not address the domestic security 
problems Tehran’s actions caused in the Arab Gulf monarchies.857 However, an 
Omani diplomatic mission to promote the security plan was aborted due to the 
plan’s rejection by all other Gulf states. The greatest opposition to Oman’s 
proposal was voiced by Iraq. Iraqi officials paid visits to the regimes in Kuwait 
and Manama to ensure their opposition to the Omani plan. The Al Thawra 
newspaper, the Iraqi Baath party’s mouthpiece, rejected Oman’s plan as “a new 
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imperialist alliance.”858 To the Iraqi regime, Oman’s proposal “was suspect from 
the very beginning, because the sultan had a well-known preference for closely 
cooperating with the West in security matters.”859 Having failed to get any 
support for its security plan, Oman made bilateral arrangements with the United 
States. The two states concluded a framework agreement according to which 
the U.S. armed forces would be allowed access to certain Omani air force and 
navy installations in case of a regional confrontation and upon invitation by the 
Omani government. The agreement, which was finalised in June 1980, also 
provided for an increased supply of U.S. military equipment as well as U.S. 
upgrading of Oman’s military infrastructure. In addition, the United States held 
out the prospect of an economic aid programme that would benefit the Omani 
population.860 All remaining Arab Gulf states rejected the agreement, with the 
greatest opposition being uttered by Iraq.861 
Four months earlier, on February 8, 1980, the Iraqi regime had put forward a 
Gulf security plan, significantly different from Oman’s earlier proposal. Much 
more abstract and broader in scope, and clearly excluding Iran, the National 
Charter for the Arab States “stressed non-alignment, the peaceful resolution of 
problems between Arab states, Arab mutual defense, adherence to interna-
tional law, and Arab economic integration.”862 In what could be interpreted as a 
warning to Oman, the National Charter’s first article stated, 
“The presence in the Arab homeland of any foreign troops or military 
forces shall be rejected and no facilities for the use of Arab territory shall 
be extended to them in any form or under any pretext or cover. Any Arab 
regime that fails to comply with this principle shall be proscribed and 
boycotted both economically and politically as well as politically opposed 
by all available means.”863 
Having close relations with the United States, being distrustful of Iraq, and 
preferring a solution that involved Iran, Oman became the only Arab Gulf 
monarchy that did not express immediate support for the Iraqi proposal.864 On 
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May 27, prior to the official conclusion of the U.S.-Oman Military Access 
Agreement, Oman’s Foreign Minister Qays Al Zawawi paid a visit to Iraq. Al 
Zawawi tried to prevent a further deterioration of the already troubled Omani-
Iraqi relations. Upon arrival, the Omani foreign minister stated his country’s 
desire “to initiate cooperation with Iraq and to ‘remove any misunderstanding 
that might have arisen as a result of certain political opinions.’”865 Although he 
later qualified his statement, Al Zawawi even expressed his government’s 
support for Iraqi National Charter.866 During his visit to Baghdad the Omani 
foreign minister tried to explain to the Iraqi government that the soon to be 
concluded agreement with the United States did not establish permanent U.S. 
bases in Oman867; indeed, a central clause in the U.S.-Omani treaty stated: “no 
U.S. military units will be stationed in Oman, nor will the U.S. government seek 
to do so.”868 However, the Omani argumentation did not convince the Iraqi 
government.869 
In general, Omani-Iraqi relations were somewhat strained. Despite the gradual 
rapprochement with Baghdad after 1975, Iraq’s support for radical forces in the 
Gulf in general and the Dhofar rebels in particular was etched on the Sultan’s 
mind. Moreover, Oman’s approval of Egypt’s separate peace treaty with Israel 
along with Muscat’s rejection to abrogate relations with Cairo antagonised the 
Iraqi regime.870 
Following a meeting between Sultan Qaboos and President Saddam Hussein at 
the Arab League Amman Summit in November 1980, Omani-Iraqi relations 
showed considerable improvement. Anxious to enter into closer relations with 
the Sultanate – the Iran-Iraq War had reached a stalemate and Iraq was in 
need of political support –, the Baath regime withdrew its diplomatic recognition 
of the radical PFLO and, in March 1981, expelled the organisation’s 
representative from Baghdad. Around the same time, Iraqi Foreign Minister 
Tariq Aziz proclaimed that Iraq’s previous policy of striving for domination in the 
Gulf had been replaced by a desire for cooperation. Nonetheless, while 
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tensions between Oman and Iraq subsided and high-level delegations visited 
each other’s countries over the next years, bilateral relations did not become 
particularly close.871 
In the early phase of the Iran-Iraq War, Oman took a cautious pro-Iraqi stance. 
The Sultanate initially gave the Iraqi armed forces permission to use Omani 
bases in missions to reconquer the occupied UAE islands. Reports in this 
respect vary: the Omani government only confirmed the landing of two Iraqi 
transport planes in the initial days of the war; another report claims the 
assembling of Iraqi helicopters and troops in Oman.872 Following its initial siding 
with Iraq, Oman took a neutral stand in the war. This was also attributable to a 
“near-clash between the Omani and Iranian navy” in late 1980.873 Nonetheless, 
Oman provided military aid to Iraq by purchasing Egyptian military spare parts 
for Iraq.874 
Omani-Iranian relations deteriorated during the first three years of the war. In 
protest to Iran’s rejection of Arab calls for a ceasefire Oman recalled its chargé 
d’affaires in October 1982875 and, soon thereafter, gave the Iraqi government a 
symbolic $10 million in war support. Oman’s financial contribution to Iraq’s war 
effort was met by explicit Iraqi appreciation.876 In marked contrast to later 
statements in which the Sultan expressed his country’s desire for friendly 
relations with Iran, Qaboos stated in January 1983 Newsweek interview in 
unusually strong words 
“They [Iran] are going to cause problems because they are going to use 
subversive mechanisms in the area, and that is going to create some 
instability […] But we are very determined to prevent them from 
threatening, intimidating or overthrowing the present government.”877 
                                            
871 Compare Kechichian, Oman, p. 110. 
872 Nonneman, “Gulf States,” p. 174. 
873 Ibid, p. 176. 
874 Kechichian, Oman, p. 111, fn 113. For another motivation behind Oman’s facilitating of 
indirect Egyptian-Iraqi arms deals, see Chapter 4. 
875 Diplomatic relations had already before been temporarily abrogated. David Menashri, “Iran,” 
in Colin Legum, Haim Shaked, and Daniel Dishon (eds.), Middle East Contemporary Survey, 
Volume Five: 1980-81 (New York and London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982), pp. 521-77, 
p. 565. 
876 Kechichian, Oman, p. 103. 
877 Cited in ibid. 
  237
In July of the same year, an Omani diplomat gave a strong reply to Tehran’s 
threat to close the Strait of Hormuz: 
“The Strategic Straits of Hormuz is Omani territory and neither Iran nor 
any other country has the right to interfere in Oman’s internal affairs [...] 
[We] will not accept this nor allow it to occur.”878 
However, Omani-Iranian relations recovered within a matter of months. In 
March 1984, Sultan Qaboos sent “a cable of greetings to Iranian President, ‘Ali 
Khameneh’i, on the occasion of the Persian New Year, whishing ‘prosperity and 
stability to the friendly Iranian people’.”879 Over the following months several 
messages were exchanged between the two countries.880 
Early on, Oman had a great interest in a termination of the war as it feared the 
consequences of continued fighting. Expressing his concerns, Sultan Qaboos 
stated in an interview in November 1983, 
“In any situation, there is the possibility of hostilities getting out of hand. 
That’s why I believe every possible step–on the national, regional and 
international level–should be taken to stop the [Iran-Iraq] war. I 
understand from the Iranian declarations that Iran will not follow through 
its threats with steps on the ground unless all its oil facilities are crippled 
or destroyed. In such a situation, the Iranians will have nothing to lose. I 
believe too that the Iraqis are wise enough to evaluate what they are 
doing.”881 
Since the very first days of the GCC’s existence, the Omani regime had 
advocated military integration among the six Arab Gulf monarchies. In the war’s 
fifth year, Oman’s position changed due to the Sultanate’s concern that Iran 
would consider any form of GCC military pact to be directed against them. In 
April 1985, Sultan Qaboos told the Egyptian weekly magazine Al-Mussawar, 
“To be perfectly frank, I say that here in Muscat we do not believe it to be 
in the interest of security in the Gulf that Iran feels we intend to establish 
an Arab military pact that will always be hostile to it, or that we are about 
to form a joint force, whose main task is to fight Iran[…] There is no 
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alternative to peaceful coexistence between Arabs and Persians in the 
end, and there is no alternative to a minimum of accord in the region.”882 
It seems safe to assume that the Sultan’s change of hearts was based on the 
assessment that “Oman would be better protected by his taking a conciliatory 
tone towards Iran, rather than through total solidarity with more pro-Iraqi GCC 
states such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.”883 With very little effect of the war felt 
in the Sultanate, the Omani government aligned its policy towards Iran in due 
consideration of the fact that it would have to deal permanently with Iran as its 
neighbouring country. Hence, a conciliatory policy towards Tehran would be an 
investment in the future. Along these lines, Sultan Qaboos adopted a pointedly 
neutral position in the war and initiated attempts to mediate between the two 
contestants. A marked example for the Sultan’s publicly expressed objective 
view on the war was his opening speech to the 1985 GCC Summit in Muscat.884 
Moreover, Oman did not condemn the search-and-seizure operations Iran 
conducted in both the Gulf and the Arabian Sea; more than that, Omani Under-
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Haytham Ibn Tariq, even publicly “asserted that, 
under international law, Iran had the right to stop and search ships since it was 
in a state of war.”885 In February 1986, Oman publicly condemned Iran’s capture 
of the Faw peninsula but soon reverted to its previous neutral stance.886 Even 
after the incident at the hajj in July 1987, Oman adhered to the largest extent to 
its neutrality. Only one month later, when Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati paid 
a visit to Muscat, the Omani regime “labeled Iran a source of pride for the Gulf 
(even while supporting Kuwait’s right to reflag).”887 In both the GCC and the 
Arab League, Oman backed communiqués and summit resolutions that 
condemned Iran; however, the Sultanate made repeated efforts to moderate the 
organisations statements.888 Two prominent examples were the Arab League 
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foreign ministers’ communiqué in August 1987 and the December 1987 GCC 
summit resolution; in both cases Oman together with the UAE tried to mitigate 
anti-Iranian warnings.889 In September 1987, speaking before the UN General 
Assembly, the Omani foreign minister declared his government’s objection 
against the proposed anti-Iranian sanctions.890 
In the course of 1987, Omani-Iraqi relations suffered under Sultan Qaboos’ 
repeated reiterations of his country’s interest in friendly relations with Iran 
despite Iran’s rejection to agree to Security Council Resolution 598. Baghdad 
was particularly angered about the Sultan’s statement in late 1987, when he 
emphasised that not Iran but also Iraq should abide by the ceasefire order.891 
Sultan Qaboos considered these statements necessary in his attempt to bring 
about a ceasefire and restore stability in the Gulf; only by taking a neutral stand 
would Oman be accepted as mediator in Tehran’s eyes and secure friendly 
relations with Iran for the future. In the end, Qaboos’ strategy panned out. In 
1987, there were several high-level contacts between Oman and Iran, Oman’s 
support for the reflagging operation did not have any negative repercussions on 
its relations with Iran, and Omani mediation efforts were successful when 
Muscat arranged the repatriation of Iranian soldiers that had been captured by 
the U.S. military.892 Having called for and worked towards the termination of the 
war for several years, the Omani regime was very relieved when Iran finally 
accepted the ceasefire on June 20, 1988; both the Omani government and 
press praised Iran’s decision.893 
3.5 From the End of the Iran-Iraq War to the Invasion of Kuwait 
The ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War caused great relief in all Arab Gulf 
monarchies. The longest interstate war of the 20th Century had had very 
negative effects on both their foreign security and their domestic and economic 
stability. Hence, as Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal stated at a GCC 
Ministerial summit shortly after the ceasefire, it was their predominant interest 
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“to see the war end in a comprehensive peace agreement and to see security, 
stability, and peace return to our region.”894 
However, the potential resumption of Iranian-Iraqi fighting was not the Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ only concern. First, they had realised over the previous eight years 
that their political influence on the two belligerents was very limited. Throughout 
the entire war they had made considerable attempts to mediate a ceasefire, but 
repeatedly failed; even financial incentives, their most powerful foreign policy 
tool, had not led to success. Second, the war had revealed their striking military 
inferiority in comparison to Iran and Iraq; a fact that became increasingly 
worrisome as, upon conclusion of the war, Iraq’s military power had greatly 
amplified.895 Against this background, the GCC states made efforts to enter into 
closer “strategic, military, and security coordination” with Egypt.896 Third, with 
the war having come to a close, the Arab Gulf monarchies were concerned that 
Iraq might refocus on its revolutionary and hegemonic ambitions towards the 
Arabian Peninsula. Fourth, the oil glut of the 1980s had greatly reduced the 
Arab Gulf monarchies’ previous economic strength. Nonetheless, it could be 
expected that Saddam Hussein would demand significant financial support for 
the reconstruction of Iraq.897 
Against this background the Arab Gulf monarchies made attempts to mediate 
an Iranian-Iraqi peace agreement, improve relations with Tehran, and maintain 
friendly relations with Baghdad. 
Leading the GCC mediating efforts towards a peace agreement were Bahrain, 
the GCC’s rotational chairman in 1989, and to a larger degree Oman, the 
organisation’s president in 1990. The latter had the best relations with Tehran 
and was therefore predestined for the task.898 Within the framework of the GCC, 
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the Arab Gulf monarchies made great efforts to take a balanced position and 
reiterated the necessity of “a just peace that takes into consideration the 
legitimate rights of both parties.”899 
Rapprochement with Iran 
The Arab Gulf monarchies made efforts to improve their relations with Iran both 
within the scope of the GCC and on a bilateral basis. GCC officials stressed 
their commonalities with Iran based on neighbourhood, common history and 
culture as well as a common interest in Gulf stability. The Arab Gulf monarchies’ 
desire to reintegrate Iran in a subregional multilateral framework was 
encouraged by a turn towards more pragmatism in Iran’s foreign policy, 
particularly following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1989.900 As early 
as in November 1988, this change in Iranian attitude became obvious, when 
majlis speaker Rafsanjani blamed the Iranian lack of “tactfulness” in relations 
with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for the two states’ support of Iraq; shortly 
afterwards, Rafsanjani remarked that from the Iranian perspective there were 
“no obstacles” to an improvement in relations with the Arab Gulf monarchies. 
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Besharati also expressed his hope to enter into 
a new era of relations, stating “bygones are bygones; we should think of the 
future.”901 
Saudi Arabia 
During the first two post-war years, Saudi-Iranian relations fluctuated between 
rapprochement and overt hostility. Prior to the ceasefire, the controversy over 
the quota for Iranian pilgrims had led to the abrogation of diplomatic relations, 
Iranian boycott of the hajj, and massive anti-Saudi propaganda from Tehran. 
After the war, Riyadh sought an easing of bilateral tensions: in October, King 
Fahd ordered the local media to cease anti-Iranian commentary; shortly 
afterwards, at a meeting of Muslim information ministers in Jidda, the King said 
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that he “would have loved to have seen [his] Iranian brothers here today;”902 
and in December, Riyadh and Tehran began negotiations on Saudi 
compensation for the bereaved of the Iranians that had died during the 1987 
hajj incident. Iran also stated its readiness to “overcome the great 
misunderstanding between us.”903 
In the first two months of 1989, conflict arose inter alia due to failure to reach a 
compromise on the compensation issue, disagreement on Afghanistan, and the 
probable involvement of Iranian government officials in attacks on Saudi 
diplomats abroad. Relations temporarily improved through direct meetings in 
London as well as Omani and Pakistani mediation. At the OIC foreign ministers 
meeting in Riyadh in March, both states adopted a compromising position on 
controversial questions. Subsequently, friendly statements were issued by 
Tehran and Riyadh. However, this rapprochement was short-lived. In April, 
particularly the resurgence of controversy over the quota for Iranian pilgrims led 
to a renewed deterioration of bilateral ties, the resumption of mutual media 
propaganda, and Tehran’s boycott of the 1989 hajj.904 
Another cautious improvement in relations following Khomeini’s death came to 
a sudden end in mid-September: Tehran was enraged when the Saudi 
authorities executed 16 Kuwaiti Shiites that had planted bombs in Mecca during 
that year’s hajj and publicised the perpetrators’ confessions that revealed 
Iranian involvement in the incident.905 Over the next months, Saudi-Iranian 
relations remained hostile: the Saudi regime blamed Iran for 
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“seeking to dominate the Arab countries of the Gulf, planting agents 
disguised as diplomats, attacking embassies, hijacking airplanes, and 
intimidating pilgrims in Mecca, all on behalf of Satanic goals.”906 
Tehran in turn denounced Riyadh for defying God’s command by limiting the 
number of Iranian pilgrims allowed to fulfill their Muslim duties and rejected the 
quota of 150,000. 
In April, relations seemed to improve when Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Besharati became the first Iranian official to visit Riyadh since the abrogation of 
diplomatic relations in 1988. However, subsequent secret talks failed to produce 
a compromise and both parties blamed each other for this failure. Riyadh had 
apparently been willing to increase the quota of Iranian pilgrims but rejected the 
Iranian demand to allow demonstrations during the hajj. Tehran accused 
Riyadh to be under U.S. orders to prevent devout Muslims from demonstrating 
against Israel and the United States. In the end, the disagreement could not be 
settled, prompting Iran to boycott the third hajj in a row. Riyadh’s provision of 
large-scale humanitarian aid in response to an earthquake in northern Iran 
could not mend fences. 
Following the accidental death of 1,426 pilgrims during the hajj, Saudi-Iranian 
relations deteriorated even further. Both the Iranian government and media 
emphasised Riyadh’s incompetence to oversee the hajj and reiterated earlier 
demands for all-Islamic jurisdiction over the holy sites.907 Some Iranian media 
sources went as far as to accuse the Saudi regime of having committed “a 
premeditated massacre.”908 The Saudi reaction was equally denunciatory of the 
Iranian regime.909 Hence, in July 1990, Saudi-Iranian relations had made full 
circle and were as hostile as they were in the final phase of the war. 
Kuwait 
Following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the highly strained Kuwaiti-Iranian 
relations began to improve, although rather slowly. The Kuwaiti regime was 
interested in an Iranian reduction of subversive activities in the Emirate, while 
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Tehran hoped to improve its standing in the Arab world by entering into more 
cooperative ties with Kuwait. In September 1988, a Kuwaiti diplomatic 
delegation re-established the Kuwaiti embassy in Tehran, which had been 
abandoned in 1987; in this context, Kuwaiti State Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Usaymi stated, “We want to forget the past.”910 A month later, Iranian Foreign 
Minister Velayati paid a visit to Kuwait. 
In March and May 1989, bilateral relations were burdened by the seizure of two 
Kuwaiti ships through the Iranian Revolutionary Guard911; the vessels were 
released following State Minister Usaymi’s attendance at Khomeini’s funeral in 
June. In September, both Kuwait’s detention of a leading Shiite cleric and its 
acquiescing to the execution of its Shiite citizens in Saudi Arabia provoked 
Iranian criticism. However, despite these incidents, both states continued to be 
interested in an improvement of relations and in late September Iran sent an 
ambassador to Kuwait, the first since the revolution.912 Nonetheless, Kuwait 
apparently continued to be concerned about Tehran’s contacts to Shiite 
underground organisations in the Arab Gulf monarchies.913 
Kuwait’s interest in a rapprochement with Iran increased once the conflict with 
Iraq had intensified; it was essential to Kuwait that Iran supported the Emirate’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. In July 1990, a visit of Iranian Foreign 
Minister Velayati to Kuwait was praised by both sides as an important step 
towards mutual understanding and cooperation. Subsequently, Kuwait sent an 
ambassador to Tehran and the “resumption of shipping, flights, and commercial 
activities […] was described as ‘imminent.’”914 
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Bahrain 
In September 1988, the Bahraini foreign minister met his Iranian counterpart at 
the United Nations in New York, where they discussed the implementation of 
the ceasefire. Two months later, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Besharati paid 
a visit to Bahrain for discussions on the improvement of bilateral relations. 
Subsequently, Iran posted a chargé d’affaires in Manama. However, Bahraini-
Iranian relations remained burdened by Iran’s previous intensive anti-Bahraini 
propaganda and subversive activities in the island state. Hence, improvement in 
bilateral relations was rather slow and cautious from Bahrain’s side.915 In this 
respect, Bahraini Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman stated: “It is important that 
good intentions be shown clearly […] time alone can reveal good intentions and 
with the lapse of time, relations [with Iran] will gradually improve.”916 
Qatar 
Following the ceasefire, the Qatari government expressed its hopes for an 
improvement in bilateral relations with Iran. In the summer of 1988, Qatar 
received acting Iranian Foreign Minister Besharati. During the first months of 
1989, the Qatari-Iranian rapprochement continued with Iranian state visits and 
talks about increased economic and cultural relations. However, in June 1989, 
Iran claimed a third of the Qatari offshore “North Field” and announced to pump 
its share of natural gas once it had determined the reserves’ exact dimension. 
In an attempt to placate Iran, the Qatari government refrained from commenting 
on Iran’s claim and subsequently made particular efforts to stress the “good 
neighborliness and Muslim brotherhood” that characterised bilateral relations.917 
UAE 
UAE-Iranian relations had been comparatively good throughout the war due to 
the UAE’s largely neutral stance and the two states’ close economic ties. In the 
post-war period, relations improved further. The year 1989 saw several state 
                                                                                                                                
Contemporary Survey, Volume XIV: 1990 (Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview 
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visits and the establishment of new air routes.918 Otherwise, the UAE made 
attempts to contribute to the stabilisation of international relations in the Gulf. 
For one thing, the Emirates tried to convince Iran of the need to conduct 
relations with the Arab Gulf monarchies “based on good intentions.”919 
Moreover, Sheikh Zayid’s suggestion to establish an Islamic common market 
was meant to include Iran in a multilateral framework. In order to not antagonise 
Tehran, the UAE refrained from taking sides in the conflictual Saudi-Iranian 
relations or other disputes involving Iran.920 In early July 1989, apparently out of 
concern for Gulf security, Dubai intercepted canisters of raw material for 
mustard gas destined for Iran and sent them back to their source of origin in 
India.921  
Disagreement arose in oil pricing policy. While Iran was interested in a price 
raise, the UAE rejected its assigned quotas and overproduced, thus provoking a 
further slump.922  
Oman 
Among the Arab Gulf monarchies Oman was most active in mediating between 
Iran and Iraq as well as Saudi Arabia and Iran. This was made possible by 
Muscat’s friendly relations with Tehran. From August 1988 onwards, these 
relations further improved. 
Tehran repeatedly expressed its appreciation for Oman’s balanced stance 
during the war. In October 1988, Omani-Iranian diplomatic relations were 
upgraded to the ambassadorial level with the arrival in Muscat of the first Iranian 
ambassador since the revolution; Oman’s ambassador to Tehran arrived the 
following September. Moreover, economic ties considerably improved. In 
October 1988, the Omani oil minister visited Tehran; subsequently, the two 
states consulted on oil-pricing policy and in 1990, they agreed to proceed with 
the joint development of the shared offshore Hinjam oil field. In March 1989, on 
the occasion of the first Iranian heavy industry exhibition in Oman, a bilateral 
                                            
918 Uzi Rabi, “United Arab Emirates,” in Ami Ayalon (ed.), Middle East Contemporary Survey, 
Volume XIII: 1989 (Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 672-
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919 Ibid, p. 675. 
920 Ibid, pp. 675f. 
921 Los Angeles Times, July 3, 1989. 
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memorandum on the establishment of joint industrial and commercial 
companies was signed. In August, Oman’s role in Iran’s post-war reconstruction 
was discussed during the visit of an Omani delegation to Iran. The following 
June, Oman and Iran established a joint industrial and economic commission 
and signed an economic cooperation and coordination framework agreement. 
In June 1990, the Iranian-Omani rapprochement became apparent in the 
military field when two Iranian destroyers visited the Omani port of Qubus and 
the Iranian Naval Academy commander was given an official reception by the 
Omani minister of state for foreign affairs. Moreover, it was reported that the two 
states were negotiating a naval security agreement.923 
Towards the Invasion of Kuwait 
As mentioned above, the Arab Gulf monarchies’ concerns about Iraq’s 
hegemonic ambitions resurfaced following the end of the Iran-Iraq War. In the 
first post-war months, Saddam Hussein made efforts to allay these 
apprehensions by emphasising repeatedly Iraq’s desire to build Arab unity 
based on trust among Arab states. Indeed, relations initially remained cordial 
with Iraq: high-ranking visits were exchanged and Iraq’s historic claims on 
Kuwait took a backseat.924 However, Baghdad’s hegemonic ambitions soon 
revived with 
“Iraq now claim[ing] that its victory over Iran – described by Baghdad as 
the first Arab victory in modern history – highlighted Iraq’s role in 
safeguarding the entire Arab world from a catastrophe and, by 
implication, entitled Iraq to a leading role in the Arab world.”925 
Having saved them from Iran and being able to do so again due to its military 
strength and the Arab world’s largest arms industry, Baghdad now expected the 
Arab Gulf monarchies’ gratitude, political support in its ongoing conflicts with 
Iran and Syria, and recognition as their leader. In this context, Iraq requested to 
be admitted to the GCC, clearly with the ambition to dominate it. When this was 
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denied, Iraq founded an alternative regional organisation, the Arab Cooperation 
Council (ACC), together with Egypt, Jordan, and North Yemen.926 
Meanwhile, as negotiations with Iran had stalled, Iraq renewed its pressure on 
Kuwait regarding a lease of Warba and Bubiyan and began to make implicit 
threats. Kuwait’s decision to build a city on Bubiyan Island caused serious 
friction in bilateral relations. A visit by the Kuwaiti Crown Prince and the 
Defence Minister to Iraq in early February and May 1989 respectively failed to 
reach an understanding.927 
These developments alarmed the Arab Gulf monarchies that now were 
particularly eager to improve relations with Baghdad.928 In late March 1989, 
King Fahd visited Iraq – the first visit by a Saudi King since 1957. The timing of 
Fahd’s visit, only weeks after the creation of the ACC, demonstrated Riyadh’s 
concerns about Iraq’s intensified regional ambitions; the composition of the 
ACC was particularly worrisome for Riyadh as Egypt was an important Saudi 
ally and counterweight to Iraq929 and North Yemen was considered to be within 
Saudi Arabia’s sphere of influence. During the visit, King Fahd and Saddam 
Hussein concluded a non-aggression and non-interference agreement; this, too, 
was clear indication of Saudi anxiety and a sign that the close war alliance had 
been replaced by a rather distrustful and uneasy relationship. Moreover, an 
Iraqi announcement that Riyadh would contribute to the post-war reconstruction 
of Basra seems to suggest that the Saudi regime had to give Baghdad financial 
incentive to conclude the agreement. Further proof of Saudi concern about 
Iraq’s ambitions was Riyadh’s reluctance to deliver its earlier promise to assist 
with the reconstruction of the Osirak nuclear reactor, Israel had destroyed in 
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June 1981. King Fahd made his government’s support conditional on both the 
purely civilian purpose of the project and its international supervision.930 
In December, Bahrain had been making efforts to strengthen its relations with 
Iraq and signed a similar non-aggression and non-interference pact with 
Baghdad.931 A year earlier, the Bahraini prime minister had made a statement 
indicative of the Emirate’s concern about Iraq’s post-war power position. In mid-
December 1988, Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman had told the Kuwaiti newspaper al-
Siyasa “Iraq triumphed […] and we cooperated with it and helped it achieve this 
victory […] Iraq will not forget its brothers’ assistance.”932 
In early 1990, Iraq’s policy began to adopt an increasingly aggressive tone. As 
Gause argues, Saddam Hussein had become convinced 
“that domestic, regional and international forces were working against 
him, to the extent that the survival of his regime was at stake. […] His 
response to this perceived threat was a much more bellicose stance 
toward what he saw as his unfaithful allies – the United States and the 
Gulf monarchies, particularly Kuwait – and a return to anti-Israeli rhetoric 
to mobilize regional support.”933 
General Wafiq Al Samarai, then chief of the Iraqi general military intelligence, 
later reported that Saddam Hussein had told him in March 1990: 
“America is coordinating with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait in a 
conspiracy against us. They are trying to reduce the price of oil to affect 
our military industries and our scientific research, to force us to reduce 
the size of our armed forces.”934 
Indeed, the low oil price935 prevented a badly needed economic upswing in Iraq, 
having a negative effect on domestic stability. Hence, Iraq was calling for higher 
oil prices in OPEC. In contrast, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE had an 
interest in the preservation of the current price and the latter two even wanted 
to increase their production quotas. In fact, the UAE had rejected its assigned 
quota of 1.1 million barrels per day (b/d) for the first half of 1990 and produced 
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almost double the amount.936 Kuwait, too, was overproducing. In March, Iraq 
failed in its attempts to win the three Arab Gulf producers’ agreement for a rise 
in the oil reference price both in a tripartite meeting with Riyadh and Kuwait and 
in an OPEC ministerial meeting. Subsequently, continued overproduction by the 
UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and others led to a further oil price drop. In early 
May, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE along with other OPEC members 
agreed to reduce their production rates. However, as these production cuts 
were never fully implemented, the oil price remained low. As a consequence, on 
May 30, in his closing speech to the Arab League Summit in Baghdad, Saddam 
Hussein accused the overproducers – without calling them by name – of 
conducting “a kind of war against Iraq.”937 After further UAE-Kuwaiti demands 
for higher production quotas, Iraq began to attack them directly. To prevent a 
further intensification of tensions, Saudi Arabia intervened and pressured Abu 
Dhabi and Kuwait to concede. At a meeting of Arab Gulf oil producers in Jidda 
on July 10, Kuwait and the UAE pledged to stick to their quotas and Saudi 
Arabia agreed to reduce its production rate; the next day the oil went up almost 
one dollar.938 
Saudi Arabia’s intervention was exemplarily for Riyadh’s appeasement policy 
towards Iraq in the months before the invasion of Kuwait. The Saudi regime was 
cautious not to antagonise Iraq as it feared its militarily far superior neighbour; 
hence, they gave Baghdad rhetorical support, e.g. when Iraq executed a British 
journalist accused of espionage in March and when Saddam Hussein 
threatened Israel with destruction in April. Moreover, despite the obvious 
disunity of interests a joint statement following Saddam Hussein’s meeting with 
King Fahd in March “read as if Saudi Arabia and Iraq were the closest allies.”939 
The Saudi appeasement strategy was most obvious when Riyadh allowed 
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Saddam Hussein to dictate policies in OPEC, one of Saudi Arabia’s main 
spheres of influence.940 
Since 1989, Kuwait had also made efforts to appease Baghdad in several 
fields: first, Kuwait assured Iraq of their dependability in time of need; Kuwait 
would support Iraq again as they had done during the Iran-Iraq War. Second, 
the Emirate tried to improve relations with Iraq by engaging in joint infrastructure 
development projects; this was successful in reducing tensions in the second 
half of 1989. During this time, the Kuwaiti Emir was decorated by Saddam 
Hussein for Kuwait’s support during the war.941 Third, Kuwait was supportive of 
all efforts to bring about an Iranian-Iraqi settlement; an important reason for that 
was certainly the hope that with reconciliation between the two states, Iraq 
would take pressure of Kuwait with respect to the islands. Fourth, the Emirate 
gave Iraq rhetoric support, e.g. with regard to Iraq’s perception of an imminent 
Israeli threat and the execution of the above-mentioned journalist.942 
Nonetheless, Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations deteriorated rapidly due to several issues: 
first, the above-mentioned disagreement over oil prices and Kuwaiti overpro-
duction; second, Kuwait’s denial of an Iraqi request for $10 billion in emergency 
aid – Kuwait apparently made a counteroffer of $500 million over three years943; 
third, Kuwait’s rejection to forgive Iraq’s war debts of roughly $14-15 billion944; 
Kuwaiti refusal of an Iraqi defence cooperation agreement that “would have 
turned Kuwait into an Iraqi base;”945 Iraqi rejection of the 1963 border agree-
ment and accusations of Kuwaiti border violations and oil theft; and reiterated 
Iraqi demands for the control over Warba and Bubiyan.946 
Although Kuwait and the UAE cut their oil production according to the Jidda 
compromise, Iraqi actions became increasingly aggressive. On July 15, in a 
public letter to the Arab League’s Secretary-General, Iraqi Foreign Minister 
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Tariq Aziz accused Kuwait of “hav[ing] encroached on Iraq and systematically, 
deliberately, and continuously harmed it.” In particular, he accused Kuwait of 
having both “set up military establishments, police posts, oil installations, and 
farms on Iraqi territory” during the Iran-Iraq War and stolen oil worth $2.4 billion 
from the Iraqi Rumaila oil field. Moreover, he accused Kuwait and the UAE of 
having “implemented an intentional scheme to glut the oil market,” costing Iraq 
$1 billion per year.947 The next day, Saddam Hussein threatened implicitly to 
use military force against Kuwait and the UAE, which were stabbing a “poisoned 
dagger” into Iraq’s back.948 Meanwhile, Iraq began moving troops towards the 
Kuwaiti border.949 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE reacted differently to Iraq’s verbal 
aggression. Kuwait, convinced that there was still sufficient room for negoti-
ations, tried to appease Iraq and called for Arab mediation.950 Saudi Arabia was 
alarmed by the growing tensions. However, Riyadh had a deep conviction that 
Saddam Hussein would not attack Kuwait; the notion of one Arab state invading 
another was simply inconceivable. Consequently, the Saudi regime misread 
Iraq’s aggressive posture as a strategic move to get the greatest possible 
concessions from Kuwait.951 Egyptian President Mubarak’s meeting with 
Saddam Hussein on July 24 seemed to confirm that there was no imminent 
danger to Kuwait’s integrity.952 
Among the Arab Gulf monarchies’ leaders, only Sheikh Zayid assessed the 
situation differently, taking more seriously the Iraqi threats issued against his 
country. The UAE president was reportedly very concerned about the 
vulnerability of the UAE’s offshore oil installations to Iraqi long-range air-to-
surface capabilities. Soon after the publication of Tariq Aziz’ memorandum, the 
                                            
947 “Letter to Arab League Secretary General Chedli Klibi from Tariq ’Aziz, Deputy Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister of Iraq, on 15 July 1990,” reprinted in Iraq Speaks: Documents on 
the Gulf Crisis, compiled by Fred Moore (Darby, PA: Diane Publishing, 1993) pp. 5-8. 
948 Bengio, “Iraq” (1990), p. 400. 
949 Gause, International Relations, p. 98. 
950 Goldberg and Kostiner, “Kuwait,” p. 510. 
951 Personal interview with Charles W. Freeman, U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 1989-
1992, in Washington, D.C. in April 2001; phone interview with David L. Mack, U.S. ambassador 
to the UAE form 1986-1989 and U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs 
from 1990-1993, in April 2001; and personal interview with Dr. Judith S. Yaphe, former senior 
analyst on Near East Persian Gulf issues in the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian 
Analysis, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, in Washington, D.C. in April 2011.    
952 Saddam Hussein had given President Mubarak his clear commitment to not invade Kuwait. 
Compare Interview with President Mubarak, New York Times, November 8, 1990, p. A14. 
  253
U.S. Government had offered the Arab Gulf monarchies military support. Only 
Sheikh Zayid accepted the offer and requested U.S. refuelling capacity so that 
his jets could conduct round-the-clock air patrol over the offshore oil 
installations. In order to not overly antagonise Iraq, U.S. support – mission 
name Ivory Justice – was masked as a joint military exercise.953 
Saudi Arabia considered the U.S. involvement an unnecessary provocation of 
Iraq and tried to prevent it. In the days leading to the invasion, the Kuwaiti 
government even requested the U.S. Ambassador to stay away from the foreign 
ministry as to not give the impression that Kuwait was asking for U.S. support. 
On the eve of the invasion, after the Jidda meeting between Iraqi and Kuwaiti 
representatives had failed, Kuwait rejected a final U.S. offer to send a deterrent 
signal in direction of Baghdad. At around 2 am the next morning Iraq invaded 
Kuwait.954 
3.6 Chapter Conclusion 
During the entire timeframe under review, it was the Arab Gulf monarchies’ 
objective to shape their relations with Iran and Iraq in such a way as to realise 
the following shared fundamental policy interests: the preservation of external 
security and territorial integrity, domestic and regime stability, and economic 
prosperity as well as the attainment of a stable balance of power without the 
emergence of Iran or Iraq as subregional hegemon. Additionally, Saudi Arabia 
had a strong interest in maintaining its sphere of influence on the Arabian 
Peninsula and preserving its role as the leader of the Muslim world. 
However, despite the fact that they continuously shared largely the same 
interests, the six Arab Gulf monarchies’ individual bilateral relations with the two 
subregional powers displayed both considerable alterations over time and 
significant differences in comparison to one another. The underlying reason 
was the existence of both disparities among Arab Gulf monarchies and change 
over time with respect to a variety of factors: geostrategic position, military 
strength, the existence of military aggression, territorial claims, subversive 
activities, or ideological challenges by either Iran or Iraq, the national and 
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sectarian composition and ideological orientation of the population, and national 
economic orientation. 
At all times, the Arab Gulf monarchies formulated their policies towards Iran and 
Iraq with regard to the effects that their relations with one of these two states 
would have on their relations with the other. This was due to the fact that, over 
the period under review, Iran and Iraq were in conflict with each other, to 
varying degrees of escalation. Under these circumstances, a rapprochement 
with one of the subregional powers created the risk of retaliations by the other. 
The analysis has shown that the Arab Gulf monarchies’ relations with Iran and 
Iraq from 1971 to 1990 can be divided into several sub-periods. Following a 
trend that had already set in prior to Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf all six 
Arab Gulf monarchies maintained closer and less conflictual relations with Iran 
during most of the 1970s. This was mainly due to a greater congruity in 
interests: the Arab Gulf monarchies and the Shah’s regime shared common 
interests in the preservation of the conservative (monarchical) political order in 
their states, the containment of both Baathist ideology and Soviet influence in 
the Gulf and the greater Middle East, the maintenance of the territorial status 
quo (following the occupation of the three UAE islands), cooperative relations 
with the United States, and the security of trade routes through the Gulf and the 
Strait of Hormuz. In this context, their rapprochement with Iran was also a 
strategic response to the Arab Gulf monarchies’ perception of threat to their 
interests emanating from Iraq. 
From Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf to the 1975 Algiers Accord, Oman had 
the closest and most cordial relations with Iran among the six Arab Gulf 
monarchies. This was mainly due to Tehran’s staunch support for Sultan 
Qaboos in the intra-Omani Dhofar War. Iran’s military intervention upon Omani 
request was instrumental in defeating the rebels and stabilising the Sultan’s 
rule. Qatar and Bahrain also had close relations with Iran. After the Shah had 
given up Iran’s historic claim of Bahrain and had agreed to the emirate’s 
independence bilateral relations showed constant improvement. In the case of 
both Bahrain and Qatar, the large Iranian expatriate community promoted close 
economic ties with Iran without causing any significant frictions within the two 
societies. On the contrary, in Qatar the Iranian segment of society even seemed 
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to have contributed to regime stability following the replacement of the Emir in 
1972. UAE-Iranian relations started off conflictual due to Iran’s military 
occupation of Abu Musa and the Tunb islands. Pressure by both the local 
population and other Arab states – not least Iraq – as well as Ras al-Khaimah’s 
vehement rejection of Iran’s actions impeded initially any significant UAE-
Iranian rapprochement. However, Dubai’s markedly pro-Iranian stance, the 
need to balance the difficult relations with Saudi Arabia, the threat of Iraqi 
subversion activities, and generally wide-ranging congruity in interests with Iran 
soon led to a gradual improvement of bilateral relations between the UAE and 
Iran. Despite its concern about Iran’s nationalistic, imperialist ambitions in the 
Gulf, distaste of Iran’s de facto relations with Israel, and disagreement over oil 
policy, the Saudi regime considered close relations with Iran a strategic 
necessity. The Shah’s regime, too, was interested in close cooperation with 
Riyadh. This was attributable to joint threat perceptions regarding Iraq’s and 
PDRY policies as well as Soviet intrusion into the subregion, and similar 
concepts regarding a conservative political order and economic stability in the 
Gulf. Among Arab Gulf monarchies, Kuwait’s relations with Iran were the most 
distant. The two main reasons were the influence of Arab nationalism and 
strongly pro-Palestinian attitudes within the Kuwaiti society and paradoxically 
the highly conflictual relations with Iraq. A strong popular reaction and Iraqi 
pressure motivated the Kuwaiti regime to protest most emphatically among 
Arab Gulf monarchies against the Iranian occupation of Abu Musa and the 
Tunbs. Moreover, Iran’s hegemonic ambitions in the Gulf and its stance in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict also caused protest in the Kuwaiti population; an overt 
Kuwaiti rapprochement with Iran was therefore politically inadvisable. In this 
context, the distinct characteristics of the Kuwaiti political order with a 
comparatively influential National Assembly as a central institution for the 
formulation of the popular political will played an important role. Lastly, while the 
Kuwaiti government was in dire need for support against Iraq’s territorial claims, 
the demonstration of any meaningful cooperation with Iran would have only 
increased Iraq’s aggressive demeanour towards the Emirate. 
In contrast, all six Arab Gulf monarchies had conflictual relations with Iraq or at 
least viewed Baghdad’s Gulf policies with considerable concern. The Iraqi 
regime had nationalist ambitions for subregional hegemony and aimed at an 
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alteration of the political status quo in the Gulf. Iraqi attempts to subvert the 
monarchical regimes on the Arabian Peninsula with the ultimate objective to 
install Iraqi-style Baathist regimes showed significant similarities to revolutionary 
Iranian policies a few years later. Without any doubt, Kuwait was most 
threatened by Iraq as evidenced by the latter’s aggressive claims on Warba and 
Bubiyan islands and other parts of Kuwait’s territory. The Emirate was also the 
only Arab Gulf monarchy to be subject of repeated intrusion by the Iraqi military. 
In Oman, Iraq made active attempts to overthrow the Sultan by giving significant 
support to the Dhofar rebels. Saudi Arabia was also the target of Iraqi 
aggression: Baghdad bribed and armed Bedouins and incited them to revolt 
against the Al Saud regime, engaged in massive anti-Saudi media propaganda 
in the hopes to instigate a revolution, and provided a safe haven for Saudi 
deserters. In the case of Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE Iraq gave support to 
oppositional elements and used its trade centres “as channels for Ba‘thist 
influence.”955 
From the Algiers Accord to the Iranian Revolution the Arab Gulf monarchies 
continued to show significant similarities in their relations with Iran and Iraq. As 
was the case in the previous period, their relations with Iran were closer, more 
cooperative, and less conflictual than their ties with Iraq. The major difference to 
the pre-1975 period was, however, the notable improvement in the Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ relations with Iraq. The underlying reason for this development was 
a change in Iraqi policy, characterised by both Iraq’s rapprochement with Iran 
and its general desire for greater cooperation with all Gulf states. This 
cooperation was mostly limited to the economic field. Nonetheless, the basic 
ideological differences between Iraq and the Arab Gulf monarchies – Baathist 
vs. conservative monarchical and pro-Soviet/anti-American vs. pro-Western – 
persisted, as did Baghdad’s desire to alter the subregional status quo according 
to its ideological and nationalistic objectives; although, this was mostly pursued 
in a less aggressive fashion. In contrast, Iran continued to share fundamental 
interests with the Arab Gulf monarchies: domestic political and territorial status 
quo, security of export routes in Gulf waters and the Strait of Hormuz, 
containment of Soviet influence in the Gulf and the larger Middle East, and, 
although to different degrees, close relations with the United States. 
                                            
955 Niblock, “Iraqi Policies,” p. 145. 
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In this subperiod, among Arab Gulf monarchies, Oman continued to have the 
closest relations with Iran, on which it depended for military protection. Bahraini 
and Qatari relations with Iran also continued to be cordial and improved further 
during this period. UAE-Iranian relations, too, saw very significant improvement 
as the island issue had lost most of its significance. Saudi-Iranian relations saw 
some intermittent differences, such as in oil policy or the Iranian hegemonic 
ambitions; otherwise there was a considerable congruity in interests in Gulf, 
regional, and global matters. Kuwaiti-Iranian relations were unproblematic but 
never particularly close mostly due to the strong Arab nationalist and pro-
Palestinian influence in the Kuwaiti society. In the light of the increasing 
instability in Iran, all Arab Gulf monarchies were concerned about a potential 
overthrow of the Shah’s regime as the latter had largely served their interests. 
Meanwhile, none of the Arab Gulf monarchies had particularly close relations 
with Iraq; too great were the differences in policy objectives. Kuwait had the 
most conflictual relations with Iraq; although there was a reduction in tension 
from mid-1977 onwards, the territorial dispute remained unsolved. Oman’s 
relations with Iraq improved after Iraq ended its support for the PFLO; 
nonetheless, conflict arose over Iran’s military presence in Oman, U.S.-Omani 
relations, and Egypt’s Israel policy. Saudi-Iraqi relations also showed 
improvement but the two states’ visions of the political order in the Gulf were 
largely contradicting. While Bahrain’s, Qatar’s, and UAE relations with Iraq 
improved particularly in the economic sphere, suspicions about Iraq’s 
subversive activities prevented any meaningful political rapprochement. 
In the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, 
the Arab Gulf monarchies’ policies towards Iran and Iraq underwent 
considerable change and displayed increasing differences. This growing 
discrepancy was attributable to the different degree the Arab Gulf monarchies’ 
domestic, foreign, and economic security were affected by the alteration in 
Iranian foreign policy and the military conflict between the two subregional 
powers. 
The fall of the Shah and the advent of the Khomeini regime caused concern in 
all six Arab Gulf monarchies. They all feared negative effects on Gulf 
(economic) security and – less so in the case of Oman – a spill-over of the 
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Shiite revolution to the Arabian Peninsula. Hence, in the initial post-
revolutionary period all six states made efforts to enter into stable relations with 
the new Iranian regime. The constitution of their societies (read the number of 
disillusioned and discriminated Shiites and expatriates receptive for the ideals 
of the Khomeini movement) and the varying degree to which Iran engaged in 
subversive activities in the different states shaped decisively the development of 
individual bilateral relations. In addition, Iran’s direct challenge of Saudi Arabia’s 
role as Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and its utilisation of the hajj as a 
propaganda platform on the one hand and the mutually beneficial UAE-Iranian 
trade ties on the other, greatly affected Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE respectively. 
Following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War and particularly after the failure of 
Baghdad’s vision of a blitzkrieg, the Arab Gulf monarchies all shared the same 
basic interests and, to different degrees the same dilemma. It was in the interest 
of all six to guarantee their internal, external, and economic stability and 
security. To this end, it was their objective to see a rapid termination of the war 
and prevent both an Iranian victory and a clear-cut Iraqi triumph. For one thing, 
the continuation of the war carried the risk of territorial expansion (direct 
involvement of the Arab Gulf monarchies) and internationalisation of the war 
(involvement of the superpowers and their rivalry) as well as economic hardship 
(through the disruption of maritime trade routes). On the other hand, an Iranian 
victory would allow the Khomeini regime to export its antimonarchical Shiite 
revolution to the Sunni Arab Gulf monarchies much more vigorously. A clear-cut 
Iraqi victory, in turn, would increase Iraq’s power to export its own 
antimonarchical Baathist revolution and enforce its hegemonic ambitions in the 
Gulf. These objectives remained the same until the end of the war, the only 
exception being the deliberate internationalisation of the conflict in the light of 
the Tanker War. 
The dilemma that all Arab Gulf monarchies shared was that the need to take a 
stand in the war would ultimately alienate one of the powerful belligerents. In 
the end, their positioning in the war shaped to a large degree the Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ relations with Iran and Iraq. Eventually, the group of six was split. 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, most affected by Iranian subversion and by the war, 
and in the case of Kuwait highly sensible to Iraqi pressure, took the most 
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distinct pro-Iraqi stance. They both provided Baghdad with very significant 
political, financial, and logistic support; despite repeated attempts to prevent a 
complete deterioration of relations, their bilateral ties with Tehran were mostly 
hostile. Bahrain, which was also heavily affected by Iranian subversion, sought 
stronger relations with Iraq in the initial phase and temporarily cut relations with 
Iran in January 1982; following a temporary rapprochement with Iran, Manama 
followed increasingly an anti-Iranian and pro-Iraqi approach during the war’s 
last two and a half years. Oman, Qatar, and the UAE maintained the least 
conflictual relations with Iran and following pro-Iraqi support in the war’s initial 
phase took a largely neutral position and became most active in mediation 
attempts. 
Among all Arab Gulf monarchies, Oman had the most conflictual relations with 
Baghdad. This was due to Muscat’s repeated pro-Iranian statements, 
particularly in the war’s final years. Kuwait’s constant refusal to lease Warba 
and Bubiyan to Baghdad clouded relations with Iraq; however, Iraq’s reliance on 
Kuwait’s massive financial and logistic support prevented a significant strain in 
bilateral ties. Saudi Arabia was Iraq’s largest financial supporter; nonetheless, 
Iraqi demands for even larger grants and intermittent Saudi attempts to improve 
relations with Iran caused some friction. 
In the light of the common challenges to their interests, the Arab Gulf 
monarchies increasingly coordinated their policies in the framework of the GCC. 
Although the organisation per se did not provide any meaningful security to its 
member states, it allowed the individual states more flexibility in their foreign 
policy. The more moderate states could issue Iran-critical and pro-Iraqi 
statements on a multilateral basis, placating Iraq without endangering their 
position in Iranian eyes. At the same time, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were able 
to be indirectly involved in mediation attempts with Tehran without provoking too 
much Iraqi backlash. 
In the first two post-war years the individual Arab Gulf monarchies’ relations 
with Iran showed significant differences: while all had a basic interest in less 
conflictual and more cooperative ties with Tehran, their success in achieving 
this objective was mixed. Following the general trend during the final years of 
the war, Oman’s relations with Iran improved the most significantly. The other 
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four small GCC states witnessed a slower but still remarkable rapprochement in 
ties with Tehran. The exception was Saudi Arabia: despite intermittent 
improvements bilateral relations with Iran continued to be heavily strained 
particularly due to harsh disagreement over the hajj and Saudi control over the 
holy sites in Mecca and Medina as well as the continuation of Iranian 
sponsoring of asymmetric attacks on the Kingdom. 
The individual Arab Gulf monarchies’ relations with Iraq were all burdened by 
Iraq’s increasingly aggressive posture; however, not all GCC states were 
equally affected and they did not agree in their threat perception regarding 
Baghdad’s policy. Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman all tried to maintain solid, though 
cautious relations with Iraq. Saudi Arabia largely followed an appeasement 
policy towards its powerful neighbour. Kuwait’s relations with Iraq were the most 
strained due to both aggressive Iraqi demands for territorial, financial, and oil 
policy concessions and Baghdad’s increasing threats against the Emirate. 
Kuwait tried largely to appease Iraq but remained steadfast on the island issue 
and for a long time also on its oil overproduction. The latter aspect heavily 
burdened the UAE-Iraqi relations as well. In the end, Sheikh Zayid was the only 
GCC ruler that correctly anticipated Iraqi military aggression and upped its 
defences by involving the United States. 
In summary, the analysis has shown that the individual Arab Gulf monarchies’ 
relations with Iran and Iraq showed increasing convergence during the first two 
sub-periods (1971-75 and 1975-79). This changed in the aftermath of the 
Iranian Revolution and particularly following the Iran-Iraq War’s initial phase. In 
the final sub-period (1988-90), the smaller Arab Gulf monarchies entered into a 
rapprochement with Iran, while Saudi-Iranian relations remained highly 
conflictual; meanwhile, the Arab Gulf monarchies’ relations with Iraq ranged 
from cautious rapprochement to conflict escalation. 
Despite their progressively diverging bilateral relations with Iran and Iraq, the 
Arab Gulf monarchies increasingly coordinated their policies with respect to the 
Iran-Iraq War. The GCC framework allowed the six states a greater degree of 
flexibility in their policies: the regional organisation was used as a platform that 
enabled the neutral group issue multilateral statements critical of Iran and 
supportive of Iraq, thereby satisfying Iraqi and pan-Arab expectations without 
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causing too much friction in bilateral relations with Iran; on the other hand, the 
pro-Iraqi camp could be indirectly involved in mediation attempts with Iran. This 
increased coordination activity was the Arab Gulf monarchies’ reaction to the 
growing negative effects the Iran-Iraq War had on their fundamental policy 
interests, particularly their economic prosperity. 
Over large parts of the period under review, the Arab Gulf monarchies managed 
to offset threats to their basic interests emanating from Iran and Iraq by 
alternately appeasing and balancing the source of the threat. This was 
particularly effective during the first two sub-periods. Following the Iranian 
Revolution the new regime in Tehran made considerable attempts to destabilise 
the Arab Gulf monarchies’ domestic order. However, despite Iranian-sponsored 
subversive activities (e.g. during the hajj), the regimes in the Arab Gulf 
monarchies managed to maintain regime stability. 
During the Iran-Iraq War, the Arab Gulf monarchies’ economic prosperity was 
considerably challenged by both the Tanker War and the massive financial and 
economic support particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait granted Iraq at a time of 
low oil prices. The end of war in August 1988 was welcomed by the Arab Gulf 
monarchies; it not only alleviated the challenges to their economic interests but 
saw neither Iran nor Iraq emerging as the clear winner. 
Over the longest part of the period under review the Arab Gulf monarchies’ 
external security and territorial integrity remained intact; exceptions were 
relatively small-scale Iraqi intrusions into Kuwait’s territory in the 1970s, the 
continued Iranian occupation of the three UAE islands, and isolated Iranian 
attacks on the Arab Gulf monarchies’ territories and oil installations during the 
Iran-Iraq War. However, in August 1990, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait showed 
the limits of the Arab Gulf monarchies’ abilities to balance their military 
weakness. 
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4. THE POSITION OF THE ARAB GULF MONARCHIES IN THE ARAB-
ISRAELI CONFLICT, 1971-1990 
The Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as the necessity to position themselves publicly 
in regard to the conflict presented a particular challenge to the Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ external security and regime stability. In case of armed conflicts, 
they would have to expect a variety of direct and indirect security threats. Much 
more problematic, however, was the political quandary in which the Arab Gulf 
monarchies had increasingly found themselves. They had been caught between 
their common Arab-Islamic identity and their increasingly intensified relationship 
with the United States. This chapter will show how the Arab Gulf monarchies 
succeeded in reconciling two fundamental interests: they largely met the 
expectations of their own people and the demands of the more radical Arab 
states without undermining their strategically important relations with the Israel-
friendly United States. This achievement is attributed to an astute, balanced 
policy conducted by the Arab Gulf monarchies. In pursuing this policy, they did 
not achieve the resolution of the key issue. However, this cannot be seen as a 
failure of their policy but rather as an expression of their limited power. 
Moreover, I will show that the positions of the Arab Gulf monarchies as a group 
changed during the period under review from a rather confrontational to a more 
cooperative approach. In doing so, the remaining five Gulf states’ positions 
displayed a gradual convergence with the previously distinct Omani stance. The 
same applies to the perceptions of and the relations with the Palestinian 
liberation movement. 
Several general observations can be made with regard to the Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ position in the Arab-Israeli conflict during the timeframe under 
review: During the entire period, the Arab Gulf monarchies’ policy stances were 
influenced by three main factors: identity/ideology, religion, and strategic 
considerations. Both the populations and the regimes of the Arab Gulf 
monarchies share with the Palestinian people as well as the populations and 
regimes of the Arab front states the feature of Arabness, the quality of being 
Arab. This commonality created a border-transcending feeling of brotherhood 
leading to a strong identification with the plight of the Palestinians, the Arabs 
that fled from war and Israeli occupation, and not least the Palestinian national 
cause. Hence, both the populations and regimes of the Arab Gulf monarchies 
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came to see the Arab-Israeli conflict as a common Arab struggle with the clear 
objective to liberate occupied Arab lands and to establish a Palestinian state. In 
this context, the notion of Arab nationalism and that of Arab identity had a 
mutually-enforcing relationship, such that the strengthening of one lead to the 
strengthening of the other. In Kuwait, where Arab nationalism was most 
prevalent in the minds of the people and the regime alike, this transnational 
feeling of Arab brotherhood and identification with Palestinian grievances and 
with the wider Arab cause in the confrontation with Israel was strongest. This 
effect was intensified further by the large Palestinian Diasporas in some Arab 
Gulf monarchies; again this was particularly the case in Kuwait, where 
Palestinian influence in the media, education, and the political sector was the 
greatest. 
The fact that the majority of Arabs are Muslims while the majority of Israelis are 
Jews amplified the sense of togetherness in distinction to the non-Arab, non-
Muslim other. Israel’s occupation and subsequent annexation of East 
Jerusalem, and with it the third holiest shrine of Islam, gave the conflict a 
distinct religious element. Particularly, people and regime in Saudi Arabia, the 
cradle of Islam and home of the two holiest Mosques in the Islamic world and a 
religiously very conservative society, were infuriated by the Israeli occupation of 
East Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. In the other Arab Gulf monarchies, 
too, the view on and the aspirations regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict had 
thenceforward an intensified religious character. The clear objective in this 
regard became the recovery of Muslim control over the Al-Aqsa Mosque; the 
only aspect in which particularly the Saudi regime was not ready to make 
compromises. 
In addition, strategic considerations had a great influence on the Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ decision making process. The regimes made policy decisions 
regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict with great appreciation of their interest to 
guarantee national security, regime stability, and economic prosperity. As 
chapter 2 revealed, the Arab Gulf monarchies could be considered relatively 
weak states during the timeframe under review. Compared to their immediate 
neighbours Iran and Iraq or the regional power Egypt, the Arab Gulf monarchies 
were both militarily inferior and had far smaller populations. Their economies 
and therefore also their regime stability were heavily reliant on the export of oil 
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products. Moreover, as outlined in previous chapters, they faced considerable 
external and internal challenges to both their national security and regime 
stability: the striving for power and hegemony by subregional and regional 
powers, the latter’s interfering in the Arab Gulf monarchies’ domestic realm by 
instrumentalising identity conflicts and exploiting regime legitimacy deficits, the 
global Cold War contestation, and recurrent contradictions between popular 
expectations for foreign policy behaviour and security necessities. Due to the 
close interconnection of these domestic and foreign policy challenges, the Arab 
Gulf monarchies pursued an omnibalancing strategy, dynamically adjusting their 
policy in a constant endeavour to satisfy their varied interests. Nonetheless, 
with increasing oil export revenues, the Arab Gulf monarchies, Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait in particular, gained considerable economic power and political 
influence which to a certain degree counterbalanced their above mentioned 
weaknesses. 
Among Arab Gulf monarchies, Saudi Arabia had the greatest influence on the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and the incipient peace process. This was due to the scope 
of the Kingdom’s economic power and political influence and not least its role 
as the custodian of the two holy sites of Islam. Saudi Arabia’s influence 
increased rapidly in the early 1970s, especially during and in the aftermath of 
the 1973/74 oil crisis. To a smaller degree, the same counts for most other Arab 
Gulf monarchies. Until the 1973 October War, the latter, less so in the case of 
Kuwait, had been preoccupied with nation building and subregional politics; in 
the case of Oman, this was true for another few years. During the entire period 
under review, the Arab Gulf monarchies’ influence on the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and the nascent peace process was predominantly economic, financial, 
diplomatic, and political, not militarily.  
With the exception of Oman, the smaller Arab Gulf monarchies largely shared 
Saudi Arabia’s perspectives on the Arab-Israeli conflict and mostly followed 
Saudi Arabia’s lead regarding their position. The “Saudi group” rejected the 
notion of Zionism and perceived the Israeli occupation of Arab territory as a 
major if not the main cause for regional instability. Their rejection of the State of 
Israel increased in reaction to Israeli military victories, the occupation of Arab 
lands, and the deteriorating living conditions of the Palestinian people. 
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The Saudi regime perceived Soviet communism as a more significant long-term 
threat to its external and domestic security than Zionism. The smaller Arab Gulf 
monarchies, too, saw a threat in Soviet policy and ideology. Therefore, unlike 
Egypt (until the early 1970s), Syria, and Iraq, which turned towards the Soviet 
Union for political and military support, the Arab Gulf monarchies attempted to 
influence the Arab-Israeli conflict to the advantage of the Arab cause through 
close relations with the United States, Israel’s most important ally. 
The Arab Gulf monarchies considered what they saw as unbalanced pro-Israeli 
U.S. policy dangerous to their interests as it both turned their close relations 
with the United States into a liability with respect to regime stability and in intra-
Arab relations and drove Arab states into the Soviet camp. The last aspect was 
alleged most emphatically by Saudi King Faisal. 
Since the early 1970s, Saudi Arabia and the smaller Arab Gulf monarchies 
considered the Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, particularly East 
Jerusalem, the creation of a Palestinian state, and the repatriation or 
appropriate compensation of the Palestinian refugees as the basis for a conflict 
resolution. From 1974 onwards, Saudi Arabia arose as a moderate negotiator 
for a comprehensive peace settlement and used its economic and diplomatic 
power to serve this purpose. In the aftermath of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace 
treaty, the smaller Arab Gulf monarchies supported Saudi Arabia in its 
intensified endeavour to bring about a first Arab peace proposal. 
During the entire timeframe under review, intra-Arab dynamics had a great 
influence on the Arab Gulf monarchies’ stances in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
When making policy decisions with respect to the conflict, the Arab Gulf 
monarchies always took into consideration their policies’ expected effect on 
intra-Arab relations. Conversely, the Arab Gulf monarchies repeatedly 
formulated their positions in the conflict in response to intra-Arab dynamics. The 
best example in this regard is Saudi Arabia’s announcement of and the smaller 
Arab Gulf monarchies’ support for a joint Arab peace initiative at a time when 
the intra-Arab balance of power had shifted to their disadvantage. 
During the better part of the period reviewed in this dissertation, the Omani 
regime walked a separate path in its policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
the State of Israel. The Sultanate was more intent on reconciliation among all 
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parties involved, followed a decisively more accommodating policy towards 
Israel, and was more distrustful of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) 
than its fellow Arab Gulf monarchies. This changed in the course of the First 
Intifada when the Omani stance converged with the policies of the remaining 
Arab Gulf monarchies. 
With regard to the Arab monarchies’ position in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the time 
period under review can be discriminated into four distinct phases: from 1971 to 
the end of the first oil crisis in 1974; from the lifting of the anti-U.S. oil embargo 
to the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty; from Egypt’s separate peace with 
Israel to the beginning of the First Intifada in December 1987; and finally from 
the start of the Intifada to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. 
4.1 The Pre-1971 Era 
The period under review commences amid a transitional phase with respect to 
all six Arab Gulf monarchies’ positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Following the 
1967 Six-Day War, Saudi Arabia had gradually taken over a more prominent 
role in the Arab world in general and as a member of the Arab front in the Arab-
Israeli conflict in particular. Kuwait, too, had become increasingly active and 
influential in the conflict. In contrast, the influence of the remaining Arab Gulf 
monarchies was considerably less distinct, mainly due to their preoccupation 
with domestic affairs as well as their still greatly limited financial resources. 
The Early Era 
The first links between the Arab Gulf monarchies and the Palestine conflict had 
been established in the 1930s. King Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia regularly and 
straightforwardly emphasised in diplomatic contacts with his strategically 
important British ally his rejection of the rapidly increasing immigration of 
European Jews to Palestine. Following an extended meeting with King 
Abdulaziz in 1937, George Rendel, a British Foreign Office envoy, reported to 
his ministry:  
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“The Arab quarrel is not against the Jews in Palestine […] It is against 
the alien invaders who make no secret about wanting to transform 
Palestine from an Arab country into a Jewish country.”956 
As Rendel assessed correctly, the Saudi King’s opposition to the massive 
Jewish immigration was based on a rejection of foreign intrusion and Zionist 
ideology, not on a categorically anti-Judaism basis. Accordingly, the Saudi 
monarch was adamant in his fundamental rejection of any plan to partition 
Palestine. Despite Abdulaziz’ firm opposition to the 1937 Peel Commission 
Report, the first official document to suggest a partition of Palestine into an Arab 
and a Jewish state, the Saudi King was anxious to not jeopardise his country’s 
relations with the United Kingdom. Hence, he refrained from publicly taking a 
stand against British policy.957 Despite isolated deviations from this general rule, 
the reluctance to criticise publicly an important ally’s policy later became 
characteristic for the U.S.-Saudi relations. British diplomats soon realised that 
Abdulaziz’ standpoint regarding Palestine was based on irrevocable principals 
rather than on opportunistic bargaining, wherefore any attempts to bribe the 
ruler of a still bitterly poor desert Kingdom were doomed to fail. In November 
1944, the British Minister of State in the Middle East, Walter E. Guinness, 
established that  
“Ibn Saud’s attitude over the Palestine question borders on the fanatical, 
and he has assured me that he would, if necessary fight against the 
cession of any territory in Palestine to the Jews.”958 
King Abdulaziz’ uncompromising stance on Palestine was reasserted at his 
prominent meeting with U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt onboard the 
U.S.S. Quincy on the Egyptian Great Bitter Lake on February 14, 1945. 
President Roosevelt failed in his attempt to convince King Abdulaziz to accept 
the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. The Saudi King even extracted from 
the U.S. President the promise that the U.S. government would not take any 
decision “with respect to the basic situation in [Palestine] without full 
consultation with both Arabs and Jews.” Moreover, Roosevelt pledged to “take 
no action, in [his] capacity as Chief of the Executive Branch of [the U.S.] 
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958 Cited in ibid, pp. 23f. 
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Government, which might prove hostile to the Arab people.”959 When on 
October 4, 1946, on the occasion of the adjournment of the Palestine 
Conference in London, President Roosevelt’s successor, Harry S. Truman, 
“urged” with respect to the approaching winter “that substantial immigration into 
Palestine cannot await a solution to the Palestine problem and that it should 
begin at once,”960 King Abdulaziz promptly protested in a letter to the U.S. 
President.961 In his response letter, dated October 28, 1946, President Truman 
renewed his predecessor’s commitments.962  
In the end, President Truman’s priorities changed and the U.S. government 
promoted the creation of an Israeli State in Palestine, much to the frustration of 
the Saudi administration. When on November 29, 1947 the UN General 
Assembly adopted Resolution 181 in which it suggested the partition of 
Palestine, Prince Faisal, who represented Saudi Arabia at the session, furiously 
stormed out of the assembly hall.963 When roughly half a year later the State of 
Israel declared its independence, the Saudi regime strongly rejected this 
development, immediately declared war to Israel, and sent a small contingency 
of armed forces to support its Arab brother states during the First Arab-Israeli 
War964; despite contrary statements in literature, it seems safe to say that Saudi 
forces also saw war action.965 Moreover, the Saudi King threatened to impose 
sanctions against U.S. oil concessions if the United States were to supply Israel 
with arms. Evaluating the motivation behind King Abdulaziz’ threat, ARAMCO 
                                            
959 President Roosevelt repeated these promises in a letter he sent King Abdulaziz on April 5, 
1945. Cited in The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIII, No. 330 (October 21, 1945), p. 623. 
960 “Statement by the President Following the Adjournment of the Palestine Conference in 
London,” available online on the website of the Harry S. Truman Library (item 227): 
http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1763&st=227&st1 (accessed on May 3, 
2013). 
961 Cited in The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XV, No. 384 (November 10, 1946), p. 848. 
962 Cited in ibid, pp. 849-51. 
963 Zahlan, Palestine and the Gulf States, p. 34. 
964 Figures on the exact Saudi troop strength differ. A document by the British Embassy in 
Jidda, Saudi Arabia, dated August 18, 1948, put the number of regular Saudi troops at 1,200 
and speaks of an additional unquantified number of irregular Saudi troops. Compare Benny 
Morris, 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale 
University Press, 2008), p. 205, fn. 122. 
965 Several sources recount that, in October 1948, Saudi auxiliaries (one infantry company) 
fought at close quarters beside Egyptian troops against the Israeli Givati Brigate at Huleiqat, 
roughly 20 kilometres northeast of Gaza. Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace 
in the Middle East from the War of Independence through Lebanon (New York: Vintage Books, 
1982), pp. 23, 48, 94 and Morris, 1948, p. 326 (Morris refers to a Hebrew source). Contrasting 
this, Gawdat Bahgat claims that the Saudi troops did not see any war action. Gawdat Bahgat, 
“The New Middle East: The Gulf Monarchies and Israel,” The Journal of Social, Political, and 
Economic Studies, vol. 28, no. 2 (Summer 2003), pp. 123-52, pp. 127f. 
  270
Vice President Fred Davies stated that if sanctions were imposed “it would not 
be because of [the King’s] desire to do so but because the pressure upon him 
of Arab public opinion was so great that he could no longer resist it.”966 In 
another clear sign of rejection of the newly founded Israeli state, King Abdulaziz 
prohibited ARAMCO from shipping Saudi oil to Israel.967  
In the 1930s and 1940s, the remaining Arab Gulf monarchies were still political 
dependencies of the United Kingdom and therefore no independent foreign 
policy actors. Nonetheless, at least in the case of some of them, one could 
witness the beginning of political cross-influence with the Palestine conflict. In 
June 1936, three months in the Palestinian general strike, the Palestinian 
authorities called on the Kuwaiti government for financial support. Respectful of 
his country’s treaty obligations towards the United Kingdom, Sheikh Ahmad Al 
Jabir denied the Palestinians governmental support and also formally prohibited 
the Kuwaiti population to make donations to compensate the financial loses of 
the striking Palestinians. However, when many Kuwaitis defied the Emir’s 
orders and collected money for the Palestinian cause, the leadership, in a sign 
of tacit approval, did not intervene. In October 1936, a pro-Palestinian 
committee, newly established by members of the leading Kuwaiti merchant 
families, managed to rally a considerable 9,500 rupees, roughly £730, in 
support of the Palestinian people. Again the government did not intervene; 
whether this passivity was a sign of the leadership’s approval or due to its 
unwillingness to infuriate the population remains unknown.968 In any case, the 
fact that so many Kuwaitis were willing to donate from their still highly limited 
financial resources is clear evidence of the Kuwaiti population’s strong 
sympathy for and identification with the Palestinian people and their plight. This 
feeling of solidarity, which was later reinforced by a large Palestinian Diaspora 
in Kuwait, would decisively influence future Kuwaiti policy towards the ensuing 
Arab-Israeli conflict, at least until August of 1990. 
In the emirates of Dubai and Sharjah, the population also collected money to 
support the Palestinians; even Sheikh Saqr ibn Sultan Al Qasimi, the Emir of 
Sharjah, made a considerable financial donation. While the Bahraini population 
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apparently did not collect money for the Palestinian people they, too, were 
infuriated by the reports from Palestine and distributed pamphlets that called for 
Muslim solidarity behind the Palestinian cause.969 
Oman was a different case. Under the reign of Sultan Said bin Taymur, Oman 
was virtually excluded from the outside world. Omani foreign relations were 
conducted via London and the Sultanate had little contacts with the rest of the 
Arab world. Exceeding that, “Sa‘id did not identify his Sultanate as an Arab 
state.”970 Accordingly, the Omani Head of State did not consider the Palestine 
conflict and later the Arab-Israeli conflict to be his country’s business. In 
reaction to the 1937 Peel Commission Report, he went even as far as stating 
that the conflict was not a pan-Arab affair as it was not the concern of any other 
Arab state but Palestine. In clear contrast to the Saudi and the remaining Arab 
Gulf monarchies’ stance, Sultan Said agreed with the Peel Commission’s 
suggestion of partitioning Palestine as the best course of action, as peaceful 
coexistence of Arabs and Jews was an unlikely and the expulsion of either party 
an ineligible option. This remained Sultan Said’s only public statement on the 
Palestine respectively Arab-Israeli conflict.971 Apart from the obvious self-
exclusion from the conflict and the responsibility for its solution that was later at 
least partially revoked under his son, Sultan Said’s statement was already 
heralding the basic pattern of Oman’s independent foreign policy from 1970/71 
onwards: a foreign policy aiming at conflict resolution, peaceful coexistence, 
and non-interference, only marginally influenced by (Arab) nationalist and 
religious ideology. 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the Trucial Coast States also rejected the creation 
of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948. However, as they were still British 
dependencies and not yet autonomous foreign policy actors, they were not in a 
legal position to join Saudi Arabia in declaring war to the newly founded state or 
to follow the Saudi example and send military units to participate in the First 
Arab-Israeli War, which broke out within hours of Israel’s Declaration of 
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Independence.972 Moreover, the smaller Arab Gulf monarchies were largely 
preoccupied with domestic political developments whereas the Palestine 
question and the conflict with Israel were not on the top of their agendas. 
In the course of the 1956 Suez War, Saudi territory was for the first time 
affected directly by the Arab-Israeli conflict when Israel occupied two 
uninhabited Red Sea islands claimed by the Kingdom.973 Following the 
combined French-British invasion of Egypt, the reactions of Saudi Arabia and, 
somewhat surprisingly, the small emirate of Qatar were prompt and resolute, 
but, in the end, of little lasting impact. Saudi Arabia denounced the attack on 
Egypt and supported its Arab brother state with roughly $10 million. Moreover, 
on November 6, 1956, a week after the Anglo-French invasion, Saudi Arabia 
broke off diplomatic relations with both aggressors and imposed an oil embargo 
against them.974 The Saudi reaction heralded the Kingdom’s ensuing strategy in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict: exertion of influence with diplomatic, financial, and 
economic and, if at all, only symbolic military means. The oil ban against France 
and the United Kingdom had limited effect but signalled Saudi readiness to use 
its vast economic resources as political leverage. Hence, the later use of the oil 
weapon in the context of the 1973 October War was not the unheard of 
innovation in Saudi foreign policy as it is mostly depicted as; particularly as 
Saudi Arabia interrupted oil shipments for political reasons again in 1967. 
In Qatar, not only the public but also the governmental reaction to the Suez War 
and particularly the British involvement was astonishingly vehement. 
Immediately following the invasion, Qatar’s Emir, Sheikh Ali bin Abdullah, 
condemned the aggression against Egypt and the British participation in the 
plot. Not only did the Qatari ruler sanction a general strike and mass 
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demonstrations, he led them. Exceeding this, Sheikh Ali ordered the interruption 
of Qatari oil shipments to Bahrain, emphasising his protest against British 
involvement in the war. Moreover, he tolerated that more than two hundred 
Qataris volunteered to join the Saudi army that was to be deployed to Egypt.975 
In Kuwait, there were acts of sabotage against installations of the British 
controlled Kuwait Oil Company. However, there was no significant public 
criticism on Britain’s role in the Suez War from either the Kuwaiti government or 
the leaderships of any of the remaining Arab Gulf monarchies.976 
The Suez War marked a turning point in intra-Arab relations. Soon, an intra-
Arab Cold War separated the Arab World and put Saudi Arabia on the opposite 
side of the two most prominent Arab front states, Egypt and Syria. Under Jamal 
Abd al-Nasser, who after the 1952 Egyptian Revolution had at first been prime 
minister and than ascended to Presidency in June 1956, post-revolutionary 
Egypt had maintained a relatively good relationship with Saudi Arabia. This 
changed, however, in the aftermath of the Suez War, which concluded as a 
military defeat but political victory for Egypt and served as a catalyst for 
Nasser’s rise to the role of the leader of the greatly strengthened Arab 
nationalist movement.977 After Saudi Arabia had tacitly approved the 1957 
Eisenhower Doctrine, the intention of which was to reduce Soviet influence in 
the Arab world and to weaken the position and policy of Nasser who enjoyed 
Soviet support and whose Arab nationalist agenda threatened U.S.-friendly 
Arab monarchies, Saudi-Egyptian relations deteriorated dramatically.978 In 
subsequent years, Yemen became the main theatre of the Saudi-Egyptian 
contestation as the eight-year long North Yemen Civil War, started with a coup 
d’état against Imam Muhammad Al Badr in September 1962, turned into a proxy 
war between Nasserite Egypt and the Saudi Kingdom. Moreover, the Soviet 
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support of Egypt and Syria discouraged Saudi Arabia from engaging actively in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict alongside its fellow Arab brother states.979 
The Six-Day War, the Khartoum Conference, and the War of Attrition 
The devastating defeat of the Arab front during the 1967 Six-Day War then not 
only put an end to the dominance of both Arab nationalism and Nasser himself 
but significantly changed Saudi and also Kuwaiti influence in the Arab world in 
general and with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular. Following a 
months-long steady escalation of tensions between the two neighbouring 
states, Israel started a surprise air strike on all Egyptian airfields on June 5, 
1967. After the virtual destruction of the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian air 
forces and the attainment of full air supremacy, the Israeli army managed to 
conquer the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, the previously Egyptian controlled Gaza 
Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Syrian Golan Heights within a 
matter of six days. The equally swift and staggering defeat by Israel deeply 
shocked the entire Arab world and changed permanently political dynamics in 
the entire region. 
In late May, in the light of seriously rising tensions between Egypt and Israel, 
King Faisal ordered three of the five Saudi infantry brigades to Jordan to 
support King Hussein’s forces in case of a war involving the Hashemite 
Kingdom. However, a surprising Jordanian-Egyptian rapprochement made King 
Faisal reconsider. On May 30, King Hussein signed a five-year defence treaty 
with Egypt, which provided a Joint Defence Council, a Joint Command, and a 
Joint Staff. Disapproving of Hussein’s pact with Nasser, King Faisal ordered his 
troops to not proceed into Jordan and take positions in the northwestern Saudi 
town of Tabuk, roughly 100 kilometres from the southern Jordanian border. King 
Faisal’s change of opinion is another piece of evidence of the influence intra-
Arab dynamics had on the general Arab and Saudi policies towards the Arab-
Israeli conflict, particularly in the Nasser era. Then, on late June 4, a few hours 
before the war started, one Saudi infantry brigade crossed into Jordanian 
territory. However, the Saudi troops, due to their slow proceeding to the 
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frontline, did not see any combat; by the time of the ceasefire they had only 
reached the Jordanian city of Maan.980 
Once again, the Saudi reaction to an Arab-Israeli war took place more on a 
diplomatic, economic, and financial level. On June 7, Saudi Arabia imposed an 
oil embargo, as they did before in 1956. This time, however, the embargo was 
not only directed at the United Kingdom but mainly at the United States for their 
support of Israel. On the following day, Saudi oil exports were completely 
halted, including those through the trans-Arabian pipeline to the Mediterranean 
Sea. Much unlike the embargo six years later, the politically motivated 
interruption of Saudi oil shipments to the United States had little economic 
effect and was therefore reduced to a political statement of protest. The Saudi 
embargo stayed in place until right after the end of the Arab League Khartoum 
Conference on September 1, 1967.981  
The Saudi government had warned the United States indirectly through Robert 
I. Broughman, ARAMCO’s Vice President, on at least two occasions against 
intervening in the war to the advantage of Israel. As early as May 23, Saudi Oil 
Minister Ahmad Zaki Yamani warned Broughman that in case of U.S. support 
for Israel in the expected war, Saudi Arabia would nationalise ARAMCO. When 
asked why the Saudi government objected to the United States standing up to 
Nasserite policies, Yamani responded, “We are all Arabs. Your government 
would be foolish if it does not keep out.”982 What the Saudi minister implied was 
that despite the severe Saudi-Egyptian conflict, Saudi Arabia would not and 
could not afford – both with a view to foreign and domestic policy repercussions 
– to break ranks with another Arab state during a war with Israel; even if that 
meant compromising relations with the United States. On June 5, in a 
conversation between King Faisal and Broughman the Saudi monarch himself 
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uttered a warning in the direction of the United States. Broughman recalled King 
Faisal having stated, without explicitly referring to oil exports, that  
“consequences of such involvement on behalf of Israel will leave Arab 
states no alternative but to take measures against those countries 
involved in providing such assistance.”983 
A resolution passed at an Arab oil ministers conference in Baghdad on June 5 
then provided the political basis for the ensuing Saudi oil embargo.984 The 
resolution read  
“Arab oil shall be denied to and shall not be allowed [to] reach directly or 
indirectly countries committing aggression or participating in aggression 
on [the] sovereignty of any Arab state or its territories or its territorial 
waters, particularly [the] Gulf of Aqaba.”985 
The resolution did not specify the countries that were supporting Israel militarily. 
Indeed, the Arab oil producing countries failed to agree on a joint decision in 
this regard. Hence, Saudi Arabia had some levy regarding the timing and the 
target countries of the embargo. Upon the proposal of Iraq and Algeria and 
despite initial opposition from the moderate monarchies of Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, and Libya the Baghdad conference adopted a second resolution that 
provided explicitly for the confiscation of the assets of oil companies owned by 
nationals of embargoed countries.986 
Due to the high importance of its alliance with the United States, neither the 
expropriation of ARAMCO nor the extensive use of an oil embargo was in the 
Saudi government’s interest. However, as John McCone, the former Director of 
Central Intelligence, stated in a briefing in late June 1967, the Saudi 
government faced difficulties in 
“maintaining its position, which is essentially friendly, against the 
demands of such unfriendly countries as Iraq, which are urging the 
                                            
983 Letter, John J. McCloy to Secretary of State Rusk, 6/5/67, RG 59, Records of the Depart-
ment of State, Central Files, 1967-69, PET 6 SAUD, NARA. 
984 Participants at the conference and signatories of the resolution were the oil ministers of Abu 
Dhabi, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Compare 
Fuad A. Jabber (ed.), International Documents on Palestine, 1967 (Beirut: The Institute of 
Palestine Studies, 1970), p. 584f. 
985 Cited in Telegram, Baghdad 2140, American Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State, 
6/6/67, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, PET 17-1 ARAB, 
NARA. 
986 Compare ibid and Telegram, Tripoli 1900, American Embassy in Libya to the Department of 
State, 7/15/67, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, PET 17-1 
LIBYA, NARA. 
  277
expulsion of Americans and the nationalization and expropriation of the 
American-owned companies.”987 
In order to reduce Iraqi, Syrian, and Algerian pressure regarding oil company 
nationalisation, Saudi Oil Minister Yamani tried his best to portray ARAMCO 
and the other Western oil companies in the Gulf as “friendly instruments,” 
referring to their positive influence on their respective home countries’ policies 
towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.988 
On the second day of the war, Radio Cairo broadcasted the incorrect charge 
that U.S. military aircraft had participated in the Israeli attacks of the previous 
day. This misinformation quickly spread in the Arab world and infuriated large 
parts of the Arab populations. Moreover, Iraq used the pretext to impose an oil 
embargo and pressured the other Arab oil producing states to follow its lead.989 
Under this impression, Saudi Arabia had no alternative but to implement the oil 
embargo against the United States. Had they failed to do so, the Saudi 
government would have become a target of political attacks from the radical 
Arab states. Moreover, Saudi regime stability would have been at stake, despite 
the fact that the Saudi population was not as susceptible to pressure from 
Nasser as the peoples of other Arab states. In this context, McCone highlighted, 
“[p]ublic indoctrination by Radio Cairo is placing the heads of basically 
friendly Arab regimes in a position where they cannot speak out publicly 
for fear of the indignation of the masses which, whipped up by Cairo 
propaganda, might even cause the overthrow of such governments.”990 
Hence, Saudi Arabia did not lift the oil embargo before the Khartoum resolution 
gave this action common Arab legitimacy.  
Saudi public protest against Israel’s aggression and occupation of Arab territory 
turned quickly into violence against U.S. installations. On June 7, in reaction to 
Israel’s capture of East Jerusalem, the work force of ARAMCO in the eastern 
Saudi city of Dhahran went on strike. The Saudi government, despite its 
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characteristic scepticism with regard to public protest gatherings, allowed a 
peaceful demonstration to take place in Dhahran the following day. When 
roughly one thousand demonstrators turned to violence, the Saudi security 
forces stayed idle and did not intervene. The protesters rallied to the U.S. 
General Consulate, destroyed windows and cars, and set up a Saudi flag after 
pulling down the U.S. banner. At the Dhahran air base, the angry crowd 
“systematically destroyed the homes and cars of foreigners as well as the 
offices of American Airlines.”991 In addition, around 300 local students stormed 
the ARAMCO camp and vandalised cars and the ARAMCO president’s home. 
In response to the attacks, the U.S. government prepared for the evacuation of 
its citizens, only to scrap the plan at the last moment.992 It can be assumed that 
by not intervening in the acts of violence against U.S. property, the Saudi 
government allowed for an outlet for public anger and frustration. Had the 
government intervened, protecting U.S. installations, the popular anger could 
have turned against the regime. As no U.S. citizens were harmed during the 
violent protests, the damage to U.S.-Saudi relations was limited and considered 
by Riyadh as an acceptable price for continuing regime stability. 
On May 18, earlier than Saudi Arabia, Kuwait announced the mobilisation of its 
armed forces and even placed them under the Egyptian-Syrian Joint 
Command.993 Moreover, the Kuwaiti leadership sent a military unit, the Al-
Yarmouk Brigade, to Egypt; first Kuwaiti units reached Egypt on May 24.994 On 
the day of the Israeli attack, Kuwait declared defensive war on Israel.995 The 
Kuwaiti troops eventually joined the Egyptian armed forces in battle and 
suffered nine casualties.996 As early as on the second day of the war, Kuwait 
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announced an oil embargo against the United Kingdom and the United 
States.997 Despite this drastic action, the Kuwaiti foreign minister assured the 
British Ambassador, Geoffrey Arthur, that the oil embargo was a necessary but 
temporary measure. He further emphasised that Kuwait continuously relied on 
British protection and had a vital interest in the continuation of good relations 
with the United Kingdom. Indeed, the embargo against both the United 
Kingdom and the United States was lifted in early July.998  
The decision to impose an oil embargo was clearly a strategic move by the 
Kuwaiti administration. Its objective was to placate both the radical Arab states, 
particularly Egypt and Iraq, and the Kuwaiti population, which held dear the 
Palestinian cause and the general concept of Arab nationalism. There is much 
evidence to support this assessment. In a conversation with U.S. Ambassador 
Howard R. Cottam on the second day of the embargo Emir Sabah III 
“expressed pride in [his government’s] ‘cleverness’ in demonstrating its 
Arabism by prompt and full cooperation. By cutting off oil shipments to 
[the United States and the United Kingdom], sabotage had been averted. 
He hoped oil cut-off would be temporary and have [a] minimum bad 
effect on Kuwait.”999 
On June 10 and 11, Kuwaiti oil workers went on strike. At the time, Ambassador 
Cottam assessed that the strike was not only tolerated but contrived by the 
Kuwaiti government in order to maximise pressure on both the Kuwait Oil 
Company and ARAMCO whose representatives met with the oil ministers of 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq on June 11. In retrospect, Cottam’s following 
suggestion regarding Kuwaiti and Saudi strategy in the early days of the oil 
embargo appears highly plausible:  
“Kuwaitis and Saudis may be trying [an] extreme delicate and dangerous 
game of proving their Arabism and at [the] same time not jeopardizing 
their long-range interest in keeping oil flowing.”1000  
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The strategic nature of Kuwait’s oil embargo became clearest when Emir Sabah 
III suggested what Ambassador Cottam termed “Bedu chicanery,” namely the 
manipulation of cargo manifests to allow for oil shipments to the United States 
and the United Kingdom despite the ongoing embargo. Upon recommendation 
of both the British and U.S. governments, as well as the oil companies BP and 
Shell, the suggestion was not implemented.1001 
Again, as in 1956, the Qatari popular and governmental reactions to the war 
were strong. The Qatari government joined Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 
imposing an oil embargo against the United Kingdom and the United States. 
The embargo started on June 20, ten days after the end of the war, and was 
kept in place until September 5. The population and also the police force 
reacted highly emotionally to the events of the war. As during the Suez War 
there were acts of sabotage against the oil infrastructure. Moreover, the Doha 
“police force broke down and wept, in almost its entirety,” due to the 
catastrophic defeat of their idol Nasser.1002 
The Bahraini regime, too, imposed an oil embargo. Otherwise, the public 
governmental reactions were relatively muted. Also on a public level, reactions 
were comparatively limited.1003 
The Trucial States’ official reactions to the Six-Day War and its outcome were 
muted mainly due to the emirates’ primary concentration on domestic affairs. 
Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, and Ras al-Khaimah saw large demonstrations, mostly 
peaceful in nature, and some acts of sabotage, e.g. against a British radio 
station in Ras al-Khaimah. In the case of Dubai, protests were of a much more 
violent nature and came along with considerable damage to property, inter alia 
of British companies. According to the British resident in Dubai, the riots were 
orchestrated by Palestinian nationals.1004 
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Of all Arab Gulf monarchies, the reactions of both the Omani government and 
population was the most muted. In line with Sultan Said’s earlier stance towards 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Omani administration remained on the sidelines. In 
addition, the Sultanate did not witness a single demonstration.1005 Beside Sultan 
Said’s lack of interest in the matter, mainly the low urban concentration, the 
absence of other Arab, particularly Palestinian nationals in Oman, and the low 
degree of technological infrastructure explain the Omani reaction.1006 
From August 29 to September 1, 1967, roughly two and a half months after the 
end of the Six-Day War, the Arab League states came together for the above 
mentioned Summit in Khartoum. The Summit became a milestone in the history 
of both intra-Arab relations and the Arab-Israeli conflict. First, the Summit’s 
participants decided that henceforward Arab oil should be utilised as a “positive 
weapon,” producing financial resources to be used for the reconstruction of the 
defeated Arab states’ economies.1007 This departure of earlier calls by the 
radical Arab states for the use of the negative oil weapon, namely oil 
embargoes, was in the clear interest of the conservative oil producing 
monarchies, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya. Crucial in the decision making 
process was the fact that Egypt, virtually bankrupt after the Six-Day War, 
needed extensive financial support from the Arab oil exporting states. 
Second, the summit resolution expressed appreciation for the Arab oil 
producing states’ previous financial support for “the States affected by the 
aggression to stand firm in the face of any pressure.”1008 This clause did not 
only signify the increasing importance of the moderate oil monarchies in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, it also symbolised the beginning of the end of the Arab 
Cold War. 
Third, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Sabah of Kuwait and King Idris of 
Libya committed to support financially the war-struck economies of Egypt, 
Jordan, and Syria. The three Heads of State pledged to grant the Arab front 
states quarterly payments amounting to a yearly total of £135 million ($376 
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million) from mid-October 1967 onwards “until the effects of the aggression are 
eliminated.”1009 The lion’s share of the financial aid (£95 million / $246.6 million) 
was earmarked for Egypt and smaller amounts of £40 million ($111.4 million) 
and £5 million ($13.9 million) for Jordan and Syria respectively. Among the 
three donor countries Kuwait pledged the largest share of £55 million ($153.2 
million), followed by Saudi Arabia (£50 million / 139.3 $ million), and Libya (£30 
million / $83.6 million). Amounting to more than 20 percent of their respective 
yearly revenues, the economic aid granted by the three oil monarchies was a 
very significant financial commitment.1010 However, the financial support 
entailed political benefit in the long run as it gave Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
considerable influence particularly in Egyptian policy. Moreover, Saudi Arabia 
was able to establish itself in a leading role among Arab states. 
Fourth, as a quid pro quo for the massive financial support, a politically 
weakened Nasser, agreed to terminate his feud with Saudi Arabia: The 
Egyptian President renounced his earlier attempts of destabilising the Saudi 
regime. He ordered the Egyptian anti-Saudi radio propaganda to stop and 
promised to withdraw all his troops from Yemen; a promise he eventually kept 
by the end of November 1967. Conversely, King Faisal agreed to discontinue 
Saudi financial aid for the Yemeni royalists.1011 
Fifth, in the Khartoum Summit resolution, the attending Arab League members 
agreed on what was later referred to as the “three noes.” They pledged to abide 
to the main principles of “no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no 
negotiations with it.”1012 
Despite its uncompromising position towards Israel, the Saudi government 
frowned upon the War of Attrition that Egypt fought with Israel in the attempt to 
pressure the latter to abandon its territorial gains from the Six-Day War. 
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According to Safran, the Saudi opposition was motivated by five main factors. 
First, over the course of the war Nasser continuously intensified its relationship 
with the Soviet Union and allowed the latter to consolidate its position in Egypt. 
Egyptian military setbacks were countered by in increase in Soviet military 
assistance both in terms of arms deliveries and growing numbers of “Soviet 
advisers.” The Soviet armed forces enjoyed exclusive access to Egyptian air 
bases and naval installations, Soviet ground and air units defended Egyptian 
territory, and roughly 17,000 Soviet military advisers infiltrated the different 
branches of the Egyptian armed forces. As Safran points out, “it looked to most 
observers, and certainly to the Saudis, as though the Soviets were well on their 
way toward turning Egypt into a dependent proxy if not a satellite.”1013 Saudi 
Arabia was already highly concerned about both the Soviet Union’s strong 
presence in Iraq, Syria, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen and 
the superpower’s support for the relevant regimes’ subversive actions. The 
heavily intensified Soviet engagement in Egypt amplified the Saudi 
apprehension of a systematic Soviet encirclement.1014 
Second, regardless of its actual military strategic effectiveness, Egypt’s 
campaign against Israel served to improve Nasser’s heavily damaged prestige 
and helped restore ailing pan-Arabism’s radiance in the region. Particularly the 
resurrection of revolutionary Arab nationalism unsettled the Saudi adminis-
tration. In May and September of 1969 respectively, the Saudi regime 
witnessed military coups bringing to power Arab nationalist regimes in both 
Sudan and Libya. Colonel Muammar Al Qaddafi even went to the lengths of 
suggesting a merger of Libya with Egypt and other Arab countries. The new 
Sudanese regime under Jafar Al Numeiry, turned towards socialist reforms and 
close cooperation not only with Egypt but also with the Soviet Union.1015 
Moreover, the Saudi regime itself was faced with a coup attempt. Inspired by 
and collaborating with Saudi socialist opposition movements, military personnel, 
among them 60 Saudi air force officers as well as the director of the Saudi Air 
Force Academy in Dhahran, planned to proclaim the “Republic of the Arabian 
                                            
1013 Safran, Saudi Arabia, p. 139. 
1014 Ibid. 
1015 Ibid. 
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Peninsula” after killing the King and the senior princes in an air strike on the 
royal palace.1016 
Third, Nasser instrumentalised this renaissance of pan-Arabism to pressure the 
Saudi regime into policies consistent with his agenda. At the 1969 Arab League 
Summit in Rabat Nasser requested Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil exporting 
states to use oil as political leverage against the United States and the entire 
West with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict.1017 
Fourth, from the Saudi perspective the War of Attrition jeopardised Jordan’s 
nature as a crucial buffer state. For one thing, Jordan had so far shielded the 
Saudi territory from the Arab-Israeli war zone. However, beside Egypt, the PLO, 
operating from Jordan, was the most significant Arab participant in the War of 
Attrition.1018 Moreover, in the course of the war, the Palestinian organisation had 
gradually established a state within a state in the Hashemite Kingdom and 
threatened to politically highjack the entire country. This would have served as 
an additional blow to Saudi security, as the Kingdom would then have faced 
three radical, revolutionary, and anti-Saudi states at its northern border.1019 
Fifth, the War of Attrition was characterised by a permanent escalation and bore 
the risk to turn into a full-fledged war Saudi Arabia would almost certainly have 
been dragged into. Particularly the Saudi oil export stability would then have 
been at risk either by the war itself or by a (self-)imposed use of the oil 
weapon.1020 
Nonetheless, in 1969, the Saudi administration sent a brigade to the Jordanian 
city of Kerak to assist Arab forces in their fight against Israel. Reportedly, the 
Saudi brigade suffered one fatality and several wounded.1021 The Saudi military 
involvement appears to have been based on two main motives: First, it was a 
reaction by the Saudi regime to its people’s moral support for the fedayeen’s 
                                            
1016 The respective opposition movements were the Popular Democratic Front, the National 
Front for the Liberation of Saudi Arabia, and the Federation of Democratic Forces in the 
Kingdom. Joseph A. Kéchichian, Succession in Saudi Arabia (Palgrave: New York and 
Houndsmills, 2001), p. 104. 
1017 Safran, Saudi Arabia, pp. 139f. 
1018 Jordan and Syria also periodically took part in the attacks against Israel. 
1019 Safran, Saudi Arabia, p. 140. 
1020 Ibid. 
1021 Zahlan, Palestine and the Gulf States, p. 50. 
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fight against the Israeli army. In this context, the U.S. ambassador to Saudi 
Arabia summarised in early 1970 
“The fedayeen mystique has captured imaginations here as elsewhere in 
the Arab world. Saudis, chafing with frustration at the continuous 
humiliation of Arab armies, take satisfaction in the bellicose stand and 
reported military successes of the commandos. With Government 
blessing the Saudi media nourish this enthusiasm with daily stories of 
commando exploits, real or imagined. Since the January Ghor al-Safi 
incident, where Fedayeen and Saudi Army efforts to repell [sic] the I.D.F. 
seem to have been especially lavish in extolling the fighting mettle of the 
commandos as brothers in arms of the Saudi forces in the thick of the 
battle.”1022 
Second, the Saudi regime considered the growing popularity of the fedayeen as 
an opportune offset to the general popularity of Nasser and his Arab nationalist 
ideology.1023 
In the following years, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait supported the Arab front states 
financially as previously agreed. In the aftermath of the 1969 Rabat Arab 
League Summit the Kuwaiti government announced additional financial support 
for the PLO. The Kuwaiti administration’s Law No. 3 of 1970 read: “An amount 
of Fifteen Million Kuwaiti Dinars [equivalent to $42 million] shall be appropriated 
for the participation in the support of the fedayeen action and the liberation of 
Arab land.”1024 In fact, the Kuwaiti government had not planned to pay the full 
amount to the PLO. In contrast, two thirds of the pledged appropriation (KD10 
million/$28 million) were earmarked for and eventually paid out to Egypt. In this 
context, referring to a conversation with the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, Sabah Al 
Ahmad, in December 1969, U.S. Ambassador John P. Walsh revealed 
“it looks better, somehow more patriotic, for the legal record to show that 
Kuwait has hereby come forth with another 15 million dinar gift to support 
The Cause in Palestine rather than to record the UAR as beneficiary. 
The GOK [Government of Kuwait] after all gets full marks locally for 
backing the fedayeen, whereas local critics of continued gifts to Nasser, 
while cautious, are more numerous and more vocal.”1025 
                                            
1022 Airgram, Jidda A-51, American Embassy in Jidda to the Department of State, “Saudi 
Support for the Fedayeen,” 2/23/70, NND 969031, Box 2042, POL 13-10 ARAB 2-1-70, NARA. 
1023 See ibid. 
1024 Enclosure to Airgram, Kuwait A-33, American Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of 
State, “Kuwait Pays its Rabat Assessments,” 3/26/70, NND 969031, Box 2042, POL 13-10 
ARAB 3-1-70, NARA. 
1025 Airgram, Kuwait A-33 (1970). The Kuwaiti government’s rhetoric support for fedayeen 
action in Palestine was made very explicit in the law’s Explanatory Note, which included 
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Sheikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi also made a voluntary financial contribution to the 
front states by transferring £1.3 million to Jordan.1026 
The Arab Gulf monarchies’ support for Egypt, Syria, and the PLO was prompted 
by several factors: First, with regard to the magnitude of the Arab defeat during 
the Six-Day War and the Israeli conquest of even further Arab territory – the 
Syrian Golan Heights, the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, and not least East 
Jerusalem – the Gulf States saw an immediate need to support the Arab and 
the Palestinian cause more vigorously. Particularly the Israeli occupation of 
East Jerusalem, the site of the Al-Aqsa Mosque (“The Farthest Mosque”), the 
third holiest shrine of Islam after the Al-Masjid al-Haram (“The Sacred Mosque”) 
in Mecca and Al-Masjid an-Nabi (“The Mosque of the Prophet”) in Medina, had 
a very significant psychological impact not least on the deeply religious Saudi 
King Faisal. Raymond H. Close, CIA station chief in Jidda for the better part of 
the 1970s, characterises Faisal as having been much more emotional regarding 
the Arab-Israeli conflict than his considerably more pragmatic successors. 
Close furthermore identifies the occupation of East Jerusalem as a key aspect 
in Faisal’s rage against Israel.1027 
Second, by playing a more active role in supporting the Arab cause, specifically 
Saudi Arabia saw an opportunity to both extend its relevance as leading power 
among Arab states and to stabilise the newly concluded peace with Egypt by 
making the latter increasingly dependent on Saudi support. 
Third, again, predominantly Saudi Arabia saw a chance to utilise the financial 
leverage it had gained on Egypt in order to influence the latter’s foreign policy, 
particularly with regard to Egypt’s strategic alliance with the Soviet Union. 
Fourth, the Arab Gulf monarchies’ payments to the front states and their support 
of the PLO had also domestic policy reasons as it mirrored the population’s 
moral support for the fight against Israeli occupation of Arab lands. Once again, 
                                                                                                                                
following formulation: “[W]e absolutely believe in the benefit of the Palestinian armed struggle 
which has now occupied an outstanding place in the theater of events, due to the acceleration 
of its heroic operations in Palestine and the occupied land against the common enemy.” 
Enclosure to Air-gram, Kuwait A-33 (1970). 
1026 Zahlan, Palestine and the Gulf States, p. 45. 
1027 Phone Interview with Raymond H. Close in April 2011. 
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the Arab Gulf monarchies’ foreign policy decisions with regard to the Arab-
Israeli conflict were taken in an effort to guarantee regime stability. 
The Arab Gulf Monarchies and Palestinian Political Movements 
The heavy blow the outcome of the Six-Day War dealt to Nasser and Arab 
nationalism also influenced Palestinian politics. Prior to the war, the Arab 
Nationalist Movement, an amalgam of partially competing Nasserist and Marxist 
pan-Arab subgroups with branches in most countries of the Arab World, was the 
dominant force in intra-Palestinian politics. In the aftermath of the Six-Day War, 
the Palestinian nationalist Fatah then became the most influential Palestinian 
political faction, much to the benefit of the Arab Gulf monarchies. Both Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait supported Fatah while being highly critical and wary of other 
Palestinian liberation movements, especially the radical leftist such as the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). The political ideology and actions of 
these organisations were detrimental to the Arab Gulf monarchies’ foreign 
policy interests and their regime stability. 
The relationship between Kuwait and Fatah was a particularly close one as the 
Kuwaiti government played a vital role in the creation of the Palestinian 
movement. Following the First Arab-Israeli War of 1948, entailing a massive 
wave of Palestinian refugees, Kuwait became the home of a large Palestinian 
Diaspora. In the following years, the shortage of manpower in Kuwait’s fast 
developing oil industry had an additional increasing effect on Palestinian 
immigration to the Gulf emirate. However, Palestinians in Kuwait were not all 
manual labourers. On the contrary, the first Palestinians to come to Kuwait 
belonged to the intelligencia and soon played a very significant role in Kuwait’s 
education, health care, and media sector and also served as political advisors 
to the administration.1028 The Kuwaiti government allowed the Palestinian 
refugees to use Kuwait as an organising centre for the establishment of a 
                                            
1028 Compare Crystal, Kuwait, p. 130. Evaluating the influence of the Palestinians on Kuwait’s 
development, Shafeeq Ghabra states: “In almost every phase of development, be it economic, 
military, administrative, or educational, the Palestinians had a tremendous effect, particularly 
during the 1948-1965 period. This period was characterized by the laying of Kuwait’s modern 
economic infrastructure [in which] the Palestinian role in the work force was crucial. In 1965, for 
instance, 48 percent of all employees in Kuwait’s public sector were Palestinian […] In the 
private sector, Palestinians composed 41.4 percent of all employees.” Shafeeq Ghabra, 
Palestinians in Kuwait: The Family and the Politics of Survival (Boulder, CO, and London: 
Westview Press, 1987), p. 41.  
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Palestinian national movement. In 1959, with the support of the Kuwaiti 
government, a group of intellectual Palestinian refugees including Yasser 
Arafat, Salah Khalaf, and Khalil Al Wazir founded Fatah in Kuwait, where the 
movement kept its headquarters until 1966. In the organisation’s early years, 
financial support for Fatah originated mainly from Kuwait; official financial 
support by the Kuwaiti government, however, set in later and became very 
significant following the 1967 Khartoum Summit.1029 
When the PLO was founded in 1964, its conception going back to the Arab 
League’s first Summit in Cairo in January of that year, the Kuwaiti 
administration allowed the organisation to open an office in Kuwait. Moreover, 
the Kuwaiti leadership permitted the establishment and active political 
engagement of other Palestinian organisations whose “[a]ctivities ranged from 
social and cultural programs to union work, fund-raising, and demon-
strations.”1030 The government only drew a line when it came to Palestinian 
paramilitary presence in Kuwait and prohibited infighting among Palestinian 
factions on Kuwaiti ground as well as Palestinian involvement in Kuwaiti 
domestic political affairs.1031 
Official Saudi financial support for Fatah started in 1965. Previously, Fatah had 
agreed to refrain from any political or organisational activities in Saudi Arabia. In 
return, the Saudi regime levied a 5% tax on the salaries of every Palestinian 
employee in the Kingdom and transferred the tax receipts to Fatah. Moreover, 
the Saudi regime distributed collection boxes for the Jihad in Palestine all over 
the Kingdom. Together with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia became the main funder of 
Fatah. A main reason for the close link between the Palestinian organisation 
and the two Arab Gulf monarchies was the consensus that Arab nationalism 
was the connecting element between sovereign Arab states whose territorial 
integrity and individual interests took precedence.1032 
A 1973 U.S. Department of State Intelligence note encapsulates the Saudi 
stance towards the different Palestinian liberation movements: 
                                            
1029 Crystal, Kuwait, p. 131 and Friedemann Büttner and Helga Baumgarten, “Der Nahost-
Konflikt und die Golfstaaten,” in Fred Scholz (ed.), Wirtschaftsmacht im Krisenherd: Die 
Golfstaaten (Braunschweig: Westermann, 1985), pp. 65-80, p. 68. 
1030 Crystal, Kuwait, p. 131. 
1031 Ibid. 
1032 Büttner and Baumgarten, Nahost-Konflikt, pp. 68, 71. 
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“Animated by hostility to Israel, sympathy for the Palestinians, and 
concern about the subversive capabilities of the fedayeen1033, King 
Faysal has adopted a cautious policy of limited support for the 
Palestinian resistance movement. He has no use for the Marxist 
iconoclasm of the PFLP or the PDFLP -- organizations which publicly 
condemn “reaction” and enjoy clandestine logistic and intelligence 
support for Faysal’s archenemies in South Yemen. Although he might 
have paid the PFLP a little blackmail on occasion in an effort to keep it 
from sabotaging Tapline, the only recipient of a regular Saudi subsidy 
has been Fatah.”1034 
Saudi Arabia repeatedly emphasised their clear preference for Fatah over other 
Palestinian movements in their dealings with the United States and attempted 
to convince the latter to modify its policy so that Fatah would be strengthened in 
relation to the more radical, leftist Palestinian factions. In a conversation with 
U.S. Ambassador Hermann F. Eilts in late January 1970, Saudi Defence 
Minister Sultan Al Saud stressed that 
“Fatah is [the] only Arab guerrilla organization which has not resorted to 
outside terrorist tactics. It is operating solely to recover [the] occupied 
territories. […] Only [the] Fatah leadership can be relied upon to be anti-
Communist.”1035 
The Kuwaiti government shared the Saudi perspective and also considered 
Fatah and its leader Yasser Arafat as the only reliable Palestinian partner.1036 
In 1965, one year after its foundation, the PLO opened an office in Doha, Qatar. 
As there was no PLO representation in what later became the UAE, the PLO 
representative in Doha, Abu Sitah, visited the Trucial States occasionally. 
Sheikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi financially supported all Palestinian factions 
irrespective of their ideological standing, as they were all fighting for Palestine’s 
liberation. Following the Six-Day War, the government of Abu Dhabi gave 
voluntary financial support to Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Reportedly, Sheikh 
Zayid saw it as his Arab nationalist duty to support the Arab front states. 
                                            
1033 In this context, the term fedayeen refers to armed Palestinian militias. 
1034 Intelligence Note, RNAN-28, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research, “Arab World: Fatah Gets Back Into Faysal’s Good Grace,” 6/12/73, Box 2585, 
Documents on Saudi Arabia 1971-73 III, NARA. Compare Airgram, Jidda A-51 (1970). 
1035 Telegram, Jidda 331, American Embassy in Jidda to the Secretary of State, 1/29/70, NND 
969031, Box 2042, POL 13-10 ARAB 2-1-70, NARA. 
1036 Compare Paper Prepared by Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff, 
7/11/72. Cited in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. XXIV, Middle East 
Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972; Jordan, September 1970, eds. Linda W. 
Qaimmaqami and Adam M. Howard (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 2008), pp. 372-76, p. 376. 
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However, Abu Dhabi’s payments were not made public due to the emirate’s 
treaty obligations to the United Kingdom. In 1968, Sheikh Zayid issued a decree 
according to which the deportation or arrest of any Palestinian member of a 
liberation movement required his personal permission. In the following year, 
Abu Dhabi’s ruler decreed the levying of a 5% tax on all Palestinians working in 
Abu Dhabi as well as the transfer of all of Abu Dhabi’s payments to the 
Palestine National Fund (PNF). As the fund represented all Palestinian factions, 
Abu Dhabi continued its non-discrimination policy in its support of Palestinian 
liberation movements. This policy remained in place at least until the end of the 
period under review. Also in 1969, Sheikh Zayid allowed the PLO to open a 
local office in the Abu Dhabi, which was completely financed by the emirate. 
Until the creation of the UAE, Abu Dhabi made several additional payments to 
different Palestinian liberation movements, including the PFLP. According to 
Jamil Al Ramahi, the PLO representative in Abu Dhabi, the fact that the lion’s 
share of Abu Dhabi’s payments went to Fatah was only attributable to the 
movements size not its ideological orientation.1037 
4.2 Britain’s Withdrawal, the October War, and the Use of the Oil Weapon 
The Newly Independent Arab Gulf Monarchies and the Arab-Israeli Con-
flict 
Until they reached full independence in 1971, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the 
seven emirates that formed the UAE, did not consider the Arab-Israeli conflict 
as an issue of great political importance.1038 After their independence, they were 
preoccupied with nation building, state consolidation, and subregional affairs. In 
this context, then U.S. Consul General in Dhahran, Lee F. Dinsmore, pointed 
out: 
                                            
1037 Al-Alkim, Foreign Policy, pp. 172f. 
1038 Characteristic for the subordinate character of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian 
cause in the case of these newly independent states was a speech, Sheikh Isa bin Salman Al 
Khalifa, the Ruler of Bahrain, gave on occasion of the ninth anniversary of his enthronement. 
U.S. diplomat Dinsmore later recalled: “Next, almost as if he feared that the adulation of Iran 
had tipped the pan of a delicate balance too far, the Ruler returns to Arabism and adds a gram 
of reassurance about “cooperation with Arab states.” The invocation of the “sacred cause of 
Palestine,” dropped quickly just before a transition to another topic is almost loudly perfunctory 
to a non-Arab, but not to Arabs themselves. It is an important part of the required litany.” 
Airgram, Dhahran A-4, American Consulate in Dhahran to the Department of State, “Accession 
Day Speech of the Ruler of Bahrain, 1/6/71, NND 969031, Box 2112, POL 15-1 BAHRAIN, 
NARA. 
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“Left alone, the leaders of these states would undoubtedly prefer to avoid 
involvement in the Arab-Israeli problem. Unfortunately their new status 
as heads of independent Arab states will not allow them the convenience 
that went with their former anonymity.”1039 
With their new membership in the Arab League also came the necessity to 
express a clear position with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict. When the 
Egyptian government announced its diplomatic recognition of the newly 
independent UAE, it let the administration in Abu Dhabi subtly know that it 
would expect UAE contribution to the Arab cause. The official Egyptian 
declaration read “Egypt […] believes that the new Arab sister state will 
contribute towards the path of the Arab nation for its glory, dignity and 
prosperity.”1040 
Only a few months after Qatar’s independence, the newly appointed Qatari 
Minister of Defence, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, announced his country’s plan 
to develop what U.S. Ambassador William A. Stoltzfus called “a rather 
grandiose military establishment.”1041 With respect to the future role of Qatar’s 
armed forces Sheikh Hamad declared: 
“We believe that our prime responsibility is to protect this (Gulf) Arab 
front so that the principal Arab forces would be free to confront our 
number one enemy -- the Zionist invader.”1042 
With this statement the Qatari leadership both emphasised the importance it 
attached to the Arab cause and signalised that it would not participate militarily 
in future Arab-Israeli confrontations. 
For the most part, the newly independent Arab Gulf monarchies strongly 
supported both the Palestinian cause and the PLO.1043 Several factors 
motivated this policy stance: first, the regime’s decision-makers felt genuine 
                                            
1039 Airgram, Dhahran A-151, American Consulate in Dhahran to the Department of State, “Arab 
Amirates: Their Conduct in Foreign Affairs,” 12/29/71, NND 969045, Box 2640, POL 7 UAE 1-1-
70, NARA. 
1040 Telegram, Cairo 3008, American Embassy in Cairo to the Department of State “Egypt 
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1041 Airgram, Kuwait A-44, American Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State, “Al-
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QATAR, NARA. 
1042 Ibid. 
1043 For UAE support of the Palestinian cause and the PLO, see al-Alkim, Foreign Policy, pp. 
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sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians and objected to the occupation of 
Arab lands, particularly in the case of Jerusalem. 
Second, Qatar and the UAE had significant Palestinian communities. The 
roughly 45,000 Palestinians living in Qatar amounted to 22% of the population 
and even exceeded the community of Qatari nationals. In the UAE, the 
Palestinian share of the population was even larger with 40,000 Palestinians 
constituting approximately 30% of the total population. The influence of the 
Palestinian expatriates in the societies was particularly palpable as they 
occupied influential positions, for example in the media sector.1044 
Third, being a newly independent state, not yet recognised diplomatically by its 
powerful neighbour Saudi Arabia, the UAE had a vital interest in the recognition 
of its legitimacy as a sovereign state by as many members of the Arab League 
as possible. Hence, staunch support of the Arab cause was a strategically 
advisable policy.1045 
Fourth, the individual UAE emirates and Qatar, lacking both the personnel and 
the expertise, were heavily reliant on foreign Arab consultants in the field of 
foreign policy. Sheikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi, President of the UAE and main 
decision maker in the country’s foreign policy, relied on an Iraqi foreign policy 
advisor.1046 Qatar’s leadership confided in a former Egyptian diplomat as chief 
foreign policy advisor.1047 Hence, the foreign policy of the two countries was 
affected greatly by former diplomats of radical Arab states. For example, in 
September 1972, the UAE, as the only Arab Gulf monarchy, supported a 
                                            
1044 John K. Cooley, “Iran, the Palestinians, and the Gulf,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 3 
(Summer 1979), pp. 1017-34, p. 1020 and Abadi, “Israel’s Relations,” p. 52. For example, the 
director of the newly established radio station in Dubai was a Palestinian. Airgram, Dhahran A-
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Palestinians, and the Gulf,” p. 1020. 
1045 Personal interview with historian Dr. Frauke Heard-Bey in Abu Dhabi in February 2012. 
1046 Adnan Al Pachachi, Iraq’s Permanent Representative at the United Nations from 1959 to 
1965 and again from 1967 to 1969 as well as Iraqi foreign minister from 1965 to 1967. Al 
Pachachi, a strong supporter of Nasserite Arab nationalism, left the Iraqi diplomatic service 
following the Baath party’s rise to power in Iraq. 
1047 Dhahran A-151 (1971). 
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proposal by radical Arab states to boycott the 1972 UN General Assembly 
session in response to U.S. policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.1048 
Only Oman refrained from support of the PLO due to the involvement of 
Palestinian factions in the ongoing Dhofar Rebellion as ideological and material 
supporters of the rebel forces.1049 
U.S. Policy, the Strength of Communism, and the Predicament of Moder-
ate Arab Regimes 
In their dealings with the United States, Saudi Arabia consistently stressed the 
negative consequences the disproportionate U.S. support for Israel had for the 
interests of both the moderate Arab regimes and the United States themselves. 
The main theme of Saudi warnings was the connection between U.S. policy and 
the level of Soviet influence in the Arab world. In the Saudi administration’s 
logic the U.S. bias for Israel, marked by diplomatic, political, and economic 
support as well as weapons shipments, drove Arab states into the arms of the 
Soviet Union; examples of this development could be seen in the cases of 
Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and the two Yemens.1050 In a letter to President 
Nixon, dated March 22, 1972, King Faisal stated: 
“It distresses me […] to have to say that it is the United States that is 
inducing the Arab nations to side with the Communist camp in self-
defense and for the preservation of their dignity. […] [C]ontinued political, 
economic and military patronage and support of Israel by the United 
States, as well as the United States’ readiness to supply arms and 
aircraft to Israel upon request and on the pretext of preserving the 
balance of power, have caused the Arab states to give in to domestic 
public pressure and take a hostile stand toward the United States […] 
America’s unabashed siding with Israel is responsible for the latter’s 
persistence in wrongdoing, inflexibility and rejection of every plan for a 
solution […] As a result of her obduracy and of the United States’ siding 
with her, Israel now sneers at United Naions [sic] resolutions and pays 
no attention to them. This is bound to result in the growth of Communist 
influence in the area under the leadership of the Soviet Union, which 
                                            
1048 The proposal was put forward by Iraq, Libya, the PDRY, and Syria. Telegram, Jidda 3045, 
American Embassy in Jidda to the Department of State, “Proposed Arab Boycott of UNGA,” 
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1049 Compare Allen, Jr. and Rigsbee II., Oman under Qaboos, p. 206. 
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2/5/69, cited in FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XXIV, pp. 399-404, p. 399. 
  294
sides openly with the Arabs, and in a gradual shrinking of the interests of 
the United States of America in that part of the world.”1051 
The connection between U.S. foreign policy and the strength of Soviet influence 
in the Arab world was appreciated by the entire Saudi administration. Things 
were different with regard to what U.S. Secretary of State Rogers called 
sarcastically King Faisal’s “pet theory that Communism and Zionism are twin 
aspects of the same world-wide conspiracy.”1052 Faisal was of the firm belief 
that Israel was playing a skilful game of duplicity, pretending to be in a political 
alliance with the United States, while being secretly in cahoots with the Soviet 
Union. In the above quoted letter to President Nixon Faisal stated: 
“I am absolutely certain that it is Communist influence on Israel that has 
prompted her to obstruct every proposal for a solution, the reason being 
to perpetuate trouble in the area so that Communism may be able to 
spread its influence there and eventually bring all of the states of the 
Middle East to resolve, against their will, in its orbit.”1053 
While he never openly disagreed with his half-brother, Prince Fahd, already 
then a highly important figure in Saudi foreign policymaking, did not share 
Faisal’s belief in the existence of a Communist-Zionist conspiracy.1054 
The U.S. foreign policy bias for Israel caused additional problems for Saudi 
Arabia and other U.S. allies among Arab states. For one thing, the radical 
factions in the Arab world put significant pressure on the Saudi and other 
regimes to terminate their strategic alliance with Israel’s main supporter. Saudi 
Arabia was more and more caught in a substantial dilemma: Close relations 
with the United States were simultaneously essential for and a liability to the 
security, economic prosperity, and domestic stability of the Kingdom. As Saudi 
Arabia was also an important partner to the United States, the Kingdom tried to 
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persuade the U.S. government that a more balanced foreign policy in the 
Middle East was in U.S. vital interest, too. 
The Kuwaiti government, too, urged the United States to adopt a more 
balanced policy in the Middle East. Reporting on a conversation he had with 
Kuwaiti Minister of Interior and Defence Sheikh Saad in October 1971, U.S. 
Ambassador John P. Walsh stated: 
“Sa’ad at that point became rather emotional and said he couldn’t 
understand our policies. […] He said every Arab wants the Russians out 
of the Middle East, but our policies make it almost impossible for any 
decent Arab Government to survive.”1055 
Moreover, Saudi Arabia was concerned about fedayeen violence outside of 
Israel and against non-Israeli targets. The Kingdom was particularly anxious 
about attacks on the oil infrastructure in the region and actions jeopardising the 
domestic stability of Jordan. In its dealings with the U.S. government, Saudi 
Arabia argued that U.S. policy prompted the radical fedayeen factions to such 
actions that were contradictory to the interests of both the moderate Arab states 
and the United States themselves.1056 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt’s Change of Camps 
Following Nasser’s death on September 28, 1970 and Anwar Al Sadat’s 
subsequent succession as president of Egypt, the relations between the Arab 
Gulf monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia, and Egypt improved considerably. 
Faisal and Sadat’s longstanding close friendship was essential in the rapid 
Saudi-Egyptian rapprochement. In a notable example of the mutual respect and 
trust between the two statesmen, Sadat let the Saudi government know that he 
had instructed his military command to take orders from Faisal in case of an 
emergency while he was away on a trip to Moscow in early 1972.1057 
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In its relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia utilised its vastly increased oil income 
predominantly to influence the former regarding its superpower affiliation. It was 
the distinct Saudi objective to assure that Egypt interrupts its strategic alliance 
with the Soviet Union and joins the U.S.-led Western alliance. The Saudi 
intention was based on four main factors: First, the Saudi regime was strictly 
anti-Communist and considered the Soviet Union a major threat to its foreign 
and domestic security. Should Egypt defect the Soviet Union and become an 
ally of the United States, it would weaken considerably the Soviet position in the 
Middle East and in the entire East-West conflict for that matter. 
Second, having the United States as a common ally would tighten the Saudi-
Egyptian relationship and further reduce the threat of a renewed enmity 
between the two Arab states. 
Third, by helping the United States to a significant strategic victory, Saudi 
Arabia would proof its outstanding importance for U.S. strategic interests in the 
Middle East, further solidifying a bilateral relationship particularly relevant to 
Saudi Arabia’s security and domestic stability. 
Fourth, Saudi Arabia hoped that by ensuring that Egypt enters the U.S. camp 
the United States would reduce its disproportionate support of Israel. 
Shortly following Nasser’s death, Saudi Arabia attempted to convince the new 
Egyptian regime to terminate its close relationship with the Soviet Union. In 
November 1970, in a meeting with President Sadat, the Saudi chief of 
intelligence, Kamal Adham, conveyed King Faisal’s suggestion that a 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Egypt would affect U.S. foreign policy towards 
the Arab-Israeli conflict to the advantage of the Arabs. Sadat made a 
counterproposal: He would order the Soviet military out of Egypt in return for an 
Israeli withdrawal from the Suez Canal’s east bank and the resumption of 
shipping on the canal; Adham conveyed Sadat’s proposition to the United 
States. In the following months, Adham, who had by then become a regular 
intermediary between Sadat and the Nixon administration, informed the U.S. 
government of Sadat’s urgent intention to reduce Egypt’s dependence on the 
Soviet Union. Nonetheless, on May 27, 1971, Egypt signed a fifteen-year Treaty 
of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. King Faisal, who arrived in 
Washington on the same day, used the occasion of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty 
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to reiterate the necessity for a change in U.S. foreign policy in order to not 
further strengthen Soviet influence in the Arab world.1058 
In the end, the declaration of close Soviet-Egyptian relations had a little lasting 
effect. On July 7, 1972, Sadat ordered all Soviet personnel to leave Egypt by 
July 17 and to take all advanced weaponry with them.1059 Paradoxically, 
progress in the U.S.-Soviet détente became the trigger for the break in Soviet-
Egyptian relations. In the final communiqué of the U.S.-Soviet summit in 
Moscow in May 1972, the two states agreed on an early warning mechanism to 
reduce the risk of regional conflict escalation and subsequent superpower 
involvement. In light of this development, Sadat considered the Soviet military 
presence in Egypt to constrain his autonomy of decision regarding the conflict 
with Israel as he expected the Soviet Union to strongly oppose the war option. 
Ultimately, the assurance of continuous Saudi political and financial support 
was an essential criterion for Sadat’s decision to terminate his country’s close 
relations with the Soviet Union.1060 
Saudi Arabia’s policy of rapprochement with Egypt and intermediation between 
Egypt and the United States turned out to be rather successful; two of three 
main Saudi objectives were realised. Egypt terminated its close relations with 
the Soviet Union. Over the course of the following years, Egypt became an 
important ally of the United States in its Cold War efforts against Moscow. The 
Saudi-Egyptian relationship grew stronger allowing Saudi Arabia to consolidate 
the role as a major Arab power it had gained following the Six-Day War. 
However, the Saudi regime underestimated the strength of the U.S.-Israeli 
relationship. In the end, the Egyptian realignment did not affect either the U.S. 
relations with Israel, the U.S. stance towards the occupation of Arab land or the 
Palestinian question in the way Saudi Arabia anticipated or at least hoped for. 
As a consequence of their failed attempt to alter U.S.-Israeli relations and 
provoke U.S. pressure for an Israeli policy change, Saudi Arabia eventually 
referred to supporting another war against Israel in the autumn of 1973. 
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Principal Readiness for Peace 
With the exception of Oman, the Arab Gulf monarchies vehemently rejected 
Zionist ideology as well as Israeli occupation of Arab lands, demanded an 
immediate Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, particularly East 
Jerusalem, and publicly supported both fedayeen actions against Israel and the 
notion of “the Battle of Destiny against the Israeli enemy.”1061 However, behind 
closed doors, in contacts with the U.S. administration, the Arab Gulf monarchies 
showed clearly their principal readiness for a peaceful resolution of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. 
It is important to note that King Faisal, likely the strongest anti-Zionist among 
Arab Gulf monarchs, made a clear distinction between Zionism and Judaism. 
While he respected the Jewish religion and the right of Palestinian Jews to live 
in Palestine, he strongly rejected the notion of Zionism. He blamed Western 
Jewish immigrants and their Zionist-nationalist ideology for the ongoing conflict. 
In his 1972 letter to President Nixon, Faisal emphasised 
“if only the /Near/ Eastern Jews were involved and the Western Zionists 
were to return to the countries from which they emigrated, the Arabs and 
they /the Near Eastern Jews/ would be able to live together, as they have 
in the past, and the problem would be solved entirely.”1062 
In public statements, the Arab Gulf monarchies, again with the exception of 
Oman, maintained their anti-Israeli stance as well as their strong support for the 
Arab cause. In an address to heads of Islamic pilgrimage missions in Mecca in 
January 1973, King Faisal reiterated his call for “a Jihad to defend our holy 
places, our land, our faith and our dignity.”1063 Assessing the significance of 
Faisal’s statement, the U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia pointed out that the 
“King can normally be expected to make such a reference to Holy War against 
Zionism in any public speech before a Moslem audience.”1064 A joint 
communiqué of King Faisal and the Qatari Emir, Sheikh Khalifa Al Thani, in May 
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1973, took the same line when it called “for [the] mobilization of Arabic and 
Islamic resources to prepare for [the] ‘Battle of Destiny’” against Israel.1065 In a 
conversation in the presence of Newsweek correspondent Arnaud de 
Borchgrave in December 1970, King Faisal advocated a very uncompromising 
position when he said that a return to pre-Six-Day War borders was 
unacceptable and that “the Arabs would insist on the total elimination of the 
present Israeli state, and no less than the establishment of a multi-national 
democratic state.”1066 Following the same logic, Saudi Arabia also rejected UN 
Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, which requested the return of Arab 
territories occupied during the Six-Day War and failed to mention the creation of 
a Palestinian state. However, in private conversations with U.S. government 
officials, the Saudi administration adopted a very different attitude, showing 
significant readiness to compromise. Reporting a conversation with King Faisal 
in May 1969 U.S. Ambassador Eilts summarised the Saudi monarch’s remarks 
regarding a territorial settlement with Israel as follows: 
“[The] Israelis must be induced [to] lay their cards on the table and [to] 
indicate what they want. If their territorial demands are reasonable and 
compensation is offered, [King Faisal] thought Jordan would be willing 
and able [to] work out something. [The Saudi government] will accept 
anything which [the] parties directly involved agree upon. […] Faisal 
made it clear however, that Jerusalem is [the] single exception to his 
willingness [to] accept such rectification of boundaries. He insisted that 
[the] Israelis must get out of Jerusalem. Failing this, [the Saudi 
government] will not accept any peace settlement and will seek to rally 
Arabs and Muslims against it.”1067 
Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Saqqaf later indicated to the U.S. 
administration that Saudi Arabia would neither lead the way and accept 
Resolution 242 nor submit a proposal for conflict resolution based on the UN 
document. However, Saqqaf repeated that if the Arab parties directly involved in 
the conflict with Israel accepted an agreement based on Resolution 242 Saudi 
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Arabia would “abide by it.”1068 A few months later Saqqaf reiterated the 
boundaries of Saudi Arabia’s readiness to compromise, when he stated that the 
Kingdom would accept any solution of the conflict as long as it “does not detach 
[Jerusalem’s] holy places from the Arab world.”1069 
The clear contradiction between official and unofficial Saudi statements is 
attributable to the Saudi regime’s objective to not provoke domestic or foreign 
Arab opposition to its policy. A peaceful conflict resolution was clearly in Saudi 
Arabia’s interest. Nonetheless, it was too high a political risk for the Saudi 
administration to call publicly for a conflict resolution on the basis of recognition 
of the pre-Six-Day War realities. Moreover, the Saudi government stressed 
unequivocally that it was not willing to compromise with regard to the holy sites 
of Jerusalem; a stance that has remained unchanged until today. It is however, 
noteworthy that while in 1969 King Faisal demanded Israel leaving Jerusalem 
altogether, three years later Minister of State Saqqaf insisted on the attachment 
to the Arab world only of Jerusalem’s holy places. 
To prevent another Arab-Israeli war, Saudi Arabia tried to contribute to the 
realisation of an Egyptian-Israeli interim agreement by acting as an intermediary 
between Egypt and the United States. In a conversation with Joseph J. Sisco, 
the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 
Prince Sultan “promised that Saudi Arabia would press Sadat to ‘keep his cool’” 
and expressed his hope that “the U.S. would likewise press Israel not to 
complicate things.”1070 
Also, the Kuwaiti government made public statements that clearly contradicted 
their unofficial conversations with the U.S. administration. At a reception for 
Kuwaiti journalists on the occasion of the Eid al-Adha holiday, the Kuwaiti Emir 
emphasised that “Kuwait stands by the Arab confrontation countries and will not 
spare any resources, in money or men, for the Battle of Destiny against the 
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Israeli enemy.”1071 In contrast, around the same time, in a conversation with 
U.S. Ambassador Walsh, the Kuwaiti Minister of Interior and Defence, Sheikh 
Saad, expressed considerable concern regarding the possibility of imminent 
war.1072 Paralleling Saudi statements, Kuwait made clear in contacts with the 
U.S. administration that it would not deal directly with Israel or accept UN 
Resolution 242. However, Kuwait would accept any solution agreed to by the 
Palestinians.1073 
In contrast to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the UAE publicly endorsed UN 
Resolution 242 on December 7, 1972. Addressing the UN General Assembly 
the UAE Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Saif Ghubash, requested that the 
world community press Israel to stop its illegal settlement building in the 
occupied Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Syrian Golan Heights. The UAE’s 
endorsement of the UN Resolution prompted criticism by the PLO.1074 
The Way into War 
The newly gained Saudi influence on Egypt’s policy and the new Egyptian 
perception of Saudi Arabia as an Arab power in general and an important ally in 
particular were evidenced when Sadat informed Faisal in April 1973 about the 
secret Egyptian-Syrian plan to attack Israel in the autumn of the same year in 
order to reconquer previously lost territory.1075 On August 23, 1973, during an 
unannounced visit of Sadat to Riyadh, King Faisal promised to support the joint 
Egyptian-Syrian war efforts against Israel with up to $500 million and signalled 
his willingness to use oil as a political weapon to put pressure on Israel’s allies. 
According to Muhammad Heikal, Faisal emphasised that for the oil weapon to 
work as a means of influencing the policy of Israel’s supporters, the war needed 
to go on for more than only a few days. Reportedly, Faisal said 
“But […] give us time. We don’t want to use our oil as a weapon in a 
battle which only goes on for two or three days and then stops. We want 
to see a battle which goes on for long enough time for world public 
opinion to be mobilized.”1076 
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Faisal likely had in mind the first and effectless use of the oil weapon during the 
1967 Six-Day War.1077 
When the October War1078 eventually broke out on October 6, the Arab Gulf 
monarchies did (at first) not take part militarily. After initial hesitation, Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait each sent a motorised infantry brigade to the Syrian Golan 
Heights. The contingents that included artillery units reached the Golan Heights 
on October 13, eight days into the war. The Saudi troops saw merely one day of 
battle (October 19) on which they later claimed to have destroyed and damaged 
a total of eight Israeli tanks, while they themselves reportedly lost four armoured 
cars and nine soldiers.1079 Kuwaiti units are also reported to have been fighting 
alongside Egyptian and Palestinian forces on the Sinai Peninsula.1080 
However, as in previous Arab-Israeli wars, the main involvement of the Arab 
Gulf monarchies was on a financial, economic, and diplomatic level; particularly 
active in this regard were Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. 
Repeated Warnings of Oil Sanctions 
For months prior to the outbreak of the October War, the possibility of an Arab 
oil embargo had been discussed in the international press. When the Arab oil 
exporting countries began to apply the oil weapon on October 17, the U.S. 
government was caught by surprise. They had not anticipated Saudi Arabia’s 
not only agreeing to but even actively pressing for the use of oil sanctions 
against the United States and several European and other nations. However, 
the U.S. government should not have been taken aback by the actions of Saudi 
Arabia and the remaining major oil producing Arab Gulf monarchies. Indeed, 
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Saudi Arabia had warned the U.S. administration on several occasions in direct 
contacts and over the press that under certain circumstances they would see no 
alternative but to use their oil resources as political leverage. As early as in 
October 1971, Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Saqqaf warned his 
U.S. counterpart, William P. Rogers that, while it was not in their interest, the 
Saudi administration would be politically forced to embargo the United States 
should another Arab-Israeli war break out.1081 
The Saudi government clearly wanted to prevent the use of the oil weapon, 
mainly to not jeopardise their relations with the United States. In August 1972, 
in an interview with the Egyptian weekly magazine Al-Mussawar, King Faisal 
discarded the use of the oil weapon against the United States, claiming it would 
only hurt the Arab cause and not affect the U.S. economy, as the United States 
would “not need a bit of Saudi oil or the oil of the Arab Gulf before 1985.”1082 It 
is safe to assume that the Saudi King was well aware of the falseness of his 
statement and that his comment was intended to change the Arab and 
particularly the Egyptian public’s perspective on the use of oil as a political 
weapon against the United States. 
In mid-April 1973, the Saudi administration altered its previous stance and 
stressed the connection between the developments of its oil exports with U.S. 
policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. During a visit to Washington, Saudi Oil 
Minister Yamani suggested that Saudi Arabia could increase its oil production in 
order to meet risen U.S. energy demands. However, implying the precondition 
of a U.S. policy alteration, he diplomatically added “it was important to create 
the right political atmosphere.”1083 
On May 23, King Faisal said in a meeting with several ARAMCO and U.S. 
government officials that due to the close U.S.-Saudi relations the current U.S. 
policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict caused increasing Saudi isolation within 
the Arab world. He went on to warn that unless there was a significant change 
in U.S. policy, the Saudi regime would have to act with the consequence that 
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U.S. interests in the region would no longer be maintained. Henry Moses, Vice 
President of the Mobil Oil Corporation, later recalled King Faisal having alarmed 
his U.S. dialog partners with the words “Action must be taken; otherwise 
everything will be lost.”1084 
In the course of July 1973, Saudi warnings towards the United States further 
intensified. On July 4, King Faisal for the first time declared publicly that an 
increase in Saudi oil production would be difficult as long as the United States 
did not adopt a more balanced policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Two weeks 
later, the King’s warnings escalated further when he expressed that, unless 
there was an alteration in U.S. policy, Saudi Arabia would be forced to limit its 
oil supply to the United States.1085 
The Kuwaiti government also issued several warnings in this regard. In April 
1973, Emir Sabah Al Sabah declared, “[w]hen zero hour comes, we shall use 
the oil as an effective weapon in the battle.”1086 The following month, on May 
15, 1973, on the occasion of the anniversary of Israel’s creation, Kuwait joined 
the radical Arab states of Algeria, Libya, and Iraq, in symbolically stopping oil 
production for a short period of time. This action could be seen as a warning 
shot to the United States and other Israel-friendly states, that Kuwait would be 
ready to use the oil weapon in coordination with other Arab oil producing 
states.1087 Along with the majority of Arab states, the Kuwaiti government 
harshly criticised the U.S. veto of UN Security Council draft resolution S/10974 
on July 26, 1973. The draft resolution, that “strongly deplore[d] Israel’s 
continuing occupation of territories occupied as a result of the 1967 conflict,” 
had been sponsored by several members of the Non-Aligned Movement, 
including Sudan.1088 In reaction, Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry sources announced 
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“that the Ministry would launch immediate consultations with the Arab 
capitals to adopt a unified Arab policy to confront the American - Zionist 
alliance and consider all steps necessary to force the U.S. to abandon its 
hostile and anti-Arab policies.”1089 
Sheikh Zayid, too, issued several warnings of an oil embargo. In interviews to 
the Dutch newspaper De Telegraph on August 6, 1973 and to the Lebanese 
daily Al-Anwar two days later, the UAE President implied that his country would 
agree to the use of the oil weapon if its application were decided unanimously 
among Arabs.1090 In another interview to the Kuwaiti magazine, Al-Hawadith, on 
August 23, Sheikh Zayid expressed explicitly his readiness to join in an Arab oil 
embargo against the United States. He even went as far as to threaten the 
United States to terminate its support for Israel or to “face the 
consequences.”1091 
Application of the Oil Weapon 
On October 12, in the light of considerable Arab advances in the first days of 
the war, the United States started a massive air lift of war material to support 
Israel’s armed forces.1092 U.S. justifications that their war support of Israel was 
mere compensation for very significant Soviet reinforcements sent to the Arab 
states neither convinced the Saudi administration nor did it alleviate its 
anger.1093 On October 16, the Saudi government requested the European 
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Community countries pressure the United States to change its policy. 
Otherwise, Saudi Arabia would reduce its oil production and urge the remaining 
Arab oil producing states to follow its lead, thereby harming particularly the 
European states that were highly dependent on oil imports from the Arab 
world.1094 
The governments of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE were also very upset 
about the U.S. airlift. The harshest criticism of U.S. policy was voiced by the 
Emir of Qatar.1095 
On October 17, the same day the Saudi and Kuwaiti foreign ministers met with 
President Nixon in Washington, the members of OAPEC assembled in Kuwait. 
Present at the meeting were five of the six Arab Gulf monarchies (Oman was 
not a member of OAPEC) as well as Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. 
During the meeting, Iraq advocated its fellow Arab oil producers to 
“nationalize all American businesses in the Arab world, to withdraw all 
funds from American banks, and to institute a total oil embargo against 
the United States and other countries friendly to Israel;” 
a policy amounting to “a declaration of all-out economic warfare against the 
United States.”1096 Both the Algerian Oil Minister, chairing the meeting, and 
Yamani clearly objected the Iraqi proposal whereupon the Iraqi delegation left 
the meeting in anger. The remaining Arab oil ministers then decided to cut their 
oil production by five percent and to implement additional monthly reductions of 
five percent until Israel withdraws from all Arab territories occupied during the 
1967 Six-Day War. The decision to reduce overall oil production rather than to 
embargo single countries was made after considering the previous, effectless 
Arab oil embargoes of 1956 and 1967, when embargoed nations were supplied 
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through third nations. The prospect of continued reductions in oil production 
was supposed to intensify pressure on the United States and indirectly on 
Israel. The Arab oil ministers added another aspect to the equation when they 
decided that unspecified “friendly states” would receive oil shipments at 
previous levels.1097 Thereby, the Arab oil producers intended to “maximize 
uncertainty, tension, and rivalry within and among the importing countries,” as 
“[o]ne clear objective of the plan was to split the industrial countries right from 
the start.”1098 In a secret resolution, the Arab oil ministers recommended 
subjecting the United States to “the most severe cuts” with the intention to 
evoke eventually “a total halt of oil supplies to the United States from every 
individual country party to the resolution.”1099 
Saudi Arabia became the first Arab oil producing state to reduce its oil 
production. On October 18, the Kingdom cut its production by ten percent, 
double the percentage agreed upon at the Kuwait meeting. Due to the 
Kingdom’s high production rate of nearly 10 million barrels per day, Saudi 
Arabia’s production cut was of particular impact. Qatar followed suit the next 
day, also reducing its production level by ten percent. Bahrain reduced its oil 
production by five percent on October 20, Kuwait by ten percent on October 21. 
Iraq, whose radical proposal had been rejected in Kuwait, walked a completely 
different path. Not only did they not reduce their oil production, they increased it 
and profited from skyrocketing oil prices.1100 
On October 19, after giving advance notice to several Arab governments, 
President Nixon publicly requested the U.S. Congress to appropriate a military 
aid package for Israel amounting to $2.2 billion.1101 This massive interference 
into the war in support of Israel prompted a significant tightening of Arab oil 
sanctions against the United States. The UAE were the first Arab country to 
react. On October 18, on the eve of Nixon’s official request to Congress, UAE 
Oil Minister Al Utaibah announced at a press conference that the UAE would 
embargo oil shipments to the United States effective immediately. He 
emphasised that the embargo would be expanded to any other state supporting 
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Israel in the war. In addition, Said Al Utaiba implicitly called on the remaining 
Arab oil producing countries “to follow Abu Dhabi’s lead.”1102 Interestingly, only 
the emirate of Abu Dhabi imposed immediately the embargo against the United 
States.1103 Dubai only followed suit three days later. Second to Abu Dhabi in 
embargoing the United States was Libya (Oct. 19), followed by Saudi Arabia 
and Algeria (both Oct. 20), Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar (all Oct. 21). Even 
Oman, known for its political restraint in the Arab-Israeli conflict, imposed an 
embargo against the United States on October 25.1104 The Saudi embargo was 
most painful to the United States as the Kingdom had previously shipped 
9,794,000 barrels per month to the United States.1105 
The Bahraini regime went one step further and officially cancelled the 
December 1971 leasing agreement, which allowed the U.S. Navy to use 
docking facilities at Jufair.1106 This measure was also to compensate the minor 
effect the reduction of the Bahraini oil production would have; by that time 
Bahraini production was already declining and at a level of only 68,000 barrels 
per day.1107 
The oil embargo did not remain limited to the United States; other countries 
were added to the list due to their support for Israel in the course of the war. 
Between October 21 and October 30, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and 
Qatar as well as Libya followed Algerian lead and imposed embargoes against 
the Netherlands for their staunch support of Israel.1108 An embargo was also 
imposed on Denmark.1109 At the Arab League’s Algiers Summit on November 
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28, the embargo was further extended to “the colonialist and racist regimes of 
South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal” for their support of Israel.1110 
With both elements of the oil weapon, production cuts and embargoes, applied, 
the Arab oil producing states had classified importing countries into three 
categories: favoured countries that could import Arab oil at pre-October levels, 
embargoed countries, and neutral countries that would have to divide among 
themselves what was left of Arab oil exports.1111 
In early November, the Arab oil producing states, with the exception of Iraq, 
decided to reduce their September oil production quotas by 25% including the 
already embargoed quantities. Moreover, they scheduled an additional 5% 
production cut for December based on the November quotas. Reportedly, by 
the time the decision was made, Kuwait’s production rate had already been 
reduced by 22 to 23%.1112 
The oil sanction policy was relatively effective with the European states. A 
declaration by the European Economic Community’s foreign ministers issued on 
November 6 showed a clear alteration of European policy. The document called 
for a ceasefire and negotiations toward a “just and lasting peace through the 
application of Security Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts.” Moreover, the 
document voiced that the foundation of an Arab-Israeli peace agreement should 
be 
“[t]he inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force [,] [t]he need for 
Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the 
conflict of 1967 [and the] [r]ecognition that in the establishment of a just 
and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinians.”1113 
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In appreciation of the EEC nations’ stance in the conflict, the Arab Oil Ministers, 
at their November 18 meeting in Vienna, decided to exclude the non-
embargoed European nations from the December production cut.1114 
At their December 25 meeting, the Arab oil ministers decided to increase their 
production by 10% in order to bolster the suffering European and Japanese 
economies. At the same time, however, the oil embargo against the United 
States was kept up.1115 It was not before March 18, 1974 that the Arab oil 
ministers decided to lift the embargo against the United States. Even then, upon 
insistence of Algeria, the lifting of the embargo was announced to be only 
provisional and conditional on continuing U.S. policy.1116 The embargoes 
against the Netherlands and Denmark stayed in place for nearly another four 
months and were lifted only after a decision taken at an OPEC meeting on July 
10, 1974.1117 
At first glance, Saudi Arabia’s demeanour during the oil crisis looked like a 
major foreign policy shift. Particularly the oil embargo against the United States 
appeared as a considerable breach of previous Saudi policy. On closer 
examination, however, Saudi policy during the oil crisis showed great 
consistency with the Kingdom’s policy both before and after the application of 
the Arab oil weapon. First, when the October War started, Saudi Arabia felt the 
need to stand by its relatively new-found allies, Egypt and Syria to prevent a 
resurgence of the intra-Arab Cold War. Just as before and after the October 
War intra-Arab dynamics influenced greatly Saudi policy towards the Arab-
Israeli conflict. 
Second, the Saudi decision was highly affected by concerns over domestic 
instability. Failure to sanction U.S. support for Israel would not only have 
caused massive opposition from radical Arab elements abroad, it would have 
infuriated the Saudi population as well. Hence, a demonstration of Arab unity 
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and solidarity was in the vital interest of the Saudi regime both with a view to 
external security and regime stability. 
Third, once the tide of the war had begun to turn in clear favour of Israel, it was 
in Saudi interest to prevent another devastating Arab defeat; for the sake of the 
Arab cause and not least because of the possible domestic instability such a 
development could trigger in Egypt and Syria. Particularly the possibility of a 
coup against Sadat by radical Egyptian factions concerned the Saudi 
administration. 
Fourth, by actively supporting the Arab cause Saudi Arabia saw an opportunity 
to substantiate its longstanding claim for a leading role in the Arab world. 
Fifth, particularly King Faisal had a genuine interest in the restoration of Muslim 
control over the holy sites in East Jerusalem. 
Sixth, as positive incentives had previously proven to be ineffective in prompting 
the United States to work sustainably towards these goals, Saudi Arabia 
considered negative incentives worth trying. In consequence of the United 
Kingdom’s withdrawal from the Gulf, the U.S.-Saudi alliance had increased in 
strategic importance for the United States. This allowed the Kingdom to adopt a 
more progressive policy stance without taking too high a risk of jeopardising the 
essential partnership with the United States. Nonetheless, the Saudi 
government was highly reluctant to impose an oil embargo against its U.S. ally. 
However, in the light of the massive U.S. support for Israel the Saudi 
government could no longer resist the pressure within the Arab world. During a 
meeting in mid-December King Faisal explained his dilemma to U.S. Secretary 
of State Kissinger 
“Since 1967, a lot of other forces have pressed me not only to cut off oil 
but to break diplomatic relations with the United States. For years I have 
resisted pressures from my fellow Arabs not to take more extreme 
measures. But after the October war, when the US attitude appeared to 
be one of all-out support for Israel, I had no choice.”1118 
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King Faisal was particularly concerned about the harm the oil embargo could do 
to the U.S. military power.1119 Therefore, the King wanted to lift the embargo as 
soon as possible. However, as mentioned above, the Saudi monarch placed 
high value on the preservation of Arab unity. Hence, a unilateral Saudi lifting of 
the embargo was out of the question. He emphasised in contacts with the U.S. 
administration that just as the decision to apply the oil weapon had been taken 
in accordance with the other Arab oil exporting states, the lifting of the embargo 
had to be decided collectively.1120 In order to get the radical Arab states to 
agree to a lifting of the oil sanctions and to be able to justify such an action 
before the Arab people, the Saudi regime needed U.S. involvement in the post-
October reality to the advantage of the Arab states. In essence, this meant 
successful U.S. mediation efforts towards Israeli disengagement from Arab 
lands.1121 A unilateral Saudi lifting of oil sanctions prior to Israeli concessions 
would have exposed the Saudi regime to attacks from other Arab parties and 
revive “all the old accusations of their being tools of the Americans.”1122 
At the December 8 Arab Oil Minister meeting, the Saudi delegate failed to get a 
majority behind a decision to lift the embargo and all production cuts prior to the 
Geneva peace conference on December 21, which had been scheduled upon 
Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy between Egypt and Israel. The eventual decision 
taken at the OAPEC meeting required the first step of a scheduled complete 
Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories as a quid pro quo for the 
lifting of the anti-U.S. oil embargo.1123 At an OAPEC meeting on December 25, 
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the Saudi Oil Minister again did not get the approval of a clear majority of his 
colleagues to lift the embargo and production restrictions.1124 
In late December, King Faisal authorised the supply of Saudi oil to the U.S. 
Navy’s Sixth and Seventh Fleet. The latter was actively engaged in the Vietnam 
War and was in need for oil shipments to maintain its fitness for action. As King 
Faisal did not want to see the anti-Communist U.S. military actions in Southeast 
Asia jeopardised, he agreed to a top secret breach of the embargo. Faisal’s 
condition was that the circle of persons privy to the oil deal to be strictly limited 
to minimise the risk of an information leak that would have been catastrophic to 
the domestic and foreign reputation of King Faisal and his government. 
Reportedly, the only Saudis that knew about the agreement were Oil Minister 
Yamani and his deputy, Faisal’s son Saud Al Faisal.1125 
In early January 1974, Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Saqqaf held 
out to Kissinger that the oil boycott could be lifted if Israel were to disengage 
from the Mitla Pass in Sinai as a first step to a full withdrawal from occupied 
Arab territories and prior to an Israeli guarantee of the Palestinian right to self-
determination.1126 Around January 20, there seems to have been disagreement 
among the Saudi administration’s inner circle regarding the lifting of the 
embargo. Reportedly, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Saqqaf and Minister 
of the Interior, Prince Fahd, advocated an immediate unilateral Saudi lifting of 
the oil embargo while Oil Minister Yamani and the Minister of Finance, Prince 
Musaad, insisted that Saudi Arabia would have to act in accordance with the 
remaining Arab oil producing states. King Faisal eventually took Yamani’s side 
and the Kingdom did not lift the embargo unilaterally.1127 
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By the end of January, it seemed that King Faisal and the Egyptian President 
Sadat had gotten the agreement of the majority of Arab oil producers to lift the 
embargo. In any case they had obtained approval from Bahrain, Qatar, and the 
UAE.1128 The signing of the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement on 
January 18 had been helpful in this regard as it could be considered the first 
step towards Israeli withdrawal from Arab lands. It was agreed that President 
Nixon would announce in his January 30 State of the Union Address the 
imminent summoning of an OAPEC meeting that would “discuss the lifting of 
the oil embargo.”1129 Moreover, upon both Sadat’s and Saudi request, Nixon 
included in his speech the remark that the Sinai disengagement agreement was 
“the first step” towards “full implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 
and 338.”1130 This was particularly supposed to secure Kuwaiti support to the 
lifting of the embargo.1131 
It then came as a considerable surprise that upon contacting the remaining 
Arab oil producers regarding the lifting of the embargo Saudi Arabia only 
received support from Egypt and Qatar. Algeria, Kuwait, and the UAE “firmly 
supported” the Syrian stance, that the embargo could only be lifted once Israeli 
had started disengaging from the occupied Golan Heights.1132 
In early February, Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Saqqaf travelled to 
Syria to convince President Assad to lift the embargo. To reach a common Arab 
agreement, Saqqaf suggested a “mini-summit” of King Faisal and Presidents 
Sadat, Assad, and Boumedienne of Algeria. Saqqaf reported to U.S. 
Ambassador Akins that Assad wanted to invite the ruler of Kuwait, Sabah Al 
Sabah, to the summit, a scenario the Saudis wanted to prevent by all means. 
Akins reported to Washington that Saqqaf expressed his worry that “Sabah 
might get up on a nationalist soap box and try to win a name for himself by 
being more Arab than Syria or Egypt.”1133 Saudi Arabia eventually managed to 
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schedule the summit at a time when Emir Sabah was travelling elsewhere so on 
February 15 only the heads of state of Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria 
met in Algiers. The participants of the Algiers mini-summit “decided in principle 
to lift the embargo.”1134 As King Faisal later reported to U.S. Ambassador Akins 
the four heads of state agreed that an agreement on the modalities of Israeli 
withdrawal from the Golan Heights would be a sufficient prerequisite for the 
lifting of the embargo. To prevent another defeat in an OAPEC meeting, King 
Faisal had previously insisted on postponing a summit that had been scheduled 
to take place in Tripoli on February 14. This would allow enough time for both 
the mini-summit and progress regarding the Israeli disengagement from 
Golan.1135 
As mentioned above, it took more than another month before the Arab oil 
ministers decided to lift the embargo. However, it is noteworthy that the decision 
was made prior to the signing of the Syrian-Israeli disengagement 
agreement.1136 Eventually, Libya – as expected all along – and Syria – due to 
the pending disengagement agreement – did not associate themselves with the 
official declaration of the embargo’s end.1137 
Saudi Arabia was clearly the most influential of the Arab Gulf monarchies in 
shaping Arab oil policy during the crisis. Nonetheless, the UAE and particularly 
Kuwait had some influence, too. Interestingly, as already mentioned above, 
they were partially in opposition to Saudi policy regarding the application of the 
oil weapon. 
The U.S. support of Israel during the October War had a significant effect on 
U.S.-Kuwaiti relations. A telling example was Kuwait’s rejection to receive U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs Joseph 
Sisco who wanted to discuss the oil embargo with the Kuwaiti leadership.1138 
Both Kuwait and the UAE repeatedly opposed Saudi advocating for the lifting of 
the embargo against the United States. In mid-December 1973, Saudi Minister 
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of State for Foreign Affairs Saqqaf reported to U.S. Ambassador Akins that both 
Kuwait and the UAE could oppose Saudi calls for the end of the anti-U.S. 
embargo.1139 The fact that the Saudi regime eventually failed to gain 
acceptance for its policy during the December 25 OAPEC meeting suggests 
that Kuwait and the UAE did at least not back the Saudi position. As mentioned 
above, the two Arab Gulf monarchies later plainly objected the lifting of the 
embargo prior to initial steps towards Israeli disengagement from Syrian 
territory. 
As in the case of Saudi Arabia, the Kuwaiti government’s policy during the oil 
crisis was the manifestation of a variety of interests. The Kuwaiti administration, 
too, had a genuine interest in the return of occupied Arab lands and the creation 
of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. However, in the words of 
Partrick, Kuwait’s policy was also 
“a reflection of how a revived Arab nationalist imperative regionally had 
to be embraced by the amirate. This was […] part of an ongoing foreign 
policy construct that Kuwait used to offset both regional and internal 
criticism in light of its traditional defence alignment with the UK, and now 
increasingly the US.”1140 
On the one hand, “Arabism was a language that Kuwait drew on as a safety net 
to ensure it maintained the sympathy of Arab countries.”1141 On the other hand, 
the high degree of internalisation of and support for the notion of Arab 
nationalism among the Kuwaiti population as well as members of the national 
assembly had a significant influence on the Kuwaiti government’s decision 
making.1142 Particularly this last aspect motivated the Kuwaiti leadership to 
pursue a more hard-line position than the Saudi administration. 
In the case of the UAE, it appears that Sheikh Zayid’s personal attitude was an 
important driving force behind the country’s comparatively hard-line policy 
during the oil crisis. The President of the UAE is reported to have been very 
bitter about the United States’ staunch support for Israel during the war. 
Reportedly, this was the decisive reason why he unlike the heads of state of the 
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remaining Arab Gulf monarchies, later consequently declined all invitations for a 
state visit to the United States.1143 Moreover, as expounded above, the UAE’s 
large Palestinian community as well as the country’s striving for recognition as a 
sovereign state among the Arab state community greatly influenced its position 
during the oil crisis. It can be assumed that the latter aspect was an important 
motive behind the UAE’s siding with Syria towards the end of the oil crisis. 
Furthermore, at that time, the United Kingdom and not the United States was 
the most important UAE ally. Hence, Sheikh Zayid opposed the indiscriminate 
oil production cut that also hurt the UAE’s British ally.1144 In an interview to Al-
Hawadith Sheikh Zayid later stated: 
“I objected to the reduction in oil production because it would have meant 
a penalty imposed on all; while a distinction should have been made 
between those who supported the enemy and those who did not. Thus, I 
suggested that we cut off oil supplies to those who supported the enemy, 
assisted those who opposed the aggression, and did not inflict any 
measures on those who were neutral.”1145 
Accordingly, Sheikh Zayid early on called for an oil embargo against the United 
States. Contrary to earlier announcements that he would not make unilateral 
moves with regard to oil sanctions, he eventually did not await a common Arab 
decision and became the first head of state to impose an embargo against the 
United States.1146 In another sign of Sheikh Zayid’s serious desire to support 
the Arab war efforts against Israel, he suggested to his Qatari counterpart the 
levying of a 25% oil revenue tax to finance the procurement of arms to be used 
against Israel.1147 That it took the emirate of Dubai a few days to impose the 
anti-U.S. embargo following the UAE President’s decision suggests a difference 
in perspective between Sheikhs Zayid and Rashid. 
The remaining three Arab Gulf monarchies had very minor influence on Arab oil 
policy during the oil crisis. Among them, only Bahrain and Qatar were members 
of OAPEC and participants at the Arab oil minister meetings. The three 
countries’ oil production levels were comparatively low. In a conversation with 
U.S. Ambassador Akins, Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Saqqaf 
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encapsulated the unimportance of Qatar with regard to Arab oil politics during 
the crisis. Mentioning that Qatar had backed the Saudi plea to lift the oil 
embargo in early February 1973, Saqqaf reportedly said that the Emirate’s 
voice “doesn’t even count.”1148 Bahraini and Omani oil productions were smaller 
than Qatar’s, and Oman did not even participate in the oil minister’s meetings. 
Hence, the two countries’ significance in shaping Arab oil policy was even more 
remote. Their decisions to follow their fellow Arab oil producers in applying the 
oil weapon were also motivated to different degrees by a genuine interest in the 
Arab cause as well as domestic and external pressures to act in accordance 
with Arab unity and solidarity. 
At first sight, the use of the oil weapon turned out to be largely effectless. The 
United States kept up their political, economic, and military support of Israel. 
The latter did not withdraw from the occupied Arab territories and the 
Palestinians did not get their state. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia and the smaller 
Arab Gulf monarchies profited greatly from the results of the oil crisis. First, the 
Kingdom succeeded in positioning itself as a leading power in the Arab world. 
This aspect would later influence greatly the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
associated peace process. 
Second, the skyrocketing oil prices let to a dramatic increase of Saudi Arabia’s 
state revenues, which again had two major consequences: with regard to 
foreign policy, Saudi Arabia, was able to increase considerably its financial 
support of and thereby its political influence on the Arab front states, particularly 
Egypt; with regard to domestic policy, the Saudi regime was able to finance the 
country’s development into a wealthy, modern rentier state with a lasting 
positive effect on domestic and regime stability. 
Third, due to Saudi Arabia’s importance in U.S. strategy, the oil crisis had no 
negative effect on the bilateral U.S.-Saudi relationship. On the contrary, in the 
post-oil crisis period, Riyadh received more political and military support from 
the United States than before. Additionally, the Saudi regime reinvested much 
of its petro-dollars in the United States which gave the Kingdom more influence 
on the U.S. economy. Leaving aside the fact that the use of the oil weapon did 
                                            
1148 Telegram, Jidda 552, American Embassy in Jidda to the Department of State, “New Arab 
Condition for Lifting Oil Boycott,” 2/3/74, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 139, Country 
Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Dec 73-Feb 74, NPMP, NARA. 
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not help ending the Arab-Israeli conflict, Saudi Arabia’s policy during the oil 
crisis brought the Kingdom significant advantages in both the foreign and 
domestic realms. 
Fourth, the other Arab Gulf monarchies also profited from the oil market 
dynamics; that was particularly true for Kuwait and the UAE, which had 
comparatively higher oil production rates. Although not to the extent of Saudi 
Arabia, financially potent Kuwait was able to increase its influence in Arab 
politics in general and on the Arab front states in the Arab-Israeli conflict in 
particular; as in the case of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait’s power stemmed predomi-
nantly from its financial resources. To a lesser degree, this also implied to the 
four remaining Arab Gulf monarchies. Just like the Saudi leadership, they were 
able to contribute to the stability of their regimes through reinvesting parts of 
their considerably increased oil revenues into infrastructure development. 
4.3 Camp David and Egypt’s Expulsion from the Arab League 
The end of the oil crisis in March 1974 ringed in a new phase of Gulf State 
involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Henceforth, Saudi Arabia used its 
increased power status in the Arab world to work towards a holistic conflict 
settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The most prominent example in this 
regard was Saudi involvement in pre-negotiations for the planned Arab-Israeli 
Peace Conference in Geneva. For one thing, Saudi Arabia had still a genuine 
interest in seeing an end to the Palestinian plight, the creation of a Palestinian 
state as well as the return of all Arab lands under Israeli occupation. 
More importantly, however, Saudi Arabia was interested in a termination of the 
divide among the conflicting allies of the United States in the Middle East – 
Egypt and itself on one side, Israel on the other. The motivation behind it was 
Saudi Arabia’s particular interest in the stabilisation of the anti-Soviet front. 
Additionally, Saudi Arabia found itself in a dilemma between its responsibilities 
as an Arab and Islamic power for the common Arab and Islamic cause and its 
essential strategic partnership with the United States, a nation perceived 
disproportionally supportive of Israel. This quandary bore the potential to have 
negative effects on both Saudi Arabia’s stance in the Arab and Islamic world 
and on the Kingdom’s domestic stability. 
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Despite the strong interest Saudi Arabia had in the settlement of the conflict and 
the considerable readiness to compromise it showed over the years, the 
Kingdom remained steadfast with respect to the basic Arab and Muslim claims; 
most importantly Palestinian statehood and the recovery of Muslim control over 
the holy sites in Jerusalem. On these issues, the Kingdom was not willing to 
compromise, not for the sake of peace and surely not for an improvement in 
U.S.-Saudi relations. 
The smaller Arab Gulf monarchies had a similar interest in a settlement of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Also in their cases a genuine interest in the liberation of 
Arab lands and the creation of a Palestinian state played a significant role; not 
least because it was an important concern of their people. Moreover, while not 
all of them shared the same close relations with the United States as Saudi 
Arabia, they had no interest whatsoever in a strong Soviet influence in the Arab 
world. The continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict carried exactly this risk. 
Furthermore, as long as Arab lands were occupied and the Palestinian people 
were deprived of their basic rights radical factions in the Arab world would enjoy 
continuing support. Being moderate, conservative states with close political, 
economic, and security relations with the West the Arab Gulf monarchies were 
often at odds with and even targets of these radical Arab factions. 
Compared to Saudi Arabia, the smaller Arab Gulf monarchies had considerably 
less influence in the Arab world and on the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict; 
among them Kuwait was clearly the most influential. Hence, the smaller Gulf 
States largely followed Saudi lead with respect to the conflict and the way 
towards its solution. The only exception was Oman that took a path very 
distinctive from the other Arab Gulf monarchies. 
Sadat’s Jerusalem Visit 
When on November 9, 1977 Egyptian President Anwar Al Sadat announced 
publicly his readiness to travel to Jerusalem and speak before the Knesset, the 
Israeli parliament, Saudi Arabia’s reaction was mixed.1149 First of all, Sadat’s 
                                            
1149 Addressing the Egyptian People’s Assembly, Sadat emphasised the value he attached to 
the attainment of peace in the Middle East as well as his readiness to go to great lengths to 
realise this objective. He then said, “Israel will be astonished when it hears me saying now, 
before you, that I am ready to go to their own house, to the Knesset itself, to talk to them.” Cited 
in Holden and Johns, House of Saud, p. 480. 
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announcement took the Saudi government by complete surprise. Merely one 
week earlier, on November 2, when Sadat had visited Riyadh to coordinate the 
two countries’ policies in preparation for U.S. President Carter’s scheduled 
Middle East trip later that month, he had not given the slightest hint with regard 
to his planned revolutionary declaration. The Saudi leadership’s surprise was 
coupled with feelings of confusion, anger, betrayal, embarrassment, and 
concern. For the preceding six years, Saudi Arabia had supported the Egyptian 
regime with billions of dollars in order to stabilise Sadat’s government, influence 
its policy, and continuously improve the Saudi-Egyptian relations. That Sadat 
did not consult or at least inform them prior to his milestone announcement 
shocked, humiliated, and angered the Saudi regime and revealed the limits of 
their “riyal diplomacy.” 
Moreover, by making his announcement shortly after his visit to Saudi Arabia, 
Sadat conveyed the impression that he had not only consulted the Saudi 
regime but had also received Saudi approval for his surprising step.1150 As 
Prince Turki, who in 1977 had become director of the Saudi intelligence service, 
recalls, “both King Khaled and Crown Prince Fahd at the time felt that they were 
insulted and that they were taken advantage of by President Sadat.”1151 A well 
informed former U.S. official with close personal ties to then Saudi Crown 
Prince and de facto ruler Fahd reports that the latter summoned him 
immediately after he had learned of Sadat’s speech. According to the source, 
Fahd was enraged by Sadat’s decision to approach Israel without previously 
consulting with the Saudi government. Fahd’s anger, bitter disappointment, and 
strong feeling of betrayal was not at all attributed to Sadat’s policy change but 
to the blatant disrespect the latter showed for both Saudi Arabia’s status in the 
Arab world and the Saudi-Egyptian relationship.1152 From the Saudi perspective, 
Sadat added insult to injury when he continuously failed to seek consultation 
with the Saudi government, while on November 16, the day before he 
announced his definite decision to speak before the Knesset, he met with 
Syrian President Assad in an unsuccessful attempt to convince the regime in 
                                            
1150 Having also visited Damascus and Tehran right before his announcement and having 
invited an unsuspecting Yasser Arafat to the People’s Assembly session on the day of his 
revolutionary declaration, Sadat gave the impression that he had previously consulted Hafiz al-
Assad, the Shah, and Arafat. 
1151 Personal interview with HRH Prince Turki Al Faisal Al Saud. 
1152 Personal interview with a source that prefers to remain anonymous. 
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Damascus of his policy’s wisdom.1153 The Saudi government gave its first 
official statement on November 18, nine days after Sadat’s announcement 
before the Egyptian People’s Assembly and only one day before Sadat travelled 
to Israel. In its press statement, the Saudi administration expressed its surprise 
over Sadat’s policy move and emphasised that any peace initiative in the Arab-
Israeli conflict “must emanate from a unified Arab stand.”1154 
On November 24, the Egyptian daily newspaper Al-Ahram reported that Saudi 
King Khaled had “praised the sacrifices made by Egypt for the Arab cause” in a 
message to President Sadat.1155 The Saudi Press Agency immediately denied 
the claim and referred to the Saudi government’s earlier emphasis on Arab unity 
with respect to Middle East peace initiatives.1156 In early December, the Saudi 
administration denied firmly another press release according to which the 
Kingdom, Kuwait, and the UAE had stopped their financial aid to Egypt.1157 
On December 12, King Khaled called upon the Arab states to close ranks in a 
joint effort to realise the central Arab objectives: the recovery of Muslim control 
over Jerusalem, the return of the remaining occupied Arab territories, and the 
restoration of the Palestinian people’s legitimate rights.1158 This statement 
clearly reflected the Kingdom’s concern of a renewed polarisation in the Arab 
world after Sadat’s Jerusalem visit. In a December 21 statement, Crown Prince 
Fahd stressed the strength of the Saudi-Egyptian relations. He pointed out that 
the Saudi and the Egyptian people belonged together as one family and 
anything that harmed the Egyptians would also harm the Saudis. Moreover, the 
Crown Prince stressed that Saudi Arabia would never break off contacts with 
Egypt.1159 This statement was primarily targeted at the radical states that issued 
anti-Egyptian propaganda.1160 
                                            
1153 Lorenz, Egypt and the Arabs, pp. 87f. 
1154 Cited in Holden and Johns, House of Saud, p. 481. 
1155 Cited in ARR: Arab Report & Record (London: Economic Features, ltd., 1977), p. 930. 
1156 Cited in ibid. 
1157 Ibid, p. 993. Kuwait also denied the claim. Ibid, p. 977. 
1158 Ibid, p. 994. 
1159 Ibid. 
1160 On December 5, in reaction to the declaration of the Tripoli meeting, Egypt severed diplo-
matic ties to the summit participants Algeria, Libya, Iraq, South Yemen, and Syria. See ibid, p. 
1012. 
  323
The government of the UAE was highly critical of Sadat’s unilateral decision to 
address the Knesset and publicly voiced its 
“deep sorrow over the acute divergence in Arab positions and the 
tendency of some Arab states [a clear referral to Egypt] to take positions 
not agreed upon by the rest of the Arab world.”1161 
The press statement continued to stress that “[a]ny settlement in the Middle 
East had to guarantee the rights of the Palestinians, and this could only be 
achieved within the framework of complete Arab solidarity.”1162 This last 
statement was both a clear demand in the direction of Sadat to not conclude a 
separate peace with Israel at the expense of the Palestinian cause and 
evidence of UAE apprehension of a rift within the Arab world in the course of 
which the Arab Gulf monarchies would be caught between Egypt and the 
radical states. However, to reduce pressure on the Sadat regime, the UAE 
relativised its criticism by emphasising the sacrifices Egypt had made over the 
preceding years for the common Arab and not least the Palestinian cause and 
that Egypt as a “confrontation state[…] had the right to take whatever measures 
[it] deemed necessary to liberate [its] territories.”1163 
On November 23, in a first reaction to Sadat’s Jerusalem visit, the Kuwaiti 
administration reiterated its “commitment to the Palestinian people and the 
relevant resolutions of Arab summit conferences.”1164 As the UAE government, 
Kuwait also emphasised the importance to preserve Arab unity and solidarity. 
On November 30, Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah Al Sabah stated that 
“Kuwait’s policy is to avoid further cracks in Arab ranks and to make all possible 
efforts to cement Arab solidarity.”1165 Hinting at an invitation by the Libyan 
government to participate in an anti-Egyptian Arab summit in Tripoli, the Kuwaiti 
foreign minister declared on November 30 that Kuwait would only participate in 
Arab summits that were “attended by ‘all the 21 member-states of the Arab 
                                            
1161 Cited in ARR (1977), p. 945. 
1162 Ibid. 
1163 Shmuelevitz, “The Gulf States” (1977-78), p. 190. 
1164 ARR (1977), p. 977. 
1165 Cited in ibid. 
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League.’”1166 Two days earlier, Foreign Minister Sabah announced an impen-
ding Saudi-Kuwaiti diplomatic mission to prevent a rift among Arab states.1167 
On December 9, Syrian President Assad visited Kuwait for consultations on the 
developments in the Arab world following Sadat’s Jerusalem visit. According to 
the Qatari News Agency, Kuwait reiterated its call for Arab solidarity, as “[a]ny 
split in Arab ranks would affect the struggle for the restoration of occupied Arab 
land and the rights of the Palestinians.”1168 Ten days later, King Hussein of 
Jordan came to Kuwait also to discuss the development of Arab unity.1169 
On November 29, in an address to the Qatari Consultative Council, Emir Sheikh 
Khalifa also warned of the negative consequences of Arab disunity, which he 
called “the biggest threat to the Arab world.” The Qatari Emir also expressed 
indirect criticism of Sadat’s unilateral decision to visit Jerusalem when calling 
the preservation of Arab solidarity through dialogue the duty of the Arabs.1170 
Beside Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia, Oman was one among only four 
Arab states and the only Arab Gulf monarchy to publicly support Sadat’s 
Jerusalem visit.1171 
Most of the smaller Arab Gulf monarchies followed Saudi lead in the weeks 
after Sadat visited Jerusalem. The only exception was Oman. The remaining 
four states criticised Sadat’s unilateral decision, however, in a mild and restraint 
way. They all feared a new polarisation in the Arab world and as a 
consequence thereof a strengthening of the radical states. Hence, they 
emphasised the need for Arab unity and solidarity, as they considered this the 
only way to both prevent an intra-Arab rift and realise the fundamental Arab 
cause. As a matter of fact, in the weeks following Sadat’s Jerusalem visit the 
Arab Gulf monarchies met regularly for consultations to coordinate their 
policies.1172 
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1169 Ibid. 
1170 Ibid, p. 929. 
1171 Memorandum, Analysis of the Arab-Israeli Developments, No. 567, 9/22/78, NLC-SAFE 17 
B-13-72-4-7, Jimmy Carter Library. 
1172 ARR (1977), p. 994. 
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The longer the intra-Arab crisis went on, the more Saudi Arabia and the smaller 
Arab Gulf monarchies saw themselves in the apprehended dilemma. They were 
caught in the middle between Egypt, whose willingness to compromise in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict they generally supported, and the more radical anti-Israeli 
Arab states, which perceived Egypt as a traitor of the Arab and the Palestinian 
cause. This dilemma reached its first peak when Egypt and Israel finalised the 
Camp David Accords almost exactly ten months after Sadat’s speech before the 
Israeli parliament. 
The Camp David Accords 
Following massive lobbying by the U.S. Carter administration, and despite 
Saudi intervention1173, Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister 
Begin agreed in early August 1978 to meet at Carter’s Camp David retreat in 
Frederick County, Maryland the following month. While Iraq and Syria, 
spearheads of the Arab radical block, rejected the scheduled summit Saudi 
Crown Prince Fahd lauded the forthcoming meeting speaking of a “’courageous’ 
act and a ‘giant step’ towards peace.”1174 However, the Saudi leadership was 
also concerned that the Camp David summit would provoke a serious breach in 
inter-Arab relations. Hence, the Saudi government was reportedly “pushing for a 
pan-Arab summit to heal wounds and develop a common strategy for dealing 
with Israel.”1175 
On September 17, 1978, following two weeks of secret negotiations, moderated 
by U.S. President Carter and his National Security Advisor Brzezinski, Begin 
and Sadat signed the Camp David Accords at the White House in Washington, 
D.C. The Camp David Accords consisted of two framework agreements. The 
first of these agreements was a framework for negotiations towards the end of 
the establishment of a self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza 
within a period of five years. The envisaged solution was supposed “to 
recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people,” “satisfy the aspirations 
of the Palestinians and meet Israel’s security needs,” and entail “a just 
                                            
1173 Compare Daniel Dishon and Varda Ben-Zvi, “Inter-Arab Relations,” in Colin Legum, Haim 
Shaked, and Daniel Dishon (eds.), Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume Two: 1977-78 
(New York and London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1979), pp. 213-49, p. 231. 
1174 David Butler et al., “Carter’s Risky Summit” Newsweek, August 21, 1978, pp. 6f., p. 6. 
1175 Raymond Carroll et al., “A Salvage Operation,” Newsweek, August 14, 1978, pp. 18f., p. 
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settlement of the refugee problem.”1176 The agreement both left the Israeli 
occupied Syrian Golan Heights unmentioned and, much more relevant for the 
Arab Gulf monarchies and the better part of the Arab world, it failed to address 
the highly controversial issue of East Jerusalem. The second framework 
agreement related to the bilateral Egyptian-Israeli relations and built the 
foundation for the subsequent peace treaty between the two states. According 
to the agreement, Israel pledged to return the occupied Sinai Peninsula under 
full Egyptian sovereignty (a), including a complete withdrawal of Israeli military 
forces (b), limit its military forces within 3 kilometers of the Egyptian border (C in 
conjunction with f)1177, and to allow Egypt free passage to Jordan through a new 
highway to be built (e). In return, Egypt committed to guarantee Israel free 
passage through the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Suez, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the 
Strait of Tiran (d), to limit its military presence on the Sinai Peninsula (A and B 
in conjunction with f)1178, and to use Israeli built airfields on the Sinai Peninsula 
solely for civilian purposes (c). Moreover, the two treaty parties determined to 
invite United Nations forces to ensure the two treaty parties’ compliance with 
the subject terms of the treaty. Lastly, and most importantly, Egypt and Israel 
stipulated to enter into “complete, normal relations […] including: full 
recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of 
economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people, and 
mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law” once the envisaged 
bilateral peace treaty was signed and an interim withdrawal was completed.1179 
In direct reaction to the Camp David Accords the governments of rejectionist 
Algeria, Libya, South Yemen, and Syria as well as the PLO met in Damascus 
on September 21 and uttered threats of breaking political and economic 
relations with Egypt. The PLO was particularly enraged over the agreements 
                                            
1176 “Camp David Framework for Peace – Text of the Agreements Signed on 17 September 
1978,” reprinted in Madhi F. Abdul Hadi (ed.), Palestine Documents Volume 1: From the Pre-
Ottoman/Ottoman Period to the Prelude of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference 
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1177 Within 3 kilometres of Egypt’s eastern border, Israel’s military presence was restricted to a 
maximum of four infantry battalions. 
1178 In a corridor of approximately 50 kilometres east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal, 
the Egyptian military presence was limited to one division. Moreover, in a corridor with a width 
varying from 20 to 40 kilometres west of the Israeli border and the Gulf of Aqaba, Egyptian 
security forces were restricted to lightly-armed civil police forces. The exact demarcation of the 
areas with military restrictions was designated for a bilateral peace treaty. 
1179 “Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, 17 September 
1978,” reprinted in, Abdul Hadi, Palestine, p. 251. 
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with some of their members calling for the overthrow of Sadat, Yassir Arafat 
accusing the latter to have “sold Jerusalem, Palestine and the rights of the 
Palestinian people for a handful of Sinai sand,” and PFLP leader George 
Habash threatening with terrorist attacks on U.S. Middle East oil 
installations.1180 
Although clearly less harsh in tone and omitting threats the Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ reaction to the Camp David Accords was largely negative as well. 
The Saudi government reacted in an uncharacteristically swift fashion and 
declared with respect to the arrangements regarding the West Bank and Gaza 
that the agreements reached between Egypt and Israel “cannot be considered a 
final acceptable formula for peace.”1181 The Saudi government criticised that the 
accords lacked a clear Israeli commitment to withdraw from all occupied Arab 
territories, particularly Jerusalem, and failed to recognise the Palestinian right 
for self-determination, especially regarding the establishment of a Palestinian 
state “on the soil of their own country.”1182 Furthermore, the agreements failed 
to acknowledge the PLO’s role as the only legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people. However, the Saudi administration also emphasised that it 
“did not have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab 
country, nor to dispute the right of another country to regain its occupied 
territories by armed struggle or by peaceful means, provided this did not 
clash with ‘higher Arab interests’.”1183 
Despite its rejection of the Camp David Accords, the Saudi administration made 
sure to express its appreciation for U.S. President Carter’s efforts to bring about 
a peaceful conflict resolution.1184 Reportedly, part of the reason for the negative 
Saudi reaction was the Saudi leadership’s displeasure over the Carter adminis-
                                            
1180 Angus Deming et al., “The Problems,” Newsweek, October 2, 1978, pp. 12, 18, 20, 
quotation on page 18. A Reuters report quoted Habash as stating that “all American interests in 
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Israeli Developments, No. 567. 
1181 Cited in Deming, “Problem,” p. 18. See also Arnaud de Borchgrave, “The Saudis: Upbeat,” 
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tration’s failure to inform them about the content of the Camp David Accords 
prior to their public announcement.1185 
The smaller Arab Gulf monarchies’ reactions followed Saudi Arabia’s; both 
chronologically and, with the exception of Oman, content-wise. The UAE’s 
Federal Council of Ministers also rejected the Camp David Accords labelling 
them an inadequate “basis for a just and final settlement of the Middle East 
conflict.”1186 Through Foreign Minister Ahmad Khalifa Al Suwaidi, the UAE was 
quick to reiterate both its support for the PLO and its observance to the 1974 
Arab League Rabat Summit resolution.1187 Even the ruler of Dubai, Sheikh 
Rashid Al Maktoum, who was known for his reluctance regarding statements on 
political issues, publicly opposed the accords. However, despite their voiced 
opposition to the accords the Arab Gulf monarchies, all refrained from any 
rhetoric attacks on Egyptian President Sadat and ensured to “carefully leave 
open doors for continued negotiations.”1188 
The Kuwaiti administration rejected the Camp David Accords on September 20, 
stressing that “a just and lasting Middle East peace” could only be the result of 
a complete Israeli withdrawal “from all occupied Arab territories, including 
Jerusalem, and [the restoration of] the legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
people, under the leadership of the PLO.”1189 
On the same day, the Qatari government, too, rejected the Egyptian-Israeli 
agreements, calling them an “unsuitable basis for a just and comprehensive 
peace.” Giving the reasons for its rejection, the Qatari administration stated that 
in the accords Israel failed to commit to a complete withdrawal from occupied 
Arab lands. Moreover, the documents did not recognise the PLO as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.1190 
Also on September 20, the Bahraini government rejected the Camp David 
agreements on grounds that they were in contradiction to the Arab League 
Algiers and Rabat Resolutions of 1973 and 1974 respectively. Moreover, the 
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Bahraini administration called for the convening of an Arab League summit 
meeting “to discuss the ‘pan-Arab’ issues of the occupied Arab areas and the 
Palestinian Arab people.”1191 With this statement, Bahrain once more stressed 
the importance of Arab unity in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Oman, the only Arab Gulf monarchy that had openly endorsed Sadat’s 
Jerusalem visit in 1977, also became the first Arab state to approve the Camp 
David Accords. On September 25, the Omani government stated that parts of 
the Egyptian-Israeli agreements constituted “tangible process” towards peaceful 
conflict resolution. Moreover, Oman reiterated its commendation of Sadat for his 
Jerusalem visit in the previous year. Lastly, the Omani foreign minister 
emphasised Oman’s conviction in every Arab state’s autonomy of decision and 
the principal of non-interference in the affairs of other Arab states, when stating 
that Arab governments had the right to take any decision of which they were 
convinced.1192 Thereby, the Omani government clearly contradicted Saudi 
Arabia’s emphasis that Arab national policies must under no circumstances 
jeopardise “higher Arab interests.” However, with regard to its support for the 
Camp David Accords, Oman later “backed down after a reading of the public 
mood.”1193 
Over the following weeks, the initial Saudi position towards the Camp David 
Accords gradually changed. The Saudi leadership emphasised that it clearly 
opposed a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace unless it would be linked to 
significant progress regarding Palestinian rights. To prevent Egypt from 
neglecting the Palestinian cause, the Saudi government made implicit threats to 
discontinue financing the Arab Organisation for Industrialisation (AOI).1194 
However, contrary to earlier official statements the Saudi government appreci-
ated the Palestinian self-government over Gaza and the West Bank envisaged 
in the Camp David Accords as a significant step towards Palestinian self-
determination. The Saudi change of attitude was also influenced by the fact that 
during a meeting of Libyan President Ghaddafi and Yassir Arafat with Jordanian 
                                            
1191 Cited in ARR (1978), p. 671. (emphasis added) 
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1193 Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments, No. 567. 
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King Hussein, the former two had implicitly authorised the latter “to negotiate 
the future of the West Bank on behalf of ‘all Palestinians.’”1195 As a strong 
supporter of the claim that the PLO was the sole legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people, Saudi Arabia clearly rejected this development.1196 
Moreover, Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan’s insinuation that Israel might 
eventually abandon its opposition against the restoration of Arab sovereignty 
over East Jerusalem also influenced the Saudi position.1197 
A few weeks later, on October 24, 1978, in a conversation with U.S. 
Ambassador John C. West, Crown Prince Fahd expressed his strongest 
support for the Camp David Accords. Fahd recounted a personal talk with 
Sadat’s special advisor, Sayid Marii, in which he reportedly gave 
“the strongest possible message of support for Sadat and Egypt […] I 
assured him that Sadat could count on continued support, both economic 
and political from Saudi Arabia. I told him that we would not allow any 
action to be taken against him as a result of the Camp David 
meeting.”1198 
Furthermore, Fahd reported he had promised the Egyptian president $108 
million worth of funds to pay for military equipment and to set aside an 
additional $350 million for Egyptian F-5 fighter plane purchases. Fahd further 
accounted that he had passed on to Sadat that he should not “heed what he 
might hear or read about Saudi frigidity towards him” and that with respect to 
the Saudi reactions to both his Jerusalem visit and the Camp David 
announcements, the Saudi regime “decided to support [the respective 
initiatives] in our own style based on refurbishing our credibility with our 
effective brethren in the area”. Finally, Fahd reported that he had conveyed to 
Sadat that he would “see to it that [at the planned Arab League Baghdad 
Conference] no action would be taken which would embarrass or hurt Egypt.” 
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Moreover, Fahd reported to have argued strongly for Sadat’s participation in the 
Baghdad Summit.1199 
With regard to the upcoming Arab League Summit, Fahd told Ambassador West 
that he had agreed to and supported Saddam Hussein’s proposal to organise 
the conference in Baghdad in late October (foreign minister meetings) and early 
November (head of state meeting), convinced that this would impose on the 
Iraqi government a special sense of responsibility for the success of the summit. 
Fahd further recounted that once he had gotten 
“indications that the Summit was going to be used as a platform for the 
Rejectionists to condemn Egypt and isolate them from the rest of the 
Arab world, I became concerned and determined that this could not be 
allowed to happen.”1200 
Fahd reported that during a recent visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister Sadoum 
Hammadi he 
“told him in blunt terms […] that [the Saudi government] would not 
tolerate or support any action to boycott or isolate Egypt from the rest of 
the Arab world. Saudi Arabia will oppose any condemnation of Egypt 
because of its participation in the Camp David talks.”1201 
Reportedly, Saddam Hussein, in a subsequent phone conversation with Fahd, 
assured “that the Summit would not be an instrument of condemnation for Egypt 
or a platform for the mouthings of the radicals of the Rejectionist movement.”1202 
However, Fahd reported to have devised a contingency plan in case the 
rejectionists should try to hijack the Baghdad Summit for harsh criticism against 
Egypt. Apparently, Fahd had agreed with President Ali Abdullah Saleh of the 
Yemen Arab Republic that the latter would shift the summit’s focus by publicly 
confronting Iraq and Libya with their involvement in the failed coup attempt 
against him in mid-October.1203 
According to Fahd’s recount, he encouraged the Jordanian leadership to lobby 
for support of the Camp David Accords among the Palestinian population in 
Gaza and the West Bank. Moreover, Fahd informed Ambassador West that he 
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had sent Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal on a tour through the remaining Arab 
Gulf monarchies to lobby for support of Egypt during the upcoming Baghdad 
Summit. Furthermore, Fahd declared his intention to convince Arafat of the 
opportunities the Camp David Accords offered for the PLO and the Palestinian 
people. In this context, Fahd pointed out that the Saudi government had 
“come to the conclusion that supporting Sadat’s and Carter’s efforts 
would produce such worthwhile results as no other Arab, or group of 
Arabs, could begin to bring about.”1204 
In the days leading to the Baghdad Summit, the Saudi leadership was aware 
that the radical Arab states were preparing not only to reject the Camp David 
Accords but also to terminate diplomatic and economic relations with Egypt. An 
essential reasoning behind the Saudi decision to participate in the Arab League 
summit was to exert a moderating influence on the conference’s final statement. 
The Baghdad Summit, which took place between November 2 and November 5, 
1978, was characterised by quasi-universal participation; Egypt, which had not 
been invited, was the only Arab League member state not attending the con-
ference. While the vast majority of states were represented by their heads of 
state or other high level delegates, e.g. Crown Prince Fahd in the case of Saudi 
Arabia, Oman and Sudan only sent low level delegates. This clearly demon-
strated the two states’ disapproval of anti-Egyptian sanctions envisaged by Iraq 
and the rejectionist states.1205 
During the summit, the first controversy emerged around the question whether 
Egypt should be given another chance to reverse its previous policy towards 
Israel and to return to the general Arab consensus unpunished. Against 
opposition from Algeria, Libya, the PDRY, and the PLO Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
and other Arab Gulf monarchies were successful in their lobbying for the 
dispatch of an Arab League delegation to Cairo to offer Egypt economic aid in 
return for the latter’s rejection of the Camp David Accords. The three-headed 
delegation that eventually left for Cairo on November 4 was headed by the 
Lebanese Prime Minister Salim Al Huss and complemented by the Syrian 
Minister of Information, Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad, as well as the UAE Foreign 
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Minister, Ahmad Khalifa Al Suwaidi. It is safe to assume that the financial 
incentive with which the delegation was tasked to confront Sadat was 
considerable. In its summit call, Iraq had suggested that Arab annual economic 
aid to Egypt should amount to no less than $5 billion. While the dimension of 
the ultimate offer the delegation was to submit to the Egyptian President 
remains unknown, it is unlikely that it fell significantly below the benchmark set 
by Iraq. However, President Sadat refused to meet the delegation altogether 
prompting the latter’s immediate return to Baghdad.1206 
Following the delegation’s failed mission to Cairo, the summit participants 
discussed whether punitive measures should be taken against Egypt. While the 
radical Tripoli block1207 advocated immediate sanctions, the Arab Gulf mon-
archies, led by Saudi Arabia, pleaded against it. The latter argued that 
sanctions would be counter-productive as they would fail to change Cairo’s 
policy and warned of the consequences of an Egyptian isolation. In the end, 
both sides agreed on a compromise: The summit participants adopted the 
general principle of anti-Egyptian sanctions, agreed on a number of broadly 
defined punitive actions, however, decided neither to apply these measures 
immediately nor to announce them publicly. An unpublished summit resolution 
stipulated that in the case of Egypt signing a separate peace treaty with Israel, 
the following measures would be taken by the remaining Arab League 
members: first, the termination or suspension of diplomatic relations with Cairo; 
second, economic sanctions against Egypt; third, Egypt’s expulsion or 
suspension from the Arab League; and fourth, the relocation of the Cairo-
situated Arab League headquarters.1208 Despite the non-disclosure of the 
resolution in the summit’s final communiqué, its content was soon leaked to the 
press. Moreover, a statement made by the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Saadoun 
Hamadi, that “[t]he necessary resolutions [had been] taken,” suggested clearly 
that the summit had resolved on more than a rhetoric rejection of the Camp 
David Accords.1209 
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The summit’s officially publicised final communiqué was surprisingly mild in tone 
and did not utter any threats in the direction of Egypt. Referring to the preceding 
Arab League’s 1973 Algiers and 1974 Rabat resolutions the document stated 
that 
“[t]he struggle to regain Arab rights in Palestine and in the occupied Arab 
territory is a general Arab responsibility. All Arabs must share this 
responsibility, each in accord with his military, economic, political and 
other abilities. The conflict with the Zionist enemy exceeds the framework 
of the conflict of the countries whose territory was occupied in 1967.”1210 
The communiqué stressed further that no Arab state had the authority to “act 
unilaterally in solving the Palestinian question in particular and the Arab-Zionist 
conflict in general;” any solution of the conflict had to be preapproved by an 
Arab League summit resolution on the basis of an Arab consensus. With 
respect to the Camp David Accords, the document stated that the signatories 
considered the Egyptian-Israeli agreements to “harm the Palestinian people’s 
rights and the rights of the Arab nation in Palestine and the occupied territory” 
and to contradict previous Arab League resolutions, particularly those of 1973 
and 1974, the Arab League Charter, and relevant UN Security Council 
resolutions. Hence, the Camp David accords would “not lead to the just peace 
that the Arab nation desires.” In consequence, the Arab League members 
disapproved of the agreements, declared their unwillingness to deal with its 
results, and “rejected all the political, economic, legal and other effects resulting 
from them.” Addressing Egypt, the document called on the government in Cairo 
“not to sign any reconciliation treaty with enemy” and expressed the hope “that 
Egypt will return to the fold of join[t] Arab action and not act unilaterally in the 
affairs of the Arab-Zionist conflict.”1211 Moreover, as a sign of their support for 
the Arab cause, the Arab League members decided to set up a fund to support 
the Palestinians and the Arab front states. For the next ten years, the major 
Arab oil producing states, among them Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and 
Qatar, would allocate a yearly sum of $3.4 billion to the Arab front.1212 
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The Arab Gulf monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia, were responsible for the 
relatively lenient reaction to Egypt’s breach with general Arab consensus. 
However, in the eyes of some states, including one Arab Gulf monarchy, the 
measures agreed upon went too far. While the final communiqué was signed by 
all participants, Oman alongside Morocco and Sudan registered reservations 
against the decisions taken regarding anti-Egyptian sanctions.1213 
From the First to the Second Baghdad Meeting 
Following the Baghdad Summit, Saudi-Egyptian relations remained close. In 
February 1979, Saudi Arabia committed to finance 50 F-5 fighter jets ordered by 
the Egyptian government worth $525 million, clearly exceeding the sum Crown 
Prince Fahd had promised Sadat’s special envoy roughly four months 
earlier.1214 According to Crown Prince Fahd, Saudi Arabia signed assistant 
agreements for several non-specified projects in Egypt totalling $645 million in 
mid-March.1215 
In several meetings with U.S. Ambassador West in March 1979, the Saudi 
leadership emphasised that they did not want to punish Egypt following an 
Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement. The Saudi government reported to try its best 
to convince the other Arab states to forego the envisaged anti-Egyptian 
measures, but would have to abide to the decisions taken at the Baghdad 
meeting in November 1978. This was not least the case because the Arab 
League Charter and the Arab Mutual Defence Pact each provided for these 
measures in case a member state signed a unilateral treaty with Israel.1216 
Emphasising his country’s quandary, Prince Abdullah, the Commander of the 
Saudi National Guard, referred to “Saudi Arabia [as being] caught ‘between the 
fire and the thorns.’”1217 
                                                                                                                                
($150 million), the occupied territories ($150 million), and Lebanon ($100 million). Dishon, 
“Inter-Arab Relations,” p. 217. 
1213 Ibid, p. 216. 
1214 Memorandum, Middle East Desk to National Security Advisor Brzezinski, “While You Were 
Away Report,” 2/16/79, NLC-10R-18-5-1-6, Jimmy Carter Library. 
1215 Memorandum, The Situation Room for the President, 3/18/79, NLC-128-4-2-13-9, Jimmy 
Carter Library. 
1216 Ibid. 
1217 Memorandum, The Situation Room to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 3/16/79, NLC-128-11-22-10-2, 
Jimmy Carter Library. 
  336
In the weeks prior to the scheduled signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, 
the Saudi government repeatedly asked the United States to amend the treaty 
in such a way as to give Saudi Arabia substantive arguments to convince the 
other Arab states to refrain from sanctioning Egypt. It is safe to assume that the 
Saudi government was hoping for a clear commitment to the Israeli withdrawal 
from Arab lands and the rights of the Palestinian people. Beside the impending 
rift within the Arab world, to the disadvantage of the moderate camp, the Saudi 
government also feared a negative impact on its bilateral relations with the 
United States in case of their support for anti-Egyptian sanctions.1218 The Saudi 
leadership initially feared that in reaction to their participation in sanctions 
against Egypt, the U.S. government would punish Saudi Arabia in turn, e.g. in 
the form of immediately terminating their military support. These fears were only 
allayed at meetings between the Saudi leadership and U.S. national security 
advisor Brzezinski, during which the Saudi government realised that the Carter 
administration could live with Saudi participation in the anti-Egyptian sanctions; 
that is, as long as Saudi Arabia continued supporting Egypt financially and 
formulated only constructive criticism of the peace process. The Saudi 
administration was very relieved to hear that the U.S.-Saudi relations would not 
be seriously damaged as a consequence of its official anti-Egyptian stance.1219 
Only two days before this reassuring news, U.S. Ambassador West had 
appreciated the dilemma the Saudi leadership faced and appraised the decision 
forced on Crown Prince Fahd as “probably the most difficult decision that he 
has been called upon to make as defacto ruler.”1220 According to Ambassador 
West’s assessment, the Saudi government’s inner circle was divided regarding 
the appropriate measures following an Egyptian-Israeli separate peace; 
reportedly the Minister of Defence, Prince Sultan, was “most supportive of the 
peace process,” while the foreign minister, Saud Al Faisal, was “the most vocal 
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and articulate opponent of the present process and [the] biggest advocate for 
the implementing sanctions through the Arab League.”1221 
The week before the eventual signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, 
Crown Prince Fahd explained the imminent Saudi policy to the U.S. adminis-
tration. The relevant memorandum of conversation reads: 
 “He wanted to be sure of U.S. understanding in the event the region 
experiences ‘acts of destruction’ and the Saudis keep quit [sic] or follow a 
policy which is ‘not readily understood.’ We should know they are not 
being destructive but dealing with the matter in their own way. They 
strongly indicated their preference to proceed in their own manner, with 
no publicity.”1222 
However, in the subsequent days, Saudi Crown Prince Fahd in an interview 
with Newsweek still suggested that the Kingdom would not participate in an 
Arab economic and diplomatic boycott of Egypt.1223 
In mid-March 1979, in a private conversation with U.S. officials, the Bahraini 
Emir expressed his support for the pending Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty as well 
as his hopes for a common supportive stance by all Arab Gulf monarchies. 
However, he remarked that he was expecting an Arab Summit opposing the 
treaty. Moreover, in clear evidence of Bahrain following Saudi Arabia’s lead with 
regard to its policy stance relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict the Emir pointed 
out that he could only take a public stance once he had learned the Saudi 
position.1224 
As in the case of Bahrain, the remaining smaller Arab Gulf monarchies, with the 
exception of Oman, largely followed the Saudi lead in the months between the 
two Baghdad Summits. This was attributable to both their comparatively smaller 
political importance within Arab politics and to a far-reaching congruence of 
interests. 
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On March 26, 1979, not least as a result of persistent mediation on part of the 
Carter administration, Egypt and Israel concluded a bilateral peace treaty based 
on the Camp David Accords. In direct consequence, the foreign and economy 
ministers of the Arab League nations convened in Baghdad the following day. 
The meeting was tasked to determine how to implement in practice the punitive 
measures against Egypt that had been decided at the Baghdad Summit roughly 
five months earlier. This time, three delegations stayed away from the 
conference, clearly signing their disapproval with the impending anti-Egyptian 
sanctions: Oman, Sudan, and Djibouti. 
The second Baghdad meeting was characterised by intense conflict among 
participants regarding the scope of punitive measures against Cairo. Again, 
advocating a lenient stance towards Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and 
the UAE pleaded for the mildest possible sanctions in line of what had been 
decided in November 1978. In the first working session, on March 28, Saud Al 
Faisal agreed to the relocation of the Arab League’s headquarters as well as 
the suspension of the Egyptian membership in the organisation. However, the 
Saudi foreign minister emphasised that the decision to withdraw ambassadors 
from Cairo and cut bilateral diplomatic relations with Egypt had to be taken by 
the individual Arab states as it fell within their national sovereignty rights. In 
clear contrast, the Iraqi host delegation and the PLO were calling for much more 
drastic reprisals. Iraq advocated an oil embargo against Egypt, the PLO even 
proposed to extent diplomatic, political, and economic sanctions to the United 
States for its facilitation of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Among the present 
Arab Gulf monarchies, at first only Kuwait favoured a middle course between 
the two sides. The Kuwaiti government’s comparatively greater sensitivity to 
PLO opinions explains this behaviour. The dispute between the different 
factions peaked when the delegations of the PLO, Libya, and Syria walked out 
of the conference whereupon the meeting was adjourned.1225 
On March 29, the delegations of the Arab Gulf monarchies left Baghdad for 
consultations in their capitals respectively for Kuwait, which hosted a 
conference on the conflict between the two Yemens. On the following day, the 
delegations of the five Arab Gulf monarchies met to coordinate their positions 
before the resumption of the Baghdad meeting (Oman remained absent). They 
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were joined by the Jordanian foreign minister, who reportedly pleaded for a 
compromise with the more radical factions. However, a breakthrough was only 
reached on March 31 after Saud Al Faisal informed Saddam Hussein in a 
private conversation that the Saudi government had decided to accept stricter 
sanctions against Egypt. It is safe to assume that Iraq’s public declaration that 
any Arab state that failed to sever completely relations with Egypt was a 
collaborator of Sadat had at least some influence on the Saudi decision.1226 The 
remaining Arab Gulf monarchies then followed Saudi lead, so that on the same 
day, soon after the resumption of the conference, a resolution was agreed upon 
that effected Egypt’s virtual isolation from the Arab world.1227 
The summit resolution stated the signatory states’ decision to withdraw 
immediately their ambassadors from Egypt and to sever political and economic 
relations with Egypt within one month. Moreover, the Arab foreign ministers 
decided to consider Egypt’s suspension from the Arab League and to move 
temporarily the regional organisation’s headquarters to Tunis. Moreover, the 
foreign and economy ministers decided far-reaching economic sanctions 
against Egypt.1228 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, there were two main factors that prompted the 
government’s change of heart, away from the repeated statements of continued 
support for Egypt and the stern opposition against all attempts by the radical 
states to punish the Sadat regime to a backing of Egypt’s isolation from the 
Arab world. First, the Saudi government did not want to break ranks completely 
with the radical states and the PLO. Too vivid was the memory of the 
asymmetric tactics applied by the radical pan-Arab forces (led by Nasser’s 
Egypt) against the Saudi monarchy during the Arab Cold War that had only 
ended roughly one decade earlier; too threatening was neighbouring Iraq, 
forerunner in sanctioning and ostracising Egypt, particularly since the power 
triangle in the Gulf had been severely shaken in the course of the Iranian 
Revolution. 
                                            
1226 Goldberg, “The Saudi Arabian Kingdom” (1978-79), p. 746. 
1227 Dishon, “Inter-Arab Relations,” pp. 221f.  
1228 Compare “Arab League Summit Conference Resolution, Baghdad, 31 March 1979,” 
reprinted in Abdul Hadi, Palestine, pp. 277-9. 
  340
Second and most importantly, the fall of the Iranian Shah itself shocked the 
Saudi regime to the core and reminded it of its own vulnerability. For one thing, 
the case of Iran demonstrated that the United States was not able to prevent 
the fall of one of its closest and strategically most important allies. Moreover, 
despite the fact that many reasons for public insurrection against and the 
eventual toppling of the Shah were absent in Saudi Arabia (deteriorating 
economic situation; isolation of the ruler from his people; lacking human 
development; the ruler’s irreligiousness)1229, the Saudi regime had to be careful 
not to alienate its population. With regard to the Saudi public opposition to the 
Camp David Accords, particularly due to the perceived “selling-out” of the 
Palestinian cause and Arab Jerusalem, an explicit or implicit public Saudi 
government approval of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty would have born the 
risk to antagonise the Saudi population against the regime. Moreover, a Saudi 
siding with Egypt would have given revolutionary Iran additional fuel for its anti-
Saudi propaganda.1230 Therefore, the decision to support the isolation of Egypt 
was taken based on strategic consideration of the risks to state and regime 
security any (perceived) siding with Egypt would entail. 
It is interesting to note that both during the cabinet meeting in the course of 
which the Saudi government decided to abrogate relations with Egypt and the 
subsequent official Arab League decision in Baghdad, Crown Prince Fahd was 
on a prescheduled vacation/medical leave in Spain. Hence, while Prince 
Abdullah served as acting prime minister, Crown Prince, de facto leader, and 
prospective King Fahd was symbolically absent from the decision-making 
process when Saudi Arabia imposed sanctions on Egypt. Particularly in Arab 
culture, and not least in Arab politics, where personal relations are very 
significant and personal affronts are received bitterly, the de facto ruler’s 
ostensive non-involvement in anti-Egyptian actions would allow for an easier 
improvement of Saudi-Egyptian bilateral relations in the future.1231 
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The Sultanate of Oman, again as the only Arab Gulf monarchy, did not 
participate in the Arab meeting and consequently did not abrogate its relations 
with Egypt. Addressing his people on the occasion of Oman’s 9th National Day 
on November 18, 1979, Sultan Qaboos implicitly referred to the Egyptian-Israeli 
peace treaty as “a first, hopeful, step along the road to peace in the Middle 
East.” However, emphasising the rights of the Palestinian people Qaboos 
added 
“this cannot be regarded as more than a first step. It cannot be regarded 
as enough. It is not only peace that is at stake: it is the complete redress 
of the wrongs and suffering that has been inflicted on the Palestinian 
people. […] Neither the intransigence of Israel – in defiance of the 
expressed will of the United Nations – nor the mischievous activities of 
those whose interest it is to perpetuate this situation can be allowed to 
prevent the achievement of this aim. Oman categorically declares that it 
will warmly support any constructive initiative by any Arab or other leader 
which may promise to lead to this end.”1232 
In this context, two aspects are remarkable: first, Sultan Qaboos is referring to 
Israel by its name in contrast to the two Arab League Baghdad Summit 
resolutions of November 1978 and March 1979, which referred to Israel solely 
as “the Zionist enemy;” thereby, Qaboos accorded Israel some form of at least 
rhetorical recognition; second, while it remains unclear what Qaboos means by 
“the complete redress of the wrongs and suffering that has been inflicted on the 
Palestinian people” the strong emphasis to support “any constructive initiative” 
that realises this objective implicates an inherent readiness to compromise. 
Oman’s policy stance in the aftermath of Sadat’s Jerusalem visit can be 
explained by two factors: First, it was in line with Oman’s previous endorsement 
of a policy of greater compromise in the Arab-Israeli conflict, its advocacy for 
non-interference in the foreign affairs of other Arab states, and its lower degree 
of identification with the Arab cause. Second, Oman was dependent on Iranian, 
and after the Islamic Revolution, Egyptian military assistance in the Dhofar 
region. Imperial Iran had for years heavily supported the Omani regime in 
counter-insurgency warfare against the Dhofar rebellion. As the Shah was a 
supporter of Sadat and his rapprochement with Israel, Oman could not reject 
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Sadat’s policy without falling from grace in Tehran’s eyes. Following the Iranian 
revolution, Sultan Qaboos found in Egypt a new strategic partner and a provider 
of military support. Therefore, support of the Camp David Accords and the 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was a necessity regarding Omani domestic 
security.1233 
Until the end of May, the vast majority of Arab states followed the Baghdad 
resolution and closed their embassies in Cairo. The only exceptions were 
Oman, Sudan, and Somalia1234; the former continued to have regular high level 
meetings with Egyptian officials.1235 Moreover, Sultan Qaboos continued to 
favour publicly the Camp David Accords which, in an interview with the Journal 
of Defense and Diplomacy, he called “the only constructive step toward a 
peaceful settlement of the ME problem that has so far been achieved.”1236 
Following its expulsion from the Arab League, also Egypt’s membership in the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) was suspended in reaction to the 
country’s separate peace with Israel. The decision was taken during the 
organisation’s meeting in Fez, Morocco, from 8-12 May 1979. Again, Oman 
walked a different path from the vast majority of Arab states when it abstained 
during the voting procedure.1237 
However, even in the case of the other five Arab Gulf monarchies diplomatic 
relations with Egypt were not entirely cut. The previously recalled Saudi 
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ambassador returned temporarily to Cairo in May 1979; while his visit happened 
under the pretext of family reasons, he met Egyptian officials for political 
talks.1238 Moreover, the UAE recalled its ambassador from Cairo, however, 
maintained “a full diplomatic mission […] with a chargé d’affaires portfolio.”1239 
Also the Arab Gulf monarchies economic ties with Egypt were never fully cut. 
On May 21, 1979 Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Mansuri informed the United 
States embassy in Riyadh that his government would practice a “dormant” 
policy towards Egypt for a period of approximately two years, during which 
Saudi Arabia would refrain from a public reconciliation with Egypt in order to not 
create problems with other Arab states. However, this period could be 
shortened in case of “significant progress towards an acceptable settlement of 
the Palestinian issue.”1240 
In early April the following year, in a conversation with Presidents Carter and 
Sadat and U.S. National Security Advisor Brzezinski, Saudi Ambassador to the 
United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, said that the Saudi government was 
generally “prepared to recognize Israel’s right to exist within approximately the 
borders of 1967.”1241 Moreover, Prince Bandar emphasised that Saudi Arabia 
would “support a peace process with all [its] weight.”1242 However, with regard 
to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty Bandar said, Saudi Arabia did not believe 
that Sadat’s tactics were right; the Saudi government did not believe Israel 
would deliver upon its treaty commitments.1243 Upon Prince Bandar’s request, 
President Sadat pledged to halt any criticism on Saudi Arabia in public 
speeches and in the press.1244 
Three months later, a severe Israeli provocation brought about yet another 
intensification of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On July 30, 1980 the Knesset 
approved a law with which Israel in clear violation of international law annexed 
the occupied eastern part of Jerusalem and declared that “Jerusalem, complete 
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and united, is the capital of Israel.”1245 The Saudi reaction was uncharac-
teristically strident and evidenced the high relevance the Kingdom attributed to 
the restoration of Arab control over East Jerusalem. In a joint communiqué on 
August 6, 1980, the Saudi and the Iraqi government announced that they would 
“sever all political and economic relations with any state which responds 
favourably to the decision of the Zionist entity and which keeps its embassy in 
Jerusalem.”1246 This threat was particularly directed at the Netherlands, one of 
thirteen states to maintain an embassy in Jerusalem; at that time, the 
Netherlands imported more than half a million barrels of oil from Arab countries 
and Iran daily. A total of nine other Arab countries followed suit in threatening 
with a partial oil embargo; among them were also Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and 
the UAE. Once again, taking a more conciliatory path, Oman did not associate 
itself with the Saudi-Iraqi threats.1247 
4.4 The Fahd Plan and Egypt’s Return to the Arab Fold 
The Fahd Plan 
The third phase of Gulf State involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict set in 
following Egypt’s isolation from the Arab world in response to its separate peace 
with Israel. In reaction to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and its conse-
quences, particularly the shift in the intra-Arab balance of power, as well as 
other international developments, Saudi Crown Prince Fahd developed a peace 
plan that he made public on August 7, 1981 in the form of an interview 
published by the Saudi Press Agency (SPA). Fahd’s initiative was a milestone 
not only in the history of Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
but in the conflict’s history in general. The peace plan initiated the end of the 
Khartoum era. Saudi Arabia indirectly consented to make peace with Israel 
under certain conditions: an Israeli “withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied 
in 1967, including Arab [i.e. East] Jerusalem[,]” the dismantling of all “Israeli 
settlements built on Arab land after 1967, including those in Arab Jerusalem[,]” 
the Israeli “affirmation of the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return to 
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their homes and compensation for those who do not wish to return” and the 
foundation of an independent Palestinian State, consisting of the West Bank, 
the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem as its capital. The initiative is remarkable 
for several reasons. First, the Saudi regime called Israel by name in an official 
document. Already by avoiding formulations such as “the so called state of 
Israel” or “the Zionist identity,” or even “the Zionist enemy,”1248 Saudi Arabia 
both demonstrated sincerity with regard to its peace proposal and indicated its 
readiness to diplomatically recognise Israel as a state according to international 
law. 
Second, Saudi Arabia consented to recognise an Israeli state in the borders 
prior to the outbreak of the 1967 Six-Day War. In abandoning the claim on the 
territory conquered by Israel in the course of its War of Independence, Saudi 
Arabia showed its readiness to an unprecedented major concession. 
Third, by stating that “[a]ll States in the region should be able to live in peace in 
the region” and by assigning the United Nations the responsibility to guarantee 
the implementation of all of the initiative’s provisions, Saudi Arabia called for a 
comprehensive peace settlement involving all Arab states. 
The motivation and intentions behind both content and timing of the Fahd 
Initiative were manifold. First, Saudi Arabia intended to end the new divisive-
ness in the Arab world, particularly Egypt’s isolation, in order to recreate the 
intra-Arab balance of power the Kingdom had benefited from until the 1978 
Camp David Accords. It was in Saudi Arabia’s particular interest to resuscitate 
the Egyptian antipole to Iraq’s ambitions in the Arab world in general and the 
Gulf in particular. A comprehensive peace settlement would put an end to the 
intra-Arab divide, recreate Arab solidarity and a unity of ranks in the Arab world, 
and terminate the general heightened influence radical and militant actors within 
the Arab world enjoyed following the Camp David Accords. Hence, Saudi 
Arabia’s holistic approach. 
Second, the Saudi regime hoped that the PLO would support the initiative, as 
this would increase the chances that the United States would recognise and 
deal with the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. Following 
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Egypt’s expulsion from the Arab League, Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador 
to Washington, had “strongly urged” the U.S. government to enter into a 
dialogue with the PLO in order to strengthen the position of U.S. allies within the 
Arab camp.1249 
Third, Saudi Arabia considered a comprehensive peace settlement in the Arab-
Israeli conflict necessary in order to safeguard its strategic relationship with the 
United States. Around the time of the plan’s publication, Saudi Arabia had a 
particular interest in gaining a better image in the eyes of the U.S. Congress as 
the latter’s approval was needed for an AWACS deal that had been concluded 
earlier by the governments of the United States and Saudi Arabia.1250 A 
comprehensive conflict settlement would also put an end to the dilemma the 
Kingdom was facing regarding the economic and security related necessity to 
partner with the United States, a country widely identified in the Arab world, 
including in the Saudi population, as close ally and benefactor of Israel. 
Fourth, a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict would further reduce Soviet 
influence in the Arab world. The Soviet Union would lose the advantage of 
presenting itself to the Arab front states as an alternative, Israel-critical political, 
economic, and military superpower supporter. 
Fifth, following Egypt’s separate peace with Israel, the Palestinian question had 
come to the anticipated standstill. 
Sixth, Israel had increased its preconditions for a peace settlement. 
Seventh, the new Reagan administration did not assign the same value to an 
Arab-Israeli peace settlement the preceding Carter administration had. 
The publication of the Fahd Plan was deliberately timed to coincide with Sadat’s 
visit to the United States. While Sadat and U.S. President Reagan were 
meeting to discuss the revival of the peace process following the Israeli 
legislative elections of June 30, 1981, Crown Prince Fahd pointed out the failure 
of the Camp David Agreement and emphasised the treaty’s “uselessness […] 
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as a framework for a just and comprehensive peace in the M[iddle] E[ast].”1251 
Instead, the Saudi Crown Prince suggested his alternative holistic peace plan. 
The reaction to Fahd’s initiative was mixed. The Israeli government forthrightly 
rejected the plan, only welcoming the general Saudi readiness to diplomatically 
recognise Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Begin criticised the Fahd Plan for neither 
explicitly calling for a peaceful conflict settlement nor peaceful relations between 
the Arab states and Israel. Begin emphasised that, in not mentioning the name 
Israel, the plan’s provision that “all States in the region should be able to live in 
peace” would even be acceptable to the Arab rejectionist states that denied the 
existence of the Israeli state.1252 The United States welcomed the peace plan 
and praised it as a step in the right direction. However, the Reagan adminis-
tration did not attribute much political attention to it.1253  
The Arab world was divided. Beside Jordan, particularly the other Arab Gulf 
monarchies strongly advocated the initiative. Iraq and Syria were silent at first. 
The reactions of the numerous PLO factions differed greatly, also reflecting their 
attitude towards and relations with Saudi Arabia.1254 At a meeting of the PLO 
Executive on the very day the Fahd Plan was made public, several radical 
factions voiced immediate opposition to the Saudi initiative: the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), the Palestinian Popular Struggle 
Front (PPSF), and the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF). The Iraqi controlled 
Arab Liberation Front (ALF) as well as the Syrian controlled Al-Saiqa did at first 
not position themselves, just as their respective patron states1255; both Syria 
and Iraq kept a low profile and, despite their rejection of the plan, avoided direct 
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public criticism of the Saudi initiative.1256 Fatah itself was split, too. Major critics 
among Fatah’s elite were Farouq Qaddoumi, the Head of the PLO’s political 
department, as well as Salah Khalaf and Saleh Nimr, both members of Fatah’s 
central committee. However, the different factions within Fatah expressed their 
support and criticism with great caution in order to neither antagonise Saudi 
Arabia nor Syria.1257 
On October 5, 1981, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal relaunched the 
Fahd initiative in his address to the UN General Assembly. In his speech, Saud 
Al Faisal criticised Israel for having failed to adhere to previous UN General 
Assembly and Security Council resolutions regarding the Arab Israeli conflict in 
general and the Palestinian question in particular. He added, 
“[w]e strongly feel that the need at present is not to adopt similar 
resolutions but rather to combine all these resolutions in a single 
resolution to be adopted by the Security Council, and considered as a 
framework for a comprehensive and just solution to this problem.”1258 
He then suggested the Fahd Plan as a basis for such a resolution. By bringing 
the Fahd initiative before the UN General Assembly and arguing for an adoption 
of the same by the UN Security Council, Saudi Arabia showed a public activism 
previously unknown in its traditionally subtle foreign policy behaviour. This 
significant change in strategy shows clearly the high importance and urgency 
the Saudi government accorded to overcoming the intra-Arab divide, the return 
of Egypt to the Arab fold, and the recreation of a broadest possible Arab 
consensus and solidarity for the Palestinian cause. In contrast, as the Saudi 
government anticipated an Israeli rejection to the Fahd Plan, reaching a 
comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict was not the determining 
motivation behind the active Saudi lobbying for its peace initiative. Indeed, 
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Israeli rejection of the Fahd Plan was even more vehement in reaction to Saud 
Al Faisal’s UN speech than it had been when the plan was first published.1259 
The formulation and interpretation of the Fahd Plan’s seventh clause had 
determining influence on further Arab and international reactions to the Saudi 
initiative. As mentioned above, when the Fahd Plan was first published in 
August 1981, the English translation authorised by the Saudi Press Agency 
implicitly suggested a right for peace for “[a]ll States in the region,” while the 
Arabic original left out the word “all.” When Saud Al Faisal introduced the Fahd 
Plan at the United Nations, his reiteration of the peace initiative also omitted the 
word “all,” leaving up for interpretation whether it included Israel or not.1260 This 
imprecision in the peace plan’s key clause was intentional; it was supposed to 
leave room for interpretation in order to optimise the likelihood of support from 
different factions such as the Arab rejectionist states, the PLO, and the United 
States; Saudi Arabia was however certain that Israel would reject the initiative. 
Uncertainty regarding the meaning of the plan’s seventh clause was fanned 
further by several contradictory statements by Saudi officials. In an interview 
with Time Magazine published on November 3, 1981, Prince Abdullah bin 
Abdalaziz pointed out that the Fahd Plan’s seventh clause was to be 
understood as Saudi recognition of Israel.1261 However, when two weeks later, 
Saudi Arabia’s ambassador at the United Nations made a comment along the 
same lines, he was repudiated promptly.1262 In early January 1982, the New 
York Times reported Saud Al Faisal to have stated that were Israel to 
implement the Fahd Plan’s provisions Saudi Arabia would in turn “accept” 
Israel. However, the Saudi administration soon emphasised that the potential 
“acceptance” of Israel Saud Al Faisal had mentioned would not be tantamount 
to Saudi “recognition” of Israel.1263 
To give the Fahd Plan additional weight and to present it to the Arab League as 
an Arab rather than a Saudi initiative, the Saudi regime put its peace proposal 
on the agenda of the GCC ministerial meeting in Taif (Aug 31-Sep 2, 1981). 
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The GCC ministerial meeting submitted the plan to the second GCC Heads of 
State meeting, scheduled for November 10-11, and officially requested Saudi 
Arabia to place the peace initiative on the agenda of the upcoming Arab League 
summit in Fez. During the November GCC Summit, the six heads of state then 
officially endorsed the Fahd Plan.1264 
The First Fez Summit 
The Arab League Foreign Minister Meeting, which immediately preceded the 
Head of State Summit, saw a heated discussion on the Fahd initiative. With the 
exception of Algeria and Iraq, the members of the Steadfastness group directly 
attacked the Fahd Plan, particularly the plan’s seventh clause. The Syrian 
foreign minister rejected the initiative, arguing that the recognition of Israel 
within the pre-Six Day War borders was too much of a concession as this meant 
the capitulation of “four-fifths of Palestine” to Israel.1265 The Syrian regime 
further stressed that the Fahd Plan failed both to claim sufficient rights for the 
Palestinian people and to determine a definitive time table for the Israeli 
withdrawal from occupied Arab territories. Iraqi Foreign Minister Hammadi and 
Farouq Qaddoumi, the PLO representative, also rejected the initiative, however, 
leaving open the possibility of conciliation at the ensuing Heads of State 
meeting. The Saudi Foreign Minister, however, insisted that the seventh clause 
was an integral part of the plan’s strategy of stages.1266 
The Saudi government, already disgruntled about the harsh criticism it had 
faced in the run-up to and during the foreign minister meeting, was offended 
when only eleven out of twenty Arab heads of state participated in the Fez 
summit; the Saudi irritation was aggravated by the fact that at the 1980 Arab 
League summit in Amman, it had been agreed that at future summits, member 
states would be represented by their heads of state or their deputies. 
Particularly Syrian President Assad’s last-minute decision to stay away from the 
Fez summit upset the Saudi government. The Al Saud regime had completely 
miscalculated Syria’s reactions to the Fahd Plan and expected all along that the 
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Assad administration would back the Saudi initiative at the Fez summit.1267 
Assad’s absence from the meeting proved them wrong and already heralded 
Syria’s opposition to the Saudi proposal. 
With the exception of Saudi Arabia and Oman, the Arab Gulf monarchies were 
represented by their heads of state, emphasising their support for the peace 
initiative. As the peace plan’s official initiator and de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, 
Crown Prince Fahd represented the Kingdom. In contrast, Oman was only 
represented by one of Sultan Qaboos’ personal aides. The Sultan’s absence 
from the summit was most likely a sign of protest against Egypt’s forced 
absence in consequence of its expulsion from the Arab League two years 
earlier.1268 
The Head of State meeting saw a very heated debate and eventually the 
meeting was very short-lived. Yassir Arafat and Iraqi Foreign Minister Khaddam 
toned down the harsh criticism against Fahd and his initiative, praised the Saudi 
efforts, and prevented the Saudi Crown Prince from taking the peace plan from 
the agenda. Nonetheless, due to the participants’ irreconcilable differences on 
the Fahd Plan, the summit was adjourned indefinitely after only one four-hour 
session.1269 
The failure of the Fez Summit and the rejection of the Fahd Plan meant a major, 
embarrassing foreign policy defeat for Saudi Arabia. By means of an editorial, 
published in the November 30 issue of the Saudi newspaper Al Riyadh, the 
Saudi government indirectly expressed its resentment with its initiative’s 
opponents. The editorial stated that, with respect to previous events, a review of 
Arab financing was in order, meaning that Saudi financial support to Syria had 
to be reconsidered. Moreover, the editorial called on the GCC states as well as 
conservative Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, and the Yemen Arab Republic to 
distance themselves from the confrontation states. Furthermore, the Saudi 
media criticised the PLO for its stance in Fez. However, blame was also placed 
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on other states (particularly Syria) for blackmailing the PLO into opposing the 
Fahd Plan.1270 
The Second Fez Summit 
Despite the embarrassment it suffered at the 1981 Fez Summit, the Saudi 
regime held on to its peace initiative and, one year later, managed to get the 
Arab League’s endorsement of a revised version as the First Arab Peace 
Initiative. 
The Saudi administration shelved its peace plan until several regional 
developments had increased the chances for its adoption. First, in April 1982, 
Israel disengaged from the Sinai Peninsula; a development the Saudi media 
cheered as both an “all-Arab success” and a turning point in intra-Arab 
relations.1271 It became clear that Israel was ready in principal to withdraw from 
occupied Arab territory. Second, Israel annexed the Golan Heights on 
December 14, 1981 and left Syria politically embarrassed due to its inability to 
react effectively to Israel’s actions. Third, the Lebanon War that took place from 
June to September 1982 significantly weakened Syria and the PLO.1272 During 
the military conflict, Israel shot down several Syrian military jets, adding to the 
Syrian regime’s embarrassment. However, the PLO suffered a by far larger 
blow, when it was forced to retreat from Lebanon and relocated to Tunis. 
Following the war, both the Syrian regime and the PLO were more accessible to 
the Saudi peace plan as they were increasingly reliant on Saudi diplomatic and 
financial support.1273 Finally, Iraq, the other major opponent to the Fahd Plan in 
the autumn of 1981 was now preoccupied by the turn of the tide in its war with 
Iran. 
Due to Syria’s previous harsh disapproval, the Saudi government consulted the 
Assad regime more intensively prior to the resumption of the Fez Summit in 
early September 1982. Moreover, it had become clear to the Saudi regime that 
it had to be ready to compromise in order to have the Fahd Plan accepted by 
the Arab League. 
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In the end, the Saudi regime agreed to several alterations of its initial plan. First 
and most importantly, Riyadh accepted to alter the Fahd initiative’s controversial 
seventh clause and thereby the degree of legitimacy the peace initiative granted 
Israel. Instead of the original plan’s affirmation of “the right of all countries of the 
region to live in peace,”1274 the eventual Arab peace plan merely delegated to 
the UN Security Council the responsibility to establish mechanisms to 
guarantee peace between all states in the region. This provision falls short of 
the earlier indirect acknowledgement of Israel’s right to peace, implying an 
Israeli right of existence. 
Second, the revised version of the Fahd Plan emphasised the PLO’s role as the 
“sole and legitimate representative” of the Palestinian people (new article 4).1275 
Most likely, the Saudi regime had initially refrained from mentioning the PLO 
and attributing to it such a pivotal role in order to not sabotage any potential 
chance for U.S. or Israeli approval of the initiative. 
Third, by assigning the responsibility for the safeguarding of peace in the region 
to the UN Security Council, the amended proposal indirectly attributed to the 
Soviet Union a shared responsibility for the development of the Arab-Israeli 
peace process, a political gesture important to the Syrian regime.1276 
The Assad regime, too, was ready to compromise. It agreed to vote in favour of 
the Fahd Plan after the above mentioned alterations had been made. Moreover, 
Syria dropped its previous insistence on an Arab League resolution con-
demning the U.S. Reagan Plan and agreed to the appointment of an Arab 
League commission tasked with further exploration of the U.S. stance towards 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Additionally, Syria abandoned its earlier demands to 
call for the mobilisation of all Arab resources, particularly oil resources, for 
armed struggle with Israel.1277 
When the previously adjourned Fez Summit reconvened on September 6, 1982, 
Presidents Hussein of Iraq and Assad of Syria participated, already demon-
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strating their respective regimes’ changes of attitude towards the amended 
Saudi initiative. Beside the ostracised Egypt, only Libya did not take part in the 
summit. Once again, presumably in reaction to Egypt’s continuing expulsion 
from the Arab League, Sultan Qaboos stayed away from the conference and 
sent a deputy.1278 
In clear contrast to Saudi Arabia’s failure to get approval of its peace initiative at 
the first Fez Summit the year before, the 1982 Fez Summit became a great 
political success for the Kingdom as the revised Fahd Plan was adopted by the 
Arab League. Due to the expected rejection by the Israeli government, the 
peace plan came to nothing. However, Saudi Arabia had managed to assert its 
claim to a leadership position in the Arab world. Moreover, Saudi Arabia 
succeeded in gathering virtually the entire Arab League behind a moderate and 
constructive approach with regard to Israel. 
Since the adoption of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the ensuing 
Egyptian isolation from the Arab world, the promotion of a holistic peace 
proposal addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict had been a main foreign policy 
concern of Saudi Arabia. Beside the off chance of effectively bringing about a 
conflict resolution and the aspiration for a more positive image in the eyes of the 
U.S. Congress, the predominant Saudi motivation behind the Fahd Plan was 
the restoration of Arab unity and solidarity and the healing of the intra-Arab rift 
the Camp David Accords had torn. With the adoption of the Fez Peace Initiative, 
this objective was at least partially met. Hence, in the following months and 
years, Saudi Arabia refocused its foreign policy attention away from its own 
peace initiative and was preoccupied with more pressing challenges: the 
development and the consequences of the Iran-Iraq War, the readmission of 
Egypt to the Arab League, the support of the Afghan mujahedeen in their fight 
against the Soviet Union, and other issues such as Syrian-Lebanese and intra-
PLO relations. In an interview with the BBC on October 5, 1983, Saud Al Faisal 
encapsulated the Saudi position on the Arab-Israeli peace process when he 
declared that by adopting the Fez Initiative the Arab states had demonstrated 
their capability for serious, positive, and objective action and that it would now 
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be up to the “international community, and […] the US in particular, to shoulder 
its responsibilities.”1279 
While Saudi Arabia had been the main champion of its peace initiative and was 
mainly responsible for its adoption in the Arab League, the influence of the 
smaller Arab Gulf monarchies was limited. By then united in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, the latter had publicly endorsed the Fahd Plan and 
coordinated with Saudi Arabia their policy stance in the two Fez meetings. 
Nonetheless, their support and lobbying for the Saudi initiative was not a 
decisive factor towards the approval of the Fahd Plan by the Arab League 
members. Following the 1982 Fez Summit, the Arab-Israeli peace process 
moved to the sidelines of the smaller Arab Gulf monarchies’ foreign policy 
agendas as well. The subregional developments in the Gulf took precedence. 
The only exception was Oman, which repeatedly urged a peaceful reconciliation 
between the Arab world and Israel and at times even called for Arab recognition 
of Israel.1280 On September 28, in an interview with the Kuwaiti daily newspaper 
Al-Anba Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf al-Alawi stated that 
“in the end there will be direct negotiations between the Palestinians and 
Israelis. The issue has always been discussed from an Arab point of view 
and with Arab perception, and we have never tried to understand the 
Israeli point of view and perception. In the end, the Palestinian people 
have rights and Israel’s people have rights.”1281 
However, the Omani calls remained effectless. 
Egypt’s Return to the Arab Fold 
Egypt’s expulsion from the Arab League and its subsequent pariah status within 
the Arab world was a direct consequence of its policy related to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. This development was contrary to the Arab Gulf monarchies’ interest, 
although five of them felt politically forced to back Egypt’s exclusion. Due to 
subregional (Iran-Iraq War) and regional dynamics (strengthening of radical 
forces in intra-Arab affairs), Egypt’s return to the Arab fold was an important 
objective to the Arab Gulf monarchies. This was true irrespective of the fact that 
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Egypt’s separate peace with Israel receded into the distance another important 
objective in the Arab Gulf monarchies’ eyes: the return of occupied Arab lands 
including the holy sites of Jerusalem and the realisation of the legitimate rights 
of the Palestinian people. 
Early on, Oman was very active in its attempts to reinstate Egypt’s membership 
in the Arab League and to restore Cairo’s pivotal role in the Arab world. An 
early example of this policy could be seen from 1981 onwards, when Oman 
facilitated Egyptian-Iraqi arms deals with the intention to both support Iraq in its 
war with Iran and to improve relations between Egypt and one of its harshest 
critics. While this attempt remained unsuccessful at first, as the Saddam 
government was not willing to change its general policy towards Egypt, the 
arms deals were a first meaningful case in which the anti-Egyptian boycott was 
levered out.1282 Over the following years, Oman regularly appealed to the Arab 
League members to resume bilateral relations with Cairo and to restore Egypt’s 
membership in the regional organisation. 
Sadat’s death on October 6, 1981 allowed for an improvement in Saudi-
Egyptian relations. Following the Egyptian expulsion from the Arab League, 
President Sadat had verbally attacked Saudi policy, the Saudi government, and 
individual members of the royal family’s inner circle on several occasions. In 
particular, the personal injuries had irrevocably poisoned the personal relations 
between Sadat and the Saudi leadership and had as a consequence heavily 
strained the relations between the two countries. Following Sadat’s assassi-
nation and the inauguration of Mubarak, “the Saudi media launched a campaign 
of rapprochement, hailing the new President as more committed to the principle 
of Arab solidarity than his predecessor.”1283 In addition, the Saudi media called 
on the remaining Arab states to overcome past controversies and not to stand 
in the way of a reunification of the Arab world. Admittedly, the Saudi 
government emphasised that it would not resume official relations with Egypt 
until the latter had revised its policy and returned to the Arab fold. However, 
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Riyadh made clear its willingness to give Mubarak time; it went as far as 
expressing publicly its understanding for Egypt’s inability to reject binding legal 
commitments to Israel.1284 Nonetheless, following the return of the Sinai to 
Egypt, the Saudi government requested the Sadat administration be less 
compromising in its negotiations with Israel regarding the autonomy talks over 
the West Bank and Gaza. When President Mubarak attended Saudi King 
Khaled’s funeral in June 1982, it was the first visit of an Egyptian president to 
Saudi Arabia in five years.1285 
Starting in late 1983, the Arab world’s anti-Egyptian boycott was gradually lifted. 
The Arab Gulf monarchies and particularly Saudi Arabia played an important 
role in this development. When Egypt was readmitted to the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) in January 1984, it was not least due to Saudi 
lobbying. Already in late October 1983, when Egypt was elected as a non-
permanent member of the UN Security Council, Cairo received the votes of the 
majority of Arab states. Meanwhile, the Egyptian-Iraqi relations had earlier 
grown closer in the light of the Iran-Iraq War; Egypt had upped its military aid, 
1.5 million Egyptians were by then working in the Iraqi labour force, and there 
had been a number of high-level exchanges between the two governments. 
Therefore, the Arab support for Egypt in the elections for a seat in the UN 
Security Council was not least based on a strategic decision to safeguard 
continued Egyptian support for Iraq in the light of Iranian war advantages.1286 
When Jordan re-established diplomatic relations with Egypt in 1984, the five 
Arab Gulf monarchies that had not yet restored relations with Cairo themselves 
reacted cautiously. While they had a clear interest in Egypt’s return to the Arab 
folds, they wanted this development to be based on a general Arab 
consensus.1287 
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By 1986, almost all Arab countries, including the Arab Gulf monarchies, were 
maintaining unofficial political, economic or cultural relations with Egypt, 
reinforced by Egypt’s continuous support for Baghdad in the Iran-Iraq War.1288 
Relations between Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE on the one hand and 
Egypt on the other had become very close. Sheikh Zayid, the UAE President, 
called implicitly for Egypt’s readmission to the Arab League.1289 When President 
Mubarak met with Israeli Prime Minister Peres in late summer of 1986, the 
state-controlled Kuwaiti press went as far as to laude the Egyptian head of state 
for representing Arab interests. In general, the Kuwaiti press demanded the 
renewal of Egypt’s Arab League membership.1290 In July 1986, in the first 
interview a Saudi monarch gave an Egyptian newspaper in seven years, King 
Fahd stated that “Egypt, the core of the Arab world, is our big sister and always 
in our heart and thoughts.” Furthermore, Fahd attested Egypt a “natural and 
leading role in the Arab world.”1291 
However, pending an Arab League Summit resolution calling for the end of the 
anti-Egyptian boycott, the five Arab Gulf monarchies that had earlier severed 
relations with Egypt stopped short of restoring official contacts with Cairo.1292 A 
breakthrough in this regard was reached at the 1987 Extraordinary Arab 
Summit Conference in Amman. With the agreement of Syrian President Assad, 
until then together with Libyan Ghaddafi the strongest opponent of Egypt’s 
return to the Arab fold, the summit resolution provided 
“that the diplomatic relationship between any Arab League member state 
and Egypt is an act of sovereignty decided by every state […] and is not 
[within] the jurisdiction of the Arab League.”1293 
This allowed the proponents of a reestablishment of bilateral relations with 
Egypt to go forward without the need to await a collective Arab decision to do 
so. Within one week, nine Arab League members re-established de jure-
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relations with Egypt, including the five Arab Gulf monarchies that had abrogated 
diplomatic ties with Egypt in 1979. First among them was the UAE, which 
reinstated bilateral relations with Cairo on November 11, the very day the 
resolution had been adopted. Kuwait (Nov. 14), Bahrain (Nov. 16), Saudi Arabia 
(Nov. 17), and Qatar (Nov. 18) followed suit.1294 Not least as a consequence of 
massive support by all six Arab Gulf monarchies, Egypt’s membership in the 
Arab League was finally reinstated during the Arab League Summit in 
Casablanca in late May 1989. Demonstrating the importance they attached to 
Egypt’s reinstatement in the regional organisation, the Arab Gulf monarchies 
had threatened to boycott collectively the summit if Egypt were not to be 
invited.1295 
4.5 The First Intifada and Oman’s Change of Policy 
With the outbreak of the Intifada in the occupied Palestinian territories in 
December 1987, the Arab Gulf monarchies’ foreign policy attention refocused 
on the Palestinian question. Moreover, the events prompted a significant 
change in Oman’s policy stance. In the light of the Palestinian people’s plight 
and the Israeli reactions to their uprising, the Arab Gulf monarchies turned once 
more to an antagonistic public rhetoric towards Israel. For the first time, this was 
also true for Oman. Moreover, the Arab Gulf monarchies increased their 
diplomatic, political, and financial support for the PLO. Even the strained 
Omani-Palestinian relations saw a significant improvement. 
The Arab Gulf monarchies’ rhetoric, diplomatic, and political support for the 
Palestinians and their uprising against the Israeli occupation was staunch. The 
Kuwaiti Emir, Jabir Al Ahmad, described the Intifada as “heroism which renders 
us speechless.”1296 Enthusiastic support was also expressed by Sheikh Zayid 
who was quoted by the Khaleej Times in late January 1988 as saying that the 
Intifada “proved that achieving peace in the region cannot be attained without 
regard to Palestinian legitimate national rights, the liberation of occupied land, 
and self-determination.”1297 In the following year, the UAE government even 
called for an escalation of the Intifada as “there is nothing more important to the 
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Arab and the Palestinians.”1298 Even the Omani government expressed its full 
support for the Intifada, calling it “the best way to present the Palestinian issue 
to the world after all political means have failed.”1299 The state-controlled Saudi 
media praised the Intifada as a “heroic struggle of the Palestinian masses 
against the Zionist occupation” and expressed the hope that the uprising would 
end in “the liberation of Jerusalem and the holy places” and in “the Palestinians 
regaining their rights.”1300 On the diplomatic level, such as in various UN 
committees, the Arab Gulf monarchies were also actively supportive of the PLO 
and the Palestinian cause and issued harsh criticism in the direction of Israel. 
Even the Omani regime, which had previously refrained from overly Israel-
critical statements, condemned firmly Israel’s human rights violations in the 
occupied territories.1301 
The Arab Gulf monarchies made significant financial contributions to the 
Palestinian cause and the support of the Intifada. Once again, the lion’s share 
was provided by Saudi Arabia. As pledged in the 1978 Arab League Baghdad 
Summit resolution, the Kingdom had given the PLO financial support totalling 
$855 million by the end of 1988. In the light of the ongoing Intifada, King Fahd 
ordered the continuation of financial support. Henceforward, Saudi Arabia made 
monthly payments of $6.02 million to the PLO. In addition, a fatwa issued by the 
Saudi Council of the Senior Ulama provided for the relaying of the state-levied 
Muslim charity tax (zakat) to the support of the Intifada. Moreover, the Saudi 
regime installed the Popular Committee for the Support of Palestinian Freedom 
Fighters, chaired by the Governor of Riyadh, Prince Salman, and encouraged 
private donations using the slogan “Give a riyal and save a Palestinian.” 
Including contributions by the royal family, the collected donations reportedly 
soon reached more than $13 million.1302 Kuwait also supported the Intifada 
financially. Reportedly, Kuwaiti governmental contribution had reached $22 
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million by June 1989.1303 Moreover, the Kuwaiti regime gave financial support to 
specific institutions and individuals in the Palestinian territories. In addition, the 
leading Kuwaiti newspapers organised donations.1304 Also Sheikh Zayid made a 
personal donation of $10 million and the UAE government announced in March 
1988 that all employees in the UAE would donate one day’s earnings to the 
Intifada.1305 Bahrain, too, was reported to have given financial assistance to the 
Palestinian uprising.1306 
During the first years of the Intifada, there were frequent visits by high-ranking 
Palestinian officials to the Arab Gulf monarchies. Arafat regularly visited Kuwait 
to express Palestinian gratitude for continued Kuwaiti governmental and 
popular support. Arafat and his deputy, Salah Khalaf, visited also the other Arab 
Gulf monarchies. In January 1989, Arafat for the first time visited Oman, where 
he met with Sultan Qaboos, symbolising the significant change in Omani-
Palestinian relations. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that, in keeping with 
previous tradition of maintaining relations with all Palestinian factions, Sheikh 
Zayid had contact with George Habash of the PFLP and Nayef Hawatima of the 
DFLP as well as representatives of various other PLO factions.1307 
When, on November 15, 1988, the Palestinian National Council proclaimed 
Palestinian statehood, it was welcomed publicly by the Arab Gulf monarchies. 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE were among the first Arab states to recognise the 
“Palestinian State” and to upgrade the PLO representations in their countries to 
ambassadorial level. Displaying their strong support for the Palestinians and 
their right to self-determination, the Saudi government donated a very elegant 
building as the home of the new Palestinian embassy in Riyadh, inaugurated 
symbolically on Al-Fatah Day, January 1, 1989.1308 The remaining Arab Gulf 
monarchies, including traditionally Palestine-sceptical Oman also diplomatically 
recognised the newly declared State of Palestine.1309 The Sultanate, however, 
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refused the PLO an official representation in Muscat.1310 Regarding Oman’s 
recognition of the Palestinian State, Sultan Qaboos disclaimed 
“The desire to establish the state of Palestine has been declared, but the 
state itself has not yet been established. Hence, what has actually taken 
place was the decision to establish this state […] The Palestinian 
brothers have explained to us the nature of recognition which has moral 
dimensions, so we immediately announced our recognition.”1311 
Regarding the Arab Gulf monarchies’ policy during the first years of the Intifada, 
only Oman’s stance was somewhat surprising. The rhetoric, diplomatic, political, 
and financial support granted to the PLO and the Intifada by the remaining five 
Gulf States was in accordance with their previous policies and was therefore to 
be expected. Oman, however, had been walking a separate path, often 
contradicting even the most moderate Arab states in its policy stance towards 
Israel, Palestine, the PLO as well as the greater Arab-Israeli and intra-Arab 
conflicts. The policy change from late 1987 onwards was then a reaction to the 
intensified plight and humiliation of the Palestinian people resulting from the 
indiscriminate and greatly disproportionate use of violence and blatant 
violations of basic human rights by a modern Israeli occupation force against 
Palestinian fighters, stone-throwing teenagers, and innocent bystanders alike. 
The fact that satellite television broadcasted footage of the conditions in the 
Palestinian territories intensified the effect the news of the developments had 
on both the Omani regime and its people. Therefore, a departure of previous 
calls for recognition and peace with Israel and a rapprochement with the 
comparatively moderate Palestinian factions was inevitable as it seemed both 
morally and politically necessary. Failure to take a more pro-Palestinian stance 
would have caused massive Arab outrage against the Omani regime. However, 
in early summer 1990, Oman gradually returned to its previous policy when it 
called on the Palestinians to initiate negotiations with the Israelis as this was the 
only option is the current situation.1312 Nonetheless, in the course of the Intifada, 
Oman had come significantly closer to the remaining Arab Gulf monarchies 
regarding its policy stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
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4.6 Chapter Conclusion 
During the timeframe under review, the six Arab Gulf monarchies’ influence on 
the Arab-Israeli conflict was primarily economic, financial, diplomatic, and 
political; military involvement was if at all only symbolic. The Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ policies in the Arab-Israeli conflict were mainly influenced by (1) 
identity/ideology, (2) religion, and (3) strategic considerations. As a 
consequence, during the entire period reviewed in this dissertation, all Arab 
Gulf monarchies, although setting different priorities, shared an objective in the 
realisation of several interests: the realisation of Palestinian national rights, the 
return of occupied Arab lands, and the restoration of Muslim control over the 
holy places in Jerusalem; the guarantee of regime stability; the preservation of 
strategic relations with the United States; the containment of Soviet penetration 
into the Arab world; the maintenance of Arab unity dominated by moderate Arab 
forces; and (even before the 1973 October War) the attainment of a holistic 
peace settlement supported by an Arab consensus. This set of objectives 
explains seemingly contradictory policy actions by the Arab Gulf monarchies: 
significant financial, diplomatic, and political support for the PLO and the front 
states; the (Saudi) support of the Egyptian-Syrian war preparations in 1973; the 
subsequent application of the oil weapon; efforts to effectuate change in U.S. 
policy through positive incentives and well-intended warnings; the rejection of 
the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty (with the 
exception of Oman); and the championing of the First Arab Peace Initiative. 
Saudi Arabia exerted the greatest influence among Arab Gulf monarchies on 
the Arab-Israeli conflict and the ensuing peace process. This was possible due 
to Riyadh’s economic power, its influence within the Arab world, and its close 
relations with the United States. Among the smaller states, Kuwait was most 
active and its policy most influential on the conflict. The Kuwaiti regime’s stance 
was affected greatly by the strong Arab nationalist and pro-Palestinian mood in 
the Kuwaiti population. Of the Arab Gulf monarchies that gained their political 
independence in 1971, the UAE’s involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict was 
strongest. Several factors motivated the UAE’s stance: the desire to increase 
recognition within the Arab state community, the influence of both the local 
Palestinian community and foreign policy advisors, and Sheikh Zayid’s personal 
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attitude. Due to their little political and economic weight, Bahrain’s and Qatar’s 
influence on the Arab-Israeli conflict was fairly insignificant. 
During most of the timeframe reviewed in this dissertation, Oman’s policy 
stance diverged from that of the other Arab Gulf monarchies, as the Sultanate 
advocated a more conciliatory approach towards Israel and rejected the notion 
that the policies of individual Arab states have to be subordinated to larger Arab 
interests. For the better part of the period under review, Oman refrained from 
taking an anti-Israeli posture. In addition, the Sultanate was the only Arab Gulf 
monarchy to endorse Sadat’s Jerusalem visit, the Camp David Accords, and 
implicitly also the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Moreover, in contrast to the 
remaining Arab Gulf monarchies, Oman openly opposed the anti-Egyptian 
sanctions in the Arab League. This distinct stance had its cause in several 
factors: a lesser identification with Arabness in general and the Palestinian 
cause in particular, a greater focus on domestic developments, and strained 
relations with the Palestinian liberation movement. However, the Omani stance 
underwent significant change in the light of the First Intifada. Subsequently, 
Oman initiated a rapprochement with the PLO and adopted an unprecedented 
Israel-critical position. This alteration in Omani policy was due to a combination 
of increased popular awareness of the Palestinian plight and the escalation of 
perceived Israeli wrongdoings. In consequence, there was a marked 
rapprochement between the policy stances of Oman and the remaining Arab 
Gulf monarchies. 
The analysis has shown that with respect to the Arab Gulf monarchies’ positions 
in and influence on the Arab-Israeli conflict the period under review can be 
divided into four distinct phases: from 1971 to the end of the first oil crisis in 
1974; from the lifting of the anti-U.S. oil embargo to the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli 
peace treaty; from Egypt’s separate peace with Israel to the beginning of the 
First Intifada in December 1987; and finally from the start of the Intifada to the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. 
The two essential milestones in the Arab Gulf monarchies’ involvement in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict were the application of the oil weapon in 1973/74 and the 
Fahd Plan, which provided the basis for the First Arab Peace Initiative. In 
consequence of their punitive oil policy triggered by the massive U.S. support 
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for Israel during the 1973 October War, the Arab Gulf monarchies developed 
rapidly into economically very wealthy and, in consequence, politically more 
influential states. Subsequently, especially Saudi Arabia, to a lesser degree 
also the remaining Arab Gulf monarchies, gained increased political influence in 
the Arab world in general and on the Arab front states in particular. The 
announcement of the Fahd Plan in 1981 symbolised the considerable change 
Saudi foreign policy had undergone since Egypt’s expulsion from the Arab 
League. The Al Saud regime abandoned its previous strategy of resorting to 
behind-closed-doors diplomacy and promoted publicly a holistic peace initiative. 
The Fahd Plan was an innovation in Saudi policy as it was the first public 
expression of the Saudi administration’s far-reaching readiness to compromise 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this, the Saudi regime made itself vulnerable to 
attacks from radical Arab forces; a development Riyadh had usually tried its 
best to prevent. This revision of its policy approach was mainly motivated by the 
alterations in the intra-Arab balance of power following Egypt’s exile. 
In the cases of both the application of the oil weapon in 1973/74 and the 
development of the First Arab Peace Initiative, the Saudi regime took the lead 
and the smaller Arab Gulf monarchies followed suit. The GCC endorsement of 
the Fahd Plan showed the increasing degree to which the Arab Gulf 
monarchies coordinated their positions towards the conflict. As the Fahd Plan 
was an expression of great willingness to compromise with Israel, the Omani 
regime sided with its fellow GCC states more than it had before. 
In the end, the Arab Gulf monarchies succeeded in realising most of their 
interests: they managed to guarantee their regime stability and contain radical 
Arab pressure while expanding their strategic relationship with the Israel-friendly 
United States; strengthen moderate Arab forces and re-establish Arab unity 
after the Camp David Accords; and contain and even rollback Soviet 
penetration into the Arab world. However, the Arab Gulf monarchies failed in 
inducing a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict including the creation of a 
Palestinian state, the return of occupied Arab lands, and the restoration of 
Muslim control over Jerusalem’s holy sites. Nonetheless, the Arab Gulf 
monarchies managed to get Arab consensus for a peace proposal that 
demonstrated an unprecedented readiness to compromise. In its slightly 
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modified version of 2002, this proposal remains until this day the only realistic 
basis for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
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5. GENERAL CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
This dissertation provided a comparative analysis of the Arab Gulf monarchies’ 
foreign policies from Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971 to the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990. 
In a first step (subchapter 1.5), I developed a theoretical framework that 
explains the nature of international relations and the genesis of state foreign 
policy decisions. The suggested approach, which borrows realist, structuralist, 
constructivist, and pluralist assumptions, is tailored specifically for the analysis 
of the states and the period under review in this dissertation. It assumes that a 
state’s foreign policy behaviour is the result of the limitations set by the nature 
of the international system, the state’s relative power status, and the state’s 
domestic characteristics. I argued that states are principally rational actors with 
an interest in self-preservation and that due to the anarchic and self-help nature 
of the international system as well as the uneven distribution of power on an 
international and a regional level, states in underprivileged power positions tend 
to strive for balance of power. I further contended that power, defined as the 
ability to realise one’s objectives through co-optive and coercive means, rests 
on material (as in military, economic, and financial) and non-material capa-
bilities; the latter have been characterised as the ability to influence domestic 
dynamics in other states. Additionally, I argued that every state is unique in its 
domestic nature based on a distinct composition of societal, economic, political, 
historic, ideational, and identity-related characteristics and that these aspects 
determine the nature of the people’s interests as well as the latter’s translation 
into foreign policy. I asserted that, in non-democratic states, the elites have an 
interest in a twofold self-preservation in the form of both state and regime 
security, and that, in order to realise these interests, they tend to refer to a 
policy of omnibalancing. Lastly, I stressed that the translation of interests into 
foreign policy is influenced both by the nature of the decision making process 
and the personalities of the decision makers. 
Applying the theoretical approach in practice, chapter 2 provided a comparative 
analysis of the Arab Gulf monarchies’ foreign policy interests and options as 
well as the main challenges to the survival of the individual states and regimes 
at the beginning of the timeframe under review. The study identified the 
preservation of external security and regime stability as the main policy interests 
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of the Arab Gulf monarchies in 1971. Further analysis revealed that, at that 
time, the six states had very limited military power, a disadvantage that could 
partially be compensated by economic and financial capabilities, the forging of 
alliances among each other and with third states, and the playing off of potential 
aggressors against one another. In addition, I identified the existence of sub-
state and transboundary identities rivalling national identities as both a potential 
threat for domestic stability and a channel of external influence on the Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ domestic affairs. I further argued that, in order to guarantee regime 
stability, the Arab Gulf monarchies needed to implement the basic interests 
(including foreign policy objectives) of both their elites and populations. In 
addressing the challenge of their various domestic and foreign policy interests 
calling regularly for contradictory actions, the Arab Gulf monarchies applied an 
omnibalancing strategy with the intention to realise all their objectives. These 
basic determinants, as well as the other fundamental foreign policy interests 
introduced in this chapter, remained constant during the entire period under 
review. As to prepare the reader for the following case studies and to allow for a 
better understanding of continuity and change in the Arab Gulf monarchies’ 
foreign policies, subchapter 2.6 introduced key domestic and environmental 
changes between 1971 and 1990 that had decisive influence on the six states’ 
foreign policy interests and options. 
The bulk of the thesis has then been devoted to the study of two pivotal, 
intertwined foreign policy case studies: the Arab Gulf monarchies’ relations with 
Iran and Iraq (chapter 3) and the six states’ positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
(chapter 4). As the conclusions at the end of both case study chapters already 
provided detailed synopses, the résumé given at this point will remain brief and 
concise. 
The main research questions that guided the analysis of the two case studies 
were as follows: (1) To what extent did the Arab Gulf monarchies’ foreign 
policies show a rapprochement to one another and what were the reasons for 
this development; and (2) to what degree did the Arab Gulf monarchies 
cooperate and coordinate with each other in the field of foreign policy? 
The study revealed that over the course of the two decades analysed in this 
dissertation, the Arab Gulf monarchies’ policies displayed significant conver-
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gence in one field, while, in the other field, an initial trend of convergence was 
later replaced by a development towards greater divergence in individual 
policies. 
The analysis of the six states’ positions towards the Arab-Israeli conflict showed 
that, during most of the timeframe under examination, Oman’s policy interests 
and eventual policy diverged from that of the remaining Arab Gulf monarchies. 
The Sultanate advocated a more conciliatory approach towards Israel and 
rejected the notion that the policies of individual Arab states have to be 
subordinated to larger Arab interests. I attributed this distinct policy stance to a 
lesser identification with Arabness in general and the Palestinian cause in 
particular, a greater focus on domestic developments, and strained relations 
with the Palestinian liberation movement. Two external developments then led 
to a convergence between Oman’s stance and that of the remaining five Arab 
Gulf monarchies. 
First, following the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League – the direct 
consequence to Egypt’s bilateral peace treaty with Israel – Saudi Arabia’s policy 
underwent considerable change. In abandoning its previous strategy of 
resorting primarily to behind-closed-doors diplomacy, the Kingdom publicly 
promoted a holistic peace initiative that demonstrated its readiness to far-
reaching compromise in the conflict. Within the framework of the newly 
established GCC, the smaller Arab Gulf monarchies, including Oman, 
supported the Fahd Plan and worked towards its eventual adoption by the Arab 
League Fez Summit in the autumn of 1982. Saudi Arabia’s public departure 
from the “three noes,” adopted at the 1967 Arab League Khartoum Summit, and 
the Kingdom’s unprecedented peace proposal, effected a rapprochement in 
policy positions between Oman and the remaining Arab Gulf monarchies that 
largely followed Saudi lead. 
Second, in the course of the First Intifada, which erupted in December 1987, 
Oman’s policy stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict underwent considerable 
change. In the light of increased popular awareness of the Palestinian plight 
and the escalation of perceived Israeli wrongdoings, the Sultanate initiated a 
gradual rapprochement with the PLO and adopted an unprecedented Israel-
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critical position. Consequently, the policies of Oman and the remaining Arab 
Gulf monarchies displayed additional convergence. 
The dissertation revealed that, regarding their policies towards Iran and Iraq, 
the Arab Gulf monarchies’ individual positions displayed far-reaching similarities 
and gradual convergence from 1971 to 1979. During this period, all Arab Gulf 
monarchies, with individual nuances, maintained closer and less conflictual 
relations with Iran than with Iraq. The underlying reason was a greater congruity 
in policy objectives: the preservation of the conservative political order in the 
Gulf monarchies; the containment of Baathist ideology, Iraqi hegemonic 
interests, and Soviet influence in the Gulf and the greater Middle East; 
cooperative relations with the United States; and the security of trade routes 
through the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Without a doubt, Iran’s hegemonic 
ambitions in the Gulf were cause for some concern, particularly Saudi. 
Nonetheless, all Arab Gulf monarchies, including those that initially had 
conflictual ties with Iran, displayed increasingly close relations with Tehran. 
Among them, Oman maintained the closest, Kuwait the most distant relations 
with Iran. In contrast, the Arab Gulf monarchies’ relations with Iraq were more 
conflictual due to largely incompatible policy interests. Most worrisome to the 
Arab Gulf monarchies’ interests were Baghdad’s nationalist, hegemonic 
ambitions towards the Gulf in general and the Arab Gulf monarchies in 
particular; Iraq’s intention to change the political order in the conservative Gulf 
states; and the cooperative Iraqi-Soviet relations. Among Arab Gulf monarchies, 
Kuwait (due to Iraqi territorial claims) and Oman (due to Iraqi support for the 
Dhofar rebels) had most conflictual relations with Iraq. From early 1975 
onwards, in the light of an Iraqi policy change towards more pragmatism and a 
greater interest in cooperation, the Arab Gulf monarchies’ bilateral relations with 
Iraq improved, least so in the case of Oman. Despite improvements in relations, 
all Arab Gulf monarchies remained suspicious of Iraq as fundamental 
ideological differences persisted. 
In the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and particularly following the 
initial phase of the Iran-Iraq War, the Arab Gulf monarchies’ individual policies 
towards Iran and Iraq underwent significant change and displayed increasing 
divergence. Due to differences in their historic, geopolitical, societal, and 
economic characteristics, the Arab Gulf monarchies’
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challenged in different ways and to different degrees by the alteration in Iranian 
foreign policy and the effects of the First Gulf War (1980-88). This, in turn, had 
diverging effects on the individual Arab Gulf monarchies’ policies towards and 
relations with Iran and Iraq. While they all shared the same basic interest in a 
rapid termination of the war without the emergence of a clear winner, the Arab 
Gulf monarchies were increasingly split into a pro-Iraqi and a largely neutral 
group. 
Following the end of the war, the Arab Gulf monarchies’ policies towards and 
relations with Iran displayed a partial convergence. All six states were interested 
in a reduction of tensions and a general rapprochement with Iran. While the 
smaller Arab Gulf monarchies were to varying degrees successful in realising 
this objective – most prominently in the case of Oman –, ideological differences 
prevented any meaningful Saudi-Iranian détente. Meanwhile, the Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ relations with Iraq showed significant differences. While Bahrain, 
Oman, and Qatar’s relations with Iraq remained free of serious friction, Kuwaiti-
Iraqi and UAE-Iraqi relations deteriorated rapidly from early 1990 onwards. 
Saudi Arabia attempted to appease Iraq and to prevent a further escalation in 
tensions particularly between Iraq and Kuwait. However, Baghdad’s aggressive 
attitude towards Kuwait escalated further and climaxed in the invasion on 
August 2, 1990. Again, geopolitical position had a decisive influence on the 
relations between the Arab Gulf monarchies, in this case Kuwait, and Iraq. 
The analysis revealed that, in both case studies, the Arab Gulf monarchies 
increasingly cooperated with each other and coordinated their policy positions. 
The underlying reasons were the Arab Gulf monarchies’ wide-ranging and 
growing congruity in interests; similarities in challenges to these interests; and 
their inferiority in power status compared with and vulnerability to their 
neighbours. In the light of the similarities in their objectives and the limits of their 
individual power status, the Arab Gulf monarchies had a pragmatic interest in 
cooperation and coordination in both foreign policy areas analysed in this 
dissertation. 
During the period under review, the smaller Arab Gulf monarchies (with the 
exception of Oman) largely followed Saudi lead in formulating their policies 
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towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1981, they all supported the Saudi Fahd 
Plan and endorsed it publicly in the GCC framework. 
The Arab Gulf monarchies increased their policy coordination also with respect 
to subregional politics. This was the case despite, or rather, precisely because 
of the differences in their individual foreign policies towards and relations with 
Iran and Iraq in the 1980s. The GCC framework allowed them a greater degree 
of flexibility in their policies, as the neutral group could issue multilateral 
statements critical of Iran and supportive of Iraq, thereby satisfying Iraqi and 
pan-Arab expectations without causing too much friction in bilateral relations 
with Iran; on the other hand, the pro-Iraqi states could be indirectly involved in 
mediation attempts with Iran. This increased coordination activity was the Arab 
Gulf monarchies’ reaction to the growing negative effects the Iran-Iraq War had 
on their fundamental policy interests, particularly their economic prosperity. 
This dissertation’s period under review ends with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; 
an event that caused a radical transformation in (sub-)regional and international 
relations in the Gulf, bringing to an end the system of relations which had 
gradually been developed over the previous two decades – the topic of this 
thesis – and issuing in a very different one. The latter would need to be the 
subject of another thesis. 
Within a matter of hours, the Iraqi armed forces overran and occupied Kuwait. 
What had previously been inconceivable in the eyes of most Arab Gulf 
monarchies had become a reality; an Arab state had invaded another. It 
became clear that, despite all attempts to offset their military weakness through 
massive arms purchases, their economic and financial power, the formation of 
collective defence institutions, and policies of appeasing and balancing sources 
of threat, the Arab Gulf monarchies had failed to guarantee even their most 
basic security interests. Concerns that Saddam Hussein might also invade the 
oil-rich Saudi Eastern Province motivated Riyadh to invite roughly half a million 
U.S. troops on Saudi territory to protect the Kingdom against a potential Iraqi 
aggression. In the end, only the UN-sanctioned and U.S.-led Operation Desert 
Storm managed to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. As much as they had 
not been able to prevent the invasion and occupation of Kuwait in the first 
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place, the Arab Gulf monarchies did not play any significant role in the Emirate’s 
liberation. 
Following the end of the Second Gulf War, the United States established a 
permanent significant military presence in the Gulf; the danger emanating from 
the Iraqi regime was contained by no-fly zones and economic sanctions. Under 
the impression of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Arab Gulf monarchies 
henceforth counted predominantly on the United States as the guarantor of their 
security. 
PLO Chairman Arafat’s public siding with Saddam Hussein during the Iraqi 
occupation of Kuwait had considerable long-term effects on the Arab Gulf 
monarchies’ position towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Not only did Kuwait, once 
liberated, expel hundreds of thousands of Palestinians; all Arab Gulf monar-
chies drastically reduced their financial, diplomatic, and political support for the 
PLO for several years. The 1990s and 2000s saw even temporary trade and 
other sub-diplomatic contacts between some Arab Gulf monarchies and Israel, 
despite the pending resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
As much as the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990 was a milestone in international relations of the Gulf that 
heralded in a new era in the Arab Gulf monarchies’ foreign policies. 
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APPENDIX 
The following maps are all courtesy of Ashwan Reddy. 
Map 1: The Arab Gulf Monarchies in 1971 
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Map 2: The Arab Gulf Monarchies in 1990 
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Map 3: Giant Oil Fields in the Gulf 
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Map 4: Warba and Bubiyan Island 
 
Map 5: Abu Musa and the Tunb Islands 
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